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Abstract 
The purpose of the thesis is to examine ShPah law, as an undeveloped systen-4 in 
order to identify if it could be applied to modem sale transactions. The focus is on 
remedies in which Shiah jurists have done a great deal of work. The subject is first 
examined under English law and the UN Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (as two developed systems) to identify the issues which 
have to be dealt with and then under ShPah law in depth. An extensive examination 
shows that current ShPah law suffers from substantive gaps and uncertainty. It is 
suggested that the current situation is due to lack of applying an efficient 
methodology. Instead of dealing with the legal rules in respect of concrete issues, 
ShPah jurists tend to deal with traditional as well as hypothetical cases to derive 
further detailed rules. To present a sensible picture of this system, it is suggested that 
the law should be analysed in the light of studying developed systems. Relying on this 
method, attempts are made to systernatise the relevant rules and answer the various 
questions these two modem systems deal with. ShPah law is then compared with 
English law and the Convention to highlight the existing gaps in ShPah law and to 
assess how it could be applied to modem sales. Comparative assessment of the three 
systems shows that while in English law primacy is given to damages and specific 
performance is rarely awarded, the Convention gives significance to both. Similarly, 
English law seems to permit termination more easily than the Convention. But unlike 
the Convention, it does not recognise price reduction as a separate remedy. Overall, it 
is shown that ShPah law is closer to the Convention than to English law. It attaches 
significance to both damages and specific performance, and entitles the buyer to 
reduce the contract price, but pem-dts termination more easily than the Convention 
and less easily than English law. It is concluded that because of substantive gaps and 
uncertainty in current ShVah law it is not an appropriate system to govern modem sale 
transactions, but if the suggested methodology is applied it could be developed and fill in the 
gaps. 
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INTRODUCTION 
1. Purpose 
Shi'ah Islamic law has not been getting its fair share of attention from comparative law 
addrnts in the western countries. The issue has received a serious attention more recently 
when a broad revolution took place in one of the most strategic regions of the world, that is 
Iran, in the name of ShPah Islam. Immediately after the victory, the revolutionary leaders 
declared that the Iranian legal system must be regulated in accordance with ShVah Islamic 
Law. Subsequently, the constitution of the revolution was sanctioned by the Experts Council 
of the Constitution. The revolutionary constitution, in declaring the Islamic law predominant, 
provided: 
"All civil, penal, financial, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political, 
and other laws and regulations must be based on Islamic criteria. This principle 
shall absolutely and generally govern all the principles of the constitution as well 
as all other laws and regulations, and this shall be at the discretion of the jurists 
(fuqaha), members of the Guardian Councir, (principle 4). 1 
This declaration has raised a serious question for lawyers, in particular those educated in 
western countries, whether the existing ShVah Islan-dc law is able to tackle all legal issues. No 
comprehensive work has been made in this connection yet. 
The primary purpose of this study is to show how Shiah law could regulate modem 
sale transactions. This purpose is twofold. First it is to show how the current Shilah law deals 
with the modem sale transactions. Second it is. to examine how this system will be able to 
govern them. The question derives from the fact that Shilah Law is an entirely theoretical 
religious legal system and lacks a developed law of contracts. Although during the centuries, 
in particular the two recent centuries, a good deal work has been made in this context 
(particularly, in the area of sale contracts), the law relating to remedies available for an 
aggrieved party on account of the other party's breach of contract 
ýas 
not been properly 
gathered and classified by Shilah jurists. They have also not examined the applicability of 
various principles, which they have developed on the basis of Quranic verses and tradition 
(sunnah)2 of the Prophet of Islam and his Twelve Successors (Shiah Imams) to the modem 
complicated contracts. Shiah jurisprudence, in reflecting Shilah law, has only focused on a 
3 
simple sale contract which is far removed from modem business activity. This caused a 
1 See also: principles 72 and 91. 
2 Tle term is discussed in Chapter One, 2.1.1.2. 
3 The idea of codification of Iranian civil law on the basis of Shilah jurists' judgements was a good starting 
point to assess the possibility of the adaptability of Shi ah law to the domestic legal issues. However, the 
trend has not been further carried out thereafter until recently when the new Islamic Government seized 
power in Iran subsequent to the victory of Islamic Revolution in 1978. It is to be stressed that this problem is 
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number of important questions to be left unanswered and at the very beginning a researcher 
will find out that there are considerable gaps in this respect. 
This study also intends to compare this traditional legal system with English sale of 
goods law and an important universal convention on the contracts for the international sale of 
goods prepared by the United Nations in 1980 (that is, the Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (hereinafter, the Convention) in order to assess this system, as it 
stands, and with that which is suggested in this study. 
2. Reasons for this Particular Choice 
The existence of a comprehensive codified rules on the sale of goods cases as well as a mass 
of decided cases on the issue and a long experience of English courts in applying customary 
law would itself justify the choice of this system for this study. As far as the Convention is 
concerned, it has developed over half of a century by working groups of international 
organisations and eminent lawyers from different legal systems, in particular Civil and 
Common law systems. It is therefore a product of a consolidation of different legal systems 
which can be a good example of a universal code of customary law in the ShPah law sense 
which is fully examined in the first chapter. 
Among the various areas of law, what constitutes the core of this study is the law of 
remedies. However, it is not an appropriate place to cover the whole system of remedies in 
Shi'ah contract law. The purpose of this research can only be properly achieved when a 
particular area of law is specifically emphasised. 
The importance of the law concerning the remedies for breach, of itself can, to a large 
extent, justify this particular choice, for it is an obvious fact that the question of breach of 
contract by one of the contracting parties and the other parWs remedies for it is one of the 
important aspects of contract law. Moreover, choice of this part is in line with the purpose of 
this study, i. e., the capability of ShVah legal system to adapt to modem circumstances. ShPah 
jurists have done a great deal work in this part. Thus, examination of this part would 
effectively help to compare the theories and rules justifying the remedies available under 
English law and the Convention with those of Shiah law. 
3. Scope of the Research 
Among the various aspects of the law of remedies, the most controversial part of it is chosen, 
that is, the remedies available for a buyer where the seller has failed to perform his delivery 
not confmed to the particular area of the law of remedies but the position of the other contexts of the law of 
contracts are the same. 
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obligations in accordance with the contract. However, in any alleged breach situation in 
contracts for the sale of goods -where a buyer claims breach by seller and seeks a remedy as a 
result -there are three distinct basic issues: 
(1) Has there been any defective or non-performance in fact on the part of seller? This 
involves interpretation of the contract and answering questions such as, what was undertaken 
by the seller? Has the seller fulfilled that obligation? 
2) If there has been a defective or non-performance in fact, does it constitute a breach? That 
is, was there any excuse or justification for his defective or non-performance? 
3) If there is a breach, what remedy or remedies are available to the aggrieved buycr? 4 
The question whether there has been any excuse or justification for the seller's default 
is entirely beyond the scope of the present study. Similarly, the question what the seller has 
undertaken under the contract is excluded from this study. The present research is basically 
concerned with the third question, that is, assuming that the seller, without any exempting 
excuse and legal justification, has committed a breach of contract, what remedy or remedies 
are available for the injured buyer? 
The main emphasis of this study is on the remedies available for seller's breach under 
the general law, where the parties have not provided what is to happen if the seller fails to 
perform his obligations. It therefore excludes cases where the parties have provided remedies 
for themselves under the contractý by express, implied agreement or by inference from usage. 
The concept of breach comprises any unjustifiable refusal or failure by one party to a 
lawful and enforceable contract to perform any of the express or implied duties imposed on 
that party by the law, the contract, or by established practices or usage, normally by refusing 
to perform, Ming to perform, performing late or badly. Accordingly, a seller may be regarded 
as guilty of breach of contract in various ways. After the contract is made but before 
performance is due, the seller may commit a so-called "anticipatory breach" or "repudiation". 
He may also be guilty of an actual breach by wholly failing to tender the goods or relevant 
documents; by failing to tender or ship at the time or place or in the manner specified in the 
4 In view of terminology, there are two terms used occasionally instead of each other. "right" and "remedy". 
However, the term "right" is also employed to describe what at the same time is regarded the other's 
obligation. For instance, under a sale contract the sellcr has the obligation to deliver the goods and transfer 
the property in the goods. These are exactly the rights of the buyer demanding delivery and the transfer of the 
property. These can be called the primary rights and obligations under a sale contract. However, in the case of 
breach of contract, additional rights and obligations arise which may be referred to as secondary rights and 
obligations (as Lord Diplock suggested in Photo Production v. Securicor Ltd. [1980] AC. 827 at 849). In 
some legal systems such as the Convention they appear under the heading "Remedies for breach of contract". 
Since the present research is concerned with the buyer's rights in the case of seller's failure to perform his 
obligation, in order to avoid confusion the expression "remedy" is chosen. Any use of the term "right" within 
the discussions refers to the secondary sense of the term. 
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contract; by tendering or delivering non-conforming goods or documents in breach of 
contractual requirements; or by failing to perform a subsequent obligation to repair or replace. 
Analysis of the law relating to the buyer's remedies under the all above-mentioned 
circumstances is not an easy work to be undertaken by research of the present nature. In the 
present study, the main emphasis is on examination of the law governing the remedies 
available for the buyer where the seller has performed his delivery obligations in a way which 
do not conform to the contract terms. Non-conformity, in this work, means that the 
performance rendered by the seller differs from that he has undertaken in point of view of 
quality, quantity, description and time. 5 Accordingly, non-conformity in the sense that the 
goods are not free from the third party rights or claims or in that the seller has delivered goods 
as to which he has not had good title is in principle excluded from the study. The reason for 
exclusion of the latter issue, notwithstanding the term 'lack of conformity' may include it, is 
that under ShVah law a contract on a subject which the seller has no good title is invalid 
unless the owner or the beneficiary person approves it. 
4. Thesis' Outline 
No one can comprehensively present a real picture of ShPah law without looking at the main 
sources of the law and the method of exploiting the rules relating to the issue in question. 
However, there is obviously no room in this study for a complete exposition of the relevant 
sources except in a summary form. A general introduction to the sources on which the law 
relating to the issue in question is based, the method of exploiting the law governing the issue 
and the methodology employed to perform this study are allocated to the. First Chapter. The 
main body of this work, which constitutes a large part of this thesis, i. e., dealing with the rules 
relating to the buyer's remedies under the three systems, is covered by the Second, Third and 
Fourth Chapters. A necessary part of a study of such a nature is first to compare the various 
solutions adopted in developed legal systems on the problems in question in a short form to 
highlight the gaps in the undeveloped system and then to compare them with it in order to 
assess how it works. The Fifth Chapter is allotted to this purpose. The Final Chapter will 
highlight the general conclusions obtained from this study. 
'Me study will also not cover the buyer's remedies for seller's pre-contractual misstatements as to the goods 
when they are incorporated into the contract as a contractual terms. As far as English law is concerned, the 
issue is regulated by the Nfisrepresentation Act 1967. 
CHAPTER ONE 
SOURCES OF LAW 
METHODOLOGY 
Chapter One: Sources of Law and Methodology 
1.0. Introduction 
1.1. Concept and Terminology 
Shi'ah law, as exists today, consists of mass of the qualified ShPah jurists' fat&, ff (pl. of 
fatwg religious judgement) reflected in Shiah feqh Ourisprudence). ' As a legal example, that 
is those rules to which the principle 167 of the Iranian Constitution refers: 
"Ile judge is bound to endeavour to judge each case on the basis of the codified 
law. In the case of absence of any such law, he has to deliver his judgment on the 
basis of authoritalive Islamic sources and authenticfatawd . ..... (italic added). 
2 
1.2. Historical Background 
To understand ShVah law as a separate legal system, one has to bear in mind the history of 
emergence of Shiah school of thought as a separate Islamic school. Emergence of different 
Islamic schools of thought has a long and complex history. It originates in the question of 
succession to the Prophet of Islarn, when he passed away in the Islamic Hijrah (lunar) year 
I I/AD 632. ' Before his passing away, all Muslims were unanimous that the primary source of 
law was Quran and in the case of doubt the case must have been referred to the Prophet's 
view. However, after his death differences emerged between his followers. The majority took 
the view that the Prophet did not specifically designate his successor but left the issue of 
succession to Muslims themselves to elect their own religious leader. However, the minority 
Muslims argued that the Prophet in several occasions did explicitly and implicitly specify his 
successor who was Ali ibn Abitalib (the Fourth Caliph in view of the Majority) and his 
decisions should have been observed by the Muslim community as the Prophet' decisions. 
They also argued that the question of Imdinah (divine leadership) of the Muslim community 
was not an issue to be left to Muslims themselves. God had to specify a particular person to 
lead and administer Muslim community under the divine law, On these textual and logical 
As a matter of terminology two expressions are used here interchangeably- sharVah andfeqh. However, they 
are to be distinguished from each other. Feqh is more closer than sharVah to the concept of 'law' in English. 
The former, in spite of having a narrower ambit than sharVah, covers a much broader area than law stricto 
senso. A substantial part offeqh, however, correlates to the present-day concept of the law. A ftuther term 
used here isfaqih. The term 'faqih, sing.; fuqaha, pl' (sometimes muitahed sing.; mujtahedin, pl. ) is used to 
refer to a scholar who is versed in feqh to infer detailed rules from the sources concerned. He is a religious 
jurist, and is required to be pious and observant. For the convenience, in this research the term feqh is 
translated into 'jurisprudence' with reference to the overall context of sharVah and with stress on the 
jurisprudential or theological aspect of the law and faqih is translated to 'jurist' with reference to the 
essential religious requirements the term contains. For detail discussion of these terms, see, Fyzee, Asaf, A. 
A., (1974) at 16-18,23; Badr, G. M., (1978) at 188-189, Xmid Zanjad, A. A., (1993) at 130-131; Mallat, 
C., (1993) at 2-3; Owsia, P., (1994) at 17; JannAti, M. E., (1372 H. S. ) at 80-83 
2 See also, the Iranian Constitution, Principles 4,61,72 and 170. 
3 For a detailed discussion of the issue see, Urduni, A. H. Y., (1372 H. S. ) at 184-210. 
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bases, they believed that the leadership of Muslim community devolved, upon Ali's 
martyrdom in 40/661, successively on Ali's two sons Hassan and Hussain. Thereafter it 
continued on the hereditary line through Ali's second son, Hussain the Third Ini&n, in the 
Prophetic House until the Twelfth Imam, al- Mahdi became the last who is still alive and 
remained in "occultation" (ghaybah) or hiding and will appear one day as the saviour. " 
Upon this difference, two schools of thought emerged between Muslims community. 
Upon the first which was followed by the majority, it was held that in any case where there 
was a statement from the Quran or the Prophet it must be followed, otherwise the case must 
have been referred to the secondary sources. From then the majority of Muslims have 
gradually tried to develop some reliable sources upon which the Islamic faith should have 
been based and subsequently their school of thought was formed. This particular form of 
thought is commonly called the "Sunni school of thought". However, the minority of Muslims 
disagreed with that view and gave to the words, actions and taqrir (approval) of Shj'ah 
Im5ms (they are usually called the "Household of the Prophet") the same religious validity all 
Muslims agreed to give to the words, actions and taqrjr of the Prophet. ' On this basis, a 
separate school of thought was formed with its own methodology. This is commonly called the 
"Shi'ah school of thought". ' 
Following the emergence of difference between Sunni and Shiah scholars in respect of 
the sources upon which any particular religious view must have been based it was inevitable 
that there had to emerge two separate schools of Sunni and ShPah feqh. Sunni scholars went 
their own way and gradually established their own methodology of inferring the law of 
Shari'ah. However, the Shiah community did not feel such necessity at the period of 
IM&nah. In any new situation the case was referred to the living Imarn and any answer given 
by him was considered as the law of Shariah. ' 
Although at the period of IM&nah of Shjah Imams some essential features of the 
theory of Im&nah developed and a notable legal heritage was left, they were mostly oral and 
not systematic. For this reason, after the Occultation of the Twelfth lmdm (starting from 
4 In this respect see, Urduni, A. H. Y., (1372 H. S. ) at 201-202; Al- Baligh Foundation, (1992) at 95-99; Owsia, 
P., (1994) at 18-19; Gurgi, A., (1997) at 45-46. 
5 See also, A'mid Zarj&-d, A. A., (1993) at 134. For a detailed discussion of the authenticity of the Sunnah of 
Shi'ah ImAms as a source of Islan-dc law, see, Tabatablei, S. M. H., (1995) at 95; Jannati, M. E, (1370 HS) at 
85 and seq. 
6 There are five major Islamic 'schools'today four of which are orthodox Sunni and the fifth is Shiah. The four 
major Sunni schools are the Hanafi, founded by Abu Hanifah (d. 150n67); the Maliki, founded by Malik ibn 
Anas (d. I 8on96); the Shafei, founded by ibn Idtis shafei (d. 204/820); and the Hanbali, founded by Ahmad 
ibn al-Muhammad ibn Hanbal (d. 240/855). The Shiah school has a number sub-systems the major branch of 
it is the Ithna Ashad ( literally Twelver) Shiah which is the official religion in Iran (see the Principle 12 of 
the Iranian Constitution 1979). See in this respect Owsia, P., (1994) at 17-20. For a detailed information of 
the emergence of Sunni schools see, Muslehuddin, M., at 67 and seq.; Fyzee, Asaf A. A, (1974) at 32 and seq. 7 Jannati, NL E., (1372 H. S. ) at 89; Gurgi, A., (1997) at 113. 
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265/879, particularly, after the permanent Occultation commenced from 329/941) ShVah 
scholars felt the need to systematise their ownfeqh. ' For this purpose, they began to establish 
their own methodology which is known as the e7m al us Cd (Discipline of Principles or Science 
of Roots). ' Under e7m al usCd, they have gradually developed a particular methodology by 
which a jurist would be able to infer the law of Shariah. Under this methodology, any jurist 
seeking the law of Sha? Vah must base his judgement on at least one source whose 
authoritativity is established in e7m al usal. 11 
Bearing the aforesaid point in mind, to perform a study of the nature of the present one 
may seem somewhat hard at first glance unless a general picture of the sources upon which 
the rules of this legal system should be based is presented. Identification of these sources and 
close understanding of their position in inferring the law of Shariah seems very significant. It 
enables a researcher not to fall into mere imitation and adoption of a particular legal view 
without a satisfactory justification. This may not be the case with respect to the legal systems 
which possess a well-classified as well as a developed codified legal system. However, the 
case is significant in respect of ShPah law. Talking of this legal system is not so easy as it 
may appear. When speaking of this system one must make a distinction between the principles 
which constitute the basic foundations of it and what has gradually developed over centuries 
from the emergence of Islam by Shlah scholars as ShPah jurisprudence. This is an important 
as well as a difficult task for a person who is interested in studying ShPah law. There are 
certain well-accepted sources which constitute the basic framework for understanding this 
legal system. Whatever is said on the part of a ShPah jurist must be justified by at least one of 
those well-accepted sources, otherwise it has no Islamic value. Accordingly, a legal view will 
have an authoritative value for Shiah community if it accords with those original sources. 
However, dealing in detail with all legal sources upon which ShPah law is built is not 
feasible within the study of this type. What is said below is only a general examination of the 
sources upon which any legal rule should be founded in order to show how far this system of 
law could answer modem questions within its methodology. 
8 JannAti, M. E., (1372 H. S. ) at 149; Gurgi, A., (1997) at 124 and seq., particularly, at 136. 
9 For detailed information about the history of formation and development of Shiah jurisprudence see, Owsia, 
P., (1994) at 22 and seq.; Shaliabi, M., (1372 H. S. ). ) vols, 1,2 and 3; Jannati, M. E, (1372 HS); Gurgy, A., 
(1997). 
10 It is to be noted that Islarnicfeqh is divided into two portions: usfil and furii'. Usill literally means the 'roots' 
or 'foundations' of the law, while Iura' literally means 'branches' or 'applications'. of the law. The science 
of usfil deals with the sources of the law and the principles of interpretation, while the science of furT deals 
with ahkZvn, pl. of hukn, (the particular injunctions, that is, the law as it is actually applicable in the courts). 
See also, Mutahhari, M., (1361 H. S. ) at 8 and seq.; Fyzee, Asaf A. A., (1974) at 23. For detailed information 
about the history of formation and development of E'Im al- Us 01 in Shiahfeqh see, Gurgy, A., (1997) at 299 
and seq. 
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2.0. Sources of Law 
Conventionally, it is said that ShPah law comprises the aggregate of divinely-ordained rules 
which are to be inferred by the qualified jurists. " The role of jurist in ShPah law is not to 
make the law. What he judges is a simple announcement of the law of Shariah he discovers 
from the recognised sources. " In any particular case he has to endeavour to base his 
judgement on one of the sources which are prescribed below. The process of inference of 
detailed rules from the recognised sources is called "ijtehV' (literally, "endeavour" or "self- 
exertion'). " On this view, it is held that the primary source is the Muslim Holy Book 
"Quran". The second source, in practice the most important one, is the Sunnah. Two further 
sources are also recognised by ShPah jurists, that is, ijmff' and a'ql. No further source is 
formally recognised. However, as will be shown below, certain supplementary sources have 
been, albeit in varying degrees, used by the jurists in justifying their judgements. 
2.1. Formal Sources 
Although the four aforementioned sources are formally recognised in Shiah law as the valid 
source for inferring the law of Shariah, they are not employed at the same degree. There is a 
strict hierarchical order between them and are divided into two categories: primary and 
secondary. 
2.1.1. Primary Sources 
Quran and Sunnah are held to constitute the primary sources for inf4ring the law of 
Sha? Vah. Since the rules prescribed therein are written down, they are commonly described as 
See e. g., Mutahhari, M., (1361 H. S. ) at 7; JannAti, M. E., (1372 H. S. ) at 33. The same view is true as to 
Sunni law. See in this respect, Coulson, N. J., (1964) at 1-2 and 75; Muslehuddin, M., at 55 and seq.; 
Anderson, J. N. D., (1959) at 17. 
12 This is based on a well-accepted theological belief that human community is not able independently to make 
the law since he cannot realise the masaleh (interests) and maMsed (ugliness) of his conduct and behaviour 
and to find out how they may affect its life in the other world so as to make the proper law in any case. In this 
respect, he has to be guided and assisted by who has divine knowledge and is able precisely to realise what is 
in favour of man and his community and what may be against him in the next world. Shiah school holds, as a 
matter of theological belief, that God and those who are given divine knowledge are the only persons who are 
able to do this. On this theological belief, legislation should be made by God directly or at least by those 
persons who are given such a power. In Shiah belief those are the Prophet and Twelve Imams. On this view, 
any legal opinion should be based on a specific or at least a general approval of God or the Prophet and 
Imams. See in this respect, Ezzati, A., (1976), chapter 16; Daftar Hamkari Huzah wa Daneshgah, (1368 H. S. ) 
at 296 and seq. in which the question was examined in detail in view of Shiah scholars. Shiah jurisprudence 
is based on such a theological belief. This is the reason why in any case the jurists make efforts to base their 
judgements on at least one explicit or implicit approval from God and his appointees. 
13 For detailed information about the meaning of "Ijtehad' and its English equivalent see, Weiss, B., (1978) 
199, particularly, at 200-201; Ezzati, A., (1976) chapter 12. See Also, Jannati, M. E., (1372 H. S. ) at I and 
seq. 
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nass (sing.; nusCu, pl. ), which can be translated as Script or Text, forming the 'written' 
authority. 14 
2.1.1.1. Quran 
The Quran is the principal source of every form of Islanfic thought. It is the Quran which 
gives religious validity and authenticity to every other religious source in Islam. " This source 
is often called "ketaib" (the book). It consists of over 6000 iiyah (sing.; ffyg, pl.; literally, 
verses)" divided into 114 siTrah (literally, chapters). The individual verses were pronounced 
over 23 years of Muhammad's Prophethood as wahy (revelation) of God's commandments. 
Among more than 6000 verses of the Quran only about 500 of its individual verses are said to 
be concerned with the legal issues. " However, they contain certain general principles from 
which a number of detailed rules can be derived. It is to be mentioned that since a mass of 
rew, §yg are available in respect of the Quranic rules, any jurist is required to take into account 
those part of rew5y2 which elaborated the contents of these Quranic verses when inferring the 
relevant religious precepts. " 
2.1.1.2. Sunnah 
The other source upon which a legal view can be based is Sunnah. In the terminology of 
Islamic jurists, the term "Sunnah" (sometimes it is called "sirah') means" words (q 2), action 
(fe'do and taqrjr (implicitly approval)" transmitted from the Prophet which can be translated 
into "tradition". This source was spelt out by means which is called "hadith", pl. "ahgdith", 
"rewffyaht ", pl. "rew ifyN ", or "khabar ", pl. "akhb 
14 See also, Fyzee, Asaf A. A., (1974) at 20; Owsia, P. (1994) at 68. It is to be noted that although theologically 
the words of God (Quran) and the Sunnah of the Prophet and hugms are considered the law itself by Shiah 
Muslims, they are jurisprudentially referred to as the 'source of law' rather than the law itself This is 
because they are the scattered texts from which the law is not entirely self-evident. They do not, as a rule, 
state the law in a strictly legal sense, as a code or similar instrument which states the law. They do, however, 
contain the law. Since the law is buried within the (legally) imprecise and sometimes ambiguous language of 
the scattered texts, it is said to be extracted from the texts, and it is for this reason that the texts are to be 
considered sources of the law rather than the law itself. 
15 For a detailed discussion see, Al- Balagh Foundation, (1992), at 83-88; Tabatabaei, S. M. H., (1995) at 94; 
16 
Jannati, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 77 and seq. 
Great differences exist between Islam believers as to the number of the Quranic verses, ranging between 
6000,6204,6214,6219,6225,6323 and 6660. However, these differences are for the reason of procedural 
rules of reading not for the contents. See in this respect, Mutahhari, M., (1361 H. S. ) at 12; Gurgy, A., (1997) 
at 17. 
17 See, ShahAbi, M., (11369 H. S. ) vol. 2 at 15 and seq. (in which he explains briefly all the normative verses). 
18 See in this respect, Khurlsdni, (1364 HQ. ), vol. 2 at 58 and seq. 
19 The term "Sunnah" has different meanings . But 
in this study it is use in the sense which the jurists used in 
e7m al- usal. For a detailed discussion see, Jannati, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 73 and seq. 
20 Taq? Ir means keeping silent vis-A-vis the actions and deeds of others, so much it signifies the consent and 
agreement of the M's= (infallible Izn&n or Prophet) with them. See, Mutahhari, M., (1361 H. S. ) at 14; 
Jannati, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 75 and 155 and seq. 
21 See Jannati, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 162. It is to be mentioned that the word "Sunnah" is technically to be 
distinguished from the terms such as "hadith", and etc. The latter is the story of a particular occurrence, 
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To explain, at the time when the Prophet was living, his followers referred queries and 
disputes to him and he answered their questions, adjudicated their disputes and pronounced 
rulings. Sometimes he acted with the intention of teaching his followers the law of Shadah or 
a particular action or behaviour was made and the Prophet did not object while he was 
realising that action or behaviour. His words, deeds and approvals were remembered by his 
followers and subsequently recorded in writing as the Prophet's Sunnah. " 
To that extent ShVah and Sunni schools are common, although they depart from each 
other in the way of narrating the Prophet's Sunnah. However, these two schools depart from 
each other in that Sunni school restricts Sunnah to sayings, deeds and approvals of the 
Prophet, while Shiah school extends it to include the sayings, deeds and approvals of the 
Twelve Shiah Imams. In this way, the Shiah school inserted into the category of Sunnah a 
mass of words, deeds and approvals transmitted from the Twelve Imams of Shiah after the 
death of the Prophet as a primary source of law. ' 
Accordingly, a Shiah jurist when relying on Sunnah has to look at those rewJYN 
narrated from the Prophet and Twelve Shiah Imams and establish whether or not the 
particular rule was pronounced by the Prophet or Imams. "' After he establishes the attribution 
of the statement to the Prophet or one of Imams, he should try to understand his real 
behaviour. By understanding that he tries to derive the relevant religious rules. ' 
while the former, the rule of law deduced from it, is the 'practice' of the Prophet or Im5m, that is, their 
model behaviour'. It is to be noted that when referring to the means of reporting the "Sunnah" (tradition), 
22 
the expression "rewayalit", pl. "rewayat ", will be used throughout this study. 
For a detailed discussion on the history of gathering and classification of Sunnah see, Jarmati, M. E, (1370 
H. S. ) at 127 and seq. Likewise, for a detailed discussion of the Prophet's Sunnah in Shi 'ah's view see, Al- 
Balagh Foundation, (1992) at 83 and seq. 
23 See in this respect, Tabatabdei, S. M. H., (1995) at 95; JamiAti, M. E, (1370 HS) at 85 and seq. 
24 In order to verify the reliability of the rewayat any jurist must first make sure that they are the words, actions 
or approvals of the Prophet or Imarns. For this purpose, Shiah (as well as Sunni) jurists have made great 
efforts to verify the reliability of the transn-dtters of the rewayat and thereby determined the various degree of 
authenticity of the rewdyit by establishing two interrelated disciplines: E'Im al- Rejal (ne Science of 
Persons) which concerns biographical notations on the religious creditability of the transmitters, and E'Im al- 
Derayah (The Science of Considered Appraisal) which classifies the rewrtyat into different categories of 
authority according to the chain(s) of transmitters. Basing on the creditability of the transmitters, and the 
complete or incomplete chains of transmitters the narrated rewlylt are divided into different categories. See 
in this respect, Jannati, M. E, (1370 H. S. ) at 114-115,146,164 and seq. 
25 A considerable authoritative sources have over centuries undertaken to gather and classify these statements 
citing the words, actions and approvals of the Prophet and His Twelve Successors. These are in two sets. The 
main and the primary set consists of four, collectively known as The Four Books (Kutub al- Arbaah), 
produced over a century and a half in the fourth to mid fifth/tenth to mid eleventh century, while the 
secondary set, consisting of a further four collections, is of later periods spread over almost two centuries, 
from the eleventh to early fourteenth/seventeenth to late nineteenth centuries. The first set are as follows: 
Babeway, Muhammad ibn Ali ibn (Shaykh Saddq), Man /A Ya&r al- Faqih; Kulayni, Muhammad ibn 
Yaqub, al- Kafi; Tfisi, Muhammad ibn Hassan, Tahdhib al- Ahk5m, and, al- Istebsir, Ameli, Shaykh Hurr, 
Wasdel al- ShVah; Fayz Kashruii, Mulisen, al- W; O; Nari Tabarasi, Mirza Hussain, Mustadrak al--Wasael. 
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2.1.2. Secondary Sources 
There are some other sources which are formally recognised by ShPah jurists as the source of 
the law of Shariah. However, the same validity is not given to these sources as to the two 
previous sources. Thus, in the case of conflict between a source of the second type with that 
of first type no value is given to the secondary source. These sources are ijmd' and a'ql. 
2.1.2.1. Ijmj' 
The term ijm. §' literally means 'intention to do something '2' and technically, signifies the 
unanimous convergence of the views of all reputable jurists of a particular era on a given 
point of law . 
2" No direct Quranic text or tradition, however, exits on the authority of ijmV as 
a source of law . 
2' Accordingly, the mere fact that a particular view is taken by all the qualified 
jurists of an era on a particular issue does not suffice to make it binding on the qualified 
jurists of another era. For this reason, Shiah jurists have not attached significant contribution 
to ijmff'as a source of law. In their view, ijMi'may be seen as a separate source of law where 
two requirements are met. First, there is no specific authority on a given point of law in either 
the Quran or the tradition. Second, it has to be possible to demonstrate that this unanimous 
view did in fact emanate from the Prophet or an hn5m, for example because it was based on a 
particular rewayat from the Prophet or Imirn on the issue but which was not recorded in 
writing. 29 
Such a definition makes the scope of ijmj'as a source of law much too narrow. It is in 
fact an indication of, and its authority is due to, the view of the Prophet or Imdms which 
makes it at best a special appendix to the second source of the law, the tradition rather than a 
separate source of law. " On this construction, unanimous convergence of the jurists on a legal 
view after the era of Im&nah cannot in principle be binding on the jurists of the later time. 3' 
Nevertheless, some jurists have tried to establish that the consensus of Shiah jurists 
living in any given era on a particular question of law should be followed as a source of law. 
In giving validity to such a broad consensus, they linked it to the theory of Im&nah and 
26 See also, Jannati, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 182. 
27 Various definitions are offered to describe the term ijma'. See in this respect Ansiri, M., (199 1) vol. I at 79- 
80; Jannati, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 182-184,; Muslehuddin, M., at 146-147. 
29 However, Sunni scholars have relied on a number of the Quranic verses and rewayat from the Prophet to 
demonstrate that Ijmd' should be followed. For a detailed discussion on the reasons for validity of Ijma' in 
Sunni view, see, Jannati, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 190-197; Owsia, P., (1994) at 71, Coulson, N. J., (1964) at 77. 
For a detailed discussion of the history of emergence of ijma' as a source of law see, JannAti, M. E, (1370 
H. S. ) at 185-187. 
29 See also, Ansari, M., (1991) vol. I at 80; Jannati, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 188 and 199. 
30 In order to show how the consensus is capable of indicating the view of the Prophet or ImAm various methods 
are rendered. See in this respect, Jannati, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 199 and seq. 
31 See in this respect, Mutahhari, M., (1361 H. S. ) at 16. 
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argued that its authority derives from the view of the Absent Imam since a consensus of 
ShVah jurists reflects in fact his view. Historically, ShVah jurists have relied on three 
significant successive theories to demonstrate such a broad construction. " First, consensus 
creates the 'feeling' (hess) that the absent Imam agrees with it. " Second, had the absent Im5m 
not agreed with the point at issue, he would, by his 'grace' (luo, have prevented the 
formation of the consensus on a wrong opinion. "' Third, it generates a 'conjecture' (hads), that 
it accords with the view of the absent In-dm. " 
However, although ijm. §'in the strict sense may be possible at the period of the Prophet 
or Imams since the Muslim community had directly obtained the religious precept from the 
Prophet or Imams, it is arguable in the broad sense. It has rightly been subn-dtted" that the 
theory of ! jmX in the latter sense as a source of law was taken out of the Sunni framework 
and transported with modification into the Shiah context. It hardly accords with other tenets 
of Shiah law. Treating ijmg' in this sense as a source of law will generate inconsistencies, if 
not some inherent contradictions, within the distinct Shiah doctrine of ljtehid which generally 
forbids jurists qualified as Mujtahed to follow others. " Moreover, unanimous view may be 
based on their understanding from a particular rewayat which is not received later by other 
jurists or was based on supplementary sources such as band al- uqalj which will be 
discussed later. " 
Given the above discussion, it can be said that a particular view being popular among 
most Shiah jurists (which is technically called in Shiah jurisprudence "shuhrat fatw5ei") 
should not afortior! be regarded as an authority for others, although it may be a persuasive 
source depending on the degree of eminence of the concurring jurists. "' 
32 To know the other theories see, Jannati, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 210-211. 
33 This theory was suggested by some en-dnent Shiah jurists in the early century of development of Shiahfeqh 
such as, Shaykh Muf1d, Tfa-si and Sayyed Murtadd (as cited in: Jannati, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 202). 
34 This theory is attributed to Shaykh Tfisi in his leading book, Uddah al- Usal (see, JarmAti, M. E., (1370 
H. S. ) at 203). 
3' This theory was offered by Mirza Abulqasem Gumi (see JannAti, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 207). See also, 
Ansari, M., (1991) vol. I at 83 and seq.; Khuraskii, M. K., (1364 H. Q. ) 16 vol. 2 at 68 and seq. 
36 Owsia, P. (1994) at 72. 
37 Ibid. See also, Ansdri, M. (1991) vol. I at 79. For detailed information see, Khurnsani, (1364 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 
74. 
For more criticisms on treatment of Ijma' as a source of law see, JannAti, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) 209-210 in 
which the author himself after rejecting the various methods concludes that Ijma ' cannot be regarded as a 
separate source of law at all (see ibid., at 213). 
39 See in this respect, Ansari, M., (1991) vol. I at 105 and seq.; Khurasani, M. K., (1364 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 77 and 
seq. However, some eminent Shiah jurists have recognised it as a separate source of law. See Makki, Jarnal 
al- Din Muhammad ibn (Shahid Awwal), Dhekra al- Shilahfi al- AhkAm at- Sha? Vah, as cited in: Jannati, M. 
E., (1370 H. S. ) at 116. 
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2.1.2.2. A'ql 
Historically, relying on a'ql (literally, the act of withholding or restraining and in terminology 
of the jurists, 'human intellect', 'reason') as a source for inferring the law of Shariah comes 
back to the early centuries of the development of Islamic law. However, it has formally been 
recognised by Shiah jurists later than Sunni jurists. ' During the period of IMJýnah of Shilah 
Imams since Shiah scholars could easily refer the new cases to the ImArn and ask the relevant 
religious precept (hukm), they did not feel the necessity to consider whether human intellect 
could be relied as a source of the law of Shariah, albeit some en-dnent ShPah scholars relied 
on their rational analysis to extract the detailed rules from the primary sources at a very 
limited scale. It was only after the Occultation of the Twelfth Imam that the Shiah 
community was forced to infer independently the detailed rules from the primary sources. Yet, 
up to the early fifth/tenth century no express mention can be found in ShPah scholars' works 
in respect of the 'reason' as a source of law. Some eminent ShPah jurists occasionally 
employed 'reason' for the purpose of inferring detailed rules from the textual authorities but 
they did not consider it as an independent but only as an ancillary source of law. It was often 
used in the field of theology (e7m al- kal&n) rather than feqh. The late Ibn Idris (558- 
598/1163-1203) was perhaps the first ShPah jurist who addressed specifically a'ql as a 
source of law of Shariah in ShPah jurisprudence. " After him the jurists started to examine it 
as a source of law in the methodology of feqh (e'lm uscd) and currently almost all ShPah 
jurists formally recognise a'ql as a source of law. ' 
An examination of ShPah jurists' discussions in respect of the reliability of a'ql as a 
source of law in the e7m al- usCd shows that the primary use of this source is where there is 
no textual source (nass). ' Where no textual authority is available on a legal point it is 
40 For a detailed analysis of the issue see, Jannati, M. E. (1370 H. S. ) at 224 and seq.; Ezzati, A., (1375 HS) at 
134 and seq. 
41 JannAti, M. E. (1370 H. S. ) at 224. 
42 It should be mentioned that in the course of evolution of Islamic schools of thought two basic approaches 
crystallised and have subsequently settled throughout the history of Islamic lavr the so-called Traditionalist 
and Rationalist trends. Emergence of these two opposing approaches appeared between both Sunni and 
Shi'ah scholars in the early centuries of formation of Islamic law. In the history of Shiah law the 
Traditionalist approach (which is called "hadithi" and "Ahbti") appeared in two different eras. The first 
was the early century of formation of Shiah feqh (third/tenth century) and the second commenced from the 
early eleventh/ seventeenth century. These two trends are derived from respective views on the sources of the 
law. Next to the Quran as the foremost source, Traditionalist approach confined the jurist almost entirely to 
tradition as a source of law, while the Rationalist approach supplements these sources with certain rational 
(a'qli) Principles. The supporters of the former approach also went further and maintained that the only 
source should be tradition and no value had to be given to the other sources, that is, the Quran and ljma' (for 
detailed infonnation see, Gurgy, A., (1997) at 236-239,245). However, in both periods due to the heavy 
pressure on the part of the Rationalist jurists (who are called "usid-iyin" or "muitahidin") they were gradually 
disappeared. For a detail discussion of the emergence of akhb5rism approach in the history of Shi ah law and 
its gradual decline see, Jannati, M. E., (1372 H. S. ) at 307 and seq. See also, Mallat, C., (1993) at 28 and seq. 43 In any case in which a reliable textual authority exists a'ql can only be relied on to support it. Whatever is 
the content of the nass it should be followed. However, where the generality (um ran) or unqualified (itlaq) of 
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generally held that whatever a'ql judges with respect to that issue, shire' (the Islamic-law 
maker) would judge the same. The rule is technically called "q&dah al- mul&emah". The 
rule is based on two well-settled principles in the ShVah school of thought. The First is that 
"all religious precepts derive from a real interest or expedient (maslahat) and mafsadah 
(ugliness). That is, in any case in which a particular act is required it is so for a maslahat, or, 
in any case in which a particular act is prohibited it is so for a mafsadah. Second is that the 
human intellect in some cases is able to find out certainly what is "good" (hasan) and "evil" 
(qabih), without being guided by religious rules. " In any case where no particular nass exists 
and the jurist by taking into account the results of scientific research and rational analysis 
makes certain that a particular act has a maslahat which is to be observed or has a mafsadah 
which is to be avoided he can judge that that particular act is to be done or avoided (as the 
case may be). ' 
A 'ql is further used to find out the man& (ratio) of the existing rule. That is, if a jurist, 
by examining the authority, nature and the circumstances in which an existing religious 
precept was ruled and stripping off the surrounding particularities, can with certainty identify 
the general philosophy behind the hukm, he would be allowed to apply it at similar situations. 
The process of finding out the man&, which closely resembles the English law ratio 
decidendi, is called "tanqih al- man&" (cleaning out the quintessential or the prime 
criterion). ' 
The third case in which a'ql is used as an authority is where the jurists are seeking to 
establish general principles upon which the detailed rules can be inferred. Mention may be 
made here, as examples, of the practical or rational principles (usu21 al- amaliyah or al- 
a'qliyah). 47 It is also employed to support textual authorities which are available on a specific 
issue and to understand the real intention of the Islamic-law maker by interpretation of the 
a rewdyat seems contrary to certain commands of a'ql it will be qualified and sometimes cease to be applied 
(see in this respect, Shaykh Mufid, Tashih al- Iteqad, at 34,35, as cited in: Gurgy, A., (1997) at 237; see 
also, Ansari, M., (1991) vol. I at 18). To that extent, a'ql will be employed as a tool to find out the real 
intention of a the Prophet or Imam as narrated by hadith. 
44 See in this respect, Jannati, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 238; Weiss, B., (1978) at 211. 
45 See e. g., Alldmah Helli, Tahdhib al- Usrd, at 6, and, Qumi, N4irza Abulqdsem, QawAnin al- Usal, at 257 
(cited in: Ezzati, A., (1375 H. S. ) at 138,141 respectively); Mutahhari, M., (1361 H. S. ) at 3840. For a detail 
discussion see, Jamidti, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 228 and seq., 238 and seq. 
46 See e. g., Mutahhari, M., (1361 H. S. ) at 40; Jannati, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 300-3 1. It is to be noted that in this 
case a jurist may face two types of religious niles. First are those rules provided for particular occasions, and 
second, are those announced as general rules. Accordingly, a difficult task is to distinguish these two rules, 
like obiter dicta and statement of law in English law. The method of tanqih al- manat would only work in 
respect of the second category. For a detail comparison between English and Shiah law approaches see, 
Owsia, P., (19 94) at II 1- 112. 
47 See e. g., Ansdri, M., (1991) vol. I at 335 (in respect of asl al- barAah (acquittal)); Khurasani, M. K., (1364 
H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 179 (in respect of "asl al- barriah), 185 (in respect of asl al- ihteyat) and 224 (in respect of asi 
al- takh)dr (choice)). 
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textual authorities (nusas)', and, find out the rational requirements (law&im -e- a'qli) of the 
existing rules. " 
However, in spite of the fact that ShPah jurists have formally recognised a'ql as an 
independent source of the law of Shariah and have examined it in detail in the methodology 
of the jurisprudence (us Cd al- feqh) with strong support, they are very cautious and little use 
can be found in practice. " For this reason, few cases can be found in ShPah jurisprudence in 
which they have relied solely on a'ql as a source to infer the relevant religious precept. In any 
jurisprudential case where some jurists relied on a'ql as an authority it is in fact employed to 
support some textual authority (nass) available on the issue. Even in the methodology offeqh 
where it is often relied on as an authority to establish general principles from which detailed 
rules can be inferred, it is used as an ancillary authority to support textual authority. No 
general principle can be found which is solely based on 'reason'. The use of a'ql as a tool to 
identify mang al- hukm is also subject to a rigid limitation, it must be qatei (certain) in the 
mathematical sense. " Any uncertainty would make it unreliable. 52 Accordingly, the so-called 
Rationalist approach is not in the final analysis, a licence to an independent and free rational 
argument but is in fact an allowance for the limited exercise of 'reason' within the pre- 
established bounds of basic dogmas. Upon this source it cannot be said that a'ql judges as an 
independent source, but it is employed as a tool to discover the intention of the Islan-dc-law 
maker where there is no direct authority under any of the preceding three sources, to identify 
the rational requirements (law&im -e- a'qli) and the philosophy (man&) of the existing rules, 
48 This role of a'ql can be found in Mabhath al- Alfat (Discourse on Words) of the e7m al- usfa. See also, 
Owsia, P., (1994) at 73; Ezzati, A., (1375 H. S. ) at 142. Most of the topics on Words (alfal) cover different 
detailed rules of interpretation (for a detailed discussion of these topics see, Khurasani, M. K., (1364 H. Q. ) 
vol. 1). These rules have been developed mainly to resolve problems of approach to the first two primary 
sources of the law, Quran and the tradition, and the relation within and between their perspective precepts. 
Treatment of the topics contained in this part of e7m al- usal and of interpretational technical devices is 
almost free from religious prejudices (Owsia, P., ibid. ). Mention can be made, as examples, of qiyas mansfis 
49 
al- e'llah and qiyas al- ulaweyyeh (see Jannati, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 298-299. 
See e. g., Mutahhari, M., (1361 H. S. ) at 4143 in which he mentions a number of technical examples (such as 
so 
muqaddemah w0jeb. trattub and ijtemd'amr wa nahy). 
To know of such a rigid caution, see: Jannati, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 249. 
51 This is because it is commonly held that the only way to infer the law of Sharl'ah is qat' (complete juristic 
certainty or certain knowledge) or through a iann (conjecture) provided that it is certified by an e7mi 
(certain) authority. See in this respect, AnsZai, M., (199 1) vol. I at I and seq.; Khurds&-d, M. K., (1364 H. Q. ) 
vol. 2 at 55 and seq. This rigid qualification, as will be seen in more detail, caused certain formal and 
supplementary sources unreliable in practice. 
52 For instance, the late Shaykh Murtadd AnsZari, an eminent Shiah Rationalist jurist, says: "Yes, but fairly 
relying on a'ql to find out the philosophy of the existing rules (mandtat al- ahkam) in order to extend the 
rules obtained thus to similar situations causes the jurist to err frequently in fact" (Ans&i, M., (199 1) vol. I 
at 20-21. See also, Mutahhari, M., (1361 H. S. ) at 40; Jannati, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 243, in which he says: 
"Any rational judgement which is influenced by personal, social emotional and habitual affairs has no legal 
value'. It is perhaps for the above reasons why some contemporary jurists asserted that a'ql is a potential 
source for the law of Shari'ah and in practice no jurist requires it because of tradition! In other words, on 
their view, Shilah law has recognised a'ql as a potential source for inferring the law of Shapiah but up to 
now no one was forced to refer it for inferring the law for the lack of textual authorities. 
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philosophy (man&) of the existing rules, to understand the real intention of shffre' by 
interpretation of his words and deeds or to support the contents of textual authorities. 
2.2. Supplementary Sources 
Although it is commonly said that the only sources within which the jurist is required to infer 
the law of Sha? Vah are those described above, these sources have been, and are still being, 
supplemented by the working of other sources. Among these Wrf (custom), sometimes called 
band'at al- uqald, " is of particular significance in practice. " 
The role of community practice (custom) as a supplementary tool in the process of 
inferring the law of Shariah is, in principle, undeniable. In two cases custom is commonly 
relied on by the jurists. " First is where the Islamic-law maker impliedly referred to the 
custom. This is where the subject of religious precepts is a customary matter. Reference can 
be made to those authorities which contained terms such as aqd (contract), bay' (sale), a ýb 
(defect), darar (harm) and so on without any reference to the standard of determination of 
those terms. The second is to find out the concept of words of written authorities (Quran and 
tradition). To that extent, the jurists accept custom as a source of law without any doubt. But 
in those cases custom is not relied on to infer the law of Shariah but used to identify the 
object (mesd9q) of the prescribed religious rule or to show the concepts and meanings of the 
words used in the written authorities so as to establish what is the 'appearance' (Auh i7r) of the 
authorities. " 
However, a controversial question is whether local or national customs can be relied on 
as a separate source of the law of Shariah, particularly where there is no authority from the 
53 Technically, a number of terms are used by the jurists which need some clarification. These terms are "u'rf ', 
"sirah al- mutasharreah (the continuos practice of those who abide by the religious law) which is sometimes 
called "sirah al- muslemin (the continuous practice of Muslims community) and bana' al- Wqald' (the 
continuos practice of the learned) which also is called sirah al- u 'qala' (tradition of the learned). However, 
there is a slight divergence between the latter four usages. The first two expressions are used to refer to those 
practices formed by Muslim community, while the two others are employed to describe any common practice, 
whether formed within a non-Muslim community or both. For more information about the concept and 
54 
different types of custom see, Jannati, M. E., (1 370 H. S. ) at 391 and seq.; Sadr, S. M. B., (1994) at 211-212. 
One may suggest that factors such as ensdf (literally, equity) and addlat (justice) could be regarded, to some 
extent, as sources of law. As an example, in the leading text book of Makasib, the late AnsZari in a number of 
occasions relies on 'equity' to suggest an opinion which is apparently contrary to the results of rational 
analysis of the existing authorities. The same can be true as to 'justice'. As to the latter see, Mutahhari, M., 
(1409 HQ) at 14,27; Mehrizi, M., (1997) at 184 (in which the author has made great efforts to identify some 
Shi'ah jurists who have relied on 'justice' in some occasions to justify their judgements. However, since no 
jurist has addressed these possible sources in the methodology of 'jurisprudence, they are not examined here. 
Moreover, neither Ansari himself nor any other jurist has addressed what the term 'ensaf' means and how it 
could be relied on as a separate source of law. 
55 See e. g., Jannati, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 397,408; Sadr, S. M. B., (1994) at 197-199; Mara'shi, S. M. H., 
56 
(1994) at 101; Ma'rafat, M. H., (1994) at 106;. 
In this sense, custom, as the late Shahid Sadr points out, does not require to be approved by the Islamic-law 
maker (see, Sadr, S. M. B., (1994) at 197-198). 
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sources already discussed. In this regard a distinction has been made between those practices 
which were existent or gradually formed at the time of the Prophet and Shlah Imams and 
those modified or formed later. ShVah scholars accept the fact that a number of Quranic rules 
have their origin in pre-Islan-dc Arabian customs. " The same is true as to the Sunnah, On this 
fact, it is a well-accepted view that the early Islamic rules, whether prescribed by Quran or 
contained in the tradition, are divided into 'affinnatory' (imddei) and 'foundationary' (ta'sisi) 
precepts, being, respectively, those already existing and upheld and those freshly laid down. " 
On this view, if any particular custom at any era could be linked to the era of the Prophet or 
Imams it would be reliable even there is no particular formal authority on the issue. However, 
it is in fact an indication of Sunnah rather than a separate source of law. "' 
The significant question is how far customs formed after the period of Imlinah can be 
relied on by the jurist in inferring the law of Shadah. The jurists commonly cast doubt on the 
authority of such customs as a source of law. According to them the community practice has 
to follow and accord with the religious rules. The mere fact that a particular act or behaviour 
becomes a social and legal norm in a society or a local community does not suffice per se to 
say that it is religiously binding. It could have derived from various factors which were 
beyond the scope of religion and do not clearly indicate that the Islan-Lic-law maker consented 
to it. A particular custom will be regarded as a binding religious rule where it is proved that it 
was formed at the period of the Prophet or one of the lmýans and approved by them, whether 
expressly or impliedly. " 
3.0. Assessment 
The arrangement of sources according to their formal binding force does not necessarily 
reflect the respective order and significance of the contribution they have to the development 
of the law under this system. For instance, although the Quran is considered the God-given 
law and formally remains uppermost, " the normative verses (5yat al- ahkam) constitute its 
small portion (500 out of over 6000 verses) and provide only a small fraction of the overall 
body of detailed rules of the law of Shariah. 
In contrast, Sunnah as narrated, apart from the question of authenticity (which is in a 
way akin to the question of the reliability of English case law reporting in medieval times), " 
57 jannati, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 405406. 
58 In this respect see generally, Shahabi, M., (1369) vol. I at 61-64. 
59 Jannati, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 397,408. See also, Sadr, S. M. B., (1994) at 200. 
60 See Sadr, S. M. B., (1994) at 200; Ma'rafat, M. H., (1994) at 69 and 106. 
61 See e. g., Mutahhari, M., (1361 H. S. ) at 12; Jannati, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 3. 
62 As regards the forged rewayat see, Jannati, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 146 and seq. 
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are considered too important for the jurist. Its significance for Shiah law is undeniable. The 
vacuum left by the few general principles, or scanty and dispersed rules, of Quran on any 
given legal topic is mostly covered by tradition. " However, traditions, although they is many 
in quantity, can only meet a portion of the modem needs. Masses of new events (hawadeth 
wgqeah) with which society of the time of the Prophet and Im5ms was never concerned arose 
later and must be answered. Today Muslim communities encounter a huge volume of modem 
situations in their various relationships. Fairly, it is hard to accept that tradition will be an 
adequate source to meet them. 
As regards Ijmd', it is fair to say that this source has very little contribution to the 
detailed rules of law. There are a few cases in which the jurists have relied solely on this 
source. If it is relied on in some occasions it is in fact as a supplementary source rather than a 
separate one. Ijn-d'even in its broad sense, apart from the theoretical objections made as to its 
authenticity, could play its role in the early stages of the development of Islamic law when the 
community was fairly small, eminent jurists of the era were few, and the views of all jurists 
concerned could be obtained, Thereafter its role diminished and it may be said that it soon 
died out as an active source of the law for the practical impossibility of obtaining it. 
Accordingly, the only place left for ljmff' as a source of law is the convergence of the jurists 
of the earlier era obtained directly (which is called Ijm 5' muhassao or those consensuses cited 
by the jurists, that is ljmj' manqfd, although a number of jurists have cast doubt as to the 
authenticity of the quoted consensuses. " 
Although a'ql is in theory recognised by ShPah jurists and it could have been an 
important tool for developing this system, in practice little use can be found in jurisprudence 
to infer the law of Shariah. It is relied on primarily to support the textual authority (nass) 
available on the point or to interpret the text of the written authorities. Although it is also 
relied on to find out the ratio (e 71aht or manat) of an existing rule in order to extend to the 
similar situations or to infer a religious precept where there is no textual authority, it is 
subject to a rigid restriction which is hardly obtainable in practice. " This is because few cases 
can be found where a jurist is able to find out the binding maslah, mafsadah or the ratio of an 
existing rule with full certainty. In any legal case, some doubt will necessarily exist and 
consequently, this source, as almost all jurists suggest in the present time, should not be 
reliable. 
63 See Jannati, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 119-120. For detailed examples of the role of Sunnah see, ibid., at 120- 
121. 
64 See e. g., Khurisani, M. K., (1364 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 70 and seq. 
65 Very few examples can be found in Shiah jurisprudence where the jurists have relied on the rule of tanqih 
al- manAt See e. g., Mara'shi, S. M. H., (1994) at 86. 
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Custom and the traditions of the learned (band'dt al- uqall, pl. of band' al- uqald), as 
already seen, have little contribution to the development of the law in view of ShVah jurists. 
Almost all jurists have seen custom and community practice as a tool for understanding the 
meaning of the written authorities and identifying the object of prescribed rules. They are not 
used as separate sources for the law. Resistance on the basis that any community practice 
should be effectively linked to the period of the Prophet and Imams renders this supplementary 
source useless, at least at the present time which is so far from that period. 
As a general conclusion, it can be said that the significant practical sources in the 
present Shiah jurisprudence are the Quranic normative rules and those contained in rewYyN, 
a mass of scattered texts contain various general and specific rules. But, as any one can easily 
realise, the legal rules which are prescribed under Quranic verses or those which are contained 
in the remTy& are (apart from the question of forged rew5y&) very limited. They are not able 
to meet the thousands and thousands of legal issues with which modem societies are 
concerned. Certain 'practical principles' (usiil -e- amaliyah) such as isteshab (presumption 
of the continuance of the status quo ante until the contrary is proved and barjah (acquittal), 
are, by nature, procedural presumptions rather substantive law. They are not able to meet a 
mass of modem needs which require substantive law. 
4.0. Shlah Law and Modern Needs 
Shi'ah jurists were and are still confidently claiming that Shiah jurisprudence is able to 
provide a modem legal system and to tackle any modem needs which arise in any aspect of 
human life. The establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran was the first experience for 
Shi'ah jurists at a large scale to show the capability of ShPah jurisprudence to respond to 
various modem needs. But after nearly two decades little development can be found in 
practice, masses of legal issues are still left unanswered in ShVah jurisprudence and the 
university societies are still awaiting for their solutions. The jurists who are teaching and 
researching in Islamic Schools (Huzah -e- E'Imiyeh), show little willingness to examine these 
modem issues in their academic courses and are still emphasising hypothetical rather than 
concrete cases, classical issues which are mostly residual of the early societies and the era of 
slavery. No comprehensive work has been made to answer this significant question: "Is the 
present method of ijteh&l (discovering the law of Shariah) able to meet the modem needs and 
make this system compatible with the changing circumstances of the human legal life? And if 
so, how would it be made? " This is the reason why the Islamic Government of Iran in the 
course of making the needed laws was forced in practice to resort to a practical device, under 
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under which in any case where the Islan-dc Parliament should be unable to meet the 
expectations of the Guardian Council" (notwithstanding that six members of its twelve 
members are Shilah well-qualified jurists) the case should be referred to the "Expediency 
Council". " Under the doctrine of "Expediency of Islan-dc State", in any case in which the 
proper religious hukm (precept) cannot be inferred from the primary sources, the Islamic State 
has the power to pass the necessary resolutions in order to secure the interests of the Islamic 
State. However, this is a practical method in order to tackle State problems rather than the 
traditional method of inferring the law of Shariah, which holds that Islan-dc laws are not 
made, but are discovered through the process of inference (istinbat) from Islamic sources as 
described above. 
The significant question is therefore how this system can adapt itself to changing 
circumstances and provide a proper system of law. After establishment of the Islamic 
Government in Iran this question has extensively attracted the attention of Muslim scholars 
and entirely different views have been offered. However, some of these suggestions are 
theological in nature and beyond this study. It will also not discuss the doctrine of "powers of 
Islan-dc Governor" (ikhtey,; r-g h&em) which is presently applied by the Iranian Islamic 
Government. " What follows is an attempt to present a method by which any jurist is able to 
infer the law of SharVah in respect of any new legal issue. " 
4.1. New Reading of the Traditional Sources 
As was seen above, the jurists commonly hold that bana'at al- uqald can be relied on as a 
source of law only where they were formed at the time of the Prophet or Imains and approved 
by them. However, approval is defined in a very narrow sense, that is, if a particular public 
practice is formed within the Muslim community and acted upon at the time of the Prophet or 
an Imim. In such a situation, the inUlible leader (Prophet or In-am) had a duty to lead the 
66 Under the Constitution of the Islan-de Republic of Iran, the Parliament cannot enact laws contrary to the usill 
and ahk5m of the official religion of Iran. The question whether a particular legislation passed by the 
Parliament accords with the official religion is left to the discretion of the "Guardian Council" which consists 
of twelve members six of which are Shiah jurists who are to be appointed by the leader. See the principles 
72,96 and 110, as amended in 1988. 
67 See the Islamic Constitution of Iran as revised in 1988, Principle 112. 
Under this doctrine, in any case where a proper legal rule is required to secure the "interests of the Islamic 
State' and safeguard the interests of the Muslim community, the Islamic State is given the power to prescribe 
the proper regulations. 'Mese regulations will be religiously binding if the hakem (ruler) is a qualified person 
holding the requirements prescribed under this doctrine. The resolutions passed by the Islamic State do not 
need to conform with the traditional sources. It will suffice if the Islamic Governor sees those regulations as 
necessary for safeguarding the Islamic State and Muslim community. See in this respect, Daftar Hamkdri 
Huzah wa DaneshgA (1368 H. S. ) at 338 and seq. in which this doctrine is fully exan-dned in view of 
differentShi'ah andSunni scholars. See also generally, Sachedinc. A. A., (1988). 
Various devices are also offered by Sunni scholars to modernise the Islamic legal system in accordance with 
the Sunni jurisprudence. See in this respect, Zaki Yamany, A., (1979) 205; Khadduri, M., (1979) 213; Fazlur 
R., (1979) 219. 
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Muslim community to the right conduct. If he did not reject that common practice, as contrary 
to the law of Shatiah, his silence was an indication of his consent. 
When relying on the community practice, a distinction should be made between ib'W& 
(devotional rites) and mua'4ýnal& (social conduct). Where a particular practice emerged in 
respect of a purely religious rule regulating the relationship of man and God it may be argued 
that it should be reliable only where it is proved that it was formed at the time of the Prophet 
or ImAm and was approved by them. However, such a rigid requirement is not necessary 
where a common practice is concerned with regulating the legal relations of individuals and 
social institutions. It would be sufficient if it is proved that a particular practice becomes 
common within the community as a whole or a particular community (as the case may be a 
general custom or a particular one) as long as it does not conflict any settled Islamic rules. 
The suggestion can be justified on the basis of the following reasons. First, it is in line 
with the prophetic rewayat which says: 'Vhoever establishes a worthy tradition he would be 
rewarded for any person who acts on it". 70 It can also be justified on the basis of the Quranic 
verse which provides "Ou bel u'qiid" (You are required to respect your covenant)"' and the 
Prophetic rewdyat which provides "al- mumenCm enda shurUtehem" (All Muslims should 
respect their covenants). ' The terms "u'qUd" and "shurdt" (covenants) are general and cover 
any covenant, whether legal covenant such as contract, or social one. Bang'& al- uqal, § 
formed within Muslim community are in fact social covenants which are gradually formed 
among them because they felt their existence necessary for their life. 
Second, it can be justified on the basis of implied approval (taqr1r) of ma's&n 
(in&llible leader) through a new reading of the implied approval. It is suggested that taqrir 
signifies the approval of any actual or potential practice within the Muslim community. This 
is based on the well-settled belief between Shiah scholars that the Prophet and Shiah Imdms 
had divine knowledge and could anticipate that their followers after their period would 
gradually tend to some practice because of their modem needs and it was their duty to give the 
Muslim community a guideline to avoid from the formation of and following those common 
practice which would arise in the future if they did not agree with them. Since they did not 
reject expressly reliance on practices formed later, despite their anticipation that they may 
take place, they therefore implicitly recognised those practices formed after their period. 
70 See, Mimi Tabarasi, M. H., vol. 12, bab 15 at 230, hadith no. 13962, and, at 231 hadith no. 13965; Majlesi, 
M. B., vol. 71 at 204 bab 14 hadith 41, vol. 74 at 166 bab 7 hadith 2, vol. 97 at 7 bab I hadith 7 and at 23 
bab 2 hadith 15. 
71 See: The Holy Quran, chapter 5 (Mae'dah), verse 1: "0 yc who believe, perform all covenan&'. I In a famous statement the Prophet of Islam said; "All Muslims arc obliged to perform their contractual 
obligations". See Ameli, H., vol. 15, bab 20 at 30, hadith 4. 
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Accordingly, it can be said that any rational norm which is fully adopted and acted on by the 
Muslim community, because they are uqala is deemed to have impliedly been approved by 
the Prophet and Inidms. ' 
Band al- uqald can also be regarded as a source of the law of Shariah in accordance 
with the theory of huffiat -e- iann -e- mutlaq (a fully satisfying legal proof of general 
preponderance) in accordance with the theory of insid5d -e- bab -e- e7m (closure of the door 
to certain legal knowledge). To explain, at the present time it is conventionally held that the 
mereAann (conjecture), even a strong one, at a point of law is not valid unless it is specifically 
validated by some certain authorities. In this case, those doubtful authorities are called "iann 
khass" (specific conjecture, as opposed to "general conjecture"). In inferring the law of 
Shad'ah, the jurist must either rely on an authority which certainly leads him to the religious 
precept or on those non-certain authorities whose authenticity is certified by a certain 
authority. In any case where there is no qatei (certain) authority or authentic ianni authority 
(which are called "dalil ijfihadi") the jurist is required to rely on some practical authorities 
(usCd al- amaliyah, which are called "dahlfaqdhafi), that is, barja'h, ihteyV, takhyir and 
isteshaib. 1 
It is to be noted that these jurists do not deny that if the existing authorities, as already 
described, are not sufficient to meet the needs the jurist would be able to rely on other 
conjectural authorities. But in actual fact almost all jurists currently assume that there are 
sufficient certain and authentic ianni authorities to lead the jurist to the law of Shariah in 
any new situation and in the few circumstances where the jurist is not able to infer the relevant 
religious precept by referring to those authorities he would be able to resolve the problem by 
relying on a proper practical principle (asl-e-amah). However, this view can only be justified 
where it is proved that there are sufficient authentic authorities to meet new situations. It is 
73 See in this respect, Fayz, A., (1994) at 183-185. Such a construction has been accepted and applied in some 
cases. For example see, Haeri, S. M. K., (1994) at 104 (in which he cites from the late Ayatulldh Kumpkii). 
Ile late Kumpani holds that in any case where it is proved that a particular practice is accepted by a 
community it should be deemed as approved by the Islamic-law maker (see ibid. ). Likewise, the Late Imam 
Khumayni has referred to this broad interpretation of u'rf (custom) under the question of Ijtehid and Taqlid 
(imitation of the qualified jurist) (see, Khumayni, S. R. M., Resalah al- Ijtehad wa al- Taqlid, at 120-130, 
particular, at 125, as cited in: Fayz, A., (1994) at 184. The late ImAm Khumayni has also relied on such a 
broad construction in the law of contracts. For example, in the case of the right to claim arsh and the right to 
terminate the contract on the basis of initend' (repudiation) he has based both rights on this principle. (See in 
this respect, Khumayni, R. M., vol. 5, at 127,128,134 and 372). Likewise, a number of qawaedfeqhiyah 
(general principles) and principal rules (qawaed usu-1i) are formulated by relying on this source, although as a 
supplement to the other formal sources. The late Shahid Sadr says that it is not required that a particular 
rational norm should have been actually employed by the Muslims community at the period of Ma'sam. It 
would be sufficient if it is proved that that particular norm was realisable then by the learned (uqala-). The 
implied approval is in fact concerned with the criterion of that norm rather than the extent to which it is 
actually applied at that time (see, Sadr, S. M. B., (1994) at 210-211). 
"' See generally, AnsAri, M., (1991) vol. I at I and seq.; Khurasani, M. K., (1364 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 55 and seq. 
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submitted that such authorities are not at hand. It was pointed out before that the Quranic 
verses and the tradition are insufficient to meet the mass of new questions which arose after 
the period of the Imivinah. ' The inadequacy of the consensus was also examined. Accordingly, 
the only way is to rely on the iann where there are no authentic authorities from the Quran 
and tradition in order to infer the law of Shariah. The authenticity of such Yanni authorities 
can be justified by the theory of hujjiat -e- ýann -e- mutlaq. A clear instance of such a non- 
authentic iann is bangal- uqald. " 
One may, however, argue that the practical principles (usCd al- amaliyah) such as 
bar5at will operate before these conjectural (iunni) authorities come to operate. It is arguable, 
since the subject of the practical principles is doubt (shakk) to the religious precept (hukm-e- 
shar'ei), while it is assumed that for the reason of lack of adequate authentic conjectural 
authorities e7m-e-ejmali (literally, general or unspecified knowledge) still remains. ' 
Having proved that bang al- Wqald can be relied on as a source of Islamic law, the 
question arises how to identify such a common practice. For this purpose, some concrete 
guidelines should be provided to lead the jurist who has to rely on this source. It seems that 
the best and useful solution is to study modem legal systems and international and regional 
conventions. Any legal rule which has practically been experienced within a legal system and 
its advantages and disadvantages examined by the courts and academic writers can be taken 
75 It seems that this is perhaps the reason why some jurists in some occasions have tried to offer a new reading 
of the traditional sources. Two historical events can be presented as evidence. First, at the early century of 
formation and development of ShPah jurisprudence some eminent jurists suggested that any unanimous 
convergence of the views of all reputable jurists of a particular era on a given point of law should be treated 
as a binding rule. Second, a number of distinguished jurists such as Muhaqqeq Qumi -the writer of the 
leading text book "Qawanin! ', have tried to justify any conjectural authority as a source of law. This is in fact 
a step toward recognition of the inadequacy of the existing authentic rewayat to meet modern needs. 
76 The theory of "closure of the door to certain legal knowledge' as a valid proof (dalil) is based on a number of 
premises. The first is that, in any case relating to the individuals and community, the Islamic-law maker has a 
real precept (hulan-e-waqei). The second, and by far the most significant, is that due to the absence of an 
infallible hnkn in any case it is impossible to infer the real precept concerned through a certain authority. 
The third is that due to the existence of e'Im-e-ejmdIi (literally, general, or, unspecified knowledge) the mere 
absence of certain authority on the relevant precept will not excuse a Muslim from the real religious verdict 
(hulan-e-wAqei sharei). The fourth, is that it is unreasonable to prefer doubtful authorities where there are 
tanni authorities. Where these premises are proved a jurist would be able to resolve the problem by relying 
on lanni authorities, such as conjectural rational analysis and band al- uqalg. No jurist questions these 
premises. Ile only thing which is denied by most jurists is the inadequacy of the special tanni authorities, 
while, as shown in the text, the existing special authorities are not able to tackle all the needed issues. 
Accordingly, to that extent iann should be reliable in accordance with the theory of "InsedW', which is 
called "Insedid Saghi? ' (minor closure). However, some Shiah scholars have recently suggested that the 
door of certain knowledge to the religious law is entirely closed since no certain authority exist to validate the 
Sunnah which is frequently transn-dtted by kabar -e- w5hed (single transmission). This is called 'InsedW 
kabir'. On this view, the only way to infer the religious precepts is to rely on ianii. See, Fayz, A., (1994) at 
180 and seq. 
77 Moreover, one of the main authorities for authenticity of the practical principles is ban! al- Wqall. This 
shows that the learned themselves do not attach to these principles an unqualified role. They will rely on such 
principles when there is no strong zann. 
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into account as indication of bangal- uqalg The jurist would be able to look at the history of 
formation and development of these rules and their practical merits and demerits to make sure 
that they are clear indication of bangal- uqaU and then compare them to the settled religious 
principles. If no contrary rule, whether express or implied can be found, those rules can be 
accepted as legal rules in the jurisprudence. ' 
4.2. New Reading of the Rational Analysis 
A further technique which can be utilised to enable this system to adapt itself to changing 
circumstances is to present a new reading of the rational analysis of the existing rules. It is 
commonly held that ShVah law prohibited the method of applying a straight analogy for the 
extension of an existing particular rule to a similar instance (qiy&), which is adopted by some 
Sunni schools. ' Directly, no existing rule on a 'particular' instance can be extended to another 
9 particular' instance, no matter how similar the two cases may appear to be. However, the 
ShPah school has recognised a composite analytico-syllogistical process known as tanqih al- 
man& (or -malaik) to circumvent the prohibition of applying qiy&. The method is motivated 
by some preconception of perfect law. By the process of tanqih al- mam& the basic reason or 
the core of the rules will first be analytically stripped of the surrounding particularities, and 
then the generality of the rule so obtained will be applied to the case at hand in the guise of 
syllogism (qiy&, in a logical sense). " Tanqih al- man& in the sense described above, has 
been, however, made subject to a rigid qualification. By the process of tanqih al- mam& the 
jurist must certainly discover the criterion of the existing rule. Any doubt as to its real 
criterion would render the syllogism unreliable. 
It seems that such a qualification cannot be acceptable in all cases. It is suggested that a 
distinction should be made between pure religious laws (ibffdjt) and legal rules (muama1&). " 
As regards the first, which regulate the relationship of man and God, it can be said that 
religious rules requiring man to do or refrain from doing a particular action may be based on a 
criterion which cannot be identified by human intellect. But such a statement cannot be true as 
78 Some Shilah scholars have recently suggested that a jurist who is going to infer the law of ShatVah by the 
process of Jjtehad should not confine himself to those normative Quranic verses and tradition. In extracting 
the law of sharl'ah careful attention, they suggest should also be paid to the fundamental principle of 
"justice" along with other religious objectives for which the religion was sent. See in this respect, Hakimi, M. 
R., (1994) 107. Accordingly, the objectives of the religion as a whole would be taken into account in order to 
assess the merit and demerit of a particular legal rule formed in a legal system. 
79 Mutahhari, M, (1361 H. S. ) at 17; Jannati, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 294 and seq. For a detailed discussion of 
qiyffs (analogy) and certain supplemental principles, such as, istehsan -seeking the best, or, juristic 
preference-, see Jarmati, M. E., (1370 H. S. ) at 309 and seq.; Muslehuddin, M., at 135 and seq.; Fyzee, Asaf 
A. A., (1974) at 21-22. 
80 See also, Owsia, P., (1994) at 74. 
81 See also, Gurgy, A., (1994) at 96. 
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regards those legal rules which are prescribed to regulate the legal relations of human beings. 
Those rules are commonly based on a realisable criterion. Accordingly, it would fairly be 
possible to realise the real criterion of the existing rules and to extend the rules thus obtained 
to the new instances. The mere fact that man cannot realise with certainty the real criterion 
and that in any case there is some possibility that other factors might have been relevant in 
regulating the existing rule, should not affect the argument. If to that extent the capability of 
human intellect is doubtful, no where it will be reliable and as a result no jurist can infer the 
law by the process of ijtehW, since in any case there would be some contrary possibility. " 
5.0. Summary and Conclusions of Sources of Shiah Law 
From the above discussion it was made plain that the Quranic rules and tradition cannot be 
the adequate sources to meet the new situation. Owing to the impracticability of obtaining it, 
the consensus of the jurists, unless formed in the initial formative phase of ShPah law, has 
little contribution to the development of the law. Accordingly, the best, and most practical, 
way to adapt this system to new situations is to rely on rational analysis and well-settled legal 
practice among human societies. Various arguments were rendered to prove the latter as a 
valid source for the inference of the legal rules. Likewise, it was seen that rational analysis of 
existing rules would be an important technique for adaptation of this system to modem needs. 
There is no reason to justify that the technique of tanqih al- mamN should certainly lead the 
jurist to the real criterion of the existing rules. 
However, in order to make a balance between some of the polarised needs and demands 
of societies - stability and change, security and flexibility, certainty and adaptability - some 
concrete guidelines are required. For this purpose, it was suggested that the settled rules 
in 
modem legal systems and international and regional conventions can be useffil solutions 
for 
this system in order to identify the common practice of the learned (banjal- Wqald). 
6.0. Methodology 
The present work is intended to present a general picture of the buyer's remedies for seller's 
non-conforming delivery under Shiah law by way of comparing it with its two counterparts, 
English law and the Convention. A comparative study, in principle, can be done in two 
different forms; it may be made on a large or on a smaller scale. In the first, the spirit and 
style of different legal systems, the methods of thought and procedures they use, are 
11 in Shiah jurisprudence there can be found some cases in which some en-dnent jurists have relied on this 
technique in a broad sense. As an example see a number of instances cited in: Ma'rafat, M. H., (1994) at 90- 
91. 
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examined. " Whereas, in the second a comparative study is carried out by emphasising the 
special legal institutions or the rules used to resolve particular actual problems. " For instance, 
when can a contracting party withhold performance of his contractual obligations and 
terminate the contract? Is an aggrieved party entitled to apply to the judicial authorities to 
coerce the defaulting party to perform what he promised under contract? Is the seller to be 
given a general right to cure his defective performance? What damages can an injured party 
recover for other party's breach of contract? 
In the present study most emphasis is placed on the second method. Although such a 
study may be carried out by way of a mixed study raising a problem and analysing any 
particular solution prescribed in a relevant legal system, it seems that the best way for the 
present study is that the author first shows the attitude of the developed systems, case by case, 
and then examines the issue under the undeveloped system and at the end uses these materials 
as a basis for a comparative assessment. This would help the researcher first to show the 
vacuums in an undeveloped system and then to consider how the existing gaps can be filled by 
interpretation of the existing law and giving new suggestions. 
For this purpose, in the case of English law, the study will focus on the law regulating 
the buyer's remedies in light of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended in 1994 and 1995) as 
interpreted and applied in relevant judicial precedents and general principles of contract law, 
as a primary source, and the commentaries of academic writers in the field of the sale of 
goods law, as a secondary tool. In performing the English part of the study much emphasis is 
placed on the well-established law applicable to the issues in question without getting into 
much detail, though reference is made to different approaches taken by English commentators 
in respect of a particular issue where there is no settled law. 
Similarly, in respect of the Convention, primary emphasis is placed on the rules 
prescribed by the Convention with respect to the issues under consideration by way of 
interpretation of the text of the Convention. However, the history of legislation of any 
particular provision is not disregarded. Great efforts are made to interpret the text of the 
Convention in light of its legislative history to read the intention of the Convention drafters. 
An effort has also been made to refer to the courts' and arbitrators' attitudes towards the 
Convention provisions which are susceptible to different constructions. However, in the 
absence of sufficient available judicial decisions in respect of the Convention text in England, 
an attempt is made to access cases decided by the courts of member States and arbitral 
tribunals through the Internet (UNCITRAL and Pace University School of Law Home Pages). 
83 See in this respect, Zwelgert, K.; K6tz, H., (1987) vol. I at 4. 
" Ibid., at 5. 
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Although due to unavailability of the full text of the courts' decisions in the Internet in 
English, these decided cases do not present a clear picture of the deciding courts' views in 
respect of the concept and purpose of the relevant provisions of the Convention, the case notes 
which are published by the Journal of Law and Commerce and those are available on the 
Internet are a significant means of accessing the attitude of courts. 
A somewhat more complex method is used in the Islamic part of the work. This is 
because of the nature of this traditional and undeveloped legal system. In order to access what 
is law under this system, great efforts are made. Initially an attempt is made to answer the 
relevant questions in accordance with the existing law, that is, ShVah jurists' judgements. In 
the absence of express statements of law, it is attempted to answer the question by interpreting 
the judgements of the jurists in similar situations and analysing the original authorities upon 
which the jurists have based their judgements in those cases. When the legal vacuums could 
not be filled by the foregoing methods, the author has tried to suggest the appropriate law by 
way of interpretation of the well-accepted general principles. 
The emphasis is not confined to the jurists who have officially published their 
authoritative opinions. Efforts have been made to access the views of the current jurists who 
have not officially published their opinions. For this purpose, the writer had a chance to 
discuss with some of them in respect of particular legal issues, and in particular, with respect 
to those modem issues which have not been yet addressed by the jurists in published 
authorities. 
A significant difficulty of such a study is that most jurisprudential arguments have been 
made with respect to very traditional as well as hypothetical cases or questions rather than 
concrete ones. Likewise, the jurists have not gathered and classified the law governing the 
remedies for breach of contract, but they are scattered rules discussed in different places. One 
of the difficult tasks of the author was, therefore, to identify these rules and the relevant 
reasoning from different places. 
The other major difficulty which naturally arises from such a study is the language 
barrier. In the absence of a comprehensive work on Shiah law in English, the author was 
forced to use materials which are originally in the Arabic and Persian languages. Thus, the 
major problem of a research of the present nature was to convert the texts and arguments from 
the original context. The problem becomes more serious where some expressions or legal 
institutions have no equivalent in the second language. To tackle this problem, the writer was 
forced to get help from persons who are educated in Islan-dc and English law. An attempt has 
also been made to clarify most of the legal expressions by explanation. 
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This study will not examine secular Iranian law. Although the history of Iranian law is 
close to that of ShPah law, they are to be distinghised. " The core of this research is the law of 
Shilah as reflected in Shiah jurisprudence in the form of jurisprudential judgements (fat&J) 
by the eminent ShVahfuqah j Ourists). However, in order to present a practical example of the 
influence of ShPah jurists' judgements on Iranian civil law reference is made to the Iranian 
Civil Code (hereinafter ICC as amended in 199 1) in footnote. 
The last point which deserves to be noted is the method of transliteration of the Arabic 
and Persion texts and expressions into English. Various phonetic rules are suggested and 
applied by academic authors and organizations. But there is no official method to be followed. 
For this purpose, a method suggested by an English journal published in Tehran by Ahl al- 
Bayt World Assembly, "The Message of Thaqalayn" vol. 3, Nos. 1 &2 (1996), with slight 
modification is used throughout this work. 
85 For more information as to the history of Iranian law and its relation with ShVah law see, Owsia, P., (1994) 
at 25 and seq. 
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Introduction 
In English law, at a broad level a buyer who is injured by the seller's non-conforming 
performance may be entitled to resort to the following remedies separately or in combination; 
to withhold performance of his obligation, terminate the contract, require the defaulting seller 
to perform what he has undertaken under the contract or claim damages for the losses he 
sustained by the reason of the seller's breach of contract. 
Section One 
Withholding Performance and Termination 
1.0. Introduction 
1.1. Sketch of Discussion 
One of the crucial questions is to identify the circumstances in which a buyer may be entitled 
to refuse to perform his contractual obligations and to put an end to the contract where the 
seller has failed to perform his obligations in accordance with the contract terms. Sometimes, 
the refusal to perform will be merely a part of, or a step towards, putting an end to the 
contract, but a failure to perform may also have the less drastic effect of entitling the buyer 
simply to withhold performance of his reciprocal obligations at least for so long as the seller's 
failure continues, irrespective of whether or not he is entitled to bring the contract to an end. 
However, the question of termination seems somewhat complicated in English law since, for 
reasons which will be made clear below, English sale of goods law has not clearly 
distinguished between these two courses of action. The present section will try first to examine 
the question whether in English sale of goods law the buyer has two separate rights: the right 
to withhold performance of his obligations, and the right to terminate the contract. Then, it 
will discuss the circumstances in which the buyer may be entitled to resort to either or both of 
these two remedies. 
Termination of contract raises some further questions. First, how should it be 
exercised? When will it be effective? The latter in turn raises the question when will the buyer 
lose his right to terminate? Second, what effects will termination have on the contract, rights 
and duties of the parties? However, before considering the provisions regulating these two 
remedies it is necessary to exan-dne a preliminary issue which has an important role in 
understanding the main issue under English law. 
Chapter Two: Buyer's Remedies Under English Law 30 
1.2. Classification of Contractual Terms 
In English law, the question whether a party has a right to withhold performance of his 
obligation and to terminate the contract for the other party's non-conforming performance is 
analysed in the context of classification of contract terms as either "conditions", breach of 
which enables the innocent party to refuse to accept the non-conforming performance and 
terminate the contract, Innominate terms", breach of which entitles him to do so only when it 
results in serious consequences which will deprive him of substantially the whole benefit 
which it was the intention of the contracting parties that he should obtain from the contract, or 
"warranties" breach of which enables him only to claim damages for losses arising out of the 
breach. 
Unlike "conditions"' and "warranties"2, "intermediate terms" are not expressly 
recognised by the English Sale of Goods Act and as a result no statutory definition is 
available. They are the invention of case law, thus one must look at the case law for definition. 
This category of contract terms has firstly been expressly addressed in the leading case of 
HongKong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. 3 However, it was not a sale 
of goods case and it had not directly addressed the special problems of sale cases. For that 
reason for a period of time there was some doubt on the question whether the modem 
approach could be applied to the sale of goods cases. One view' argued that as s. 11 (3) of the 
Sale of Goods Act created a statutory dichotomy which divided all terins in contracts for the 
sale of goods into conditions and warranties, the existence of any fiirther category of 
contractual terms was impliedly excluded. But this view was rejected by the Court of Appeal 
in the case of Cehave XVv. Bremer HandelsgeselIschaft mbH (The Hansa Nord). 5 In that 
case, the Court of Appeal held that the HongKong Fir doctrine was a common law rule which 
was not inconsistent with the Sale of Goods Act and which was therefore not affected by it-6 
I See s. II of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. In spite of the fact that the term 'condition' has a significant role 
within the remedial provisions of the English Sale of Goods Act, the Act has failed to define it. The term has 
different usages. See in this respect, Wickman Machine Tools Sales Ltd v. SchulerA. G. [1972] 1 W. L. R. 840 
at 850, and, [1974] A. C. 235 at 250; StoIjar, S. J., (1953) at 488; Reynolds, F. M. B, (1963) at 534-535; 
2 
Guest, A. G. et al (1997) Para. 10-024; Trcitel, G. H., (1995) at 58,677-678. 
Unlike 'condition', the Act has expressly defined 'warranty, in s. 61 (1). See also the statement of Lord 
Abinger in a case decided before the passing of the Act, Chanter v. Hopkins [1838] 4 M. & W. 399 at 404. 
Like "condition", the term 'warranty' has different usages. See in this respect, Carter, J. W., (1991) Para. 
416. ). 
3 [1962] 2 Q. B. 26. As to the history of development of the doctrine of serious breach as a ground for rejection 
and termination see, Bridge, M., (1983) 868; Carter, J. W. and Hodgekiss, C., (1977) 3 1. 
4 See e. g., at the first instance of Cehave N. V. v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH (The Hansa Nord) [1974] 2 
Lloyd's Rep. 216, per Moccata J. See also, Reynolds, F. M. B, (1963) at 540; Montrose, I L., (1964) at 75; 
Sutton, K. C. T., (1967) at 152-3. 
5 [1976] 1 Q. B. 44. InBunge Corp v. TradaxExportS. A. [1981] 1 W. L. R. 711 at 718 Lord Scarman said that 
the statutory classification of terms in the Sale of Goods Act as conditions or warranties "is not to be treated 
as an indication that the law knows no terms other than conditions and warranties". 
6 S. 62 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act. 
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Following this decision, the courts applied this threefold division of contract terms to the sale 
of goods cases. 7 
The emergence of the new category of "intermediate" terms appears likely to have 
reduced the number of occasions when a term will be classified as a "warranty" in its Sale of 
Goods Act sense, so that it has been said that since the decision of Court of Appeal in the 
HongKong Fir case few cases can be found in which the courts have construed a contract 
term as a warranty. 8 
As regards conditions, although their continued separate existence has been 
acknowledged by the courts, 9 the courts before the decision of the House of Lords in the case 
of Bunge Corp v. Tradax Export'O showed a great tendency to regard contract terms as 
intermediate rather than as conditions. " And even in Reardon Smith Line v. Yngvar Hansen- 
Tangen, Lord Wilberforce suggested that a number of the old cases are "excessively 
12 technical" and ought to be re-examined by the House of Lords. The above statements show 
clearly that the courts during that period proved more tendency in favour of the HongKong 
Fir doctrine. 
It seems that this was probably the result of applying strict test of Diplock LJ in 
HongKong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd. 13 However, in Bunge Corp 
v. Tradax Export S. A. 14 Megaw L. J. in the Court of Appeal observed that he did not think 
that the statement of Diplock L. J. in HongKong Fir case was intended to be a "litcral, 
definitive and comprehensive statement of the requirements of a condition". The House of 
Lords, approving the judgment of Megaw LJ, held that the "wait and see" method, or, the 
"gravity of the breach" approach, is not the way to identify a condition in a contract. This is 
done by construing the contract in the light of surrounding circumstances. 15 By this criterion, 
7 In this regard, reference can be made to the statement of Browne L. J. in Bunge Corp. v. Tradax Export S. A. 
[1980] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 294 at 309). See also, Reynolds, F. M. B, (1976) 17; Weir, T., (1976) 33. 
8 Carter, J. W., (1981) at 221. For the reason of failure of the courts to recognise a term as a warranty since the 
HongKong Fir case, the editors of Benjamin's Sale of Goods raise the question whether the notion of such a 
term is a necessary one (see Guest, A. G. et al (1997) Para. 10-33). 
9 For instance, in Wiclanan Machine Tool Sales v. Schuler A. G. [1974] A. C. 235, all members of the House of 
Lords recognised that conditions in the technical sense still formed a valid part of legal reasoning. 
10 [1981] 1 W. L. R. 711. 
11 See e. g., Cehave NY v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH (The Hansa Nord) [1976] 1 Q. B. 44, (the 
statement of Roskill LJ at 70-71). 
12 [1976] 1 W. L. R. 989 at 998. 
13 [1962] 2 Q. B. 26 at 69-70. 
14 [1980] 1 Lloyds Rep. 294 at 305 
15 [1981] 1 W. L. R. 711 at 716 and 719. Perhaps it was for this reason that in Photo Production v. Securicor 
Transport [1980] A. C. 827, Lord Diplock in order to base discharge on the parties! intention, somewhat 
modified his earlier description of conditions in HongKong Fir case by describing them as arising where "the 
contracting parties have agreed, whether by express words or by implication of law, that any failure by one 
party to perform a particular obligation .... 
irrespective of the gravity of the event that has in fact resulted 
from the breach, shall entitle the other party to elect to put an end to all primary obligations of both parties 
remaining unperformed", (ibid., at 849). 
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the House of Lords did open indeed a path to treat some kinds of contractual terms more 
easily as condition. 
Under the present law, a term of a contract will generally be regarded as a condition if it 
16 17 has previously been recognised as such by statute , precedent . or it appears that it was the 
intention of the parties that a particular term is to be a condition. " However, the mere fact that 
the parties labelled a particular stipulation as a "condition" does not necessarily mean that it is 
used in its strict sense. The court will usually be disinclined to treat a term as a condition if the 
result of such a construction would be unreasonable. 19 
The important issue is, therefore, whether a previously unclassified terms is to be 
classified as a 'condition' or as an 'intermediate' term. This issue is a difficult one influenced 
by two competing policies: fairness and certainty. The first policy favours the classification of 
terms as intermediate illustrated by the HongKong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen 
Kaisha Dd. 20 , whereas, the second policy, emphasising the requirement of commercial 
certainty and predictability, favours the classification of terms as conditions . 
21 Both policies 
have been supported by judicial decisions. 22 As a matter of policy, English courts are, as will 
be seen later, more inclined to treat as conditions time stipulations in commercial contracts 
than other contract terms . 
2' However, the court may be reluctant to conclude that a term has 
been treated as a condition by the parties where that might result in termination for a relatively 
n-dnor breach. 
As far as the sale of goods cases are concerned, see ss. 12-15 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, as amended by 
the Sale and Supply of Goods Act 1994. 
17 See e. g. Bowes v. Shand (1877) 2 App. Cas. 455. The important point is that Bowes establishes that in an 
fo. b. contract the date of shipment term is a condition. 
18 See the statement of Blackburn L. J. in Bettini v. Gye (1876) 1 Q. B. D. 183 at 188. See also Wickman Machine 
Tools Sales Ltd. v. Schuler A. G. [19741 A. C. 235; United Scientific Holdings Ltd. v. Burnley Borough 
Council [1978] A. C. 904 at 923,937,944. 
19 See e. g., the statement of Lord Denning MR in Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd. v Schuler A. G [197211 
W. L. R. 840 at 851. The view was also confirmed by Lord Reid at the House of Lord [1974] A. C. 235 at 251. 
See also CehaveN. V. v. Bremer HandelsgeselIschaft mbH (The Hansa Nord) [1976] 1 Q. B. 44 at 71. 
20 See e. g., Cehave NY v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH (The Hansa Nord) [1976] 1 Q. B. 44; Tradar 
Internacional S. A. v. Goldschmidt S, 4. [197712 Lloyd's Rep. 604) and by a munber of later decisions cited in: 
Treitel, G. H., (1995) at 713 no. 95. 
21 See e. g., Bunge Corp v. Tradar Export S. A. [198111 W. L. R. 711; Gill & Duffus S. A. v. Societe Pour L' 
Exportation desSucresS. A. [1986] I Lloyds Rep. 322. See also the cases cited in Treitel, G. H., (1995) at 714 
no. 3. 
22 See the authorities cited in fiis. 20 and 2 1. 
23 But in other types of contract terms the court are somewhat reluctant to treat a contract term as a condition. 
For instance, inBunge Corp v. TradaxExport S. A. [1981] 1 W. L. R. 711 at 715, Wilberforce L. J. maintained 
"It remains true, as Roskill LJ has pointed out in Cehave N. V. v. Bremer Handelsgeselischaft m. b. H. (The 
Hansa Nord) [1976] 1 Q. B. 44, that the courts should not be too ready to interpret contractual clauses as 
conditions". 
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2.0. Rejection and Termination 
As indicated before, in English sale of goods law the buyer's right to refuse to accept the 
seller's non-confom-dng delivery and to terminate the contract is analysed in the context of 
classifying contract terms into "conditions", "warranties" and "intermediate terms". By the 
express language of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 the buyer neither is entitled to terminate the 
contract nor even has a right to reject the non-conforming goods where the lack of conformity 
is caused by breach of "warranty" . 
24 The same is true where breach of an "intermediate term" 
does not result in serious consequences. Accordingly, breach of warranty and that of 
intermediate term in the above prescribed form does not cause much difficulty in respect of the 
issue in question. The controversial issue is the case where the seller's non-conforming 
delivery results in breach of "condition" or an "intermediate term" which causes serious 
results. 
Where the seller's non-confonning delivery is caused by breach of condition it is 
conunonly said that the buyer is entitled to reject it and treat the contract as repudiated. 
However, the position of these two rights and their relationship is not quite clear. In the 
absence of a clear statement of law the following significant questions arise: 
(i) Does the term 'right to reject' refer to a right separate from the right to treat the 
contract as repudiated? 
(ii) If so, does it mean that the latter can be exercised whenever the first is available? 
The answer to the latter question throws light on the significant question whether or not the 
seller after the buyer's lawful rejection has a right to "cure" his non-confortning delivery. 
Since most arguments arise from the language of the Sale of Goods Act and case law 
which do not apply to breach of an innominate term, the following discussion will first answer 
these questions where the seller has committed breach of a condition. After that, it will 
examine the question when the buyer will be entitled to reject the seller's non-confonning 
delivery and terminate the contract if the seller has broken an innomýinate term. Finally, it will 
examine some special cases which arise in respect of the question under consideration. 
2.1. Breach of Condition 
2.1.1. Rejection and Termination, One Remedy or Two? 
In spite of the fact that the Sale of Goods Act talks of the right to reject the goods and to treat 
the contract as repudiated for breach of condition (s. 11 (4), which signifies the existence of 
24 See ss. 11 (3) 61 (1). 
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two possibly distinct rights, the phrase has not been clearly interpreted in English sale of 
goods law. In this connection the language of the section, as will be seen below, is unclear. 
Nowhere else does the Act define these two concepts in precise words. It also fails to state the 
effect of their exercise on the rights and duties of the parties. Neither the Sale and Supply of 
Goods Act 1994 nor the Law Commission's Reports which preceded ie5 make any mention of 
the buyer's right to terminate the contract. The Law Commission has never taken into 
consideration the nature of the buyer's right to reject and its relationship with the right to treat 
the contract as repudiated in making their proposals. Nor has the question been clearly worked 
out in the case law. Academic writers, as will be seen below, are of different opinions. 
Accordingly, the first question is whether breach of condition gives the buyer a right separate 
from his right to treat the contract as repudiated and terminate it. The question will be 
examined in the light of Sale of Goods Act, case law and academic writings. 
Sale of Goods Act. Although the Act has made plain that the buyer has the right neither to 
reject the goods nor to treat the contract as repudiated for breach of a "warranty "26, when 
dealing with the remedies available for breach of a "condition", it merely says that "... breach 
... may give rise to a right to treat the contract as repudiated"27 Without mentioning 
the 
existence of a right to reject. There are similar statements in the sections dealing with the 
possibility of the buyer's right to "waive the conditioný', or his election to "treat the breach of 
condition as a breach of Warranty". 28 
On the other hand, ss. 15A and 30 of the Sale of Goods Act, when dealing with the 
remedies for breach of implied conditions (ss. 13-15) and remedies for delivery of wrong 
quantity, simply talk of the buyer's entitlement to reject, without referring to the right to treat 
the contract as repudiated at all. Even s. 53 (1) in the same situation in which s. 11 (2) 
mentions the right to treat the contract as repudiated, mentions the right to reject. Likewise, the 
Act recites the circumstances where the buyer loses the right of rejection, but it does not state 
the precise meaning of rejection, but only, when it provides that the buyer is under no 
obligation to return the rejected goods to the seller, refers to the right to refuse to accept 
delivery of non-conforming goods. 29 The only provision which contains both the buyer's 
25 Law Commission, (1983); Law Commission, (1987). 
26SS 11 (3) and 61 (1). 
27 S. 11 (3). It does not mention the aggrieved party's right of "tenninatiore' or any of the other alternatives 
similar to it, although it refers to a contract of sale as being "rescinded7 by the seller on account of the 
buyer's breach (s. 48). It only refers to the right of an innocent party to treat the contract as repudiated (ss. II 
and 3 1), without saying what that signifies in practical terms. 
29S. 11(2). 
29 S. 36. See in this respect, Bridge, M., (1988) at 278-279. 
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alleged rights, i. e., to reject the goods and treat the contract as repudiated, is s. 11 (4). This 
sub-section provides: 
where the contract is not severable and the buyer has accepted the goods or part of 
them, the breach of a condition to be fulfilled by the seller can only be treated as a 
breach of warranty and not as a ground for rejecting the goods and treating the 
contract as repudiated unless there is an express or implied term to that effect". (italic 
addedýo 
It might be argued that this sub-section by using the conjunction "and" intends to give 
the aggrieved party two separate rights for breach of condition. However, this interpretation is 
arguable. "And" is conjunctive, so that one reading of this would be that the two rights are 
actually one: i. e.: the buyer who rejects is automatically treating the contract as repudiated". 
Alternatively, "and" could be read disjunctively as indicating that there are two rights which 
may be exercised separately. Thus, "and" is ambiguous. 
Case Law. Similarly, the question has not been clearly answered by case law. On the one 
hand, there are several judicial dicta which use one instead of another. " A general review of 
these cases reveals the fact that case law does not clearly show that breach of condition gives 
the innocent buyer two separate rights: rejection of non-conforming goods and termination of 
the contract. Even assuming that they regard them conceptually as two distinct rights, it is 
hard to find a clear statement elucidating the question whether the buyer can reject the goods 
without having to terminate the contract. In contrast, there can be found some cases in which 
the buyer is given the right to reject the defective goods without being required to terminate the 
contract. 33 
Academic Writers. The unclear status of the sale of goods legislation and failure of case law 
to clarify the language used in the Act has caused academic writers to take up two opposing 
approaches. On the first approach, the remedy of rejection is equated with termination or, it is 
30 These two alleged rights can also be inferred from the provision which state the remedial consequences of 
breach of warranty (ss. 11 (3) 61 (1). 
31 In other words, it uses the word "rej ection' ' as a component of a single right because of the fact that in the 
case of non-conforming delivery this right is frequently exercised by actual rejection of the non-conforming 
goods. 
32 See e. g., Bentsen v. Taylor, Sons & Co [1893] 2 Q. B. 274 at 281; Arcos, Ltd. v. E. A. Ronaasen & Son [1933] 
A. C. 470, per Lord Atkin at 480; Cehave N. V v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH (The Hansa Nord) [1976] 
1 Q. B. 44, per Ormerod LJ at 83 and 84 (in which he described the term "rejection of goods" equivalent to 
the phrases "treat the contract as repudiated", "terminate the contract" and "rescind"); Kwei Tek Chao v. 
British Traders andShippers Ltd [1954] 2 Q. B. 459 at 480 (where Devlin J treats 'rejection' as tantamount to 
'rescission' (in the sense of termination); Lord Roskill in Bunge Corp v. Tradax Expon S. A. [1981] 1 
W. L. R. 711 at 724,725. Again, there are numerous judicial dicta, in non-sale of goods cases, which express 
the law that breach of condition automatically entitles the innocent party to terminate the contract, without 
exploring the concept of "rejection" and "termination". See for instance, Lord Denning MR in the case of 
Wickman Machine Tools Sales Ltd. v. Schuler A. G [19721 1 W. L. R. 840 at 850 (see also Lord Reid's 
statement in the House of Lords, [1974] A. C. at 251); Lord Diplock in Photo Production v. Securicor Ltd. [1980] A. C. 827 at 849. 
33 See for instance, the old case of Reuter, Hufeland, & Co. v. Sala & Co. [1879] 4 C. P. D. 239. 
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a component of a single right. Apparently, according to this construction, by the buyer's 
rejection of the non-conforming goods the contract would automatically be terminated. The 
buyer will not have an option to reject the goods without being required to terminate the 
34 contract. The opposite approach is that the right of rejection is distinct from the right of 
termination, although the advocates of the second approach, as will be seen later, differ in 
permitting the victim of breach to terminate the contract . 
3' The latter approach is based on the 
fact that the term "condition" in the sense accepted in the Act is used to describe an important 
term whose full performance is a condition precedent to the buyer's duty to accept the goods 
36 the seller delivers in performing the contract. On this interpretation, the seller's delivery of 
the goods in accordance with the terms of the contract (s. 27 of the Act) is the pre-condition of 
the buyer's duty to accept and pay in exchange for them. The buyer is deemed liable to the 
seller for non-acceptance provided that the seller's delivery has been in accordance with the 
terms of the contract, express or implied, including the implied conditions. Thus he is required 
to accept (not to reject) such a delivery. Accordingly, as long as the seller's delivery is not in 
conformity with the terms of the contract the buyer is not under any duty to accept it. Under 
this approach, the right to terminate the contract is a separate right which must be justified on 
another ground. 
2.1.2. Relationship Between the Two Remedies 
Assuming that a buyer who is aggrieved by the seller's breach of condition may have two 
rights -to reject the non-confom-dng goods and to treat the contract as repudiated and 
terminate it-, a further question is to determine the relationship between these two remedies. Is 
a buyer who is given a right to refuse to accept the non-conforming goods entitled to terminate 
the contract immediately after he has rejected the goods? 
The Sale of Goods Act fails to detem-dne the relationship between rejection and 
termination. It only states that breach of condition "may give rise to a right to treat the 
contract as repudiated" (s. 11 (3)). It does not precisely determine the time when a breach of 
condition would occur, whether it will be when the seller's non-conforming delivery takes 
34 See e. g., Treitel, G. H., (199 1) at 690; Carter, J. W., (199 1) Paras. 102,628, in particular, 940; Carter, I W., 
(1991 A), at 102-103; Carter, I W., (1993) at 95 and I 10; Guest, A. G. et al (1994) vol. 2, Para. 41-040. 
35 Beale, IL, (1980) at 20-21 and 80,91; Davies, 1., (1992) at 161; Furmston, M., (1995) at 158,159; Goode, R. 
M., (1995) at 362-363; Atiyah, P. S. & Adams, J., (1995) at 449 and 456 fh. 30; Bradgate and White (1995) 
at 53; Treitel, G. H., (1995) at 704 fa. 17 then p. 670; Bridge, M., (1997) at 162,163; Guest, A. G. et al, 
(1997) Para. 12-031. 
See in this regard, Bradgate and White (1995) at 61-62. Ile idea which underlies the use of the word 
Hcondition" in this context is that the term is, or assumed to be, so vital, to the operation of the contract that 
its fulfilment by one party is a condition precedent to the other party's liability to perform his own part (see 
Wallis, Son & Wells v. Pratt & Haynes [1910] 2 K. B. 1003, the statement of Per Fletcher Moulton L. J. at 
1012; see also State Trading Corp. ofIndia Ltd, v. M GolodetzLtd. [1989] 2 Lloyd`s Rep. 277 at 282. 
Chapter Two: Buyer's Remedies Under English Law 37 
place or when the time for performance has expired, provided that it is of the essence of the 
contract. Similarly, case law has not made the issue quite clear. On the one hand, there are 
numerous judicial dicta which say that breach of condition automatically entitles the innocent 
party to reject the non-conforming goods and treat the contract as repudiated and terminate the 
contract, without distinguishing clearly between cases of curable and incurable breach, and, 
between cases in which the tijrne for performance expired and those allowing the breaching 
seller to remedy his breach within the contract time. Reference can be made to the general 
statement made by Lord Roskill in Bunge Corpn. v. Tradax Export SA. In this case he 
observed that where an obligation is held to be condition any breach of which ", Arill entitle the 
37 innocent party to rescind" the contract. Reference can also be made to the f o. b. case of 
Compagnie Commerciale Sucres Et Denrees v. C. Czarnikow Ltd. (The Naxos). In this case 
Butler Sloss L. J. remarked: 
"But if this is a condition, any breach, however trivial, would entitle the party 
aggrieved to bring the contract to an end. "38 
On the other hand, there are some other cases in which the buyer's termination was not 
regarded as lawful termination and it was held that the seller was entitled to make a second 
tender. The latter cases are, however, disputable and they will be examined in detail when 
discussing the seller's right to cure. Equally, some authors have questioned the authority of the 
former statements by that many of them are obiter, or have been rendered in situations in 
which the breach was incurable because of its nature or the time for performance had 
expired. 39 
Because of the unclear status of the issue in sale of goods law, the English 
commentators are of two different approaches. Some writers took the view that any non- 
compliance with a condition by the seller would place him in breach of condition and give the 
buyer a right to reject the non-conforming goods and treat the contract as repudiated and 
terminate the contract inimediately. 40 Unlike the language of s. 11 (3) which provides that the 
37 [198111 W. L. R. 711 at 724,725, see also Lord Scarmans judgement at 717. 
38 [1989] 2 Lloyds Rep. 462 at 478. See also non-sale of goods cases such as, Lord Denning MR in Wickman 
Machine Tools Sales v. SchulerA. G, [1972] 1 W. L. R. 840 at 850; Lord Reid in the same case before the 
House of Lords, [1974] A. C. 235, at 25% Lord Diplock in Photo Production v. Securicor Ltd. [1980] A. C. 
827 at 849. 
39 See in this respect, Bradgate and White (1995) at 69 (fn. 47). See e. g., the statements observed in respect of 
the promissory representations regarding the existence of certain facts in the subject-matter of the contract, 
such as Behn v. Burness [1863] 3 B. & S. 751 (statement that the ship "now in the port of Amsterdarif'; 
Bensten v. Tatlor [1893] 2 Q. B. 274 (statement that ship "now sailed or about to sail"; Maredelanto 
Compania Naviera SA v. Bergbau-Handel GmbH (The Mihalis Angelos) [1971] 1 Q. B. 164 (statement that 
a ship is "expected ready to load" clause in a voyage charter. 
40 See e. g., Atiyah, P. S. & Adams, J., (1995) at 449 and 456 fn. 30; Bradgate and White (1995) at 76; Bridge, 
M., (1997) at 162,163. See also, Carter, J. W., (1991) Paras. 308,407,501 and 569, in particular Para. 572; 
Guest, A. G. et al, (1994) vol. 2 Para. 41-040. In justifying this approach see, Treitel, G. H., (199 1) at 692- 
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innocent party, say buyer, may treat the seller's breach of condition as repudiation of the 
contract, the proponents of this approach argue that not much significance should be attached 
to the particular word "may" where the contract is non-severable. 41 On this approach, it is 
argued that it is assumed by the law that non-compliance with a condition does always amount 
to a repudiation of the contract. That is to say, because of the actual or presumed importance 
of 'condition' delivery of goods which do not comply with it does always lead to such a 
consequence. As a result, the buyer has an option to accept the seller's repudiation and 
terminate the contract immediately, or, to reject the defective delivery and give the seller an 
opportunity to perform his obligations in compliance with 'condition'. 42 
In contrast, some others argue that the mere delivery of goods which do not comply 
with a condition will not place the seller in breach of condition, so there is no reason to justify 
the buyer's termination. The seller will only be in breach if defective performance remains 
incurred at the time when performance is due. There is no breach because the duty of the seller 
is to tender a correct performance by the contract date. 43 On this view, the buyer's immediate 
remedy for seller's non-conforming delivery is simply to refuse to accept it. The buyer would 
be entitled to terminate the contract on account of seller's defective delivery only where: 
(a) the time for performance of the contract has expired, so that it is too late for the seller to 
make a fresh tender and the time for delivery is of the essence or has been made so as the 
result of notice or where a reasonable (or frustrating) time has passed after the contract 
delivery date; or 
(b) the seller's conduct amounts to a repudiation of the contract, e. g., by insisting on his 
original non-conforming delivery, refusing to re-tender, making a delivery so defective or so 
near the expiry of the date which is of the essence of the contract. According to this view it is 
not non-compliance with a term classified as a condition which gives an innocent buyer a right 
693, Treitel, G. H., (1988) Paras. 198,267; Treitel, G. H., (1990) at 186; Cehave N. V v. Bremer 
Handelsgeselischaft mbH (The Hansa Nord) [1976] 1 Q. B. 44, the statement of Ormerod LJ at 84. 
41 See e. g., Guest, A. G., et al, (1997) Para. 10-28; Bradgate and White (1995) at 69). 
42 See in this respect, Bradgate and White, (1995) at 75. On this view, where the buyer rejects the goods and 
requests cure but the seller fails to comply, the buyer will be entitled to terminate the contract and claimed 
damages assessed as at the date of termination (see, ibid. ). 
43 Goode, R., M., (1995) at 274-276,293-294,362-367; Beale, H., (1980) at 91. The difficulty which arises 
from this approach is that if it is assurned that before the time for performance is expired the seller's non- 
conforming delivery would not result in breach of a condition how it is that the buyer can reject for 'breach of 
condition'. Where does the right of rejection come from? The proponents of the view do not deal with this 
issue adequately. It might be argued that the right to reject is to be justified on the breach of an implied term. 
That is, the seller has undertaken to deliver goods in conformity with 'conditions' within the contract period, 
but is impliedly obliged to make just one delivery. Where he has made non-conforming delivery he will be 
guilty of breach of this implied term which entitles the buyer to reject them (the point to which Professor 
Goode refers in a footnote of his leading text book without any explanation, ibid., at 362). But if breach of Us implied term justifies rejection, the implied term must be a condition. If so, why can the buyer not 
terminate for its breach. 
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to terminate the contract but his right is to be justified by the seller's particular conduct 
resulting in repudiation of the contract, or, by the impossibility of performance resulting from 
expiry of the time for performance. 
2.1.3. Seller's Right to Cure 
Further question is whether the seller should be given a right to cure his defective 
performance, and if so, to what extent such a right is defensible in English sale of goods law. 
Sale of Goods Act provides no express provision regulating the issue. Case law has also failed 
to make clear the issue. Academic writers are currently of different opinions. In this respect, 
while a number of authors are doubtful44, some others took the view that the seller after the 
buyer's lawful rejection of non-confom-dng goods has a general right to cure. 45 Professor 
Goode is me of the authors who confidently observes that where the buyer lawfiflly rejects the 
non-conforming goods the seller has a general right to cure, provided that it is not too late for 
him to do so. In justifying the view, he argues that not only is it confirmed in a number of 
casesý6 but also it is in accord with legal principle and commercial practice. The consequence 
of this approach is that where the seller makes a non-confonning delivery and the buyer 
refuses to accept it, the seller, in the case of a contract for unascertained goods, can cure by 
tendering replacement goods. Where the contract is for specific goods the seller could not, 
without the buyer's consent, tender substitute goods, since the contract itself identifies and 
thereby restricts the goods to those named therein. ' Thus he can only cure by repairing the 
goods to make them conform to the contract. Although Professor Goode does not say so 
expressly, it appears that he regards this right as being available even in cases where the 
seller's breach consists of a breach of the statutory implied conditions. 48 On this view, the 
44 See e. g., Guest, A. G., et al, (1997) Para. 12-03 1; Ahdar, R. J., (1990) 364; Guest, A. G., et al, (1994) vol. 2 
Para. 41-045; Law Commission, (1983) Para. 2.3 8. 
45 See e. g., Goode, R. M., (1995) at 363-367; Beale, H., (1980) at 91; Sealy, L. S. & Hooley, R. J. A., (1994) at 
427. See also, Lord Devlin, (1966) 192; Beale-, Bishop, and Furmston, (1995) at 482,504 and 510; Davies, I., 
(1992) at 16 1; Apps, A., (1994) 525; Treitel, G. IL, (1995) at 704 fiL 17 and then 670 fii. 13. 
46 In this respect, Professor Goode and his advocates have relied on a number of cases such as, Tetley v. Shand 
(1871) 25 L. T. 658; Borrowman Phillips & Co. v. Free & Hollis (1878) 4 Q. B. D. 50OX Ashmore & Sone v. 
CS. Cox & Co [1899] 1 Q. B. 436; Longbotton v. Bass Walker [1922] W. N. 245; E. E. & Brian Smith (1928), 
LD. v. TMeatsheafMills. LD. [1939] 2 K. B. 302; McDougall v Aeromarine of Ernsworth [1958] 3 All E. R. 
431; Agricultores Federados Argentinos v. Ampro S. A [19651 2 Lloyds Rep. 157; Gertreide Import 
GeselIschaft mb Hv Itoh & Co. (America) Inc. [1979] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 592; Bremer Handelsgesellschaft in. 
b. H. v. J. H, Rayner & Co. Ltd. [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 216; S. IA. T. Didal Ferro v. Tradax Overseas S. A 
[198011 Lloyd! s Rep. 53; Empresa Exportadora de Azucar v. Industria Azucareva Nacional S. A. (The Playa 
Larga) [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 17 1; Motor Oil Hellas (Corinth) Refineries SA. v. Shipping Corpn of India 
(77ie Kanchenjunga) [1990] 1 Lloyds Rep. 391 at 399. 
47 The same argument may arise where the seller of unascertained goods has unconditionally appropriated goods 
to the contract. In such a situation, it can be argued that the act of appropriating goods to the contract with the 
buyer's consent may result in a description on them so that the seller cannot unilaterally recall and substitute 
them. See also, Bridge, M., (1997) at 199. 
4g Goode, R. M., (1995) at 274-277,294,, 362-367. See also, Beale, H., (1980) at 90-93. 
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buyer can reject a re-tender if, but only if, time for performance is of the essence or, though 
not originally of the essence, has been made so as the result of notice procedure, or more than 
a reasonable period of time has elapsed since the contract date delivery. 4' 
Some others'o, in contrast, have disagreed with this view and suggested that delivery of 
goods which do not comply with a condition would be breach of contract and always entitle 
the innocent buyer to reject the non-conforming goods, and, in the case of non-severable 
contract it does, in itself, amount to a repudiation of the contract by the seller entitling the 
buyer to accept it and terminate the contract. This would be regardless of whether the buyer 
could, or could not, terminate for the failure of the seller to deliver within the contract time. 
On this view, the seller is not entitled to cure the breach, but if the buyer chooses to reject 
without terminating, the seller will be entitled to attempt to cure his breach by a fresh 
delivery. 51 
As regards the cases cited to support the existence of a right to cure for seller, the 
advocates of the second view have argued that these cases cannot be authorities to establish a 
general right to cure. 52 A number of these cases, they argue, can be explained as cases where 
the sellers had not effectively appropriated goods to the contract. On their view, the case most 
often cited as authority on the issue, Borrowman Phillips & Co. v. Free & HolljS13 , 
does not 
prove the existence of a general right to cure. This case, they suggest, can only be an authority 
where the seller has not comn-dtted himself as to the appropriation. In such a case, where the 
goods offered do not correspond with the contract he has an option to withdraw his tender and 
make a fresh offer. 54 It does not apply to a case where the seller has made a binding 
appropriation or has actually delivered goods in performance of his delivery obligation and it 
55 turns on that they are not in conformity with the contract. . On this 
interpretation, a number 
of cases cited in support of the existence of the right to cure for the seller become doubtful, 
51 
since the authority cited in these cases is Borrowman. The proponents of the second 
49 Goode, M. R., (1995) at 365 and then 279. See also Beale, H., (1980) at 91; Beale H. G.; Bishop, W. D. and 
Furmston, M. P., (1995) at 482,503 and 510; Lord Devlin, (1966) at 203. 
50 Bradgate, R., (1995) at 247; Bradgate and White (1995) at 75; Atiyah, P. S. & Adams, J., (1995) at 455456; 
Bridge, M., (1997) at 163,198-201. 
51 See Bradgate and White (1995) at 76. 
52 See in this regard, Bradgate and White (1995) at 71-75; Bridge, (1997) at 199-201. 
53 [1878] 4 Q. B. D. 500. 
54 Ile editors of Benjamin's Sale of Goods, has cited this case as authority for this proposition (Guest, A. G., et 
al, (1997) Para. 19-02 1). 
55 See e. g., BradgateR., (1995) at 247; Bridge, (1997) at 199. 
Such as Motor Oil Hellas (Corinth) Refineries S. 4. v. Shipping Corpn of India (The Kanchenjunga) [ 1990] 1 
Lloycrs Rep. 391 at 399; Empresa Exportadora de Azucar v. Industria Azucareva Nacional SA. (The Playa 
Largo) [1983] 2 Lloyds Rep. 171 at 186; E. E. & Brian Smith (1928), LD. v. ffleatsheafMills. LD [1939] 2 
KB. 302 at 315; Gertreide Import Gesellschaft mb Hv Itoh & Co. [1979] 1 Lloyds Rep. 592 at 594 
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approach also argue that the cases of Ashmore & Sone v. CS. COX & C017 , Brian Smith v. 
"eatsheaf Mills" and McDougall v Aeromarine of Emsworth" can be explained on the 
same way as Borrowman. Cases such as Agricultores Federados Argentinos v Ampro SA 60 
have also been explained as those concerned with the buyer's right to make a replacement 
nominations of vessels under f. o. b. contracts. Such cases can only, they argue, support the 
right to cure for the seller by way of inference. 61 Similarly, cases such as Longbottom v. Bass 
Walk-er62 have been explained as cases involving instalment deliveries in which different rules 
may be applicable. 6' 
On the second approach, a seller who has made a delivery which does not comply with 
a "condition" may, however, be entitled to cure his default under the following 
circumstances. 64 First is where the buyer rejects the non-conforming goods and allows the 
seller to make a new tender. He may be able to do so where the buyer has lost his right to 
terminate after rejection. In some cases, the seller may be able to do so under the principle of 
mitigation. Although the buyer is not required under the general law to accept the seller's offer 
to make conforming delivery after rejection, the principle of mitigation, as will be discussed 
when dealing with the restrictive role of the principle of mitigation on the right to claim 
damages, may require him to accept the seller's offer to cure in order to mitigate his IOSS. 65 
Similarly, the seller of unascertained goods may be entitled to cure as long as his offer to 
57 [1899] 1 Q. B. 436. 
51 [1939] 2 Q. 13.302. The relevant statement cited in this case has also been explained as obiter, because the 
reasoning to which is referred is only one of two reasons for the decision (see Bradgate and White, (1995) at 
73). The same has been said as to the comment in Motor Oil Hellas (Corinth) Rqflneries SA. v. Shipping 
Corpn ofIndia (The Kanchejunga) [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 391 at 399, since the statement relied on was made 
in a case concerned with nomination of vessel under a charterparty contract. 
59 [1958] 3 All E. R. 431. The case of Gertreide Import GeselIschaft mb Hv Itoh & Co. [1979] I Lloyd's Rep. 
592 can also be explained in this way. McDougall has also been explained as a case concerned with a 
contract containing an express term giving the seller a right to make a further tender after the buyer's 
rejection. It was not based on the general provisions of the law (see Bradgate and White, (1995) at 74). 
60 [1965] 2 Lloyd! s Rep. 157. See Bradgate and White, (1995) at 74. It seems that Bremer Handelsgesellschaft 
m. b. H. v. J. H. Rayner & Co. Ltd. [1979] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 216 at 229 could be explained in this way. 
61 However, it can be said that nomination of a vessel is broadly equivalent to appropriation of goods to a 
contract. That is, as appropriation identifies some particular goods to the contract, nomination of a vessel 
identifies the vessel to be used in performance. As a result, such cases can be authorities for a limited right of 
cure; where no binding appropriation/non-dnation has been made. 
62 [1922] W. N. 245. As Atkin LJ indicated in respect of the Longbottom v. Bass Walker at 246. In this way 
Tefley v. Shand (1871) 25 L. T. 658 can also be explained, since in that case the plaintiffs (brokers who 
actually sold the cargo in their names) undertook to buy gradually the 500 bales of cotton in a certain prices. 
63 See e. g., Bradgate, (1995) at 247. The other cases such as S. I. A. T. di dal Ferro v. Tradax Overseas SA [19801 
1 Lloyds Rep. 53 at 63 and Empresa Exportadora de Azucar v. Industria Azucareva Nacional S. A. (The 
Playa Larga) [1983] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 171 at 185 can be explained on the basis that no authority has been cited 
in favour of the view in the statements cited in these cases. Moreover, the comments are rendered in respect 
of seller's duty to present documents in a documentary sale. It is not thus clear whether it would be applied to 
the other type of contracts and in respect of the delivery of defective goods under documentary sale itself. 
64 See in this respect, Bradgate and White, (1995) at 75. 
65 For instance, in Payzu Ltd. v. Saunders [1919] 2 K. B. 581, Scrutton LJ said that "in commercial contracts it is 
generally reasonable to accept an offer from the party in default" (ibid., at 589). 
JJ14VERSITY Oý 
%AEFFIELD 
LePAR, 
Chapter Two: Buyer's Remedies Under English Law 42 
appropriate a particular cargo for the contract has not been unconditionally accepted by the 
buyer . 
66 In this way one may explain the cases in which a seller was given a right to re-tender 
correct documents within the contract period when the buyer refused to accept them on the 
ground that they are not corresponding with the contract. 67 
2.2. Breach of "Intermediate" Term 
As indicated before, where breach of a term classified as an intermediate term does not result 
in serious consequences the only remedy available for it is to claim damages. Rejection and 
termination can be justified only when breach has attained a certain degree of seriousness. As 
explained in the introductory remarks of this chapter, this is a circumstance which was first 
recognised in HongKong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd's and its 
application to sale contracts was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in the Hansa Nord case in 
69 1976. 
According to the doctrine of serious breach, the court's duty is, at the first stage, to 
decide whether or not the broken term, on its true construction, was a condition. If the term 
broken is held not to be a condition, the court then should look at the breach itself and examine 
whether it is sufficiently serious to justify termination of the contract on the common law 
principles. 70 If it does, the buyer will be entitled to reject the non-conforming goods and 
terminate the contract: if it does not there will be only a right to claim for damages. 
2.2.1. Description of the Doctrine 
Notwithstanding that justifýýg termination on account of the theory of serious breach is a 
well-accepted rule now, there is no generally accepted terminology to describe the breach 
satisfying the requirements of the doctrine. Various expressions are used to refer to this 
doctrine. For instance in the leading case of HongKong Fir itself, Upjohn L. J. described the 
breach satisfying the requirement of the doctrine as one which goes "so much to the root of the 
contract that it makes fiirther commercial performance of the contract impossible, or in other 
66 One may argue that the point can be supported by the language of s. 27 of the Sale of Goods Act. The section 
requires the seller to deliver "the goode'. It is quite possible to say that such a language refers to "the specific 
goods" or, in a contract for unascertained goods, "the goods actually appropriated to the contract". As long as 
some particular goods are not effectively allocated to the contract the seller's duty is simply to identify some 
goods which conform to the contract terms. On this reading, the section would fit with a right of cure up to the 
stage of appropriation to identify the contract goods. 
67 Such as S. I. A. T. di dal Ferro v. Tradar Overseas S. A [1980] 1 Lloyds Rep. 53 at 63 and Empresa 
ExportadoradeAzucarv. Industria Azucareva Nacional S. A. (The Playa Larga) [1983] 2LIoyd'sRep. 171 at 
185. See also, Guest, A. G., et al, (1997) Para. 19-062. 
68 [1962] 2 Q. B. 26. 
69 [1976] 1 Q. 13.44 at 60,73 and 84. 
70 See e. g., Cehave N. V v. Bremer HandelsgeselIschaft mbH (The Hansa Nord) [197611 Q. B. 44, at 60,73,84; 
Bunge Corp v. Tradax Export S. A. [1981] 1 W. L. R. 711 at 717. 
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words where the whole contract is frustrated". " Diplock L. J., on the other hand, described it 
as a breach which results in an event which deprives an innocent party "of substantially the 
whole benefit which it was the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract that he 
should obtain as the consideration for perforniing" the contract. 72 In subsequent application or 
affirmation of the doctrine, the courts have described the breach giving rise to a right of 
termination under this doctrine in various terms. 7' It has sometimes been described as a breach 
which "goes to the root" of the contraCt74, or as being 'Tundamental"7, or which "destroys the 
consideration which he gave"7. 
However, what is certain is that these are not really different tests but are different 
ways of saying the same thing. Thus a breach which "goes to the root of the contract" is 
"fundamental" (going to the root); a breach which deprives a party of the whole benefit 
destroys the consideration he gave (by depriving him of the consideration he was to receive) 
and, from the innocent party's point of view, frustrates the commercial purpose by affecting 
the substance of the contract. 
2.2.2. Operation of the Doctrine 
Before the HongKong Fir doctrine comes into operation it must be proved that the broken 
term is a term which does not fall into the category of condition or warranty. If so, although 
every breach of such a term may give rise to a right to claim damages, the right to reject and 
terminate will arise only where it is proved that the breach attains a certain degree of 
seriousness. The difficult step for the operation of the doctrine is to establish that the breach is 
sufficiently serious. Three factors have been considered by the courts for this purpose the 
nature of the breach, its foreseeable consequences, 77 and the nature of event resulting from the 
breach. 78 
71 [1962] 2 Q. 13.26 at 64. 
72 Ibid., at 66. See also, Cehave N. V v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH (The Hansa Nord) [1976] 1 Q. 13.44, 
per Roskill L. J. at 73. 
73 See generally, Guest, A. G., (1984) at 480; Treitel, G. H., (1988) Para. 260; Carter, J. W., (1991) Paras. 620, 
647. 
74 See e. g., Decro-Wall International S. A. v. Practitioners in Marketing Ltd. [1971] 1 W. L. R. 361 at 368, 
Cehave NY v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH(TheHansa Nord) [1976] 1 Q. 13.44 at 60,73,84. 
75 See e. g., Lord Diplock inPhoto Productions [1980] A. C. 827 at 849; Gill & Duffus S. A. v. Berger & Co. Inc. 
[1984] A. C. 382 at 391. 
76 See e. g., Cehave N. V v. Bremer Randelsgeselischaft mbH (The Hansa Nord) [1976] 1 Q. 13.44, per Roskill 
LJ at 73. 
77 Upjohn LJ in HongKong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [196212 Q. B. 26 at 64. 78 Ibid., per Diplock LJ at 66,72. See also Bunge Corp v. Tradax Export S. A. [198111 W. L. R. 711, per Lord 
Scarman at 717. Diplocles criteria has been criticised by Lord Devlin (see, Lord Devlin, (1966) at 197). In 
contrast see, Carter, J. W., (199 1) Para. 625. 
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(A) Actual and Foreseeable Consequences 
In order to establish that the breach is sufficiently serious as to justify the buyer's termination, 
the injured buyer may rely not only on the actual events caused by the breach but also on the 
foreseeable consequences of the breach. He may also be entitled to rely on the doctrine when 
the addition of foreseeable consequences to the actual ones satisfies the requirement of the 
doctrine, even if neither, when considered alone, would be sufficient. However, since 
termination of the contract may have prevented the foreseeable consequences from actually 
occurring, the buyer in such a situation may need to rely on the consequences which would 
have occurred but for termination. 
No clear authority can be found to explain what actual or foreseeable effects of breach 
can be relied to show that the breach is sufficiently serious. However, some authors have 
suggested that a distinction should be made between actual and foreseeable consequences. 79 
When the actual consequences of the breach are relied on what is required is that the injured 
buyer has to prove that those consequences are caused by the seller's breach even though they 
were not foreseeable at the time of breach. Beyond causation, there is no further requir=ent 
in this respect. But in the case of foreseeable ones, he cannot invoke the foreseeable 
consequences unless those are foreseeable at the time of termination. The same author 
continues to suggest that the fact that an injured buyer had foreseen that breach would be 
sufficiently serious cannot be conclusive. The effects of breach should be foreseeable by a 
reasonable person. The injured party's view may be relevant to what a reasonable person in his 
position would have foreseen. 'o 
However, this suggestion does not explain whether those consequences should be 
foreseeable by the seller in breach. And if so, at what time should they be foreseeable? Can the 
buyer rely on those consequences which were not reasonably foreseeable by the seller when 
the contract was made? As will be seen in the third section, the buyer can only recover 
damages for those results which were foreseeable by the seller at time of the contract. Hence, 
one may argue that how can a buyer terminate the contract on account of the results for which 
he cannot claim damages?. 
Degree of Foreseeability. It is also not clear whether it is sufficient for the buyer to prove 
that it was reasonably foreseeable that the seller's breach would have caused consequences 
which are sufficiently serious, or whether it is necessary to prove that those are the likely or 
79 See Carter, J. W., (199 1) Para. 652. 
go Carter, J. W., (1991) Para. 653. 
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the most likely consequence of the seller's breach. This issue raises the question of degree of 
foreseeability of the consequences of breach. 8' 
The question has not expressly been addressed by the courts. However, Professor 
Carter suggests that applying a very strict test and requiring substantially deprivation from the 
contract to be the most likely consequences of the breach is more doubtful. " As regards the 
other test, i. e., being the likely consequences of the breach, Carter also argues that the position 
is not quite clear. In HongKong Fir, although the Court of Appeal did not expressly refer to 
the issue, when considering whether the delay which was likely to occur as a consequence of 
the shipowner's default, their Lordships observed that the delay would not have been 
sufficiently serious since the vessel's engine crew had been replaced. It might be therefore 
argued, Carter says, that a foreseeable consequence of the shipowner's breach was serious 
delay, but this was not a likely consequence of the breach because in all likelihood the 
replacement engine crew would be competent. 83 
In contrast, Lord Devlin has suggested that physical injury should be distinguished from 
economic loss. 84 Where physical injury is a foreseeable consequence of the seller's breach this 
should give rise to a right to terminate the contract notwithstanding that the chances of 
physical injury are fairly remote. On the other hand, where, as in the HongKong Fir case, the 
foreseeable consequences of the default are economic loss it is appropriate to apply a stricter 
criterion, that is, the injured buyer has to prove that those consequences would be likely to 
occur as a result of seller's default. " 
(B) Degree of Seriousness 
As indicated above, the remedy of termination on the basis of the HongKong Fir doctrine is 
only available if the breach attains a certain degree of seriousness. The most significant stage 
in applying the doctrine is, therefore, to determine what degree of seriousness the breach must 
attain so that the doctrine could operate and give rise to a right to terminate the contract. 
81 The same question, as will be seen in damages section, arises in the case of recoverable loss. As to that issue, 
it is disputed whether to recover damages for loss resulting from the breach of contract, it is sufficient that the 
loss in question foreseeable or it must attain a degree more than the mere foreseeability. "2 Carter, J. W., (1991) Para. 653. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Lord Devlin, (1966) at 19 8. It is worth noting that the question of degree of foreseeability of recoverable loss 
is, as will be seen in detail in damages section, a controversial issue. At that place, in some English cases, it 
has been suggested that in order to ascertain the degree of requisite foreseeability of recoverable loss there 
must be a distinction between the personal injury and economic loss (see, H. Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. 
Uuley Ingham & Co. Ltd, [1978] Q. B. 791, the statement of Lord Denning MR. However, the view has not 
been welcomed by the other members of the Court of Appeal. ). 
85 Professor Carter favours this approach (see, Carter, J. W., (1991) Para. 653). In the absence of clear 
provision, Professor Carter suggests that one way of avoiding this problem is to allow the buyer to refuse to 
accept the goods in situations where a serious consequence is a foreseeable event and only to permit termination if serious consequences are likely to occur as a result of the breach (ibid. ), 
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Whether the breach of an intermediate term is sufficiently serious to give rise to a right 
to terminate the contract is a complex question. Thus, the innocent buyer who is seeking to 
rely on the doctrine so as to justify his termination has a Micult task to satisfy the court that 
the seller's breach has attained, or will be likely to attain, the sufficient degree of seriousness. 
In order to determine whether the breach of an intermediate term is sufficiently serious 
some criterion is required. When dealing with the expressions used to describe the doctrine, we 
saw that the courts have referred to the requisite criterion by using various phrases such as, 
breach resulting in a "substantial deprivation" of the party not in breach from the whole 
benefit of the contract or in such a result which "frustrates his purpose in making the contract" 
and a breach going to "the root of the contract". 
However, these phrases are not particularly helpful in analysing the law or in predicting 
the course of the courts' decisions. Description of the test by some vague phrases do not give a 
useful guideline to the judge to assess whether the breach resulted in serious consequences. It 
is also very difficult for the injured buyer or his legal adviser to predict at what degree the 
breach will be regarded as sufficiently serious and will satisfy the court to treat the buyer's 
termination as a justified termination. This is perhaps the main reason why the doctrine has 
been the subject of strong criticisms that it places the innocent party into an uncertain position 
and promotes inefficiency by rewarding the incompetent pron-dsor. 16 
It seems that these various expressions, as pointed out above, are all metaphors which 
mean much the same. What they indicate is that a breach of an intermediate term must be 
particularly serious before an aggrieved party is entitled to terminate the contract in 
accordance with the HongKong Fir doctrine. However, for the particular nature of the test of 
such a kind the judges are indeed seeking to retain a degree of discretionary control over the 
issue. The question what degree of breach will be regarded as sufficiently serious to justify 
termination is therefore left to the court to decide on the basis of the circumstances of each 
particular case. 
Seriousness as a Question of Fact. Accordingly, although the question whether an injured 
buyer was entitled to terminate the contract on account of the seller's breach of an 
intermediate term is a question of law, the question whether a particular breach is sufficiently 
serious to justify termination of the contract is a matter of fact which is to be decided on the 
basis of circumstances of each case. Thus it is not an issue that can be determined in advance 
by fixed rules. When applying the general requirement of "sufficiently serious breach", the 
courts classify a failure in performance with an eye to the nature of the breach and its actual 
86 See e. g., Weir, T., (1976) 33; Beale, H., (1980) at 98; Carter, I W., (1991)Paras. 625,626. 
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and foreseeable consequences, considering all the circumstances surrounding the contract, the 
subject-matter, the position of the party in breach and other relevant factors. 
ReIevant Factors. In order to determine whether the breach committed by the seller attains 
a "sufficient degree of seriousness" to give rise to the right of termination, regard can 
obviously be had to any factor shown to have relevance to the circumstances of the case. 
However, case law shows that there are certain factors which are more likely to be relevant. 
These include factors 87 such as loss or detriment suffered or likely to be suffered by the buyer 
as a result of the seller's breach, loss of benefits which were expected from the performance of 
the contract, " the adequacy of damages, " any offer to remedy, 90 and motives for 
termination? '. 
In this regard, they also look at the express, implied terms of the contract and relevant 
customs in order to determine what the buyer was legitimately entitled to obtain from the 
contract. A particular expectation of the aggrieved buyer would be taken into account if it is 
indicated by the contract. The court would then compare the consequences caused by the 
breach with the contractual expectation of the injured buyer and decide whether the breach has 
deprived (or will deprive) him substantially of that contract entitlement. In this connection, the 
courts are usually influenced by the parties' conflict of interests in terminating the contract. 
For this reason they consider, on the one hand, whether termination is necessary to protect the 
87 See generally, Carter, J. W., (1991) Paras. 655 and seq.; Treitel, G. H., (1988) Para. 264; Treitel, G. H. 
(1995) at686 andseq.; Brownsword, R., (1992) at 92 andseq. 
U HongKong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [1962] 2 Q. B. 26 at 66. As an example, see 
Cehave N. V v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH (The Hansa Nord) [1976] 1 Q. B. 44; Tradar Internacional 
SA. v. GoldschmidtSA. [1977] 2 Lloyd`s Rep. 604 at 612. 
89 See e. g., Buckley L. J. in Decro-Wall International S. A. v. Practitioners in Marketing Ltd. [1971] 1 W. L. R. 
361 (a distributorship case) which is cited with approval by Lords Wilberforce and Frazer in Federal 
Commerce &, Navigation v. Molena Alpha Inc. (The Nanffi) [1978] 3 W. L. R. 757 at 779 and 783. However, 
where damages are regarded as an inadequate remedy termination will likely be pern-dtted (Bremer 
HandeligeselIschaft m. b. H. v. Vanden Avenne-Izegem P. V. B. A. [1978] 2 Lloyds Rep. 109 at 113. 
90 According to some authors, this factor should have been given an important relevance to the fact whether the 
consequences of the breach are sufficiently serious (see Treitel, G. H (1967) at 155). 
91 It is worth noting that although English law does not overtly rccognisc an explicit general duty of "good faith" 
affecting the formation, performance or breach of contracts (see particularly Bingham LJ in Inter oto Pcr fi i tu e 
LibraryLtd. vStiletto Visual Programmes Ltd. [1989] Q. B. 433 at 439), there is no doubt that Englishjudges 
would take account of the behaviour of the parties when reaching decisions. Thus, if a court thinks that a 
buyer is acting in bad faith in trying to get out of a contract on the grounds of an alleged breach, for instance 
by trying to get out of the contract to avoid a fall in market prices the court will try to prevent the buyer 
escaping the contract. Thus, it may find that there is no breach, or that the breach is only of an intermediate 
term, not a condition, and is not sufficiently serious to allow the buyer to reject and terminate. This can be 
seen in Cehave N. V v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH (The Hansa Nord). In that case the original buyers 
who had sought to reject defective goods later re-acquired them for almost the same purpose from another 
source for about a third of the original contract price it was quite obvious that the court had grave suspicions 
about the buyer, and consequently refused to regard the sellers' breach of the term requiring that "goods be 
shipped in good condition" as sufficiently serious to justify their rejection. In that case Roskill L. J. observed 
that "Contracts are made to be performed and not to be avoided according to the whims of market fluctuatiore, 
([1976] 1 Q. B. 44 at 7 1). 
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injured buyer and, on the other, the prejudice which termination will cause the defaulting 
seller. If, on balancing the above-mentioned factors, they conclude that the injured buyer 
should be allowed to terminate, they will classify the failure in performance as "substantial" in 
order to produce the desired result; and conversely. 92 
2.3. Special Cases 
Although the general rules described above are applicable to the cases discussed below, for the 
reasons which will be made clear it seems appropriate to address them separately to assess 
how these rule are applied to these cases. 
2.3.1. Breach of Severable Contracts 
English sale of goods law makes a distinction between severable and non-severable 
contracts. 93 Where the contract is construed as severable the seller's breach of condition or an 
intermediate term, even-satis4ing the requirement of seriousness, in respect of one or more 
instalment deliveries does not necessarily entitle the buyer to terminate the contract as a whole. 
In such a situation, the buyer may terminate the contract as a whole only where the seller's 
defective performance in respect of one or more instalments amounts to a repudiation of the 
whole contract. Accordingly, the crucial issue is to determine whether or not the seller's non- 
conforming delivery in respect of one or more instalments has amounted to a repudiation of 
the contract as a whole. 
The seller under a severable contract will certainly be guilty of repudiation of the whole 
contract when his non-conforming delivery with respect to one or more instalments is 
associated with an express refusal to perform or refusal to perform except in a manner which 
94 is substantially different from that bargained for. The difficult case is, however, where 
repudiation has to be inferred from the present or past defective performance of a seller who is 
not expressing his intention in this way. Is the buyer entitled in such circumstances to reject 
the non-conforming deliveries and treat the whole contract as repudiated or is he entitled only 
to reject that part in respect of which there is a breach, or is he confmed to a claim for 
damages? The question is addressed by s. 31 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act but it does not 
answer this question: when does the seller's making defective deliveries in respect of one or 
92 See e. g., Decro-Wall International S. A. v. Practitioners in Marketing Ltd. [1971] 1 W. L. R. 361 at 380. See 
also Treitel, G. H., (1995) at 686. 
93 Sale of Goods Act 1979 ss. 11 (4) and 31 (2). In view of temiinology, the usual approach is to speak of 
severable and non-severable contracts rather than obligations. But it has been suggested (Goode, R. M., 
(1995) at 284 fn. 48. ) that such a description is incorrect, since it is the obligation to deliver goods and to 
accept them and pay the price which is to be regarded severable or non-severable. 
'4 See e. g., Taylor v. Oakes, Roncoroni & Co. [1922], 127 L. T. 267 (C. A. ). 
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more instalments amount to a repudiation of the contract as a whole? It refers the case to the 
court to decide on the basis of "the terms of the contract and the circumstances of the case". 9' 
(A) Terms of the Contract 
The first factor referred to in section 31 (2) of the Act is a consideration of the terms of the 
contract. Thus the court, in deciding whether the seller's making non-conforming delivery in 
respect of one or more instalments amounts to a repudiation of the entire contract, is to look 
first at the terms of the contract itself and determine whether or not non-compliance with those 
terms is such as to amount to a repudiation of the contract as a whole. The parties may 
contemplate particular provisions dealing with the circumstances under which one of the 
parties is entitled to terminate the contract for the other partys non-confornling deliveries. 
However, discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of the present research which deals with 
the position of general law of remedies for breach of contractual terms. 
Circumstances of the Case 
The second factor referred to in s. 31 (2) is a consideration of the circumstances of the case. 
Under this provision, for a seller to be treated as repudiating the contract as a whole it is not 
necessary to prove that he has intimated to the buyer his intention no longer to be bound by the 
contract. He will be guilty of repudiation if his default goes to the root of the contract. In 
deciding whether the default has such an effect, the court must consider "first, the ratio 
quantitatively which the breach bears to the contract as a whole, and secondly, the degree of 
probability and improbability that such a breach will be repeated". 96 Relying on these criteria, 
in Maple Kock Co. Ltd. v. Universal Furniture Products (Wembley) Ltd7 the seller was held 
not repudiating the contract as a whole where under a contract to be performed by some 66 
deliveries, one out of the first 19 was defective. On the other hand, in Robert A. Munro & Co. 
Ltd. v. Meyer" where the buyer agreed to buy from the seller 1,500 tons of meat and bone 
meal, to be delivered at the rate of 125 tons per month and after about half of the total 
contract quantity had been delivered by the seller the buyer realised that those were seriously 
95 Section 31 (2): "Where there is a contract for the sale of goods to be delivered by stated instalments, which are 
to be separately paid for, and the seller makes defective deliveries in respect of one or more instalments, ..., 
it 
is a question in each case depending on the terms of the contract and the circumstances of the case whether the 
breach of contract is a repudiation of the whole contract or whether it is a severable breach giving rise to a 
claim for compensation but not to a right to treat the whole contract as repudiated. " 
96 Lord Heward in MapleHock Co. Ltd. v. Universal Furniture Products (Wembley) Ltd [193411 K. B. 148 at 
157. 
97 [1934] 1 K. B. 148 at 157. See also, Regent OHG Aisenstadt und Barig v. Francesco ofiermyn Street Ltd. 
(198113 All ER 327. 
98 [193012 K. B. 312. 
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defective and purported to treat the contract as repudiated, the court held that the buyer was 
entitled to do so. 99 
On the basis of what has been said above, it can be said that whereas under a non- 
severable contract the Act, as most English writers suggest, seems to give an innocent buyer 
an option to treat the seller's breach of a condition as a repudiation of the contract, in the case 
of severable contract it does not recognise such a presumption. Accordingly, where the seller 
is, for example, late in tendering one instalment, or tenders an instalment which does not 
correspond with a condition, it will not normally constitute a repudiation of the contract as a 
whole but will do only if it is made in such circumstances as to lead a reasonable person to 
conclude either an intention to repudiate or an inability to perform the contract as a whole, '00 
or, its effect is so serious as to go to the root of the contract. 101 Individual terms qualifYing the 
seller's delivery obligation will therefore not be conditions in the sense that the seller's failure 
to comply with them in tendering an instalment amount to a repudiation of the whole contract. 
The seller's compliance with them is a condition precedent to the buyer's liability in respect of 
that particular instalment. Thus where time is of the essence the seller's late delivery as 
regards one instalment will only affect the innocent buyees liability in respect of that 
particular instalment. The same is true where the seller tenders an instalment which is not in 
accordance with the other terms of the contract. 
(Q Effects of Repudiatory Breach 
Where the seller's non-conforming delivery in respect of some instalments amounts to a 
repudiation of the contract as a whole the buyer will be entitled to accept it and terminate the 
contract. If the seller's repudiatory breach is accepted by the buyer it would entitle him to 
reject the present defective tender and treat himself as discharged from liability in respect of 
all finther performance. He can do so even where he has previously accepted some 
instalments. However, the question arises here whether the buyer is entitled to reject the prior 
instalments. The language of s. 31 (2) is not quite clear. But some academic authors suggest 
that the language of the section is concerned with the future performance, so that the buyer 
can refuse to perform outstanding obligations. In addition, the buyer's severable obligations to 
99 In that case, Wright I observed; "Where the breach is substantial and so serious as the breach in this case and 
has continued so persistently, the buyer is entitled to say he has the right to treat the whole contract as 
repudiated" ([193012 K. B. 312 at 33 1). The same principles have been clearly stated by Donaldson J with 
respect to an alleged repudiation by the buyer in a f. o. b. case of Warinco A. G. v. Samor S. PA. [1977] 2 
Lloyd's Rep. 582 at 588. Although the decision was reversed on appeal ([1979] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 450). the 
disagreement was purely with the application of the law to the facts, and no doubt was cast on Danoldsoifs 
statement of the relevant principles. 
100 See e. g., Donaldson J. WarincoA. G. v. SamorS. P. A. [1977] 2 Lloycfs Rep. 592 at 588. 
101 See e. g., Honck v. Muller [1881] 7 Q. B. D. 92; Lord Blackburn inMerseYSteel & Iron Co. v. Naylor, Benzon 
& Co. [1884] 9 App. Cas. 434 at 443-4. 
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accept previous conforming instalments have already been fulfilled and can be no longer 
undone. 102 However, it has been suggested'o' that where the instalments already accepted 
constitute parts of an indivisible whole, e. g., individual volumes of a set of books, parts of a 
machine, or a suit of clothes, the buyer will be entitled to reject the previously accepted 
instalments. Of course, in such cases the contract is ab initio rescinded by returning the 
instalments already delivered and he will be entitled to recover the whole, or any part, of the 
price paid. 104 
(D) Effects of Non-Repudiatory Breach 
Where the lack of conformity of some instalments has not constituted a repudiation of the 
contract as a whole, the buyer is not allowed to terminate the contract as a whole. 105 Under 
such circumstances, the seller is entitled to require the buyer to accept and pay for each 
instalment tendered or which will be tendered in conformity to the contract. The buyer will not 
be entitled to refuse to accept and pay for an instalment because of a defect in or short or late 
delivery of an earlier instalment; nor is he allowed to insist on waiting to see whether the seller 
will make proper delivery of subsequent instalments before he accepts and pays for an 
instalment. 106 
However, the Sale of Goods Act has not made clear what remedy the buyer will have 
where the lack of conformity in respect of some instalments has not amounted to a repudiatory 
breach. S. 31 (2) of the Act speaks only of "a severable breach giving rise to a claim for 
compensation". It does not say whether the buyer may be entitled to reject the non-conforming 
instalments in circumstances where he is not able to terminate the contract as a whole. The 
language of s. 31 of the Act is not quite clear. It appears that the section assumes that where 
the seller's making non-conforming delivery as regards one or more instalments does not 
amount to a repudiation of the entire contract the buyer has only one option, i. e., to claim for 
damages. The sub-section, as Professor Atiyah suggests 107 . does not seem to contemplate the 
possibility of permitting the buyer to reject that particular delivery while keeping the contract 
on foot. Under such a language it might be said that the Act treats compliance of an instalment 
with the terms of contract as a warranty breach of which under the Act may only give rise to a 
102 See e. g., Atiyah, P. S. & Adams, J., (1995) at 455; Guest, A. G., et al, (1997) Para. 12-070. See also, 
Bradgate, R., (1995) at 257. 
103 Guest, A- G., et al, (1997) Para. 8-078. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ihe reason for that has been clearly stated by Brett L. I in Reuter, Hufeland & Co. v. Sala & Co. [1879] 4 
C. P. D. 239 at 256, which was cited with approval by Lord Farwell in Jackson v. Rotax Motor & Cycle Co. 
[191012 K. B. 937 at 947. 
106 See Guest, A. G., et al, (1997) Para. 8-079 and the authorities cited in fils. 68,69. 
107 Atiyah' p. S. & Adams, J., (1995) at 454. 
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right to claim damages. On the other hand, compliance of substantial parts of all instalments 
with the contract terms is a condition precedent for the buyer's duty to accept and pay for 
them. Despite the imprecision of s. 31 (2), some authors have suggested that "there is a 
considerable case law support for the buyer's right to reject non-confom-dng instalments, even 
if the buyer has lost the right to terminate the contract or has not yet acquired it". 10' In 
addition, s. 35A (2) of the Sale of Goods Act, which permits the buyer to accept the 
conforming instalments and reject the non-conforming ones, would support severable rejection 
rights. '09 
Likewise, the Act provides no clear provisions regulating the circumstances where the 
buyer will be entitled to reject some instalments which do not conform with the contract terms. 
This question, therefore, arises under what circumstances the seller's breach of contractual 
obligations as regards one instalment may entitle the buyer to refuse to accept a non- 
conforming instalment. In the absence of a clear statement of law, some authors have 
suggested that the general principles applicable to non-severable contract should apply to each 
instalment. "O That is to say, for remedial purposes each instalment is to be regarded as the 
subject of a distinct contract, although within a main contract and the principles applied to a 
contract containing a single delivery obligation should be applied to such a subsidiary 
contract. As a result, the different approaches rendered in relation to breach of a condition 
under a non-severable contract arise in this connection. That is, where the broken term is 
classified as a warranty or an intermediate term whose breach has not resulted in serious 
consequences with respect to that particular instalment the buyer's remedy is only to claim for 
damages. Whereas, if the broken term is treated as a condition any breach by the seller in 
respect of a particular instalment will (subject to s. 15A) entitle the buyer to reject that 
particular part. After the buyer has lawfully rejected the non-conforming instalment, if one 
accepts that the seller has a general right to cure he is entitled to cure the default by delivering 
a substitute instalment in conformity with the contract, provided that he does so within the 
time limited for delivery of that instalment. "' According to the other view previously analysed, 
the seller's defective delivery (assuming that it does not amount to a repudiation of the whole 
contract) entitles the buyer to reject it and give the defaulting seller the opportunity to make a 
fresh tender or immediately terminate that subsidiary contract. Under this approach, breach of 
a condition or an intermediate term satisfying the requirement of seriousness in respect of a 
log Bridge, M., (1997) 40 at 185 and fn. 250 in which he cites a number of authorities for this view. See also 
Atiyah, P. S. &Adams, J., (1995) at 454; Guest, A. G., etal, (1997) Para. 8-080 
109 Bridge, M., (1997) 40 at 185. 
110 Bridge, M., (1997) 40 at 185. 
111 Goode, R. M., (1995) at 365; Guest, A. G., et al, (1997) Para. 8-080 
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particular instalment would strike that subsidiary contract out of the main contract, which is 
pro tanto tem-dnated. ' 12 This is true according to the former view where the time fixed for 
delivery of an instalment has expired and has been of the essence. Where the buyer has 
exercised his severable rejection right in this way the seller will not be entitled 
afterwards to claim to deliver nor the buyer will be entitled to have the instalment in 
respect of which the seller has made defective delivery. The sole remedy of the buyer 
will lie in damages. "' 
2.3.2. Breach of Time Stipulation 
(A) Sketch qfDiscussion 
Failure to perform a stipulation as to time for performance of an obligation does not differ 
intrinsically from any other failure to perform. As with the terms concerning the goods 
themselves, it is not breach of any stipulation as to time for performance, but only of some 
which may give rise to a right to terminate the contract. However, time provisions have a 
history and terminology of their own in English law; and for this reason, perhaps, are usually 
considered separately. ' 14 
(" Classification and Terminology 01 
Notwithstanding that the Sale of Goods Act contains a particular provision for stipulations 
about time of performance, it fails to make clear what consequences will follow if a time 
provision is broken. The only thing which it provides is that the court should decide whether 
15 or not the infringed stipulation was of the "essence of the contract"' . In this respect, s. 10 
(2) 
provides that whether any stipulation as to time other than that of payment"' is or is not "of 
the essence of the contract" depends on the terms of the contract. 117 The Act also fails to make 
clear the position of the case where a particular time provision is not fixed by the contract. 
112 See also Guest, A. G., etal, (1997) Para. 8-080; Bridge, M., (1988) at 263-265. 
113 The view is cited in- Guest, A. G., et al, (1997) Para. 8-080. However, the editors of Benjamin's Sale of 
Goods themselves suggest that the seller should be entitled to cure the default by delivering a substitute 
instalment (ibid. ) 
114 There are also other reasons which may justify the separate consideration of time provisions in contract law. 
First, time stipulations attract a notice procedure under which time stipulation can be made essential even 
where the term was not originally of such character. Secondly, in commercial contracts, a court is more likely 
ready to treat a time stipulation as a condition than other contractual terms. See also, Carter, J. W., (1991) 
Para. 543; Treitel, G. H., (1995) at 739. 
115 The Act, in dealing with the nature of time stipulations, makes no explicit reference to the doctrine of 
conditions and warranties which is so dominant elsewhere of the Act. It uses a different terminology to 
describe a time stipulation strict compliance with which is a condition precedent to the promiseds obligation. 116 With respect to stipulations as to time of payment, sub-section (1) provides that unless a different intention 
appears from the terms of the contract, such stipulations are not of the essence of a contract of sale. 117 InMartindale v. Smith [1841] 1 Q. B. 389 at 395, a case decided before the passing of the Sale of Goods Act, 
Lord De=an observed "In a sale of chattels time is not of the essence of the contractý unless it is made so by 
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Accordingly, as regards the time for perfomiance of a particular obligation two general 
possibilities may arise: first, where the time for perforniance is fixed by the contract, and 
second, where no particular time provision is specified in the contract. In both cases this 
question may arise whether or not time for performance is of the essence of the contract. 
(1) Time is of the Essence 
The question whether a stipulation as to time is of the essence may be resolved first by the 
terms of the contract itself. "' A time stipulation will be regarded as the essence of contract 
where the parties have expressly provided that strict compliance is essential. 119 In the absence 
of such an express provision, the question whether time is of the essence of the contract is one 
of construction, that is, it is the court's duty to determine whether the nature of the subject- 
matter of the contract or other surrounding circumstances indicate that the parties should have 
intended time to be essential. 120 The court may also reach the same result by another way, that 
is, whether even a brief postponement of the performance at the stipulated time would deprive 
the claimant of "substantially the whole benefit that it was intended that he should obtain from 
the ContraCtso. 121 
Notwithstanding that the Sale of Goods Act remits the question whether a time 
stipulation in a sale contract is of the essence to the discretion of the court to decide, on the 
basis of construction of the contract, English courts have made efforts to formulate some 
general principles governing the legal classification of stipulations as to time. In this way it 
has been said, on the one hand, that "in modem English law time is prima facie not of the 
essence of a contrace"22; and, on the other hand, that "broadly speaking time will be 
considered of the essence in 'mercantile' contracts". 12' Nevertheless, in the case of contract for 
the sale of goods, the courts have taken a more specific view as to the seller's delivery 
express agreement". See also Lord Simon in United Scientific Holdings Ltd. v. Bumley Borough Council 
1111978] 
A. C. 904 at 941. 
The Sale of Goods Act 1979 s. 10 (2). 
119 See e. g., Steedman v. Drinkle [1916] A. C. 275 at 280. The time stipulation will have the effect of an express 
condition where the contract provides that, in the event of one partys any failure to perform within the 
stipulated time, the other is to be entitled to terminate (see e. g. Maredelanto Compania Naviera SA v. 
Bergbau-Handel G in bH (The Mihalis Angelos) [1971] 1 Q. 13.164), or, that the stipulation as to time is to be 
a condition. 
120 Lord Diplock in United Scientific Holdings Ltd. v. Burnley Borough Council [1978] A. C. 904 at 927. See 
also, Lord Hailsharn of St. Marylebone, (1983) vol. 9 Para. 481. 
121 Lord Diplock in United Scientific Holdings Ltd. v. Bumley Borough Council [1978] A. C. 904 at 928. 
122 Lord Simon in United Scientific Holdings Ltd. v. Bumley Borough Council [1978] A. C. 904 at 940. 
'23 Lord Wilberforce in Bunge Corp v. Tradax Export S. A. [1981] 1 W. L. R. 711 at 716. See also, Lord 
Hailsham of St. Marylebone, (1983) vol. 41, Para. 686; Carter, J. W., (1991) para. 564. 
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obligation, and, in the words of McCardie J., '24 "In ordinary commercial contracts for the sale 
of goods the rule is clearly that time is pfimafacie of the essence with respect to delivery". 12' 
It is commonly said that the question whether the time specified for perforniance of a 
particular obligation is essential is based on consideration of commercial convenience and 
certainty applicable in particular context, rather than on any general principle or presumption 
as to time being, or not being, of the essence. 126 For this reason, it is said that general 
statements such as those quoted in preceding paragraphs do not prove that this is a 
presumption or rule of law, but is apparently a presumption of fact about the intention of the 
127 parties in the paramount interests of commercial certainty , or 
in the language of Lord 
Lowry "treatment of time limits as conditions in mercantile contracts does not appear ... to 
be 
justifiable by any presumption of fact or rule of law, but rather to be a practical expedient 
021 founded on and dictated by the experience of businessmen ... On this 
basis, the mere fact 
that the contract can be labelled "mercantile" or "commercial" does not determine, in itself, the 
issue. 129 To find the commercial significance of the term, therefore, the court must look "at the 
contract in the light of surrounding circumstances, and then make up its mind about the 
intention of the parties, as gathered from the instrument itself'. "0 Alternatively, if the exercise 
has already been gone through by arbitrators, their finding about the commercial significance 
of the term will be adopted by the court. "' 
By way of summary, in three cases a stipulation as to time for performance is 
132 
commonly regarded as of the essence of the contracts. First, where the courts have held it to 
be S0.133 Secondly, when a term has to be performed by one party as a condition precedent to 
the ability of the other party to perform another term. 134 Thirdly, where the contract says so. 
12' Hartley v. Hymans [1920] 3 K. B. 475, at 484. See also by the same judge in J Aron & Co. v. ComptOir 
Wegimont [19211 3 K. B. 435 at 43940; James Finlay and Co. Ltd. v. At. V Kwik Hoo Tong Handel 
Moatschappif [1929] 1 K. B. 400, per Scrutton LI at 407. 
123 See also, StoIjar, S. J., (1955) at 532, and the authorities cited at fns. 25 and 26. 
126 For example in Bunge Corp v. Tradax Export Lord Roskill observed: "I would emphasise in this connection 
the need for certainty in this type of transaction ... Parties to commercial 
transactions should be entitled to 
know their rights at once and should not, when possible, be required to wait upon events before those rights 
can be determined" ([1981] 1 W. L. R. 711 at 725). See also, Guest, A. G., et al, (1994) vol. I Para. 21-012; 
Treitel, G. H., (1995) at 741. See also Bradgate (1995) at 38; Carter, I W., (1991) Para. 564. 
127 See e. g., Perell, Paul M., (1990) at 426; Clarke, M., (1991) at 30. 
128Bunge Corp v. TradaxExportS. A. [1981] 1 W. L. R. 711 at 719. 
129 See also, ibid., at 729; United Scientific Holdings Ltd. v. Burnley Borough Council [1978] A. C. 904 at 924, 
950. 
130 Bentsen v. Taylor, Sons & Co. [1893] 2 Q. B. 274, per Lord Bowen at 281. 
131 See e. g. Compagnie Commerciale Sucres Et Denrees v. C. Czarnikow Ltd. (The Naxos) [1991] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep. 29. 
132 See in this respect, Clarke, M., (1991) at 31. 
133 For instance, as Scrutton L. J. in James Finlay and Co. Ltd. v. N. V Kwik Hoo Tong Handel Maatschappy 
[192911 K. B. 400 at 407) observed "since the decision in Bowes v. Shand ((1877) 2 App. Cas. 455) it has 
been well settled that on a sale of goods a condition as to the time of shipment is vital and is of the essence of 
the contract. " 
134 Lord Roskill in Bunge Corp v. Tradax Export S. A. [1981] 1 W. L. R. 711 at 729. 
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Beyond these, it is all a matter of substantial deprivation and the circumstances of the case 
which are to be relied on in this connection. 
Breach of an Essential Time Stipulation. Where time is of the essence, it is well-accepted 
law that strict compliance with the time of performance is a condition of the contract, so that 
any breach by the seller will entitle the buyer to terminate the contract, no matter how trivial, 
or whether or not it causes any loss. "5 Time stipulation with such a characteristic, as the case 
of other essential contract terms, means that performance by the seller of his obligations 
within the time allowed is a condition precedent to the buyer's liability, which is not fulfilled if 
the obligations are performed after that date. 136 As a result, the buyer can refuse to accept late 
performance and since the condition can no longer be fulfilled, the aggrieved buyer is totally 
discharged from performing his primary obligations under the contract enabling him to elect to 
affirm the contract or to terminate it. 
Time provisions are important to the argument that in the case of a non-conforming 
delivery the seller has a right to make a fresh tender. On this view, the seller must do so within 
the contract period if it is of the essence; making cure beyond that period would discharge the 
buyer from his primary obligations under the contract at that point and entitle him to terminate 
the contract. As a result, the seller is deprived of the right to cure, in the sense that the seller 
cannot insist that the buyer accepts a substitute performance at the moment when the time for 
performance has expired. 
aI) 2-ime is not of the Essence 
Where the time is not of the essence, the seller's failure to perform by the specified date will 
not entitle the buyer to terminate the contract at that date 137 , although 
he will be entitled to 
damages for delay beyond the specified date. The question arisen here is "how long does the 
seller have to perform his obligation before the buyer is entitled to terminate the contract on 
account of late performance? Does the seller have only a "reasonable time period" after the 
135 See e. g., Bowes v. Shand (1877) 2 App. Cas. 455. In this case the court held that the buyers were justified in 
the termination where the seller shipped the goods prior to a stipulated period, notwithstanding the buyers 
suffered no damages as a result of the breach. 
136 Bunge Corp. v. Tradax Export S. A. [1980] 1 Lloyd! s Rep. 294 (A. C. ); [1981] 1 W. L. R. 711 (H. L. ). 
137 See e. g., Raineri v. Miles [1981] A. C. 1050. In such a case, the buyer has also an option to resort to the 
notice-giving procedure. Under this provision, the buyer will be able to give a notice containing a reasonable 
period of time requesting the seller to perform the contract within that time. By this way, he will be able to 
make the time for performance of the essence. As a result, the seller's failure to perform within the additional 
period of time the buyer will be entitled to terminate the contract. It is to be recalled that the notice procedure 
was originally developed by equity in contracts for the sale of land and is frequently utilised in this context. 
However, common law has also applied the procedure to the contracts for sale of goods (McCardie J., in 
Hartley v. Haymans [1920] 3 K. B. 475 at 495; cf. by Lord Denning in Charles Rickards Ltd. v. Oppenhaim 
[1950] 1 K. B. 616 at 623, in which he described McCardie Ys statement "as accurately stating the law in 
regard to the sale of goods". ). 
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expiration of the specified date within which he was required to perform his obligation, "' or 
can he do so until such a time as the delay goes to the root of the contract and frustrates the 
commercial purpose of the contract? 139 
At first sight, the distinction between a "reasonable time" and a "frustrating time" 
period may seem semantic. However, there is a considerable difference between these two time 
periods: it is quite possible that the seller may perform his obligation within a time which is 
regarded as unreasonable, having regard to relevant factors, yet such an unreasonable delay 
may not frustrate the purpose of the contract. 140 In addition, these two periods involve 
different factors. "Reasonable time" is governed by what remains to be done by the seller in 
breach, how hard he has been pressed by the buyer previously, and other such factors, 
whereas "fiustrating time" is determined by the effect on the innocent party: does the delay 
deprive him of substantially the whole benefit of the contract? 141 
It has been thought'42 that McDougall v. AeromaHne of Emsworth Ltd. 143 could be the 
strongest authority for the former time period. Under a clause in a contract to build and 
supply" a yacht the suppliers undertook to use their "best endeavours" to complete the 
construction and fitting out by a certain date, but owing to the effect of delays and shortages 
such delivery date could not be guaranteed. Diplock, J., held that a clause in this form placed 
on the sellers a duty to deliver within a reasonable time of the specified date, and the 
obligation to deliver within a reasonable time after the certain period of date was a 
condition. '4' Tbus, the seller had had a reasonable time within which to perform his obligation, 
because the buyer could terminate after a reasonable time had expired. 
However, it could be argued that the case was not basically concerned with the issue in 
question. In that case, there was effectively no contractually delivery date; Diplock J. was 
therefore not concerned with the right to terminate but with the prior question, when the boat 
should have been delivered. He did not need to decide whether time was of the essence until he 
had decided what the delivery date was, which in this case he held that it was "within a 
reasonable time". At the second stage, Diplock J. held that this period was a condition, and 
13" Goode, R- M., (1995) at 365 and then p. 279. However, Professor Goo4e, when dealing with buyer's 
remedies for seller' s breach, observes that the seller's delay may give rise to a right of termination if the delay 
is so great as to fiustrate the commercial purpose of the contract (ibid., at 391). 
139 Devlin I in Universal Cargo Carriers Corp. v. Citati [1957] 2 Q. B. 401 at 426. See also Apps, A., (1994) 
at 535. 
140 Universal Cargo Carriers Corp. v. Citati [1957] 2 Q. B. 401 at 430,432. 
141 See also, Beale, Bishop & Furniston, (1995) at 505. 
142 Apps, A., (1994) at 536, although he himself rejects such an inference, but on other grounds. See also 
Goode, R. M, (1995) at 279, fn. 26. 
43 [1958] 3 All E. R. 431. 
44 Although the contract was for a building a yacht, is was treated as a contract of sale. 145 [1958] 3 All E. R. 431 at 438439. 
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since the seller did not deliver within that period the buyer was entitled to terminate the 
contract. 
Moreover, there are a number of authorities which support the view that the buyer can 
only terminate when the delay becomes so long as to frustrate the commercial purpose of the 
contract. For instance, in Universal Cargo Carriers Corp. v. Citati, 146 the charterer's 
obligation to complete loading within the lay times (the time permitted for loading) was held 
not to be of the essence of the contract, so that its breach did not entitle the owner to 
terminate, but gave rise to a claim for damages only. In this case, Devlin, J., held that the 
owners could terminate the contract only if the delay went to the root of the contract. What 
yardstick should be used to determine whether it went to the root of the contract, the arbitrator 
had held that the delay must have been for a reasonable time. Devlin J., however, rejected this 
criterion and held that the proper test in order to decide whether delay in fulfilling obligations 
under a contract amounts to a right of termination is that the given delay was so grave as to 
frustrate the commercial purpose of the contract. 
On this authority, a "reasonable time" is something less than the period required for the 
delay to "frustrate the charterparty", and therefore did not amount to a delay long enough to 
justify termination. 147. It could only be accepted as the test where the period regarded as 
reasonable time was the same as the period necessary to frustrate. 148 Accordingly, in such 
cases the victim of breach can only terminate the contract if the seller's delay would deprive 
him of substantially the whole benefit of the contract. It is consistent with the Hong Kong Fir 
test; where the time has not been regarded as the essence of contract it would be an innominatc 
term the breach of which amounts to a right of termination provided that the delay is so grave 
as to frustrate the commercial purpose of the contract. 149 
aII) No 7-Ime is Specified 
Where the contract is silent as to the time for performance, the court will imply a term that 
performance must be made within a reasonable time. 150 In such a case, the seller's failure to 
deliver the goods or cure the defect in them (assun-dng he has such a right) within a reasonable 
time will amount to a breach of contract, entitling the buyer to claim for damages. The 
question arises here whether such an implied time is a condition so that the seller's failure to 
perform his obligation within the period gives rise to a right of termination. In this respect, it 
146 [1957] 2 Q. B. 401. 
147 [1957] 2 Q. B. 401 at 434435. 148 Ibid., at 403. 
"9 See also, Guest, A. G., et al, (1997) Para. 8-025. 
150 Sale of Goods Act 1979 ss. 29 (3) and 59. See e. g., McDougall v. Aeromarine ofEmsworth Ltd. [1958] 3 All 
E. F- 431; Charles Rickards Ltd. v. Oppenhaim [1950] 1 K. B. 616 at 622. See also Carter, J. W., (199 1) Para. 
103. 
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has been subnfitted that where there is no time lin-dt for delivery, the contract continues until 
its purpose is fiustrated. "' 
The suggested view seems sound. This is because the rationale for the general rule that 
time is of the essence is the need for certainty, while where no time for performance has been 
fixed there is no certainty. Accordingly, where no time is specified in the contract, time is not 
normally of the essence in the first instance. In such cases, the buyer should, in the absence of 
special circumstances indicating otherwise, only be entitled to terminate the contract if the 
delay is such as to fiustrate the commercial purpose of the contract. This is because although 
there may well be cases where special circumstances indicate that a failure to perform within a 
reasonable time is to be regarded as a breach of condition entitling the buyer to terminate, 112 in 
the absence of such special circumstances it is difficult to accept that, where no time is 
specified under the contract, the parties would have intended that time would be of the 
essence. 
2.3.3. Breach of Quantity Stipulation 
A particular provision is set out by s. 30 of the Sale of Goods Act where the seller delivers the 
wrong quantity of goods. Under this section where the seller delivers to the buyer a quantity of 
goods less than he contracted to sell, the buyer may reject them. The same right is given to the 
buyer where the seller delivers to the buyer a quantity of goods larger than he contracted to 
sell. In the latter case, the buyer may accept the goods included in the contract and reject the 
rest, or he may reject the whole. 
However, the Act does not make clear whether delivery of wrong quantity is breach of a 
"condition" which, as already discussed, gives the buyer two separate rights to reject the 
goods and terminate the contract. Although the new sub-section (2A) inserted by the Sale and 
Supply of Goods Act 1994 has restricted the buyer's right to reject the whole of the goods 
delivered'", it does not say whether he has a separate right to terminate the contract. 
Similarly, it does not make clear whether the buyer is entitled to refuse to perform his 
obligation as to the missing part and terminate the contract in respect of that part, as the 
Convention seems to suggest (Art. 5 1). As far as the first question is concerned, some authors 
have suggested that giving the buyer a right "to reject the whole of the goods delivered in the 
151 Lord Devlin, (1966) at 208. See also, Guest, A. G., et al, (1997) Para. 8-034. 
152 See, e. g., McDougall v. AeromarineofEmsworth Ltd. [1958] 3 All E. R. 431; Thomas Borthwick (Glasgow) 
Ltd. v. Bunge & Co, Ltd. [1969]1 Lloyds Rep. 17. 
Under this new provision, a buyer who does not deal as consumer will not be entitled to reject the goods 
where the shortfall or, as the case may be, excess is so slight that it would be unreasonable for him to reject. 
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circumstances dealt with by s. 30 means that in substance the seller in such cases is treated as 
though he commits a breach of condition by delivering the wrong quantity. , 154 
2.3.4. Breach of the Duty to Tender Shipping Documents 
A further question is the application of the general rules explained above to the case where the 
seller has to perform his delivery obligations by tendering to the buyer (or his bank) some 
documents representing the purchased goods. In contracts of such type (such as c. i. f and 
sometimes in f. o. b. ) the seller is obliged to tender shipping documents, consisting essentially of 
a bill of lading, insurance policy and sale invoice"' in accordance with the requirements stated 
in the contract of sale. 
As a general rule, where the documents accord with the contract the buyer or his bank 
must accept and pay the price in accordance with the contract. "' However, as in the case of 
the goods themselves, the seller may tender the shipping documents in a way which do not 
conform to the contract requirements. Where the tendered documents do not correspond with 
the contract it is the settled law that the buyer (and in the case of payment through 
documentary credit, his bank) is entitled to reject and refuse to pay for them. "' The rule has 
been justified on the general principles already explained by that as in the case of the buyer's 
obligation to accept the goods delivered to him by the seller, his duty to accept the relevant 
documents is subject to the condition that the seller's delivery has been in conformity with the 
terms of the contract. Therefore, where the documents tendered are not in accordance with the 
requirements stated in the contract the buyer (or his bank) is entitled to refuse to accept them 
and to pay the price. For instance, in the case of James Finlay and Co. Ltd. v. XV Kwik 
Hoo Tong Handel Maatschqppij158 where goods were shipped out of time under a bill of 
lading incorrectly dated to show the timely shipment, the seller was regarded as guilty of 
breach of contract entitling the buyer to reject them. 
In a documentary sale contractý in addition to the right to reject the non-conforming 
documents, the buyer is given a further right to reject the goods substituting the subject of the 
documents on arrival where he learns that goods do not conform to the contract. The existence 
'm Atiyah, P. S. & Adams, J., (1995) at 109. In contrast see: Bradgate and White, (1995) at 75; Bridge, K, 
(1997) at 199 in which he says that the seller's duty to deliver right quantity is not expressed as contractual 
condition and as a result s. 11 (3) does not come into play. 
155 See e. g., Manbre Saccharine Co. Ltd. v. Corn Products Co. Ltd. [1919] 1 K. B. 198 at 202. He may be 
obliged to tender these documents together with any other documents required by the contract, e. g. a 
certificate of quality or origin. It should be noted that in a standard f o. b. contract only the bill of lading is 
required. 
'm See e. g., Gill &DuffusSA. v. Berger& Co. Inc. [1984] A. C. 382. See also, Sassoon, David, M., (1995) at 4; 
Bradgate, R., (1995) at 657. 
1-57 See in this respect, Guest, A. G., et al, (1997) Para. 19-126 and the authorities cited there. 
'm [1929] 1 K. B. 400 (AC) 
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of two rights of rejecting the documents and the goods is based on the fact that under a 
documentary sale contract, the seller's duty to deliver includes a duty to ship (or to appropriate 
to the contract goods already afloat, which the seller may have shipped himself or bought 
directly or indirectly from the shipper) goods, and a duty to tender proper shipping documents 
in accordance with the terms of the contract. In such cases the seller may fail to perform one 
or both of these duties; and the buyer may be entitled to reject in respect of any such failure. 
The authority which clearly recognised two separate duties for a c1f seller, i. e., the 
duty to ship conforming goods, and, to tender conforming documents, as well as two separate 
rights to reject non-confom-dng goods and documents is Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders & 
Sh ipp e rs L td. 159 In that case,. Devlin J. was of the view that the right to reject non-conforming 
goods is distinct from the right to reject non-conforming documents; the former arises when 
the goods have been taken up and found after examination to be not in conformity with the 
contract and the latter on tender of the documents. " Accordingly, the documents may be 
rejected if they are defective on their face, for instance by being wrongly dated or by 
indicating that the goods were not in good order and condition. The goods may also be 
rejected, even though the documents are in order and have been taken up and paid for, if they 
themselves are defective, for example, by being of unsatisfactory quality, provided that the 
defect was not apparent on the face of the documents. 
On this view, where the seller fails to tender the shipping documents in accordance with 
the requirements stated in the contract the buyer may be entitled to reject them even though the 
goods themselves are perfectly in accordance with the contract. Thus if the contract provides 
that the goods are to be shipped, and the bill of lading is to be dated, in January the buyer can 
reject the bill dated in February, even though the goods were actually shipped in January. "' 
Similarly, he can reject a bill of lading for a quantity of goods in excess of the contractual 
lin-dts, even though the goods actually shipped are within these limits. 162 He may also be 
entitled to reject the documents even though the defect on their face would not, of itself, have 
justified rejection of the goods. 163 
159 [1954] 2 Q. B. 459. Sin-dlarly, Lord Diplock in Gill & Duffus S. A. v. Berger & Co. Inc [1984] A. C. 382 at 
395, has referred to the buyer's right to reject documents and to reject goods as "separate and successive 
rights". See generally, Sassoon, David M., (1995) at 281 and seq. 
160 However, some academic authors have suggested that the existence of two separate rights of rejection 
prescribed by Devlin J. in British Traders & Shippers case is subject to some qualifications. In practice there 
can be found some cases in which such a separation is undem-dned. See in this respect, Atiyah, P. S. & 
Adams, J., (1995) at 467-8; Bridge, M., (1997) at 191. 
161 See e. g., In re General Trading Co. & Van Stolk's Commissiehandel [1910] 16 Com. Cas. 95. 
162 See e. g., Tamvaco v. Lucas (no. 1) [1859] 1 E. &E 581. See in this connection: Guest, A. G., ct al, (1997) 
Para. 19-126. 
163Aswas the case in CehaveN. V v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH (TheHansa Nord) [1976[ 1 Q. B. 44, at 
70. 
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Another consequence of the separation of documents and goods is that the right to reject 
the non-conforming goods is not necessarily impaired by the acceptance of the documents. 164 
Thus where the buyer accepts the bill of lading and later it turns out that the goods 
constituting its subject are not in accordance with the contract conditions he will not be 
prevented from refusing to accept the goods on discharge from the ship on arrival, although he 
165 may lose his right to reject the bill of lading on the doctrine of 'waiver'. Furthermore, if the 
documents reveal that the goods are not on confonnity with the contract and the buyer 
nevertheless accepts the documents, he cannot then reject the goods themselves on the basis of 
that non-conformity but he can still reject the goods if a different defect, or non-conformity, 
not revealed by the documents, becomes apparent on delivery. 166 However, if the defect giving 
rise to both rights of rejection is a single breach, for example, the goods are shipped late and 
this fact appears from the documents, acceptance of the documents may well be treated as 
waiver 167 of the buyer's right to reject the documents as well as the goods constituting their 
subject, so that the buyer is bound to accept the goods on arrival. 161 
From the above discussion it has been made clear that a buyer may be entitled to 
refuse to accept the documents tendered to him by the seller where they are not in conformity 
with the contract requirements. In other words, contractual terms requiring the seller to 
provide and tender documents conforming with the contract are "conditions" breach of which 
gives the buyer an immediate right to reject them. The buyer's right to terminate the contract 
on account of tender of non-conforming documents is subject to the seller's right to cure 
discussed above. As has been seen before, there are certain judicial authorities which clearly 
state that following the buyer's lawful rejection the seller under certain circumstances has a 
right to make a sound tender provided that he can do so within the contract time. Beyond that 
limited right to cure the buyer will be entitled to terminate the contract immediately without 
being required to wait for the goods to be landed. 
164 See e. g., KweiTek Chao v. British Traders& Shippers Ltd, [1954]2 Q. B. 459 at 482. 
165 If, however, the buyer takes up the documents in ignorance of facts giving him the right to reject the 
documents or goods or both, he will not be taken to have waived his right to reject the documents or the goods 
(see e. g., Suzuki & Co. v. Burgett & Newsman [1922110 U. L. R. 223). Although he may, as will be seen 
below, lose his right to reject the goods under the doctrine of "acceptance" (s. 35 of the Sale of Goods Act). 
166 See e. g., Bradgate, R., (1995) at 664. 
167 It is, of course, controversial whether such a case is strictly a mater of waiver, estoppel, or solely the effect of 
s. 35. The controversy is based on the fact where the buyer has not read the documents he cannot strictly 
speaking be said to have waived the right to reject since waiver requires actual knowledge of the existence of 
the right to rcjcct. See in this respect, Atiyah, P. S. & Adams, J., (1995) at 468, Ea. 79; Bradgate, PL, (1995) 
at 664. 
168 See e. g., Panchaud Freres SA. v. Etablissements General Grain Co. [1970] 1 Lloyds Rep. 53. For finiher 
cases see, Atiyah, P. S. & Adams, J., (1995) at 468, Ea. 79. 
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3.0. Mechanism of Termination 
3.1. No Automatic Termination 
As a general rule, under English law termination of contract for breach of contract is regarded 
as a matter of "election". That is, a discharging breach does not automatically bring the 
contract to an end, 16" but gives the aggrieved party an option either to terminate the contract or 
to continue performance, 170 if he wishes, and claim damages for losses suffered as a result of 
the breach. 17' This principle is of general nature in the sense that it applies to all contracts 
including the contract of sale. '7' 
The principle has been justified on the basis of that the law should not allow the 
defaulting party to rely on his own default to obtain a benefit under the contract, to excuse his 
own failure of further performance, or in some other way to prejudice the injured party's legal 
position under the contract. 173 On the basis of this principle, it has been said that the defaulting 
party should not be allowed to rely on his breach so as to prevent the injured party from 
enforcing provisions in the contract74, or the chance of claiming specific reliet75, since the 
contract may contain provisions highly favourable to the aggrieved party, and it would be 
unjust to allow the other party by breaching the contract to bring about an automatic 
termination and so to deprive the aggrieved party of the benefits of those provisions. 
3.2. Election of Remedies 
In English law when a buyer is given a right to terminate for breach of contract it is always at 
his option. Thus in terminating the contract he is not required to apply for a court's judgment 
even though he may sometimes need the court's decision to the effect that he was entitled to 
terminate the contract. 176 In the latter case the court simply declares whether termination was 
justified or not when the party in breach has disputed it. The contract would be effectively 
'69 In contrast see, Thomson, J. M., (1978) 137 (in which he argues that the breach always bring the contract to 
an end automatically unless the victim afr=s it). 
170 An election to continue the performance of the contract is often termed an "affuinatioif' of the contract (see 
e. g., Motor Oil Hellas (Corinth) Refineries SA. v. Shipping Corpn of India (The Kanchenjunga) [1990] 1 
Lloyd's Rep. 391 at 398). 
171 See Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, (1996) at 556; Treitel, G. H., (1995) at 757 and authorities Treitel cited 
in fii. 9; Carter, J. W., (1991) Paras. 745,1001. 
172 As far as the sale of goods cases are concerned, the given feature of the right to terminate might be inferred 
from the language of s. 11 (3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 which provides that breach of condition "may 
"give rise to a right to treat the contract as repudiated". 
173AIghussein Establishment v. Eton College [1988] 1 W. L. R. 587. See also, Treitel, G. H., (1995) at 758. 174 See e. g., Decro-Wall International S. A. v. Practitioners in Marketing Ltd. [1971] 1 W. L. R. 361, where it 
was held that a repudiation or discharging breach by one of the parties to a contract does not of itself 
terminate the contract. 
173 Ibid., at 375. 
176 Treitcl, G. H., (1988) Paras. 243,248. 
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terminated from the time when the buyer terminates it not from the time at which the court 
confirms termination. Accordingly, where a breach giving rise to a right to elect is committed 
by one of the contracting parties the other is faced with two alternative rights: either to 
terminate the contract or to affirm his obligation to perform. He must choose between these 
two alternative rights. 177 When he elects for one option he loses the other. 
However, the questions remain: how must that option be exercised? Is the buyer who 
wishes to elect termination required to declare his intention of election to terminate the 
contract? Is the declaration of termination to be communicated to the defaulting party? When 
is the option of termination lost? 
3.2.1. Election of Yermination 
The Sale of Goods Act does not lay down any procedure for the election to treat the contract 
as terniinated. The Act, in respect of breach of condition, simply provides that it "may give 
rise to a right to treat the contract as repudiated". Nevertheless, since the Act does no more 
than codify the common law rules the process of termination is therefore governed in the 
absence of specific contractual terms by the common law rules on election of remedies. 
3.2.1.1. Declaration of Termination 
Generally, at common law, there is one clear requirement for exercising the option: there must 
be "unequivocal words or conduct" on the part of the non-defaulting party showing that he has 
elected to terminate or to affirm the contract. 178 The use of the term "unequivocal words or 
conduct" does not, however, mean that there must be an express words or conduct. 179 The 
requirement will be satisfied if, by words or actions, the non-defaulting party makes plain"O 
that he intends to terminate the contract. Accordingly, the requirement does not necessarily 
depend upon the terms of one communication alone. It is necessary to consider the whole of 
the relevant communications and the buyer's conduct generally. "' The requirement may also 
be met by actions such as, rejection of the seller's defective performance, making of an 
alternative contract. ' 82 
177 See e. g., Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders and Shippers Ltd. [1954] 2 Q. B. 459 at 477; Lord Goff in Motor 
Oil Hellas (Corinth) Refineries S. A. v. Shipping Corpn of India (The Kanchenjunga) [1990] 1 Lloyds Rep. 
391 at 397-398.. 
178 See e. g. Graanhandel T. Fink B. V v. European Grain & Shipping Ltd. [1989] 2 Lloyd! s Rep. 531, at 533, in 
which Evans J. said: "if he does decide to reject the goods he must do so unequivocally and be prepared to 
take a stand. " 
179 See e. g., Vitol SA v NorejfLtd., The Santa Clara. [1994] 4 All ER 109 (anticipatory repudiation). 
"' See e. g., Heyman v. Darwins, Ltd. [1942] A. C. 356 at 361. 
181 See e. g., Graanhandel T. Vink B. V v. European Grain & Shipping Ltd. [1989] 2 Lloyds Rep. 531 at 533. 
See also, Tradax Export S. A. European Grain & Shipping Ltd. [1983] 2 Lloyds Rep. 100 esp. at 107. 182 See also, M. S. C. Mediterranean Shipping Co. S. A. v. B. R. E-Metro Ltd. [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 239 at 240. 
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No particular form is required. "' A written or oral statement is therefore sufficient. The 
buyer is also not required to use the particular term "tennination". Accordingly, the use of any 
word or phrase which clearly shows that the buyer has declared the contract terminated would 
be sufficient. 184 Although the mere "silence and inactivity" on the part of the non-defaulting 
party has been said not to suffice, 18' it may be construed, in certain circumstances, as an 
affirmation of the contract depriving him of the right of termination. ' 16 In other words, if a 
buyer who has a right of option unnecessarily delays in taking his decision, he may not be 
entitled to resort to termination any more. 187 
To put the requirement in a short phrase, a party who wishes to exercise his option to 
elect his remedies must declare his intention in a proper way by which a reasonable person is 
able to understand readily what he intends. Accordingly, there must be at least some notice by 
which the right to terminate is exercised, though it does not have to be in a particular form. 
Tle party giving notice need not as a general rule even specify in the notice the ground on 
which the contract is terminated. "' If the ground stated in the notice does not in law justify 
termination, the notice may nevertheless be valid so long as a ground which does justify 
termination actually exists. "9 However, the question remains whether termination to be 
effective needs that the party in breach has received the notice of termination. 
3.2.1.2. Communication of Termination to the Defaulting Party 
The question has not been clearly answered. There can be found some authorities which 
suggest that communication is a general requirement of the election. 190 In contrast, there are 
many cases which do not insist on the requirement. 9' The idea of necessity of communication 
of election to the party in breach is probably based on the view that the decision of termination 
is an "acceptance" of the defaulting party's "offer" to put an end to the contract. 112 
183 See e. g., Lakshmijitv. FaizSherani (P. C. ) [1974] A. C. 605 at 616. 
184 For instance, in the very recent case Barber v. NUISBankplc. [1996] 1 All ER906 at 909 (CA) the contract 
for sale of car has been treated as "terminated" when the solicitors sent a letter "rescinding" the contract. See 
also Carter who suggests various examples in: Carter, J. W., (199 1) Para. 10 16. 
185 See e. g., State Trading Corp. ofIndia v. M Golodetz Ltd [198912 Lloyd's Rep. 277 at 286. 
186 See e. g., Denmark Productions Ltd. v. Boscoble Productions Ltd. [1969] 1 Q. B. 699 at 731-732. See, 
further, Dawson , F., (198 1) at 90; Lord Hailsharn of St. Marylebone, (1983) vol. 9, Para. 559; Thomson, J. M., (1978) at 142. 
187 See e. g., Mardor 
. 
fPeach & Co. v. Attica Sea Carriers Corp. ofLiberia (The Laconia) [1977] A. C. 850 at 
871. See also, s. 35 (4) of the Sale of Goods Act. 
188 Carter, J. W., (1991) Para. 1016. 
189 See e. g., Taylor v. Oakes, Roncoroni & Co. [1922] 38 T. L. R. 349. 
190 Car & Universal Finance Co. Ltd. v. Caldwell [1965] 1 Q-B. 525 at 550. For further authorities see, Carter, 
J. W., (199 1) Para. 10 16 
191 See e. g., State Trading Corp. ofIndia v. M Golodetz Ltd. [ 1989] 2 Lloyds Rep. 277 at 286 ("at least overtly 
evinced"). For further cases see, Carter, J. W., (19 91) Para. 10 16. 
192 See e. g., Heyman v. Darwins, Ltd. [1942] A. C. 356 at 361; Decro-Wall International S. A. v. Practitioners in 
MarketingLid. [1971] 1 W. L. R. 361 at 375-6. 
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Accordingly, as in considering the rules of acceptance in the context of formation of the 
contract, the acceptance on the part of the offeree must be communicated to the offeror, 19' in 
the case of election of termination, acceptance must also be communicated to the party in 
breach. 194 On the other hand, it has been argued that election is "an effect which the law 
annexes to conduct which would be justifiable only if an election had been made one way or 
the other". 195 
3.2.2. Election of Affirmation 
When the seller's non-conforming delivery constitutes a breach giving rise to the right to elect 
the injured buyer has also an alternative right to accept the non-conforming delivery, if he 
prefers, and claim for damages. The significant aspect of the rule is that under certain 
circumstances the law recognises a presumed affirmation on the part of the buyer who has an 
option to elect remedies for breach of contract. Where he elects or is deemed to have affirmed 
the contract he will lose his right to reject the non-conforming delivery and terminate the 
contract. 196 The rule can be justified on the principle that a person cannot take up inconsistent 
positions: once a choice has been made or deemed to have been made that party will usually be 
bound by that election. 197 
Since affirmation usually precludes subsequent termination, a crucial issue is: at what 
point will the buyer be deemed to have affirmed the contract and as a result have lost his right 
to reject the non-conforming delivery and to terminate the contract? In general, a buyer may be 
deemed to have elected to affirm his duty to perform the contract when that intention can be 
attributed to him. In this connection, the Sale of Goods Act has provided certain rules 
regulating the circumstances under which the buyer may affirm or is deemed as have affirmed 
the contract and consequently has lost his right to reject the non-conforming delivery and to 
terminate the contract. 198 
193 See Generally, Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone, (1983) vol. 9 Para. 254; Treitel, G. H. (1995) at 21; 
Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston, (1996) at 4849. 
194 Lord HailShani of St. Marylebone, (1983) vol. 9 Para. 556; Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston, (1996) at 556. 
195 State Trading Corp. ofIndia v. M. Golodetz Ltd. [198912 Lloyds Rep. 277 at 286. See also, Carter, I W., 
(1991) Para. 1016 
196 Sale of Goods Act, s. 11 (4). 
'"The principle was clearly stated by LordAtkin in UnitedAustralia Ltd. v. BarclaysBankLtd [1941] A. C. I 
as follows: "If a man is entitled to one of two inconsistent rights it is fitting that when with fall knowledge he 
has done an unequivocal act showing that he has chosen the one he cannot afterwards pursue the other, which 
after the first choice is by reason of the inconsistency no longer his to choose' (ibid., at 30). It can also be said 
that the reason why the non-defaulting party loses his right of termination is that he cannot at the same time 
claim the benefits of performance and claim to be discharged from the obligation to perform the contract. 
1" Ss. 11 (2), (4) and 35. It is worth noting that common law has also developed certain doctrines in order to 
identify whether or not a party who has an option to affirm the contract or to terminate it has affirmed or is 
deemed to have af[irmed the contract. There is no uniform terminology to describe these doctrines. Terms 
such as "electiore', waiver, "affirmation" in the one hand, and "estoppel", "promissory estopper', on the other, 
are used for this purpose. See e. g. Lord Goff in Motor Oil Hellas (Corinth) Refineries S. A. v. Shipping Corpn 
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3.2.2.1. Concept and Terminology 
The circumstances under which an aggrieved buyer may affirm or is deemed as have affirmed 
the contract are comprised under the heading of "acceptance"199. In this respect, section 11 
(2), as a general principle, provides that a buyer may waive a condition that has to be fulfilled 
by the seller, electing instead to treat it as warranty. When this sub-section is read with the 
provisions under s. 35, and, sub-section 11 (4) which provides that the buyer may lose his 
right to reject the non-conforming delivery and to terminate the contract once he has accepted 
the seller's non-conforming delivery, acceptance can be explained as behaviour by the buyer 
that objectively demonstrates an election to seek his remedy only in damages. 
3.2.2.2. Methods and Requirements of Acceptance 
The Sale of Goods Act provides three general methods under which the buyer may lose his 
right to reject and terminate the contract. These methods of acceptances are recited in s. 35 as 
the buyer's (a) intimating to the seller that he has accepted the goods, (b) after the seller's 
delivery doing an act inconsistent with the seller's ownership and (c) retaining the goods 
beyond a reasonable time without giving the seller a notice of rejection. 
(A) Intimation ofAcceptance 
The first method by which the buyer may be taken to have accepted the seller's delivery is his 
intimation to the seller that he has accepted the goods (s. 35 (1) (a)). However, any word or 
conduct made by the buyer will amount to an intimation of acceptance only when he has had a 
200 reasonable opportunity to examine them. This method of acceptance includes not only cases 
of express intimation, but also those where it may be inferred from the buyer's conduct, 
although such an intimation of acceptance must be clear. 201 For this reason, in Varley v. 
jAj 202 PP the buyer's 'gnunbling' letter requesting the seller to arrange a meeting with him in 
of India (The Kanchenjunga) [1990] 1 Lloyds Rep. 391 at 397-398; Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders and 
Shippers Ld. [1954]2 Q. B. 459 at 477. See also, Guest, A. G., etal, (1997)Paras. 12-034-12-038 and 19-129- 
19-131). However, since these doctrines have little relation to the present research, they are not examined 
here in separate, although they will be referred to if some of them come into applicatiorL See also, Bridge, M., 
(1997) at 169-170. 
"' It is worth noting that in the case of breach of condition, the Act (s. 11 (2). ) uses the terms "clectiore' and 
"waiver", while s. 11 (4) and 35 refers to the term "acceptance'. It is also to be stressed that acceptance in 
this context is different from that is mentioned in s. 27 which provides correlative duties of the parties to a 
sale contract. See also Goode, R. M., (1995) at 367; Bridge, M., (1997) at 169. 
200 S. 35 (2). Relying on this provision it can be said that a acceptance of a delivery note can only operate as an 
express acceptance if suitably worded as an acceptance and not merely an acknowledgement of delivery and 
the buyer was offered a reasonable opportunity to examine the goods before signing. See in this respect, Law 
Commission, (1983)_Para. 2.53; Law Commission, (1987) Para. 5.24; Atiyah, P. S. & Adams, J., (1995) at 
461; Bradgate, R., (1995) at 251; Bridge, M., (1997) at 171. 
201 Law Commission, (1983) Para. 2.53. 
202 [190011 Q. B. 513. See also Law Commission, (1983) Para. 2-53; Law Commission, (1987) Para. 245 
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order to discuss the dispute and find a solution was held not to be an acceptance, though there 
was no express staternent of intention to reject. 
(B) Act Inconsistent with Seller's Ownership 
The second statutory method by which the buyer may be taken to have accepted the seller's 
delivery is where after the seller has delivered the goods, he has done an act which is 
inconsistent with the seller's ownershi P203 (s. 35 (1) (b)). The buyer will only lose his right 
under this method where he has had a reasonable opportunity to examine the goods. 204 Case 
law suggested that acts such as selling the goods or other dispositions of them may be treated 
as acts inconsistent with the seller's ownership. Similarly, consumption of the goods by the 
buyer or using them in a way which makes the physical return of the goods impossible could 
be placed into this category. 20' However, the buyer is not to be taken to have accepted the non- 
conforming goods: 
"merely because (a) he asks for, or agrees to, their repair by or under an arrangement 
with the seller, or (b) the goods are delivered to another under a sub-sale or other 
disposition". 206 
But, as the language of this new provision shows, the above provision applies to cases where 
the buyer has repaired the goods under the arrangement with the seller; it does not apply to 
cases where the buyer has tried to repair the goods or to have them repaired without making 
any agreement or arrangement with the seUer. 
Dealing with Documents. Although the Sale of Goods Act 1979 has addressed the 
position of the case where the buyer has dealt with the goods delivered by the seller, it 
contains no provision dealing with dispositions of documents representing goods under 
documentary sales. The question which arises here is whether a buyer under a documentary 
sale contract can be taken to have accepted the seller's non-conforming delivery where he had 
made disposition of the documents, whether by way of pledge or sale, before their arrival. 
It might at first be argued that since the goods have not actually been delivered to the 
buyer the case did not come under the heading of the phrase "acts inconsistent with the seller's 
203 As to the concept of the term "an act inconsistent with the sellers ownership" used by the Act, see, Kewi Tek 
Chao v. British traders and Shipping Ltd. [1954] 2 Q. B. 459 at 487). See also, Goode, R. M., (1995) at 371. 
See also, Law Comn-dssion, (1983) Para. 2.55; Atiyah, P. S. & Adams, J., (1995) at 466-7; Guest, A. G., et al, 
(1997) Para. 12-046; Bridge, M., (1997) at 175. 
204 S. 35(2). 
205 See also, Bradgate, R., (1995) at 25 1. - 
206 S. 35 (6). It is worth noting that this sub-section applies to all the three methods of acceptance. Accordingly, 
when the buyer asking the seller, for example, to repair he will not be deemed to have accepted under the 
method of lapse of a reasonable time. This will suspend the period of reasonable time. It will also not put the 
buyer in a position that he has accepted under the head of express intimation. See also, Bridge, M., (1997) at 
170 and 171. 
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ownership". However, the answer seems arguable. It is true that the goods actually have not 
been delivered, but the documents representing the goods had, and this would often amount to 
delivery of goods. Moreover, the goods might be regarded as having been delivered by being 
entrusted to a carrier. 207 
The courts, facing with the problem, answered the question by way of recognising two 
separate rights of rejection of documents and goods and distinguishing between these two 
208 
rights. Upon this, it is said that in the case of documentary sales any disposition of the 
documents is only a disposition of the conditional property which the buyer had received, and 
that a pledge or sale of the documents, does not amount to an act inconsistent with the seller's 
ownership within s. 35 of the 1979 Act. On this rule, a dealing with the documents might 
deprive him of his right to reject the documents, but could not deprive the buyer of the right to 
reject the goods. 209 
(P Lapse ofReasonable Time 
The third method by which a buyer may be taken to have accepted the seller's non-conforming 
delivery is retention of the goods for more than a reasonable time without intimating to the 
seller that he has rejected them (s. 35 (4)). In the absence of a contract time limit for rejection, 
the buyer will lose his right to reject after the lapse of a reasonable time. The rule has been 
justified on the grounds that there must come a time when the seller is entitled to regard the 
transaction as closed and assume that he is safe from a claim for a refimd. 210 
What is reasonable is a question of fact depending on the circumstances of any 
particular case. 211 Ile court, in determining whether a reasonable time has elapsed will take 
into account different factorS212 including the nature of the goods, conduct of the parties, the 
custom of the particular trade, market conditions, and whether the buyer has had a reasonable 
time to examine the goodS213 
Unlike the two other methods, this method is not subject to the qualification that the 
buyer must have an opportunity to examine before he has been taken to have accepted the 
207 See e. g., KewiTek Chao v. Bidlish Traders and Shipping Ltd. [195412Q. B. 459 at 486; approved in Gill& 
Duffus S. A. v. Berger& Co. Inc. (1984]A. C. 382 at 395. 
2's See e. g., Kwei Tek Chao v British Traders & Shippers Ltd [1954] 2 Q. B. 459. See also, Atiyah, P. S. & 
Adams, J., (1995) at 467. 
209 However, in practice the buyer's dealing with the documents will affect his power to reject the goods unless 
the sub-buyer himself rejects. See also, Atiyah, P. S. & Adams, J., (1995) at 468. 
210 Bradgate, R., (1995) at 252. 
211S. 59 Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
212 See also, Law Commission, (1983) Para. 2.57, Law Commission, (1987) Para. 5.19; Bradgate, R., (1995) at 
253; Goode, R. M., (1995) at 376-377; Bridge, M. (1997) at 176-177. T'he Law Commission has commented 
that "Because every thing will turn on the question of reasonableness, there is no limit on the number of 
factors WI-dch the court is entitled to take into account when deciding what period of retention is reasonable 
(Law Commission, (1987) Para. 2.48). 
213 Sale of Goods Act s. 35 (5). 
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seller's non-conforming delivery. The Act simply provides that in assessing whether a 
reasonable time has elapsed the court has to taken into account whether the buyer has had a 
reasonable opportunity of examining the goodS214 , but it does not absolutely prevent a finding 
215 
that the buyer has accepted despite his not having had a reasonable opportunity to examine. 
As a conclusion, under the first two methods, the buyer is not deemed to have accepted 
the goods until he has had a reasonable opportunity of examining them at the place 
contemplated for the examination of the goods for the purpose of ascertaining whether they 
are in conformity with the contract, or, in the case of a contract for sale by sample, of 
comparing the bulk with the sample unless the right of examination has been exercised, or 
waived in accordance with the general principles. However, under the third method the 
question whether he has had such an opportunity is material only in determining whether a 
reasonable time has elapsed. But in all three cases it is the opportunity of discovering the 
defect, rather than its actual discovery, which is the crucial factor, so that a buyer may be 
deemed as having "accepted" before discovering the truth. 216 
Accordingly, the doctrine of acceptance comes into play even where the buyer has been 
217 
unaware of his right to reject and the facts giving rise to the right. Similarly, it is not 
necessary for the seller to know of the buyer's acts or to have detrimentally relied on, or 
altered his position in consequence of, the buyer's behavioui2l'. But it would be sufficient if 
214 S. 35(5). 
2's Taking into account the lack of a principle allowing an accepting buyer to revoke his acceptance, as it is 
provided in American Uniform Commercial Code (U. C. C. s. 2-608), the rule would be harsh for the buyer in 
respect of latent defects which may appear long time after delivery during the period in which he uses them. 
In addition, in a large scale-sale of commodities it is frequently impractical or at least expensive and wasteful 
for a buyer to inspect each item before he comes to use it Thus, it is probable that a buyer is required to have 
a consignment which is substantially different from that bargained for on the basis of being have had a 
reasonable opportunity to examine the goods. 'Me case has been examined by Law Commission and was 
decided ultimately in favour of finality of transaction (see Law Commission, (1983) Paras. 4.664.73, and, 
Law Commission, (1987) Paras. 5.6-5.5.14). 
216 See e. g., Bernstein v. Pamson Motors (Golders Green) Ltd. [1987] 2 All E. R. 220; Reynolds, F. M. B., (1988) 
16. 
217 This is one of the points which distinguishes this doctrine from the common law doctrine of "waiver". 
Although there are some dicta which cast some doubt on the necessity of existence of the element that a non- 
defaulting party must have actual knowledge of the defect before he can be said to have waived his right to 
reject (see e. g., Bremer HandelsgeselIschaft in. b. H. v. C. Mackprang Jnr. [1979] 1 Lloyds Rep. 221 at 226, 
230; Aviinex S. A. v. Dewulf& Cie [1979] 2 Lloyd! s Rep. 57 at 67; see also, Carter, J. W., (1991) Para. 1042), 
there are a number of authorities which demonstrate that the non-defaulting party's actual knowledge of the 
defect constitutes an essential element of the doctrine of waiver in the sense of election of remedies. This 
view has been affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Peyman v. Lanjani [1985] Ch. 457. See also United 
Australia Ltd. v. Barclays Bank Ltd. [1941] A. C. I at 30; Motor Oil Hellas (Corinth) Refineries S. A. v. 
Shipping Corpn of India (The Kanchenjanga) [1990] 1 Lloy(Ts Rep. 391 at 398; Bridge, M., (1997) at 266 
and seq.; Treitel, G. H., (1995) at 728-729; Beale, H., (1980) at 118; Carter, J. W., (1991) Para. 1042; Carter, 
J. W., (1992) at 215. 
2'g This is one of the elements which distinguishes this doctrine from the common law doctrine of "estoppel". 
The doctrine has two branches: "promisory estoppel" and "estoppel by conducf'. See in this respect, 
Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston, (1996) at 106-107 and 578-579; Carter, J. W., (199 1) Para. 1045-1046; Atiyah, 
P. S. & Adams, J., (1995) at 102. Although in modem decisions, it is difficult to find an authority to make a 
clear distinction between waiver and estoppel, differences can be found between the conceptual bases of the 
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the buyer's behaviour objectively demonstrates that he wishes to elect his remedy only m 
damages. 
3.2.2.3. Effects of Acceptance 
By virtue of s. 11 (4) of the Sale of Goods Act, where a buyer has expressly, or is taken to 
have, accepted non-conforming goods or part of them he will lose his right to reject them and 
terminate the contract. However, this general rule is subject to the overriding provision of s. 
35A, which gives the buyer a right of partial rejection. Under this provision, where the buyer 
who "has the right to reject the goods by reason of a breach on the part of the seller that 
affects some or all of them""' accepts some of them, he will not lose the right to reject the rest 
(s. 35A (1)). The restriction is, however, subject to the qualification that the goods unaffected 
by the breach were included in those goods he has accepted. On this provision, where all of the 
goods delivered by the seller are affected by the breach the buyer has an option either to 
choose to reject some or all of them, but in a case where the seller has delivered goods only 
part of which do not confonn to the contract he may (1) reject all of the goods or (2) reject 
some or all of defective goods and keep those which conform to the contract. 
Similarly, where the contract is severable the buyer will not be prevented from rejecting 
the goods delivered in one instalment simply because he has accepted a previous instalment. 
Therefore, the buyer can reject an individual defective instalment, either on general principle 
prescribed under s. 11 (4) or by virtue of the right of partial rejection provided in s. 35A. In 
addition, the right of partial rejection under s. 35A applies to each instalment of a severable 
contract and as a result the buyer will have the same options he has in respect of non- 
severable contract, That is, where the whole instalment is affected by the breach he has the 
option either to reject all or reject some and accept the remainder. In a case where only some 
of the goods in an individual instalment are defective, he may reject some or all of those 
affected by the breach and keep the remainder. 
Accordingly, under the current provisions the question of acceptance will only arise in 
respect of the very goods accepted. Thus, in a non-severable contract, the buyer who has 
accepted the goods cannot reject them and the buyer who has accepted a part or an instalment 
of the goods cannot reject that part or that instalment. In short, the buyer will only lose his 
right to reject by accepting all the goods, or by accepting goods included in the same 
two doctrines. See in this respect, Adams, J., (1972) 245; Carter, J. W., (1991) Para. 1090; Atiyah, P. S. & 
Adams, J., (1995) at 99. 
219 As the language of this provision shows, the buyer must first have the right to reject the whole goods for the 
partial defective performance. That is, the defective part must not be seen as isolated from the whole part, but 
it must be as such that allows the buyer to reject the whole goods. Accordingly, he will not be entitled to 
reject a portion of the goods and retain the remainder if his rejection would be unreasonable under s. 15A. 
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scommercial unit'220, or (in the case of severable contract), by accepting the non-confonning 
goods which he could otherwise have rejected. 
4.0. Effects of Termination 
Sale of goods legislation does not provide particular provisions regulating the effects which 
follow from termination of the contract. Accordingly, the question is to be answered in 
accordance with the general law of contract. In general, when election of termination for 
breach of contract validly takes place, it affects both the contract and relations of the parties 
from that time. 
4.1. Effects on the Contract 
One of the general questions which is often discussed in each legal system, in particular in 
civil law systems, is whether termination has retrospective or prospective effects on the 
contract. With respect to English law it is usually said that it is a general rule of the English 
law of contract that termination of the contract by the innocent party on the footing of the 
other party's breach operates prospectively and not retrospectively. 221 Retrospective effects 
are confined to the cases where the contract is rescinded on account of invalidating matters 
such as n-dstake and misrepresentation. For this reason, it is said that by termination of the 
contract on the basis of breach only future primary obligations are discharged, and that even 
the aggrieved party remains liable in damages for his own pre-termination breacheS222. 
An illustration of such an effect of tennination can be found in a severable contract in 
the meaning already discussed. Suppose, for example, that the seller breaches the contract in 
respect of one or more deliveries; in that case, the buyer may be entitled to tenninate the 
contract in relation to the future deliveries without affecting deliveries already made. Thus, it 
is clear that terniination in such a case does not affect the whole contract but only part of it. "3 
220 See s. 35 (7) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 which provides "Where the contract is for the sale of goods 
making one or more commercial units, a buyer accepting any goods included in a unit is deemed to have 
accepted all the goods making the unit; ...... 221 See generally, Cheshire, Fifoot and Funnston, (1996) at 558-559; Carter, J. W., (1991) Paras. 314,1038- 
1040,1206-1207,1211-1212,1215; McGarvie, R. E., (1964) 305; Albery, M., (1975) 337. See further 
H"an v. Darwins, Ltd. [19421 A. C. 356 at 399; Johnson v. Agnew [1980] A. C. 367, in particular at 392- 
393. Cf. Coote, B., (1970) at 227; Dawson, F., (1976) 214; Coote, B., (1981) at 802. 
" As it happened in State Trading Corp. of India v. M Golodetz Ltd. [1989] 2 Lloyds Rep. 277 at 288. See 
also Gill & Duffus SA. v. Berger & Co. Inc. [1984] A. C. 382 at 390 (where Lord Diplock seems to assume 
that such a breach had indeed occurred on the part of the seller); Treitel, G. H., (1995) at 762-763. 
223 As some academic writers have suggested (Atiyah, P. S. & Adams, J., (1995) at 455; Guest, A. G., et al, 
(1997) Para. 12-070). But, as already indicated, this point is not clearly stated by the Act (see in this respect 
2.3.1. ). See also, Treitel, G. H., (1988) Para. 283. 
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4.2. Effects on Rights and Obligations 
Generally speaking, a valid termination of the contract releases not only the victim of breach 
but also the party in breach from their primary obligations to perform in the future. 24 
However, the defaulting party is not totally discharged from any liabilities, but may be liable 
to pay damageS22' and that liability may relate both to breaches committed before termination 
and to losses suffered by the injured party as a result of the defaulting party's repudiation of 
future obligations. 226 
One explanation of the survival of the right to damages draws on a distinction between 
primary and secondary contractual obligations. 227 The breach of a primary contractual 
obligation, that is, the failure to perform a duty expressly or irnpliedly created by the contract, 
gives rise to a secondary obligation to pay damages. This secondary obligation will arise by 
operation of law unless the contract itself deals with the matter. 228 
Section Two. Speciflc Performance 
1.0. Introduction 
The previous section was concerned with the circumstances in which an aggrieved buyer may 
be entitled to withhold the performance of his contractual obligation and terminate the 
contract. The present section will examine the circumstances in which he might be entitled to 
require the defaulting seller to perform specifically what he has undertaken under the contract. 
It is a well-known fact that English law does not recognise specific performance as a 
right for a victim of breach and that English courts are very reluctant to decree specific 
224 See e. g., Lord Diplock in Moschiv. Lep Air Services Ltd. [1973]A. C. 331 at 350; Johnson v. Agnew [1980] 
A. C. 367 at 392; Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd. [1980] A. C. 827 at 849,850; Gill & 
Duffus S. A. v. Berger & Co. Inc. [1984] A. C. 382 at 390; State Trading Corp. of India v. M. Golodetz Ltd. 
[1989] 2 Lloyds Rep. 277 at 285. 
225 See e. g., Lord Diplock in Photo Production v. Securicor Transport Ltd. [1980] A. C. 827 at 848-850 and in 
Gill & Duffus S. A. v. Berger & Co. Inc. [1984] A. C. 382 at 390. See also, Thornely, J. W. A, (1967) 168; 
Treitel, G. I-L, (1995) at 762-764; Carter, J. W., (1988), 113 and 246; Opeskin, B. R., (1990) 293. 
226 See e. g., Lord Diplock in Photo Production v. Securicor Transport Ltd. [1980] A. C. 827 at 849 
("anticipatory secondary obligation"); and, in Gill and Duffus S. A. v. Berger & Co. Inc. [1984] A. C. 382 at 
390. 
227 See e. g., Photo Production v. Securicor Transport Ltd. [1980] A. C. 827 at 848; Afovos Shipping Co. v. 
Pagnan [1983] 1 W. L. R. 195 at 203; Corbin, A. L., (1917) at 745. 
228 Lord Porter in Heyman v. Darwins Ltd. [1942] A. C. 356 at 399; Johnson v. Agnew 1980] A. C. 367, at 396; 
Photo Production v. Securicor Transport Ltd. [1980] A. C. 827 at 850 (survival of choice of forum clause); 
Gill & Duffus S. A. v. Berger & Co. Inc. [1984] A. C. 382 at 390. See also Beale, H., (1980) at 105.106-, 
Cheshire, Fifoot & Fumiston, (1996) at 559-560; See Carter, J. W., (1991) Para. 1208; Shea, A. M., (1979) 
623, in particular, at 635,642 ff. 
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performance of contracts for the sale of goods. 7,29 The reluctance of English courts to 
recognise such a right has a long history and the present study is not a proper place to 
examine the reasons for such a reluctance. For the present purpose it suffices to say that, 
historically, English law gives priority to compensation by way of awarding damages. No 
considerable significance has been given to the idea of compensating an injured buyer by 
ordering the defaulting seller to carry out what he promised . 
230 However, despite the 
reluctance of the common law courts to accept the remedy of specific performance, courts of 
equity have gradually recognised specific performance as a remedy. 231 It originated in the 
realisation that there are many cases in which the remedy available at common law is not 
adequate. 232 This remedy, as will be seen below, is a form of relief that is left to the discretion 
of the court rather than the victim of breach. This equitable remedy's main application was in 
233 land disputes 
, 
but the English courts have extended the remedy to sale of goods cases and 
subsequently took statutory form and it is now regulated by s. 52 of the Sale of Goods Act 
1979.234 
2.0. Requirements for Resorting to the Remedy 
Under s. 52, an order requiring the seller to deliver the goods will only be made if the 
following requirements are fulfilled. First is the goods must be delivered are "specific" or 
"ascertained". Secondly, the court must 'Viink fit" the grant of an order for specific 
performance. 
229 Treitel, G. H., (1966) 211. It should be mentioned that where the subject of obligation is to pay a liquidated 
money such as price under a sale contract, such a reluctance does not apply. Here it is not a discretionary 
remedy. Where the beneficiary party applies for the decree the court will issue the decree ordering the 
refusing party to pay the agreed sum. See for example s. 49 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 in respect of the 
seller's right to take an action for price. See also, Ogus, A., in: Harris, D., and Tallon, D., (1989) 243 at 25 1. 
230 See in this respectý Cheshire, Fifoot and Funnston, (1996) at 607 (in which the authors explain that "this 
was probably because cominon law courts' judgments were enforced by distraint on the defendant's goods 
which ultimately produced a money sum). This reference, however, does not explain the reason why the 
common law courts' judgments were only introduced in the form of sum of money. This has its origin in the 
process of development of contractual claims in English law. 
231 Harris, D., (1988) at 132; Zweigert, K.; Kotz, H, (1987) vol. 2 at 169. It is to be noted that during the 
nineteenth century there was legislation which enabled the common law courts to order specific performance 
and the Court of Chancery to award damages (see e. g., Mercantile Law Amendment Act 1856; Chancery 
Amendment Act 1858), and eventually since the Judicature Acts 1873-75 all remedies available for equity 
courts are applicable in all divisions of the High Court. See in this respect, Cheshire, Fifoot and Furniston, 
(19 96) at 607 
232 Cheshire Fifoot & Furmston, (1996) at 644; Guest, A. G., (1984) at 516; Ogus, A., in; Ogus, A., in: Harris, 
D., and Tallon, D., (1989) at 249. 
233 See in this respect, Bishop, W., (1985) at 305; Harris, D., (1988) at 134; Furniston, M., (1995) at 158. 
234 Section 52 (1): "In any action for breach of contract to deliver specific or ascertained goods the court may, if 
it thinks fit, on the plaintifrs application, by its judgment or decree direct that the contract shall be performed 
specifically, without giving the defendant the option of retaining the goods on payment of damages. " 
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2.1. Where Goods are "Specific" or "Ascertained" 
The first requirement which appears from this section for resorting to this remedy is that the 
subject of sale must be "specific", or, "ascertained" goods. This requirement raises some 
questions: what is meant by the term 'specific goods'? What is the position of 'goods to be 
produced'? In other words, does the requirement that the goods must be 'specific' mean that at 
the time of conclusion of the contract they must exist and the seller possesses them? 
2.1.1. Specific Goods 
"Specific goods" are defined by s. 61 (1) of the Act as being goods "identified and agreed 
upon at the time the contract is made". That is, at the time of making the contract the parties 
agreed to designate the subject-matter of the contract as particular goods to be delivered by 
the seller in performance of his obligation; their individuality is established, so that there is no 
room for fiirther selection or substitution. 235 
As far as the present discussion is concerned, the most practical question arises here is 
whether non-existent goods such as "future goods", "goods to be manufactured or acquired by 
the seller after the conclusion of the contract" can be placed into the category of 'specific 
goods' for the purpose of application of s. 52. In this connection, some authors have shown 
that no clear answer can be found in case law. 216 For instance, in a case decided before the 
Sale of Goods Act was passed 237 . the court held that a contract to sell 200 tons of potatoes 
from a particular crop to be grown by the seller was to be a sale of "specific" goods for the 
purpose of treating the contract as frustrated under the rule in Taylor v. Caldwe&3'. 
Similarly, in Parley v. nippý39 the court considered a reaping machine to be specific goods, 
when the contract was for the sale of a specific second-hand self-binder reaping machine 
which at the time of making the contract, the seller did not possess and had still to acquire. 
235 See, Guest, A. G., et al, (1997) Para. 1-113. 
236 Jbid., Para. 1-114. In Howell v. Coupland [1876] 1 Q. B. D. 258 (the case was concerned with the question of 
frustration of contract), it was stated that the authorities on such a matter are confused. see also, Treitel, G. 
R, (1966) at 218. 
237 Howell v. Coupland [1876] 1 Q. B. D. 258. In this case Mellish L. J. at 262 called the potatoes "specific 
things". However, Treitel criticised that they were not "specific goods" within the defli-dtion given in s. 61 (1) 
of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 ("identified and agreed upon at the time a contract of sale is made") (Treitel, G. 
R, (1995) at 831 fii. 66). 
2m [1863] 3 B. & S. 826. 
239 [1900] 1 Q. B. 513. The case was in fact concerned with a claim on the part of the buyer that the contract 
was a sale by description and as a result of lack of conformity of the article sold with the seller's statements 
the buyer had a right to reject. The seller argued that s. 13 of the Sale of Goods Act applies only to the case of 
a sale of unascertained goods (see p. 515). However, the court, rejecting the seller's argument, held that 
although the most usual application of s. 13 was no doubt to the case of unascertained goods, it must also be 
applied to cases such as the case in question where there was no identification otherwise than by description 
(at 516). 
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Nevertheless, in In re Wai? 40, it was said that the plain language of the Act leaves no room for 
giving such a so wide meaning to the term "specific goods",, so far as the application of the 
Act is concerned. 
Academic writers have also taken up different opinions. For instance, Professor Treitel 
suggested241 that there is no linguistic difficulty or logical reason in identifying and agreeing 
on such goods as specific goods. Accordingly, where a contract is made to buy a certain 
quantity of cars to be come from the seller's factory the subject-matter of the contract seems 
to be identified and agreed upon, even if it does not yet exist, at the time the contract is made. 
In contrast, some others have said that "it is probably safe to say that future goods can never 
be specific goods within the meaning of the Act. "242 But in response to the latter view it has 
been said that although there is reason enough for acceptance of this view in the context of 
passing of property, 243 there is nothing which requires one to read into the definition of 
"specific goods" a condition that they should presently exist. 244 
As far as the language of the Sale of Goods Act is concerned, one may argue that there 
is, generally, no logical reason for the non-application of s. 52 of the Act to non-existent 
goods. For, on the one hand, the definition of specific goods in s. 61 is not conditional on the 
goods existing when the contract is made. Again, non-existent goods are not excluded by the 
provision of s. 61 (1) of the Act. On the other, the goods may be described definitely, 
particularly and specifically although they are non-existent. It can therefore be suggested that 
future goods can be the subject of specific performance, so long as, they are identified and 
agreed upon by the parties, and they can be considered as a specific goods when they are 
sufficiently identified. Accordingly, the main basis for considering the goods as specific, is the 
agreement of the contracting parties in respect of the goods, specifying them in a way which 
leads to no misleading, ambiguity or vagueness about their nature, quality or quantity, no 
matter whether they presently exist or not, or whether they have been produced or will be 
produced in the future. 
However, it would be better to make a distinction between two different types of future 
goods: those which are non-cxistent and those which exist but are not yet owned by the seller. 
In addition, non-existent goods can be further sub-divided into crops (etc. ) to be grown and 
products to be manufactured. One may argue that the treatment of these different items should 
240 [1927] 1 CIL 606. 
241 Treitel, G. H., (1966) at 218. 
242 Atiyah, P. S. & Adams, J., (1995) at 50. 
243 For, in order of application of s. 18 rule I of the Act, the goods must be in a deliverable state at the time of 
the contract, while a contract to sell Raure goods as such can never be "unconditional" (see Guest, A. G., et 
al, (1997) Para. 1-113. 
244 Ibid. 
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differ: for instance, where the seller contracts to sell a particular item which he has not yet 
bought - as in Varley v. nipp - then the goods clearly are specific. The position is different 
where the contract is to sell something not yet in existence. However, it is easier to regard a 
particular item to be manufactured as "specific" than items to be grown - as in Howell v 
Coupland etc. - unless the contract is something like to deliver "the first 1000 tonnes 
harvested from a particular field". 
2.1.2. Ascertained Goods 
Unlike the term 'specific goods', the expression "ascertained goods" is not defined by the Act. 
However, case law has made efforts to define the term. For instance, in In re WW124% Atkin 
L. J. observed that in the present context, 
... Ascertained' probably means identified in accordance with the agreement after the 
time a contract of sale is made". 246 
According to the above definition, the term means goods originally unascertained which are 
identified in accordance with the parties' subsequent agreement after the contract of sale is 
made. However, in 7hames Sack and Bag Co. Ltd. v. Knowles & Co. Ltd it was said that 
"ascertained" in s. 52 'ýneans that the individuality of the goods must in some way be 
found out, and when it is, then the goods have been ascertained". 247 
Similarly, in Wait & James v. Midland Bank, 24' it was stated that "ascertainment" might take 
place by any method which is satisfactory to the parties concerned. Moreover, a part of the 
goods purchased from a bulk which is specified, may become ascertained by process of 
exhaustion, which, was said to be "the only effective way of ascertaining the goods which are 
in bulk". 249 
Examination of the above-mentioned cases shows that the term "ascertained" refers to 
some process subsequent to the contract by which goods are sufficiently.. identified or 
245 [1927] 1 Ch. 606 at 630. 
246 See also, Guestý A- G., et al, (1997) Para. 1-116. 
247 [1918] 119 L. T. 287 at 290. It is worth noting that there is a difference between the view of Atkin L. J. in In 
re Wait and that of Sankey J. in 7hames Sack and Bag in that the first view requires identification "in 
accordance with the agreemenV after the conclusion of the contract, while on the second view any process of 
identification will be sufficient for this purpose, even if the agreement contained no provisions to that end, 
and even if the process of identification was not in accordance with such provisions on the matter as the 
agreement did contain. 
248 [1926] 31 Com. Cas. 172 at 179. 
249 Wait & James v. Midland Bank [1926] 31 Com. Cas. 172 at 178-179.11c same rules are applied to the case 
2 
of passing of property by the new s. IS rule 5 (3) inserted by the Sale of Goods Act (Amendment) 1995. 
m For instance in Thames Sack and Bag Co. Ltd. v. Knowles & Co. Ltd. which was concerned with the sale of 
ten bales of Hessian bags, and the invoice sent by the seller after the making of the contract referred to ten out 
of a particular parcel of 45 bags, the judge held that this was insufficient ascertainmcnt of the goods for the 
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otherwise eannarked by the seller as goods he intends to use in performance of the contract. 251 
However, there will be no ascertaimnent of part of a larger bulk of goods until the part has 
been actually or by way of exhaustion ean-narked and segregated from the bulk. 252 
2.1.3. Specific Performance and Unascertained Goods 
On its face s 52 appears to apply only where the goods to be delivered are of specific or being 
sufficiently ascertained after the contract is made and therefore does not apply to an important 
category of contracts, those for sale of unascertained goods still to be ascertained. 
Accordingly, the buyer will not benefit from the provision under s. 52 where the seller has 
failed to perform his delivery obligations where the goods which should be delivered to the 
253 buyer under the contract are not sufficiently ascertained. 
Yet, the question is not so clear as it seems in its apparent face. On the one hand, it 
might be argued that where the language of s. 52 is combined with the belief that the Sale of 
Goods Act is designed to provide a comprehensive code, one may conclude that the remedy 
will not arise where there is a contract for the sale of unascertained goods not yet 
ascertained. 254 On the other hand, there is a possibility to say that s. 52 may be applied to the 
case of unascertained goods. This is because first, the language of the section itself does not 
seem to exclude expressly its application to such cases. Secondly, the idea that the Sale of 
Goods Act is a comprehensive code is arguable . 
255 Accordingly, the answer depends on 
whether or not the Act presents an exclusive code of remedies available. 
The question was particularly addressed in In re Wait. 2" In that case, Atkin LT took 
the view that where a matter is dealt with by the Act, the treatment was intended to be 
257 
exhaustive. Unlike the firm view of Atkin L. J. that s. 52 codifies the buyer's rights, in Sky 
purposes of s. 52 ([1918] 119 L. T. 287). Accordingly, an inappropriate part of a larger, ascertained bulk 
cannot be "ascertained" for the purposes of section 52. 
251 For instance, where the subject of sale is growing crops or natural products, it is possible that ascertainnmet 
takes place at the same time when they are appropriated for the purpose of passing the property (see Bridge, 
M., (1997) at 532-533). 
252 Ontario Law Reform Commission, (1979) vol. 2 at 438. 
253 It seems that there is no significant difference between the contracts for goods which are wholly 
unascertained and the contracts for unascertained goods from a designated source. In the latter case which is 
called quasi-specific goods (Goode, R. M., (1995) at 252; Bridge, M., (1988) at 41) the goods remain in 
principle unascertained since it cannot be said of any particular part of a large bulk whether it has been 
identified and agreed upon at the time of contract (see Bridge, M., ibid. ). A slight difference, however, may 
appear where the particular bulk is used by the seller and reduced to or less than the contract quantity the 
remaining goods will be taken as appropriated to the contract (as in Wait & James v. Midland Bank [1926] 31 
Com. Cas. 172 at 178-179; see also, the new section 18 rule 5 inserted by the Sale of Goods (Amendment) 
Act 1995). 
254 See in this respect, Bridge, M., (1988) at 532. 
255 See in this respect, Bridge, M., (1988) at 532. 
256 [1927] 1 Ch. 606. 
257 Ibid., at 630. 
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Petroleum Ltd. v. VIP Petroleum Ltd25' some doubt was thrown on the traditional idea. 259 In 
that case, the judge did, in fact, grant specific performance of a contract for unascertained 
goods. 
Although the decision in Sky Petroleum may be welcomed as commercially realistic, it 
is hard to reconcile with the language of s. 52 (1) of the Act and with both earlier and 
subsequent authorities. 260 Moreover, neither s. 52 nor In re Wait were referred to in the 
judgment. Accordingly, it is difficult to say that in the case of unascertained goods not yet 
ascertained the buyer can apply for specific performance. In addition, assuming that the 
jurisdiction to award specific performance exists where the subject of sale is unascertained 
goods, it is likely to be exercised only rarely, for by definition, unascertained goods will rarely 
be unique. As a result, the court would hold that damages will be an adequate remedy. 
Moreover, the case may be, as Goulding J. himself pointed out in his judgment, justified 
on the special facts of the case. In a case of the nature of Sky Petroleum no question of 
specific performance would normally arise because the filling station could go and buy petrol 
on the market and be compensated adequately by damages, but at the time of the case, because 
of the Arab oil embargo and the related events of 1973, there was little prospect of the 
plaintiffs being able to procure alternative supplies from another source so that alternative 
supplies were not available to the buyers. Moreover, as some authors pointed OUt261, in the 
particular case a substantial part of the buyers' loss would not have been recoverable in 
damages because of the remoteness rule. In addition to the above-mentioned factors, in that 
case damages would clearly not be an adequate remedy because, as Professor Atiyah pointed 
OUt261, "there was a real danger that the plaintiffs would be forced out of business if the 
defendants broke their contract in the very peculiar circumstances then holding,,. 161 In the 
circumstances of that case, specific performance was a uniquely desirable and effective 
remedy. It was in fact such peculiar circumstances which induced the judge to depart from the 
general rule. 
2M [1974] 1 All E. R. 954. 
259 Addn L. J. 's view has also been objected on the ground that he offered no explanation why the parliament 
should have wished to reduce the ambit of the remedy of specific performance, and the history of the section 
does not support the thesis. (Ontario law Reform Commission, (1979) vol. 2 at 438439). 
260 Such as In re Wait [1927] 1 Ch. 606; Societe des Industries Metallurgiques SA. v. Bronx Engineering Co. 
Ltd [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 465 at 468,470. 
261 See Macdonald. E., (1987) at 25 1. See also: Berryman, J., (1985) at 319. 
262 Atiyah, p. S. & Adams, J., (1995) at 508. 
263 See also, Ontario Law reform Commission, (l 979) vol. 2 at 438. 
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2.2. When the Court Thinks Fit 
The important feature of specific performance in English law is that it is not granted as a 
matter of right to the aggrieved party seeking remedy, but it is an equitable jurisdiction whose 
exercise is left to the court's discretion. 264 . This is confirmed 
by the Sale of Goods Act 1979 
which does not require the court to give effect the buyer's application for specific performance 
but gives the court a broad power to give an order for specific performance "if it thinks fit". 
However, it is to be stressed that this does not mean that the decision is left to the 
uncontrolled fancy of any individual judge. A court may reffise to give effect the buyer's 
application for specific performance, if to grant it in the particular circumstances of the case 
will defeat the ends ofjustice . 
265 For instance, Lord Parker, explaining the rule, observed: 
"Indeed, the dominant principle has always been that equity will only grant specific 
performance if, under all the circumstances, it is just and equitable so to do. , 266 
3.0. Grounds for Refusing to Order Specific Performance 
Exercise of the court's discretion to award specific performance is guided by certain 
principles. For instance, the court will generally not order specific performance of a contract 
which involves personal serviceS117 or which requires constant supervision by the court . 
161 
However, as far as sale of goods cases are concerned the adequacy of damages rule is the 
161 
main restriction on the remedy of specific performance. 
264 See e. g., in an appeal to the House of Lords of a Scottish case Stewart v. Kennedy [1890], 15 App. Cas. 
75 at 
102, Lord Watson observed: I do not think that upon this matter any assistance can be derived from English 
decisions, because the laws of two countries regard the right to specific performance from different 
standpoints. In England the only legal right arising from a breach of contract is a claim for damages; specific 
performance is not matter of legal right, but a purely equitable remedy, which the Court can withhold when 
there are sufficient reasons of conscience or expediency against it . ..... 
See also, Cheshire Fifoot & Furmston, 
(1996) at 644; Ogus, A. in: Harris, D. and Tallon D., (1989) at 250; Priest A. 1 (1984) 927. 
265 See e. g., Shell UK Ltd. v. Lostock Garages Ltd. [1976] 1 W. L. R. 1187 at 1202. See also, Cheshire Fifoot & 
Furmston, (1996) at 645; Guest, A. G., (1984) at 5 18; Treitel, G. H., (1988) Para. 64; Priest A. J., (1984) at 
927. 
266 See also, Stickney v. Keeble [1915] A. C. 386 at 419. 
267 The restriction has been justified on the grounds of policy: that it would be improper to make one man serve 
or employ another against his will (see Guest, A. G., (1984) at 519). 
269 See e. g., Ryan v Mutual Tontine Westminster Chamber Association [1893] 1 Ch. 116, where the court 
refused to order specific performance of a contract to provide pottering services for a flat See generally, 
Burrows, A. S., (1984) 102-, Treitel, G. H., (1995) at 930; Harris, D., (1988) at 138,139; Ogus, A., in: Harris, 
D., Tallon, D., (1989) at 250 Zweigert, K., Kotz, H., (1997) vol. 2 at 171-172. 
269 This rule plays a substantial role in the case of specific performance under general law of contract (see in 
this respect, Ogus, A., in: Harris, D., Tallon, D., (1999) at 243 at 254), although the nile has been described 
as "a severe limitation in sales of other things than lands" (Dawson, F., (1959) at 532). 
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Under this rule, where complete justice can be achieved by damages, the plaintiff will 
be left to his remedy at law. 270 In other words, the court gives specific performance instead of 
damages, only when it can by that means do more perfect and complete justice. 271 
There is no clear rule by which the court can always examine the adequacy of damages 
test. Generally, where damages fail to afford a complete remedy to the aggrieved party, 272 or 
the amount of damages is impossible to be assessed, 273 they arc considered an inadequate 
remedy, and, consequently, specific performance is granted. The court will refuse to grant 
specific performance when the plaintiff is able to obtain the equivalent to what he has 
contracted for by damages. '74 
A clear instance can be found in Behnke v. Bede Shipping Co. Ltd.. 275 In this case, 
specific performance was granted because the subject-matter of the sale was a unique thing, i. 
e., a ship. However, it is not accurate to say that the buyer of a ship will always be able to 
resort to the provision of s. 52. In CN Marine Inc. v. Stena Line (The Stena Nautica (no. 
2)), 276 it was held that as a matter of law, an order for specific performance could be made in 
respect of a vessel but it, in no way, follows that there should be an order for specific 
performance in respect of every contract for the sale of a ship. 
The court's reluctance to grant specific performance is illustrated by the case of Societe 
Des Industries Metallurgiques S. A. v. Bronx Engineering Co. Ltd. 2, n In this case, the 
defendants had wrongfully repudiated a contract to deliver goods manufactured by them to the 
plaintiffs. Although the subject of sale was over 220 tons in weight and cost around E270, 
000, the evidence showed that it would take the plaintiffs between nine to twelve months to 
obtain similar goods from an alternative source. Even this serious delay failed to persuade the 
Court of Appeal that the case was a proper one for grant of specific performance, for the 
270 See e. g., Beswickv. Beswick [1968] A. C. 58 at 90-91 (Lord Pcarce), '102 (Lord Upjohn). 
271 Tito V. Waddell (No. 2), [1977] Ch. 106, Per Megarry V. -C. at 322. In the old case of Flint v. Brandon [18031 
8 Ves. Jun. 159, the Master of Rolls [Sir Wm. Grant] explained the position as follows: "Ms court does not 
profess to decree a specific performance of contracts of every description. It is only where the legal remedy is 
inadequate or defective that it becomes necessary for courts of equity to interfere ... In the present case 
complete justice can be done at law. " 
272 See e. g., Wilson v. Northampton & Banbury Junction Railway Co. [1874] 9 Ch. App. 279 at 294 (Per Lord 
Selborne) 
273 See e. g., Hart v. Herwig [1873] 8 Ch. App. 860. 
274 The rule is clearly stated by Lord Redesdale in Harnett v Yielding as follows: "Unquestionably the original 
foundation of these decrees was simply this, that damages at law would not give the party the compensation to 
which he was entitled: that is, would not put him in a situation as beneficial to him as if the agreement were 
specifically performed. On this ground the court in a variety of cases, has refused to interfere, where from the 
nature of the case, the damages must necessarily be commensurate to the injury sustained" ([1805] 2 Sch. & 
Let 549 at 553. ). 
275 [1927] 1 K. B. 649. In that case, Wright J. said: "... I think a ship is a specific chattel within the Acf' (ibid., 
at 661). See also, Hail v. Herwig [1873] 8 Ch. App. Cas. 860 at 864 (W. M. James, L. J. ) and 866 (Mellish, 
L. J. ). 
276 [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 336 (Lord Justice May) at 348, and, Parker J., ibid., at 343 
277 [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 465. 
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goods were of a type obtainable on the market in the ordinary course of businesS278 and the 
additional loss suffered by the plaintiffi as the result of the delay would be covered by an 
increased award of damages. 
Damages may be inadequate, even when the buyer can buy goods similar to those in the 
contract, if the fluctuation of the price is so great, that the party who is obliged to accept 
damages cannot be sure of being put in as good a position as he would have been if the 
contract were specifically performed and the goods supplied. '79 Furthermore, where the goods 
or items are unique, specific performance may be granted. Thus, "the more unusual the 
subject-matter of the contract, the more difficult it becomes to assess the plaintiffs loss " '280 
and "damages can be readily assessed but not so easily collected". 281 Nor can damages be 
described as an adequate remedy when the defendant is unable to pay for them, because of his 
insolvency. 282 Under these circumstances specific performance is justified and will be 
decreed. 283 
Whether damages are adequate remedy is a question of fact in each case which is to be 
decided according to the circumstances of any particular case. Accordingly, "[I]t is unsafe to 
rely on decisions reached on other contracts and in other circumstances" . 
284 It seem that the 
exercising of the inherent discretionary power by the court, varies from one court to another, 
and there are no reliable criteria to justify or predict the conduct of the court in ordering 
specific performance or granting damages in a case where there are specific or ascertained 
281 
goods, such as a ship or a machinery or some articles which are not easily obtainable. 
However, it is to be emphasised that it does not follow that specific performance will 
necessarily be granted because damages are not an adequate compensation. Above all, the 
onus is upon the plaintiff to justify the claim that damages would not achieve justice and that 
he "the plaintiff' should not be compelled to accept theM. 286 The plaintiff may fail to prove 
that the goods are unique, and consequently will not obtain specific performance, but 
damages. The court will generally enquire in any case into all the circumstances, in particular 
any hardship which would be imposed on one party or the other by giving or refusing specific 
performance. This reflects a combination of two policies; the general feeling that specific 
278 [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 465, Lord Edmund Davies at 468,469. 
279Adderleyv. Dixon (1824) 1 C. &S. 607 at 610-612; Evans Marshall& Co. Ltd. v. BertolaS. A. [1973] 1 W. 
L. Rý 349 at 380. 
280 Sharpe, R. I (1983) at 280. 
281 Ibid., at 282. 
292 Ibid. 
293 See e. g., Dyster v. Randall & Sons [1926] 1 Ch. 932. See also, Sharpe R. J., (1983) at 283 and the 
authorities cited there. 
294 Spry, I. C. F., (1990) at 62. 
285 As example, see the cases concerned with sale of ships which already discussed. 
286 CNMarine Inc. v. Siena Line (The Siena Noutica) (No. 2) [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 336 at 349. 
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performance is usually not necessary in the case of goods and the general equitable principle 
that specific performance is not be granted mechanically and that all the circumstances are to 
287 be considered . 
4.0. Right to Demand Cure 
We have been so far concerned with the question of specific performance under English law in 
general. It has been made clear that this legal system gives little chance to an aggrieved buyer 
to resort to the remedy of specific performance. And it has also been seen that even within the 
discretionary power given to the courts to grant specific performance under certain 
circumstances, in exercising the power, the English courts are very reluctant to use this power 
in favour of the plaintiff. 
The position of the right to request the seller to cure the non-conformity is not much 
better than that of specific performance in general. In fact, failure to recognise a general right 
to cure for an aggrieved buyer can be justified on the grounds that English law gives priority 
to the compensation by damages. 
As a general rule, the English Sale of Goods Act does not recognise a general right for 
the buyer to demand the cure. Case law lacks any legal statement indicating the recognition of 
such a right. Academic writers have shown little tendency to accept such a right. Accordingly, 
it can be said with certainty that under English law an aggrieved buyer has no general right to 
demand that the seller cure his defective performance. Any offer from the buyer to the seller 
for cure can be re ected by the seller unless the case places into the category discussed above, 
though if the seller accepts his offer he must perform his duty. 28' However, as indicated when 
dealing with the seller's right to cure, according to one interpretation, where the buyer 
lawfully rejects the seller's non-conforming delivery without terminating the contract the Sale 
of Goods Act enables the buyer to permit the seller to cure his defective delivery and4 to that 
exterit, to request cure. 289 
Buyer's Right to Demand Cure and S. 52 of the 1979 Act. As the law stands 
presently, in English law, where the seller has made defective delivery the buyer is primarily 
entitled to reject the non-conforming delivery and terminate the contract and/or claim for 
damages, as some authors suggest, or to reject it and wait for seller's cure and/or claim for 
287 Fumston, M., (1995) at 168. 
288 However, the European Parliament and Council Directive on the Sale of Consumer Goods and associated 
Guarantees 1996 proposed that the consumer buyer should be given a right to "ask the seller either to repair 
the goods free of charge within a reasonable period, or to replace the goods, when this is possible, ... (Art. 3 (4). 
289 See e. g., Bradgate, R., & White, F., (1995) at 77. 
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damages, as others suggest. However, the question arises whether an injured buyer who has 
lawfiilly rejected the non-conforming goods is entitled to require the seller to cure his defective 
performance on account of s. 52 of the Act. As far as the language of the section is concerned, 
there is no linguistic difficulty in recognising a limited right for an aggrieved buyer to demand 
that the seller cure within the scope of the section . 
290 The reason is that a demand to cure the 
non-conformity, whether by delivery of substitute goods or repair the defects, is in fact, a 
particular form of requiring to perform the contractual obligations specifically. In other 
words, the buyer demands the seller to perform his duty to deliver goods conforming with the 
contract terms (s. 27 of the 1979 Act). Accordingly, for this purpose, an injured buyer may be 
entitled to apply the court for a decree ordering the seller to tender conforming goods or to 
repair the defective goods provided that the requirements of s. 52 are met. That is, the 
purchased goods are of commercially unique kind, such as ship, machinery that could not 
readily be obtainable elsewhere, or the seller is the sole manufacturer so that the buyer cannot 
obtain them in the market or damages do not afford an adequate remedy to him. Under such 
circumstances, the court may exercise its discretionary power to order the seller to cure non- 
conforming goods. 
However, as far as the right to demand cure by repair is concerned, the buyer will have 
little chance to persuade the court to give effect to his application, since cure by repair will 
normally involve personal services and require constant supervision by the court in which 
circumstances the English courts, as pointed out above, are reluctant to order the party to 
perform his obligations specifically. 29' Moreover, in the case of sale of unascertained goods, it 
is quite possible to say that the buyer is not basically entitled to demand the seller for delivery 
of replacement. For, after rejection of non-conforming goods the substitute goods are not 
ascertained. Accordingly, the case will be outside the scope of s. 52. 
Section Three. Monetary Relief 
1.0. Introduction 
A further remedy available in English law for an aggrieved buyer is to claim damages for 
losses he has sustained as a consequence of the seller's breach of contract. The main purpose 
290 Since the section provides: "If any action for breach of contract to deliver ... " which includes the seller's 
291 
breach of his duty to deliver goods corresponding with the contract terms (s. 27 of the Act). 
In particular, in the case of international sale of goods under which the buyer's place of business takes place 
in another country. In such a case, it would be hard for the court to supervise the performance of the court's 
order by the seller in a foreign country. 
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of this remedy is to compensate the buyer by putting him, so far as money can do so, into the 
same financial position in which he would have been, had the contract been performed. 292 
Unlike the Convention and Shiah law which provide a further financial remedy 
enabling the buyer to reduce the contract price where the seller has delivered non-conforming 
goods, English law has not recognised such a remedy. The closest English law counterpart 
could be the 'set-off' rule provided in s. 53 (1) (a) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 which 
permits the buyer to "set up against the seller the breach of warranty in diminution or 
extinction of the price". Under this provision, as will be seen later, an injured buyer is 
authorised to deduct all or any part of his damages from the purchase price still due. 
Nevertheless, reduction of price, as reflected in the Convention and some other legal 
systems, is a remedy separate from that of damages, and should not be confused with the right 
to Set-off . 
293 In common law systems the set-off rule is not regarded as a separate remedy but 
it is, in fact, a particular means of exercising the right to damages. Accordingly, the 
appropriate place for consideration of the rule, it seems, is where the right to claim for 
damages is examined. For the said reason this section will not include a separate part under 
the heading of the remedy of reduction in price. 
2.0. Claim for Damages 
2.1. General Principles 
In English law, it is a well-established law that a breach of contract, no matter what form it 
takes, always entitles the innocent party to maintain an action for damages. An action for 
damages can succeed even though the victim has suffered no actual loss by reason of the other 
party's violation, although in that event, the damages recoverable will be purely nominal. The 
effect of such an award may simply recognise the fact that a breach of contract has 
occurred. 294 
292 See e. g., Per Parke B. in Robinson v. Harman (1848), 1 Ex. 850 at 855; British Westinghouse Electric and 
Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Underground Electric Railways Co. of London [1912] A. C. 673, per Viscount 
11aldane LC at 688-689. 
293 The nature of the "set off" rule is not quite clear in English law. For instance, in Stewart Gill Ltd. v Horatio 
Myer & Co. Ltd. [1992] 1 Q. B. 600 where the Court of Appeal considered a "no set-off' clause in a contract it 
appears from Lord Donaldson's judgement that he was not quite sure about the nature of set-off whether it is 
a remedy or a matter of procedure. The nature of the right is also controversial between academic writers. For 
further discussion of the nature of set off in academic works see, Goode, R. M., (1988) at 148 and seq 
Derham, S. R., (1996). Professor Goode himself, relying m some decided cases, prefers the procedural 
character of the remedy (ibid., at 151-152). 
294 -Me term "nominal damages" has been explained by Earl of Halsbury L. C. in: Owners of Steamship 
"Mediana " v. Owners, Master & Crew of Lightship "Comet" (The Mediana) [1900] A. C. 113 at 116. See 
also, Treitel, G. H., (1995) at 838;. Schmitthoff, C. M., (1966) at 174 and seq.; Guest A, G., (1984) at 491. 
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This general rule has been recognised in the case of breach of a contract for sale of 
goods by the Sale of Goods Act 1979. In this respect, the Act, instead of providing a general 
rule, confers on an injured buyer a right to claim damages under three separate sections. 295 
Relying on these provisions, it can be said that a buyer who has suffered by reason of the 
seller's breach of contract has a general right, subject to the restricting principles which will 
be examined later, to claim damages for any loss he has sustained, including loss of profit, 
personal injury, damaged property and indemnity he has sustained as a result of the third 
party's claim. 
2.2. Grounds for Claim for Damages 
The principle described above is applied where one of the contracting parties is guilty of a 
breach of a valid contract. An injured buyer can claim damages for loss caused by any kind of 
default, whether be it non-delivery, late delivery or defective delivery, all of which may 
amount to a breach of contract. Although delivery of goods beyond the contract time is in fact 
a form of non-conforming delivery, English lawyers, for reason which will be made clear later, 
tend to treat the case of late delivery as distinct from the case where the seller delivers goods 
which do not conform with contract terms. 29" 
Thus, the seller's total failure to deliver, or delivery beyond the contract time (where the 
contract fixes a specific time or a period of time) or beyond a reasonable time (where the 
contract does not specify specific time), or, to deliver in a way which does not comply with a 
contract term (whether classified as 'warranty', 'condition' or 'intermediate tenn') would be 
regarded as a breach of contract entitling the buyer to claim damages for losses resulting from 
it. 
It is not possible in a work of the present nature to list specifically all the possible 
losses a buyer may suffer as a consequence of seller's failure to deliver goods in accordance 
with the contract terms. They would vary from case to case in accordance with the various 
circumstances which may surround any particular case. What follows is an attempt to 
295 In the case of the seller's failure to deliver, section 51 provides: "(1) Where the seller wrongfully neglects or 
refuses to deliver the goods to the buyer, the buyer may maintain an action against the seller for damages for 
non-delivery. " Similarly, in the case of non-conforming delivery section 53 (1) reads as follows: "Where there 
is a breach of warranty by the seller, or where the buyer elects (or is compelled) to treat any breach of 
condition on the part of the seller as a breach of warranty, the buyer is not by reason only of such breach of 
warranty entitled to reject the goods; but he may ... (b) maintain an action against the seller for damages for breach of warranty. " Section 54 of the Act completes the statutory provisions by providing: "Nothing in this 
Act affects the right of the buyer ... to recover ... special damages in any case where by law ... special damages may be recoverable... " 
2" See generally, Greig, D. W., (1974) at 289. 
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generalise various pecuniary losses which may result from the seller's failure to deliver goods 
according to the contract terms. 
As far as the question of recoverable loss is concerned, whether the alleged loss resulted 
from non-delivery, late delivery or non-conforming delivery, according to the statutory 
provisions quoted above, an injured buyer may generally be entitled to recover damages for 
two general category of losses: normal (or general) loss (ss. 52 and 53) and special loss (s. 
54). The distinction between these two types of loss and the different circumstances under 
which they could be recoverable will be made clear when the rules of remoteness of damage 
are considered. 
2.3. Principles Restricting the Recovery of Damages 
An injured party is not able to recover damages for all losses he may suffer consequent upon 
the other party's breach. The protection which is afforded to an injured party by the English 
general law of contract will rarely represent his actual loss; rather it will reflect what the law 
considers it just for him to recover. For this reason, an injured party will succeed in recovering 
damages for a particular head of losses where certain requirements are met. Generally, a 
buyer who wishes to claim damages for a particular head of loss must prove that his alleged 
loss was caused by the seller's breach of contract and was not too remote. He must also take 
reasonable steps to minimise his loss. 
2.3.1. Causal Connection 
The starting point for recovery of damages is that the injured party must show that the loss 
incurred has a real connection with the other party's breach of contract. The principle is 
occasionally referred to in English law as that of 'causation% 297 Under this principle, recovery 
of damages requires a sufficient connection between the breach and the loss for which the 
injured buyer claims damages. The rule can be clearly inferred from section 51 (2) of the Act 
which provides as follows: 
"The measure of damages is the estimated loss ... resulting, ..., 
from the seller's 
breach of contract. " (italic added)2" 
297 See e. g., Donaldson M. R. in Sotiros Shipping Inc. v. Sameiet Solholt (The Solholt) [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 
605 at 608; Guest, A. G., et al, (1997) Para. 16-046; Goode, R. M., (1995) at 124; Beale, H., (1980) at 178; 
Treitel, G. H., (1995) at 679-881; Fridman, G. H. L., (1986) at 661-662; OpcskinB. R, (1990) at 315. 
... lie same point was pointed out in the statement of B. Alderson in Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch. 341 
at 354. 
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Under this doctrine the loss must be causally connected to the breach, so that if it would have 
occurred in any event it is not recoverable. Equally, if the loss resulted from some intervening 
act of the plaintiff or a third party which the defendant could not reasonably have foreseen as 
the consequence of the breach, the chain of causation will be broken and the loss will be 
regarded as too remote. In such a situation, the effect of the breach was in fact exhausted and 
replaced by the intervening act as the 'proximate cause'. 
It follows that the buyer will not be entitled to claim damages where he has incurred 
loss, but not by the reason of the fact that the contract was breached by the seller. This is the 
position where a buyer of goods has made a bad bargain or where the market value of the 
goods drops between the time the contract was made and time of breach, and the seller then 
delivers non-conforming goods which are worth no less than those contracted for would be 
worth. In such a case, no substantial damages can be recovered by the buyer on account of 
non-conformity of the goods; though if the buyer is able to reject the goods (for example, on 
the ground of some defect in the documents under a c. i. f. contract, or the goods themselves) he 
will in effect escape from the loss resulting from the fact he made a bad bargain either by 
refusing to pay the price or by rejecting the goods and recover the payment already made. "9 
2.3.2. Remoteness of Damage 
Causation is a matter of fact. Granted that a particular head of loss has in fact sufficient 
connection to the breach, English law provides that the defendant will be liable for those losses 
which were contemplated by him at the time of the contract. 300 
The legal concept of the test was first forraulated in English law by the Court of 
Exchequer in the leading case of Hadley v. Baxendale 301 and subsequently has been expressly 
299 See e. g., Taylor & Sons, Ltd. v. Bank of Athens (Pinnock v. Same) [1922] 27 Com. Cas. 142. See also, 
Treitel, G. H., (1995) at 844 and 857; Guest, A. G., etal, (1997)Paras. 19-166 and seq. 
300 See e. g., Victoria Laundry ffindsor) v. Newman Industries Ltd [1949] 2 YJ3 528 at 539, As a matter of 
terminology, some disputes have arisen as to the phrase describing the principle. The principle is sometimes 
described that of "foreseeability". Curiously, however, neither in the leading case of Hadley v. Baxendale 
(1854) 9 Ex. 341), upon which the principle is commonly based, did the court in fact refer to the term 
"foreseeability" nor does the Sale of Goods Act explicitly state the rule in terms of "foreseeability". The Act 
refers to "loss directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary course of evente' from the breach and in Hadley 
the court referred to losses which were "in the contemplation of the parties! '(ibid., at 354). See also Koufos v. 
C. Czarnikow Ltd. (The Heron 11) [19691 1 A. C. 350 at 384-385). In analysing the rule, the term 
'forcsceability' was used in Victoria Laundry (Windsor) v. Newman Industries Ltd d1949] 2K. B. 528 at539; 
and in subsequent cases the judges have described the doctrine by using the language of foreseeability. But in 
theKoufosv. CzarnikowLtd. (TheHeronfl) ([1969] 1 A. C. 350), the House of Lords deprecated the use of 
that word which they thought it more appropriate to the law of tort and suggested to recur to the original 
words as declared in Hadley v. Barendale, i. e., to the term "contemplation" instead of "foreseeability" (ibid., 
at 384-385). The divergence in phraseology, as will be explained below, did in fact derive from the different 
views raised with respect to the degree of probability which is necessary for a particular head of loss to be 
30 
recoverable by the party injured through the breach of contract 
1 (1854) 9 Exch. 341. In that case, Alderson B., in describing the remoteness rule, maintained: "... the 
damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may 
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recognised by the Sale of Goods Act in the provisions regulating the measurement of damages. 
For instance, s. 51 of the Act provides: 
"The measure of damages is the estimated loss directly and naturally resulting. in the 
ordinM course of events from the seller's breach of contract. " (underline added) 
The same principle is provided by ss. 50 (2) and 53 (2) when dealing with the case of non- 
acceptance and breach of warranty, respectively. 302 
The rule has been clearly illustrated in the leading case of Victoria Laundry ffindsor) 
303 
v. Newman Industries Ltd. . 
In that case, the defendants, an engineering company, agreed to 
manufacture and supply a large boiler to the plaintiffs. But the boiler was damaged while it 
was being dismantled for transport to the buyers, and it was delivered to them late. In that 
case, the defendants were aware of the fact that the plaintiffs ran a laundry and that they 
intended to put the boiler into immediate use in their business. However, they did not know 
that the plaintiffs intended to use the boiler to expand their business and fulfil some highly 
profitable government dyeing contracts. Under such circumstances, the plaintiffs claimed for 
loss of profit on the dyeing contracts. At first instance, Streatfeild J allowed the plaintiffs a 
sum for damages under certain minor heads but refused to award damages for loss of profits. 
The Court of Appeal, however, held that the defendants were not liable for the loss of profits 
they would have made from the special contracts, but were liable for the amount of profit the 
plaintiffs would have made using the boiler for the ordinary laundering. In the view of this 
Court, since the defendants had not been told about the dyeing contracts they should not have 
been held liable for the losses resulting from such special circumstances, but must have been 
held liable for the ordinary use of the boiler because it must have been obvious that in all 
probabilities the buyers wanted the boiler for immediate use in their laundering business. In 
the language of Asquith LJ, "everyone, as a reasonable person, is taken to know the 'ordinary 
course of things' and consequently what loss is liable to result from the breach of that 
ordinary course. 99304 
2.3.2.1. Single Rule or Two Separate Rules 
The rule in Hadley v Baxendale is often discussed as being two rules or one rule in two parts, 
an approach reflected in the Sale of Goods Act (ss. 50 (2), 51 (2) and 53 (2) and s. 54. 
fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i. e., according to the usual course of things from 
such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of 
both parties at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. " (Ibid., at 3 54, Italic 
added). 
302 The forgoing provisions are indeed intended to codify the common law provisions declared in Hadley v 
Baxendale and other early cases such as, Robinson v. Harman (1848), 1 Exch. 850 at 855 (Per Parke B. ). 303 [1949] 2 K. B. 528. 
304 [1949] 2 K. B. 528 at 539. 
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(A) First limb 
It is commonly said that the first limb of the Hadley rule is concerned with those losses which 
may fairly and reasonably be considered as arising naturally, i. e., according to the usual 
course of things, so that any plaintiff would be likely to suffer the loss in question. These 
damages are referred to as "ordinary", "general" and sometimes, "normal" damages. 305 
The computation of nonnal loss, as will be seen later in detail, depends on whether the 
breach takes the form of total non-delivery, defective or delayed delivery. The latter in turn 
depends upon the manner in which the injured buyer exercises his options; for if he elects to 
reject a non-conforming delivery, the case becomes one of non-delivery. Thus, in the event of 
non-delivery of goods, for example, the normal loss for which an aggrieved buyer can recover 
damages is the difference between the value of the goods on which they have agreed at the 
time of the contract (in this case, contract price) and their value as in fact delivered (nothing). 
306 The same criterion is true in the case of late and defective delivery. 
1""' Second limb 
In contrast, the second branch of the rule is said to be concerned with those losses resulting 
not as the natural consequence of breach but from some special or extraordinary 
circumstances. In s. 54, the Sale of Goods Act describes damages recoverable for such losses 
as 'special damages'. A plaintiff could recover damages for these losses only if the special 
circumstances had been communicated to the party in breach at the time the contract was 
concluded. 307 
Because of the variety of loss recoverable under this branch of the rule, it is not 
possible to provide an exhaustive list of special losses an aggrieved buyer may suffer as a 
consequence of the seller's breach. It would vary according to various special circumstances 
that may be known to the seller at the time of the contract. Generally, damages may be 
recoverable for this type of loss provided that the rules of remoteness are satisfied. As an 
example, where a seller agrees to sell to a buyer goods for which there is not a ready market 
and fails to deliver them, and as a result the buyer is forced to hire other goods during the 
period of time he is seeking for a replacement and then has to pay a higher price for the 
substitute goods, the excess of that price over the contract price is the normal loss and the hire 
305 See in this respect, Ontario Law Reform Commission, (1979) vol. 2 at 492. 
" Of course, in the case of defective delivery, the normal loss may include damage to the buyer's property and 
personal injury. 
307 See Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Ey- 34 1, the statement of per Alderson at 354; Monarch Steamship Co. 
Ltd. v. Karlshamns 01jefabriker (AIB) [1949] A. C. 196, per Lord Wright at 221. 
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charges may be recoverable in addition as special IOSS. 30' The special loss may also arise 
where the goods were bought for resale in the form of claiming compensation for damage to 
good will and loss of future business from his customer. 309 
2.3.2.2. Necessity of Distinction 
The distinction is clearly drawn by Baron Alderson in Hadley v Baxendale 310, and Asquith LJ 
in the Victoria Laundt)P. However, in some cases the distinction has been questioned. For 
instance, in the case of The Heron II, Lord Reid observed: 
"I do not think that it was intended that there were to be two mles or that two different 
standards or tests to be applied. 012 
It has also been argued that dividing the rule into two parts is not necessary; "contemplated 
damages" could apply both to damages which are contemplated because they "naturally arise" 
and to damages contemplated because some special information was possessed by the parties. 
Ignoring the separate "branches" also saves an analyst from having to decide which part is 
applied in a case where the answer is not certain. 313 
However, it has been argued' 14 that the consequence of dividing the recoverable losses 
and the relevant rules into two parts appears in that losses which are the ordinary and natural 
consequences of the breach eliminate any question over the need for proving awareness of 
these possible consequences. Such direct losses, if proximately caused by the breach, do not 
need to be proved to have been foreseeable by the party in breach when the contract was 
made. But if the losses in question are of the type contemplated, only in light of special 
information which the buyer or some other sources give the seller, the court must decide if the 
information was adequate to satisfy the criterion of contemplation at the time of the contract. 
309 It can be said that if the seller knows that the purchased goods will only be used for use, as opposed to 
resale, then the hire charges are recoverable under the first limb. 309 It is worth noting that loss of goodwill does not necessarily fall into the second limb. It depends on the nature 
of the goods and the facts of the case. 
310 (1854) 9 Exch. 341 at 354-355. 
311 [1949] 2 K. B. 528 at 539. See also Cotton L. J. in Hydraulic Engineering Co. Ltd. v. McHafflie Goslett & 
Co. (1878) 4 Q. B. D. 670 at 677; Wright W. M., (1980) at 493494; Street, H., (1962) at 18-22. 312 [1969] 1 A. C. 350 at 385. In that case it was also referred to the difficulty which arises from the idea of 
regarding the Hadley rule as two separate rules by that "there is sometimes difference of opinions as to which 
is the part (i. e., branches of the Hadley rule) which governs a particular case and it may be that both parts 
govern if' (ibid., at 416). See also Adams, A., (1979) at 147 (stating that the two "limbs" of Hadley tend to 
be seen today as merely parts of a single rule); James, P. S., (1950) at 39 (arguing that both parts of the 
Hadley rule "are only alternative ways of stating the same propositiore'); Sn-dth, F. E., (1900) at 277 (reaching 
the same conclusion that "Hadley v Baxendale then lays down one positive rule, and one only"); Cheshire, 
Fifoot and Furmston, (1996) at 616 (arguing that "The two branches of Hadley v Baxendale do not represent 
two separate rules, and it may sometimes be difficult to identify which is applicable"); Bridge, M., (1997) at 543. 
313 Ile argument is cited in: Murphey A. G., (1989) at 434. 
314 See e. g., Wright W. M., (1980) at 494; Murphey A. G., (1989) at 434. 
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In such a situation, the court must first, of course, decide that the facts of the case present 
which of these two situations. 
2.3.2.3. Degree of Foreseeability of Loss315 
As the above discussion showed, under English law, a buyer can only claim damages for 
losses which were in the contemplation of the contracting parties when the contract was made. 
However, it is not quite clear how far the loss must be contemplated by the party in breach in 
the light of information he possesses before the injured party becomes entitled to recover 
damages for it. 
In the leading case of Hadley v Baxendale, the court held that the requirements of 
remoteness would be satisfied where the consequences of the default have been reasonably 
within the parties' contemplation at the time of making the contract316 "as the probable result 
of the breach". The test has been fully explored by Asquith W. in Victoria Laundry v. 
317 Newman Industries. . In that case, in analysing the rules of remoteness under the 
Hadley v 
Baxendale case, he attempted to describe how much a particular head of loss must be 
foreseeable so as to satisfy the requirements of remoteness rules. In describing the criterion, he 
observed that to make a particular loss recoverable, the plaintiff does not need to prove that 
upon a given state of knowledge the defendant could, as a reasonable man, foresee that a 
breach must necessarily result in that loss. But it is enough if he could foresee that it was 
"liable to reSUlet. 318 
After near twenty years, the question was reopened by the House of Lords in Koufos v. 
C Czarnikow Ltd (The Heron 11). 319. In that case, the House of Lords held that in an action 
for breach of contract, the mere fact that a loss is foreseeable is insufficient. In Victoria 
315 See generally, Waddams, (1983), Para . 1137-1142; Swinton, 
K., in: Reiter, B. J., and Swan, J., (1990) 61- 
91. 
316 It is to noted that in a case following Hadley v Baxendale, an English court suggested that the time rule 
be 
changed to allow for notice after the contract was made (see Gee v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway 
Co. 
(1860) 6 H. & N. 211). In that case Baron Bramwell observed that the Hadley rule might be further qualified: 
"[tlhat in the course ofthe performance ofthe contract one party may give notice to the other of any particular 
consequences which will result from the breaking of the contract, and then have a right to say: 'If, after that 
notice, you persist in the breaking the contract I shall claim the damages which will result from the breach" 
(ibid. at 217). This suggestion, however, was rejected in later decisions, and some academic writers regarded 
it as "heresy" (see Adams, J., (1979) at 148). 
317 [1949] 2 K. B. 528. 
318 [1949] 2 K. B. 528 at 540. Earlier cases had similarly offered various phrases to describe the meaning of 
"probable'. For instance, inR. &H. HaIlLtd. and W. H. Pim (Junior) & Co. Ltd. [1928] 33 Com. Cas. 324 at 
329-330, Lord Dunedin stated: I do not think that 'probability' ... means 
that the chances are all in favour of 
the event happening. To make a thing probable, it is enough, in my view, that there is an even chance of it 
happening. " See also ibid., at 336 in which Lord Phillimore referred to "those damages which ... are 
... recognised 
by the parties as those which in the particular case may result from a breach... There may be 
cases where the word to be used might 'will, ' but there are also cases and more cornmon cases where the 
word to use is 'may'. " 
319 [1969] 1 A. C. 350. 
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Laundry, Asquith LJ had said that the party injured by the breach of contract was entitled to 
recover "such part of the loss actually resulting as was at the time of the contract reasonably 
foreseeable as liable to result from the breach . 91320 However, 
in The HeronU, Lord Reid did 
not agree with that statement and said that a great many "extremely unlikely results are 
reasonably foreseeable" . 
321 He also expressed his unhappiness with the reference by Asquith 
LT to the foreseeability test and thought that this reference was calculated to confuse the 
measure of recovery in tort claims with that sounding in contract. He then continued to say 
that there must be a distinction between the degree of foreseeability of damages claims in tort 
and that of in contract . 
322 The other law Lords agreed, although using different terminologies, 
that the remoteness tests are not necessarily the same in contract and tort. 323 Accordingly, on 
the House of Lords' view, for a loss to be recoverable in the case of breach of contract, it 
must be more probable than is required in tort. 
Having strongly rejected the reasonable foresight criterion in contract cases, their 
Lordships then made great efforts to explain what they thought was the correct interpretation 
of the Hadley rule. But they were not agreed on the expression that accurately conveys this 
higher degree of likelihood, although Lord Reid at least was willing to settle for something less 
than a 50% probability. In this respect, a considerable number of alternative expressions were 
considered, many being cited without express approval or disapproval. '24 
Although the House of Lords have made great efforts to present a more clear criterion 
upon which the recoverable damages are to be determined, these deliberations made, in fact, 
325 
the question more difficult than easier. However, what is certain is that according to their 
Lordships, the rule of remoteness in contract is different from and stricter than that in tort and 
when the word 'foreseeability' is used in contract, it refers to this higher degree of probability. 
320 [1949] 2 K. B. 528 at 539. 
321 [196911 A. C. 350 at 389. In that case, Lord Reid also observed: "The court (in Hadley v. Baxendale) did not 
intend that every type of damages which was reasonably foreseeable by the parties when the contract was 
made should be either considered as arising naturally, i. e., in the usual course of things, or be supposed to 
have been in the contemplation of the parties" (ibid., at 3 85). 
322 Injustifying the distinction, see, ibid., at 385-6). See also, Lord Upjohn's judgment at 422. 
323 See ibid., at 411 (Lord Hodson), at 413 (Lord Pearce), and, at 422 and 425 (Lord Upjohn). But Lord Morris 
did not specifically discuss this question. See also, Whincup, M., (1992) 433; Davies, P. J., (1982) at 25 
324 The headnote of the Law Reports is surnmarised so: ... since prices in a commodity market were 
liable to 
fluctuate, shipowners should reasonably contemplate that (per Lord Reid) it was not unlikely ... ; (per Lord 
Morris of Borth-y-Gest) the result was liable to be or at least the result was not unlikely to be ... ; (per Lord 
Hodson) the result was liable to be ... ; (per Lord Pearce and Lord Upjohn) there was serious possibility or real danger ... that, if their ships 
delayed the voyage, the value of marketable goods on board their ships would 
decline ... (ibid., at 351). 325 Moreover, the value of these deliberations is greatly diminished by the considerable degree of apparent 
verbal inconsistency between them. The usefulness of this exercise was in any event strongly questioned by 
Lord Morris, who stated that such phrases "... are useful and helpful indications of the application of the rule 
in Hadley v Baxendale. But they neither add to the rule nor do they modify it QI 969] 1 A. C. 350 at 399). See 
in this respect Pickering, M. (1968) at 209. 
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In other words, the mere foreseeability, even reasonable foreseeability, is not sufficient. The 
loss must be substantially foreseeable. 326 
The relationship of the tests of foreseeability in contract and tort was further considered 
by the Court of Appeal in H. Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co. Ltd . 
327 At the 
first instance, in respect of the question whether or not the actual loss (death of a considerable 
numbers of pigs) suffered by the plaintiffs could be recovered by them, the court held that, 
although it was reasonably foreseeable that the breach might cause the pigs to become ill, the 
defendant was not liable for the damage caused because at the time of contract neither the 
farmer nor the suppliers would reasonably have contemplated as a serious possibility that 
feeding mouldy pignuts to the pigs would cause this particular disease and the death of the 
pigs. However, the Court of Appeal, reversing the decision, held that the damage in question 
was of the same kind as that which was seen foreseeable by the first court, and so was 
recoverable. As regards the distinction between tort and the contract cases, all the members of 
the Court thought "it absurd that the test for remoteness of damage should, in principle, differ 
according to the legal classification of the cause of action". 328 . 
Although in that case the three members of the Court of Appeal were unanimous in 
regarding the loss in question as not too remote, they took different views in the reasoning. On 
the one hand, Lord Denning MR draw a distinction between breach of contract causing 
physical injury or damage to the property and breach of contract causing loss of profit or 
other economic loss. In his Lordship's view, the principle of remoteness in contract that the 
loss in question must have been within the reasonable contemplation of the parties atthe time 
of the contract as a "serious possibiliW'329 should be restricted to the latter cases . 
330 Whereas, 
where the plaintiffs claim is concerned with personal injury or damage to the property the 
principle of remoteness in tort, which in his words is "... the defaulting party is liable for any 
loss or expense which he ought reasonably to have foreseen at the time of the breach as a 
possible consequence, even if it was only a slight possibility"33 1, should be applied. 
Accordingly, the defaulting party is liable for any loss or expense which he ought reasonably 
326 However, the distinction has been criticised by some academic writers (see e. g., Mincup, M., (1992) at 
433). It is worth noting that in some earlier cases one can find some statement which describe the probability 
of occurrence of loss in such phrases. For instance, in the old case of Hammond & Co. v. Bussey (1887) 20 
Q. B. D. 79 at 93 Lord Esher, M. R. described the parties' reasonable contemplation "highly probable result of 
breacV. 
327 [1978] 1 Q. B. 791. 
328 Ibid., at 806. In the words of Lord Denning (at 802) and Scarman LJ (at 807), the difference between 
'reasonably foreseeable' (the test in the tort) and 'reasonably contemplated' (the test in the contract) was 
'semantic, not substantial'. For instance, Lord Denning in this case observed- I find it difficult ... to 
draw a 
distinction between what a man 'contemplates' and what he 'foresees"'. 
32' As it prescribed by the House of Lords in The Heron 11. 
330 [1978] 1 Q. B. 791 at 802. 
331 Ibid., at 803. 
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to have foreseen at the time of the breach as a possible consequence, even if it was only a 
slight possibility. In that case, although there was not a serious possibility or a real danger, a 
slight possibility would, in his Lordship's view be sufficient to make the defaulting party 
liable. Whereas, loss of profit on future sales or future opportunities of gain would not be 
recoverable for the mere fact that the given loss was reasonably foreseeable by the party in 
breach. Recoverability of such losses requires more than that is necessary for physical injury. 
However, this view was not welcome&" by the two other members of the Court and 
Scarman L. J., with whose reasoning Orr LT agreed, observed that the suggested distinction 
was an unnecessary and unjustified complication and the cases did not support this distinction. 
Differences in assessment of damages in relation to economic losses and physical injuries, in 
their view, merely illustrated the overall test of remoteness and did not in their opinion 
constitute a separate rule within it. 333 In their Lordships' view, the loss in question was 
recoverable even according to the rule under The Heron II, for what has to be contemplated as 
a serious possibility, is not the specific injury in question but if the type of a loss could be 
reasonably contemplated as a serious possibility it would be sufficient to make that particular 
loss recoverable. 334 In the case in question, as illness in the pigs could reasonably have been 
contemplated as a serious possibility, it was irrelevant that the specific injury in question 
could not. In so holding, they relied on the principle that a distinction must be drawn between 
the type of loss involved and the extent of the injury in question. On this basis, the two 
members of the Court treated that particular disease as differing from general illness not in 
type but in extent only. 
The House of Lords has not yet had an opportunity of hearing a comparable case which 
would enable it to express its opinion about this case. However, some academic writers have 
commented that neither approach is free from difficulties. In their view, Lord Denning's 
approach not only has no explicit support in the authorities, but the distinction between 
econon-dc and physical loss in contract cases is itself difficult to apply. The two other 
members' view also places a heavy burden on the distinction between type and extent of 
IOSS. 335 In addition, one may argue that the majority's construction has not resolved the 
problem. The question does still remain whether or not in a case such as Victoria Laundry an 
332 The view has also been criticised by academic writers. See e. g., Hadjihambis D. H., (1978) at 485-6. 
333 1978] 1 Q. B. 791 at 806. In this regard see also, Cheshire, Fifoot and Furniston, (1996) at 616; Guest, A. G., 
(1984) at 499-500; Beale, Bishop and Furmston, (1995) at 567-568; Ontario Law Reform Commission, 
(1979)vol. 2, at492493; Cooke, R., (1978) at 295-296; William Bishop, (1983)at254 andseq.. 
334 1978] 1 Q. B. 791 at 813. The same point was confirmed before by megarry I in Wroth v. Tyler [1974] 1 Ch. 
30 at6l. For more authorities on the point see, Gucst, A. G., etal., (1997), Para. 16-040, particularly, fns. 20, 
21. 
335 Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, (19 96) at 616. 
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injured party is entitled to claim damages for those losses the Court of Appeal regarded them 
as remote. In that case, what is certain is that the type of loss (loss of profits) was foreseeable 
but the court held that some lost profits were not recoverable. 
2.3.3. Mitigation Principle 
Not all foreseeable losses are recoverable. Recoverability of damages for a particular head of 
loss is also subject to another restricting rule. 336 The rule, in the language of common law, is 
called "the duty to mitigate the loss". Under this rule, once the plaintiff buyer becomes aware 
of the seller's breach of contract he must take reasonable steps to minimise his loss. If he fails 
to do so, he will recover no damages in respect of losses which he could have avoided. The 
given doctrine is clearly stated by Viscount Haldane L. C. in British Westinghouse Electric 
andManufactunng Co. Ltd. v. Underground Electric Railways Co. ofLondon 337 
Such measures will typically be making a substitute transaction. Of course, other 
measures may be appropriate to lessen the prospective loss from the breach of contract. For 
instance, measures taken to minimise potential loss would be for the buyer to hire substitute 
goods or to remedy hidden defects of the goods delivered to him by the seller, or, in a contract 
involving carriage of goods in which the seller is unable to hand them over in due time to the 
carrier, for the buyer to take them over at the seller's place of business or even to accept an 
338 offer of alternative performance from the defendant, as is appropriate. . It is this , 
principle 
which explains why, when the contract takes place within a competitive market setting, the 
plaintiff normally obtains the difference between the contract price and the market price at the 
336 The point which deserves to be noted here is that the doctrine of mitigation arises in relation to the 
computation of damages. However, in this stage, mitigation is substantially an aspect of remoteness, since it 
is within the contemplation of the parties that the plaintiff will take reasonable steps to mitigate his loss. For 
this reason, the principle is discussed under the heading of general principles restricting the recoverable loss 
rather than under the heading of measurement of damages. See also, Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, (19 96) at 
630. For a detail discussion of the different legal grounds on which the rule may be justified, see: Bridge, M., 
(1989) at 400 and seq., and, Bridge, M., (1997) at 547-548. 
337 [1912] A. C. 673. In describing the principle, he observed: "The finidamental basis is thus compensation for 
pecuniary loss naturally flowing from the breach; but this first principle is qualified by a second, which 
imposes on a plaintiff the duty of taking all reasonable steps to mitigate the loss consequent on the breach, 
and debars him from claiming any part of the damage which is due to his neglect to take such steps" (ibid., at 
689). 
338 The question whether the buyer is under the duty to mitigate his damages by accepting the seller's offer is 
not entirely clear. In The Solholt (Sotiros Shipping Inc. v. Sameiet Solholt (The Solholt) [1983] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 
605) it was held that the buyer was not entitled to the difference between the contract and the market prices, 
when he refused to accept the seller's offer, But, in Heaven & Kesterton v. Etablissements Francois Albiac 
61956] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 316 Devlin J., distinguishing between breaches as to quality and other breaches, 
observed that in the latter cases the court must take that fact into consideration in arriving at what is the 
proper sum of damages to award to the buyer. Whereas, in the first case there is no room for the court to take 
into consideration of that sort (ibid., at 321, see also, Schmitthoff, C. M., (1961) at 366). For criticism on 
these cases see, Bridge, M., (1989) 416418. However, in the case of anticipatory repudiation, it is commonly, 
said that the rule does not require the buyer to accept the seller's repudiation when it is first made (Rite & 
Carter (Councils) Ltd. v. McGregor [1962] AC 413). See in this respect, Cheshire, Fifoot and Furniston, (19960 at 631-633. ). 
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date of breach; he is expected to secure a substitute. Mitigation, then performs an important 
econon-dc function of encouraging efficiency in the allocation of reSourceS. 339 Under the so- 
called 'duty to mitigate' the plaintiff in fact has a twofold duty. He must refrain from 
unreasonable acts which would increase his loss; and he must take such positive steps to 
reduce his loss as are reasonable in the circumstances. 
The principle is well illustrated by the case of Payzu v Sanders340, where the defendant 
had agreed to sell to the plaintiffi a quantity of silk, payment to be made a month after 
delivery. The buyers failed to pay the first instalment within the agreed time, owing to a 
number of mishaps, but gave an order for the second instalment of the goods. The seller 
(defendant) who had wrongly thought that the buyers were in financial difficulties, in breach 
of contract, refused to make further deliveries except for cash. The buyers refused to accept 
the seller's offer and treated this as being a repudiation and elected to terminate the contract. 
This they were certainly entitled to do, but they then sued the seller for damages on the basis 
that the market price of silk had risen and that they could claim the difference between the 
contract price and the market price at the date of the buyers' acceptance of the seller's 
repudiation. The Court of Appeal, rejecting the buyers' argument, held that although the 
seller's refusal to continue credit terms was a breach of contract and that he was liable in 
damages, by refusing to accept the seller's offer to supply the goods on payment of cash, the 
buyers had in fact failed to take a reasonable measure in order to mitigate his damages. 
However, the mitigation rule will generally not require the plaintiff to go to the market 
under any circumstances. What a plaintiff has to do under this rule is what a reasonable man 
in his position would do. Of course, what is reasonable in the circumstances is a question of 
face4'; in spite of that, the case law from which the doctrine is derived gives some guidance in 
ascertaining whether or not the buyer has acted in a reasonable manner. Accordingly, it is 
considered that he is not bound to take any step which a reasonable man would not ordinarily 
take in the course of his business; '42 nor is he bound to hunt the globe to minimise the loss 
suffered by him . 
343 Nor does the duty to mitigate go so far as to oblige him to engage in a 
complicated and difficult litigation with third parties, even though its outcome might have 
339 See also, Ogus, A., in: Donald Harris, Denis Tallon, (1989) at 249; Beale, H., (1980) at 187 and seq.; 
Treitel, G. R, (1995) at 881 and seq.; Guest, A. G., (1984) at 510-511; Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston, 
(1996) at 628 and seq. Goetz and Scott, (1983) 967. 340 [1919] 2 KB 581. 
341 See e. g., Payzu v. Saunders [1919] 2 KB 581 at 589; Carlos Federspiel & Co., S. A. v. Charles Twigg & Co. 
Ltd. [1957] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 240 at 256. 
342 For instance, Viscount Haldane L. C. in British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. 
Underground Electric Railways Co. ofLondon [19121 A. C. 673 at 689 observed: "This ... principle does not impose on the plaintiff an obligation to take any steps which a reasonable and prudent man would not 
ordinarily take in the course of his business. " 
"3 Lesters Leather & Skin Co. Ltd. v. Home & Overseas Brokers Ltd. [1948] 64 T. L. R. 569 at 25. 
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been to reduce the IOSS. 344 Nor need he take any step which is contrary to business ethics and 
which would tend to lower or ruin his commercial reputation . 
34' Nor is he under an obligation 
to destroy his own property to reduce the damages payable by the defaulting seller. 
Furthermore, the buyer may not have the financial means to mitigate his loss; in such a case, 
he is not obliged, for the purpose of reducing damages, to do that which he cannot afford to 
do. 346 
Provided, however, that the aggrieved buyer acts reasonably in an effort to minimise the 
loss he may recover the full amount of his loss even if it later transpires that the price he paid 
is higher than the market value at the due delivery date, so that he has, in effect, increased his 
IOSS. 347 Conversely, where the buyer has actually minimised any part of his loss he cannot 
claim recovery for that part, even where he has done more than reasonable by way of 
mitigation. 348 The reason for that is plain, that is, the purpose of damages, as was indicated, is 
to compensate the buyer for loss he has suffered by placing him in as good a position as if the 
contract had duly been performed, but not in a better position. 
2.3.4. Relevance of Fault 
In English law it does not matter for the purpose of damages for breach of sale contract 
whether the breach was deliberate or accidental. In some cases where non-performance is 
caused by supervening impossibility the contract may be frustrated, in which case there will 
be no breach. Subject to that possibility, however, liability for breach of contract is therefore 
strict, in the sense that the aggrieved buyer does not have to show that the breach was 
committed deliberately or negligently. 349The reason is clear; the award of damages for breach 
of contract is to compensate the party who is injured as a result of the other party's breach. 
2.4. Measure of Damages 
So far we have been concerned with the principle of compensation and the kind of loss for 
which an injured buyer may be entitled to claim damages. Where a particular head of loss 
satisfies the preceding rules the next significant question is how to measure the recoverable 
344 Pilkington v. Wood [195311 Ch. 770 at 777. 
345 James Finlay and Co. Ltd. v. N. V KwikHoo Tong Handel Mawschappif[1929] I K. B. 400, at 410. 
34 See e. g., Dodd Properties (Kent) Ltd. v. Canterbury City Council [198011 All E. R. 928, per MegawLJ at 
935. See further, Mark, M., (1981) at 248; Sclunitthoff, C. M., (1966) at 187, Schmitthoff, C. M., (1961) at 
364; MacIntosh I G., Frydenlundl). C., (1987) at 119; Bridge, M., (1989) at400. 
347 See e. g., Melachrino v. Nicholl & Knight [1920] 1 K. B. 693 at 697; Lloyds & Scottish Finance Ltd. v. 
Modem Cars & Caravans (Kingstons) Ltd. [1966] 1 Q-B. 764 at 782. See also Schmitthoff, C. M., (1966) at 
186; Guest, A. G., et al., (1997) Para. 16-052. 
348 See also, Guest, A. G., et al., (1997) Para. 16-050. 
349 Fridman, G. H. L., (1986) at 642. 
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damages in terms of money. The question of computation of recoverable damages must be 
distinguished from that of recoverability of damages. 350 The former arises where it is proved 
that a particular loss is recoverable. After establishing the fact that the loss is of a kind which 
in principle is recoverable the question arises upon what criterion the amount of damages must 
be quantified. 
As explained above, an injured buyer is given a general right to recover damages for 
losses he has suffered as a result of the seller's breach, in whatever form it occurs. As far as 
the measure of special damages are concerned, there seems not a great deal of difference 
between the different types of breach. But in relation to normal damages, different types of 
breach lead to different practical results and their consequences in monetary terms would 
piftafacie be differently evaluated. It is perhaps for this reason that English lawyers examine 
these forms of breach separately. Following this method, the various formulae upon which the 
buyer's damages are measured will be discussed under the following headings. However, it is 
appropriate to deal first with the situations covered by statutory rules - non-delivery and 
defective delivery - and then with the situation not covered - late delivery, where analogy can 
be found. 
2.4.1. Non-Delivery 
The action for non-delivery arises where goods are not delivered at all but also when goods 
which are not in conformity with the contract are tendered and lawfully rejected by the buyer. 
In both cases, a buyer who has suffered loss can claim damages for non-delivery. 351 In the 
case of non-delivery the basic measure is the difference in value rule. The rule is regulated by 
s. 51 (2) of the Act as follows: 
"Me measure of damages is the estimated loss directly and naturally resulting, in the 
ordinary course of events, from the seller's breach of contract. " (underline added) 
For the measure of the difference in value, the Sale of Goods Act distinguishes between the 
two cases: where there is a market and where there is no available market for the goods 
purchased under the contract. 
350 Farwell L. J. in Chaplin v. Hicks (1911) 2 K. B. 786 at 797. See also, Cheshire, Fifoot and Furniston, (1996) 
at 607-608; Wilson, J. F. and Slade, C. J., (1952) at 458459. 
351 The Act does not make clear how the buyer's damages are to be measured where the seller has made short 
delivery. However, in Sealace Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Oceanvoice (The 'Alecos M') [199 111 Lloyd's Rep. 120, 
it was held that the appropriate measure for the case of short delivery was damages for non-delivery. It seems 
that in the case of short delivery the buyer may resort either to the provision under s. 30 (1) and accept that 
part actually delivered and reduce the price by that of the missing part or recover that part of the price if he 
has already paid, or to regard the seller's failure to deliver part of the goods as a case of non-delivery and 
claim damages in accordance with s. 51. Ile first option will be in his favour where the market price has 
fallen, whereas the latter can be advised when the market price of the contract goods has risen. He may also 
be entitled to claim damages for consequential losses provided the rules of remoteness are satisfied. 
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2.4.1.1. Where There is an Available Market 
Where there is a market for the purchased goods, the difference in value is prima facie to be 
assessed by reference to the market price. The case is expressly addressed by the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979 in s. 51 (3) as follows: 
"Where there is an available market for the goods in question the measure of 
damages is prima facie to be ascertained by the difference between the 
52 "353 contract price and the market or currene price of the goods ... 
Application of the market rule raises a significant question: Does the buyer's actual substitute 
purchase or actual sub-sale affect the application of the rule? 
(A) Market Price Rule and Substitute Purchase 
Application of this primajacie rule does not depend upon whether or not the injured buyer has 
gone into the market and purchased substitute goods. So the actual sub-purchase should not, 
in principle, be taken into account in preference of the market price rule, though it may be 
evidence of the market price . 
3.54 In spite of that, such a sub-purchase may affect the 
application of the rule in some cases. In this case, a distinction has been drawn between two 
events. If the buyer immediately proceeds to purchase substitute goods at a price higher than 
the market price, he can only recover the difference between the contract and the market 
price . 
3'5 This obviously means that the primajacie rule applies here. But if the sub-contract is 
made immediately after the seller's failure to deliver at a price less than the market price, it is 
not clear whether the seller can take advantage of this to reduce damages he would otherwise 
to pay. Although there is no authority directly on this point, the editors of Benjamin's Sale of 
Goods suggest that the prima facie rule in s. 51 (3) should apply to this situation. The 
suggestion has been justified on the grounds that "it cannot be said that the buyer's 
opportunity to buy at the bargain price arose only because of the seller's breach: even if the 
seller had fulfilled his obligation by delivering the pron-dsed goods, the buyer could also have 
bought the other goods at the lower price. "356Morcover, the contract to buy substitute goods 
at such a price is an extraneous event to which the seller has no connection and is thus res 
inter ahos acta. 357 But if the buyer, instead of purchasing the substitute goods immediately 
after the seller's failure to deliver does not proceed to make a sub-contract, the market price 
352 AS is seen, the Act uses two terms 'ýrnarket" or "current" price. It seems that there is no difference between 
the two terms, the latter is used simply as an explanation of the former. 
353 Ile sub-section assumes that the buyer has not paid the price in advance to the sellcr: if he has, the damages 
must also cover the price. 
354 McGregor, H., (1997) Para. 829. 
355 Guest, A. G., et al, (1994) vol. 2, Para. 41-291. 
356 Guest, A- G., et al, (1997) at Para. 17-018. 
357 Goode, R. M., (1995) at 395. 
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rule would be applied even if he has made the sub-contract at a price less than the market 
one. 358 
(B) Market Pýice Rule and Sub-Sale 
It is also said that the effect of the application of the primajacie rule is that sub-contracts are 
to be regarded as 'accidental' to the issue of damages and as being "circumstances peculiar to 
the plaintiff which cannot affect his claim one way or the other. "59 The rule will be applied 
apart from the fact that damages recoverable thereunder might exceed, or fall short of, the 
actual profits which the aggrieved party would have made had the principal and sub-contracts 
been carried out. The rule was clearly expressed in Rodocanachi v. Milburn'60 , concerned 
with an action against carriers for non-delivery of cargo when the ship sank because of its 
master's negligence. 361 The House of Lords in Williams Bros v. Ed. T Agius Ltd. 362, appl ying 
the rule in Rodocanachi v. Milburn to the sale of goods, held that the true measure of 
damages which the buyers could recover was the difference between the contract price and the 
market price and not the difference between the contract price and the resale price. In that 
case, Lord Dunedin observed that in a question of the measure of damages there must be a 
distinction between non-delivery and delayed delivery and the rule under Wertheim v. 
364 Chicoutimi Pulp CO . 
363, decided by the Privy Council, should be applied to the latter. 
2.4.1.2. Where There is no Available Market 
The market price rule has been applied by the English courts whenever possible, even where it 
produced hardship in individual cases . 
36' Nevertheless, it is a prima facie rule and it will not 
apply if there is no market. 366 In such circumstances, recourse must be made to the general 
rule prescribed by s. 51. (2). For this purpose, the court must determine the amount of 
358 See Campbell Mosom (Provisions) Ltd. v. Barnett Trading Co. [1954]1 Lloyd's Rep. 65. This is because the 
buyer is accepting the risk of market fluctuations. See also, Guest, A. G., et al, (1994) vol. 2, Para. 41-291. 359 Per Scrutton L. J. in Slater v. Hoyle & Smith [1920] 2 K. B. II at 23. For more cases see, Guest A. G., et al, 
(1994) vol. 2, Para. 41-295, fn. 48; Guest, A. G., et al, (1997) Para. 17-027 and authorities its editors cited in 
fh. 4. It is to be stressed that the question whether the re-sale price is relevant or not arises where the sub-sale 
is actually made and it is relied on by the defendant to reduce a claim for loss of value which was not alleged 
to be too remote. It is quite different from the sub-sales relied on by the plaintiff to increase the damages by 
reference to the lost of profits which he may suffer when he had lost an opportunity to sell the goods on 
favourable terms. Ile former is a question of mitigation, while the latter falls into the question of remoteness. 
Lost resale profits could be recovered by claiming under s. 54 or the second limb ofHadley v Barendale rule. 
360 (1886) 18 Q. B. D. 67 at 77 
361 In that case, Lord Esher laid down the law as follows: "It is well settled that in an action for non-delivery or 
non-acceptance of goods under a contract of sale the law does not take into account in estimating the damages 
anything that is accidental as between the plaintiff and the defendant, as for instance an intermediate contract 
entered into with a third party for the purchase or sale of the goods. "(ibid., at 77). 362 [1914] A-C. 510. 
363 [19111 A. C. 30 1. 
364 Ibid., at 522. 
365 See e. g., Thol v. Henderson (1881) 8 Q. B. D. 457 (sub-contract by buyer disregarded). See also, Mark, M., 
(1981) at 232; Bridge, M., (1997) at 561. 
3" Devlin J. in Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders and Shippers, [1954] 2 Q. B. 459 at 489. 
Chapter Two: Buyer's Remedies Under English Law 102 
recoverable damages by the way of ascertaining, by way of estimation, the value of the 
purchased goods according to various factors may be appropriate in any case. In this 
connection, the court will look at the case to see whether the buyer bought the goods for the 
purpose of resale or to use them in his business as an income-producing asset. Each case turns 
on its particular circumstances, and is usually complicated by the question of special damages 
367 
could be recovered under s. 54 of the Act or the second linib of Hadley v Baxendale rule. 
Where the court is satisfied that any peculiar circumstance was or ought reasonably to have 
been within the seller's contemplation where the contract was made it would rely on it to 
ascertain the value of the goods. For instance, where the buyer ordered goods to be specially 
manufactured for himself, the buyer's damages will be p7ima facie the difference between the 
contract price and their value 36' at the time they had to be delivered. In this respect, the buyer 
may be entitled to recover damages for the additional cost of buying reasonable alternative 
369 goods, or of adapting or modifying alternative goods for his purpose. Similarly, where the 
seller was aware of the buyer's intention to buy the goods for the purpose of resale to a sub- 
buyer, the re-sale price may be evidence of their value, provided that the resale price is not 
unusually high. 370 
In the absence of an available market for the purchased goods he is also required to 
mitigate his loss. For this purpose, he must takes reasonable steps to find a new source to 
provide him with substitute goods and if he acts reasonably the price at which he bought them 
will be the basis for assessing his damages under the general principle of s. 51 (2). In this 
respect the buyer may be entitled to recover as damages the reasonable cost he has incurred 
for procuring goods which are the nearest available equivalent in quality and price to the 
goods he has purchased under the contract. In procuring the nearest equivalent, the buyer may 
be forced to purchase goods of superior quality and so higher in price than the contract goods. 
However, he will be entitled to recover the extra costs incurred provided that he has acted 
reaSonably. 371 
17 Hydraulic Engineering Co. Ltd. v. McHafflie (1878), 4 Q. B. D. 670 (special damages); Grebert-Borgnis v. J 
& W. Nugent (1885) 15 Q. B. D. 85. (goods made to order). See also, mark, M., (1981) at 234) 
1 It has been argued that the 'value' of goods for which no substitute are available may, in appropriate 
circumstances, include an element of subjective or idiosyncratic value (Guest, A. G., et al, (1997) Para. 17- 
020, no. 56)). 
369 See also, Atiyah, P. S. & Adams, J., (1995) at 488. 
370 See e. g., Devlin J. in Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders and Shippers, [1954] 2 Q. B. 459 at 489. See also, 
371 
Guest, A. G., et al, (1997) Para. 17-020 and seq; Atiyah, P. S. & Adams, J., (1995) at 487-488. 
Hinde v. Liddell (1875) L. R. 10 QR 265 at 268,270; Blackburn Bobbin Co. Ltd. v. T. W. Allen & Sons, 
Ltd. [1918] 1 K. B. 540 at 554. See also, Guest, A. G., et al, (1997) Para. 16-071, and 17-022; Guest, A. G.. et 
al, (1994) vol. 2, Para. 41-292 and seq.; Bradgate, R-, (1995) at 263. 
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Sin-dlarly, the rule can be displaced where it would be inappropriate. 372 For instance, 
where the buyer has bought to sell to his sub-buyer the very same goods he purchased Erom 
373 
the seller as specific goods, or he has fixed the same delivery date in the contract of resale 
as in the original contract'374 the market price rule will not apply, for when the seller fails to 
deliver in such situations the buyer is not able, despite the presence of an available market, to 
avoid loss under the resale contract. The buyer can, however, recover damages for that loss 
only where such special circumstances were reasonably contemplated by the seller at the time 
of original contract. 375 
2.4.2. Non-Conforming Delivery 
As in the case of non-delivery, the basic measure in the case of non-conforraing delivery is the 
difference in value. The rule is prescribed by s. 53 (2) as follows: 
"The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the estimated loss directly and 
naturally resulting, in the ordinary course of events, from the breach of warranty" 
(emphasis added), 
The rule is a general applicable to all cases unless there is an available market for the goods in 
question. Where there is a market the damages must be measured by reference to the market 
price of the sound and defective goods as provided by s. 53 (3). 
2.4.2.1. Where There is an Available Market 
Where there is an available market for conforming goods, the market price must be taken as 
the warranted value. In this respect, s. 53 (3) lays down: 
"In the case of breach of warranty of quality such loss is pfima facie the difference 
between the value of goods at the time of delivery to the buyer and the value they 
would have had if they had fulfilled the warranty. " 376 
372 See e. g., Per Upjohn I in Thompson (W. L) v. Robinson (Gunmakers) Ltd. [1955] 1 Ch. 177 at 188; Lord 
Wilberforce inJohnson v. Agnew, [1980] A. C. 367 at 401. See also the authorities cited in. Schmitthoff, C. 
M., (1966) at 181 no 6 1. 
373 WilliamsBros v. Ed. T. AgiusLtd. [1914] A. C. 510 at 523; TheArpad [1934] P. 189 at 204. 
374Kwei TekChao v. British Traders andShippers, [1954] 2 Q. B. 459 at489490. 
375 Guest A. G., etal, (1994) vol. 2, Para. 41-295. Cases such as R& HHallLtdand WHPim (Junior) & Co. 
Ltd [1928] 33 Com. Cas. 324, might be explained by this way. In that case, the House of Lords saw the 
market rule as an inappropriate one and held that the buyer's damages should be quantified by reference to 
the re-sale price formula. However, there is the possibility to argue that it was concencd with the recovery of 
damages under the second limb of the Hadley v. Baxendale rule. For this reason, in describing the likelihood 
of the foreseeability of the buyer's sub-sale, different criterion were used by the law Lords (see the headnote 
of the case, [1928] 33 Com. Cas. 324 at 325). See also, Devlin I in Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders [19541 
2 Q. B. 459 at 489490; Guest, A. G., et al, (1997) Para. 17-031; Atiyah, P. S. & Adams, J., (1995) at 485- 
486; Bradgate, R., (1995) at 262-263. 
376 Although the Act in this section does not use the language of market, case law has used it (see e. g., Slater v 
Hoyle and Bence Graphics explained in the text). 
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When the market rule is applicable, the contract price has no relevance, though it may be 
regarded as an evidence of the market price where there is little other evidence. " This is 
because the buyer's complaint is not that he will have to buy a substitute from another source, 
but it is about how much more the goods would have been worth if they would have been 
delivered on the due delivery date in proper condition. 
Re-Sale Price or Market Price? The question which arises here is whether the buyer's 
damages for breach of warranty are to be measured by reference to the re-sale price or the 
market price. The law as it stands now is not quite clear. Two differently decided cases are 
available on the question. In the one hand, in Slater v. Hoyle & Smith Ltd. 378 # the Court of 
Appeal favoured the market rule. 379 On the other hand, the same court in the very recent case 
of Bence Graphics International Ltd. v. Fasson UK Ltd . 
3'0 has disregarded the market rule 
and favoured the re-sale price rule. The case was concerned with a contract to supply vinyl 
film to make identification decals for bulk containers. It was a term of the contract that the 
film would survive in good legible condition for at least five years. The defendants supplied 
the film for the plaintiffs who printed words or numbers on them and cut them to size so that 
they could be applied to the containers and subsequently most of them were used by them to 
make decals for Sea Containers Ltd. However, after the passage of some period it transpired 
that the film manufacturers used insufficient ultra-violet stabiliser so that the film tended to 
degrade and some decals became illegible. As a result, the customers of Sea Containers 
expressed their extensive complaints about the poor labelling of their containers, although they 
381 had not sued the plaintiffs for supplying defective items. The plaintiffs sued the suppliers to 
recover damages for breach of contract. In that case, the primary question was how the 
damages for delivery of defective product were to be measured. At first instance, Morland J., 
applying the primafacie rule prescribed in s. 53 (3) of the Sale of Goods Act, held that the 
suppliers' liability should be ascertained by reference to the difference between the value of 
the goods at the time of delivery and the value they would have had if they had fulfilled the 
377 See e. g., Minster Trust Ltd. v. Traps Tractors Ltd. [1954] 3ARE. R. 136. See also, Mark, M., (1981) at 243; 
McGregor, H., (1997) Paras. 876-877. 
378 [1920] 2 K. B. 11. 
379 In that case, Scrutton LI, treating the market price rule as general applicable to all cases, said: sub- 
contracts do not come into account.... The difference between the two market prices should be the measure of 
damages. If the buyer delivers under the sub-contract the damaged goods and has to pay damages, these 
damages will not be the measure of damages. ... The result seems the same if they are less; it is res inter alias 
acta: 'circumstances peculiar to the plaintiff, ' which cannot affect his claim one way or the other. " (ibid., at 
22-23). 
"0 [1997] 1 All E. R. 979. 
381 See Otton IJ, [1997] 1 All E. R. 979 at 982). 
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contract term. 382 However, the Court of Appeal, by a majority (rhorpe LJ dissenting), 
reversed this judgment and held the defendants liable for damages to be measured on the basis 
of the plaintiffs' liability to the subsequent or ultimate users of the plaintiffs' product 
incorporating the defective vinyl supplied by the defendants. The Court of Appeal held that 
section 53 (3) laid down a prima facie rule, from which the court might depart in appropriate 
circumstances. On the facts of the case, Otton LJ, justifying the departure from the prima 
facie rule, observed that Slater v. Hoyle could be distinguished narrowl Y383 from the present 
case, since in that case the sub-sale was of substantially the same goods, whereas in the 
instant case the goods had been substantially processed or converted by the buyer and it was 
certainly within the contemplation of the seller at the time of making the contract that the 
goods sold would have been used for the Sea Containers. In his Lordship's view, once the 
goods had been converted in a manner which was contemplated by the parties, Slater should 
not be applied and damages must be measured by reference to the sub-sale. Auld LJ, 
concurring with Otton LJ in non-application of Slater case in the instant case, did not agree 
with him that Slater could be distinguished from the instant case. In his Lordship's view, the 
time had come for Slater to be reconsidered at least in the context of claims by a buyer for 
damages on account of breach of warranty where he had successfully sold on the subject 
matter of the contract in its original or modified form without being sued by his sub-buyers. 
384 
He then criticised the reasoning of Slater's case on a number of grounds. 385 
2.4.2.2. Where There is no Available Market 
As pointed out earlier, the market rule is a primafacei rule and will not come into play where 
there is no market. In such cases, the value must be ascertained by other means, such as the 
contract price, '16 resale price, 387 the cost of putting the goods into their warranted state8a , the 
cost of buying substitute goods, 389 or even by reference to the price offered for the goods by a 
sub-purchaser before the defect was discovered (where the value of warranted goods is the 
case)390 and with knowledge of their defective conditions . 
391 
"'Me judge regarded the whole films supplied by the defendants as worthless and as result held them liable to 
pay L564,328.54 damages with interest. 
383 [1997] 1 All E. R. 979 at 988. 
3g4 Ibid., at 992. 
395 Ibid., at 994. However, this case itself has been criticised by Treitel, G. H., (1997) 189. 
`6 Where there is no evidence as to the market value of the goods which comply with the contractual 
description and quality, as it happened in Dingle v. Hare (1859) 29 LIC. P. 143. 
3" As suggested in Clare v. Mayvard (1837) 6 AD. & E. 519. 
388 Minster Trust Ltd. v. Traps Tractors Ltd. [1954] 3 All E. R. 136 at 156. 
389 See British Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Underground Electric Railways Co. of 
London [1912] A. C. 673. In this case the House of Lords accepted that the cost of substitute machines 
(turbines) could be awarded, but held that in assessing the damages any extra profit to the buyer resulting 
from the replacement of the defective machines should be taken into account. 
'" As suggested in Clare v. Maynard (1837) 6 A. & E. 5 19. 
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2.4.2.3. Damages and the Defence of Set-off 
In the case of non-conforming delivery, s. 53 of the Sale of Goods Act gives the buyer two 
options either to claim damages as described above or to withhold a part or all of the contract 
price as a self-help remedy. The case will arise where the buyer has not paid the price in 
advance. In such a case, under sub-section (1) (a), a buyer who elects to accept, or, is required 
to accept the non-conforming goods is entitled to "set up against the seller the breach of 
warranty in diminution or extinction of the price. " Accordingly, a buyer who is tendered non- 
conforming goods may exercise a measure of self-help, by simply withholding part or all of 
the price where the seller sues him for the price. His claim for damages may completely 
extinguish his liability to pay, even it is too late to reject . 
3'2 Sub-section (4) of s. 53 also 
provides: "The fact that the buyer has set up the breach of warranty in diminution or 
extinction of the price does not prevent him from maintaining an action for the same breach of 
warranty if he has suffered further damage. -)093 
The sub-section talks of 'further damage'. But it is not clear whether the term refers to 
firesh damage the buyer may suffer as a result of non-conforming goods, for example, by 
reason of latent defect, or if, it refers to damage which was not taken into account in the first 
action when assessing the extent of the reduction of price, as Mondel v. SteeP94 suggests. 
Another possible meaning has been suggested that it may refer to a sum 'over and above' the 
price at least in cases where the breach of warranty had been set up in 'extinction' of the 
price. That is, if the buyer's damages exceed the price, he may claim the excess in separate 
proceedings or by means of a counterclaim in the seller's action for the price. 395 
It should be recalled that the buyer is not deprived of his claim for damages where the 
buyer has paid the full price or the seller has recovered the full price by an action against him. 
Thus, the buyer can subsequently bring a separate action against the seller for damages 
396 resulting from breach of warranty. The rule has been justified on the ground that this is 
because the existence or extent of defect may not become apparent to the buyer until after the 
buyer has paid the price to the seller. 397 
391 See also, Mark, M., (1981) at 243-244; Bradgate, R., (1995) at 266; Goode, R. M., (1995) at 406; A. G., et 
al, (1997) Para. 17-049. 
392 See e. g., Mondelv. Steel (1841) 8 M. &W. 858. 
393 See e. g., ibid., at 871-872. In that case, the buyer also claimed for further damages for costs he incurred in 
respect of repairing the defective ship. However, the court refused to hold the manufacturer liable for the 
further damages. 
394 (1841) 8 M. & W. 858. 
395 Guest, A. G., et al, (1997) Para. 17-047; Guest, A. G., et al, (1994) vol. 2, Para. 41-303; Mark, M., (1981) at 
244; Bradgate, R., (1995) at 265. 
396 See the building contract case: Davis v. Hedges (1871) L. R. 6 Q. B. 687 at 690. 
397 Guest, A. G., et at, (1997) Para. 17-047. 
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2.4.3. Late Delivery 
The Sale of Goods Act does not provide an express provision dealing with the measure of 
damages for late delivery. Case law has not clearly examined how the buyer's damages should 
be measured where the seller delayed in making delivery. In spite of lack of express authority 
on the point, English writers, referring to some cases decided in other areas, suggest that the 
buyer's damages should be measured by reference to the difference in the market prices 
prevailing at the agreed and actual dates of delivery. 3" However, depending on whether the 
contract goods were bought for resale or use in an income-producing asset, the measure of 
damages for delay in delivery will vary in practice. 
2.4.3.1. Goods Purchased for Resale 
Where the goods are purchased for resale the natural loss resulting from delay must be 
quantified by comparing the market price or value of the goods at the due delivery date with 
the market price or their value at the actual delivery date. Where there is an available market 
for goods of the contract description at the due delivery date, the normal measure of damages 
is the difference between the market price at the due delivery date and the date of actual 
delivery. Where there is no available market, the recoverable amount will be the difference 
between the value of the goods at the contract delivery date and their value at the date of 
actual delivery: that is, the amount by which the value has fallen and which the buyer has lost 
by delay in his reselling. 399 In the latter case, the value of the goods at the time fixed for 
delivery and at the actual date of delivery is to be determined by whatever test is the most 
appropriate in the light of the evidence available. 400 In this respect, the court may rely on the 
contract price, the price at which a third party has agreed to buy the goods from the buyer. 
2.4.3.2. Goods Purchased for the Buyer's Business 
Where the goods are purchased for the purpose of use in the buyer's business, the appropriate 
measure might be some other criterion since the buyer does not complain that he has been 
tendered an asset whose realisable value was diminished by reason of delay. 11is claim is for 
deprivation of the use of the goods during the period of delay whereby he has sustained costs 
of hiring substitute goods for that period and/or additional costs he may have incurred as a 
398 Borries v. Hutchinson (1865) 18 C. B. (N. S. ) 445 at 465 with approval by Elbinger Actien-Geselischaffl v. 
Armstrong (1874) LR 9 Q. B. 473 at 477, wMch was in turn approved by Lord Pearce (obiter) in The Heron 
11 [1969] 1 AC 350 at 417418. Ile same fomula is confirmed by Lord Dunedin in Williams Bros v. Ed. T. 
Agius Ltd. ([1914] A. C. 510 at 522. See also McGregor, H., (1997) Para. 854; Atiyah, P. S. & Adams, J., 
(1995) at490; Greig, D. W., (1974) at289; Bridge, M., (1997) at 570. 
399 See Goode, R. M., (1995) at 402; Guest, A. G., et al, (1997) Para. 17-037; Bradgate, R-, (1995) at 264; 
Treitel, G. H., (1995) at 856; Sealy, L. S. & Hooley, R. I A., (1994) at437. 
' See, e. g., Retcher v Tayleur (1855) 17 C. B. 2 1. See also, Goode, R. M., (1995) at 402; Guest, A. G., et al, 
(1997) Para. 17-037. 
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consequence of having to make so without the goods for the period of delay. In such 
situations, apart from pure inconvenience, the buyer, in fact, seeks to be reimbursed for loss of 
income-profit and for any expenditure he has incurred in taking reasonable steps to mitigate 
such loss during the period after the goods should have been delivered until the actual date of 
delivery. 401 
If the asset is of an income-producing kind- e. g. because it is a production machine or 
because it is utilised in the provision of income-producing services or is an asset that the buyer 
acquired for the purpose of letting on hire - the normal measure of damages is the loss of 
profit that the seller could reasonably have contemplated as flowing from the breaCe 2. Where 
the goods were bought to be used for a specially lucrative purpose the buyer will only be able 
to claim a sum equal to the profit he would have obtained using them for their normal 
purpose, unless his special purpose was reasonably foreseeable by the seller when the contract 
was made. The latter point was clearly illustrated in Victoria Laundry v. Newman Industries 
403 which was early mentioned . 
2.4.3.3. Relevance of Actual Resale in Measuring Damages 
The question arises here, as in two other cases, whether actual resale by the buyer should be 
disregarded or it must be taken into account in fixing the damages. Two differently decided 
cases are available on the issue. In Wertheim v. Chicoutimi Pulp Co. 404, the Privy Council 
held that where the buyer has managed to resell the purchased goods at a price more than the 
market price at the actual delivery date the court must take into account such actual resale in 
fixing the amount of damages the seller is liable to pay. On the other hand, in Slater v. Hoyle 
& Smith Ltd. 405 ,a case of non-conforming delivery, the Court of 
Appeal confirmed that the 
below-market price realised by the buyer on resale should be ignored in assessing the 
recoverable damages. 406 Scrutton LJ, addressing the Wertheim v. Chicoutimi case, said: 
401 See the earlier authorities in respect of delay in delivery of ships or vessels such as, In re Trent & Humber 
Co. Ex parte Cambrian Steam Packet Co. (1868) L. R. 4 Ch. App. 112 (contract to repair the plaintiffs 
vessel). 
'0' However, where there is an available market for the goods, the buyer is required under the rules of 
mitigation to avoid loss of profit by immediately purchasing or hiring substitute goods. 
403 See in this respect, Goode, R- M., (1995) at 402403; Guest, A. G., et al, (1997) Para. 17-039; Schmitthoff, 
C. M., (1966) at 189 and seq. 
404 [19111 A. C. 30 1. 
4'5 [1920] 2 Y-B. 11. 
406 In that case, Scrutton L. J. said that sub-contracts were res inter alias acta; they were "circumstances peculiar 
to the plaintiff, " which cannot affect his claim one way or the other. If the buyer is lucky, for reasons with 
which the seller has nothing to do, to get his goods through on the sub-contract without a claim against him, 
this on principle cannot affect his claim against the seller any more thari the fact that he had to pay very large 
damages on his sub-contract would affect his original seller. " (ibid., at 23). Cf. the statement of Lord Dunedin 
in Williams Bros v. Ed. T. Agius Ltd. ([1914] A. C. 510), where he observed that in a question of the measure 
of damages there must be a distinction between non-delivery and delayed delivery and the rule under 
Wertheim v. Chicoutimi should be applied to the latter (ibid., at 522. ). 
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"This is a decision of Privy Council, and although not technically binding on us, is of course 
entitled to the greatest respect" but said that it was "difficult to see how this fits in with the 
principles ...... and concluded that 
"... all the English decisions show that a plaintiff cannot 
measure the real value of what he has lost by reference to a contract peculiar to himself, for 
which the defendant is not responsible, and that his loss therefore is not measured by that 
ýA07 price. Moreover, the buyer was not under any duty to perform his delivery obligation vis i 
vis the sub-buyer by delivering the contract goods, but he could purchase other goods and use 
them for the sub-contract. As a result, he would have been left with the original goods on his 
hands so that their market price at actual delivery would have been the relevant figure in 
assessing the damages. 
In contrast, as explained in the case of breach of warranty, the Court of Appeal has 
departed from Slater v Hoyle case in Bence Graphics. In that case, two members of the Court 
have agreed that under some circumstances the market price rule should be replaced by re-sale 
price. However, the case was concerned with breach of warranty and two members of the 
Court have based their judgments on different reasoning. Otton LJ said that Slater v. Hoyle 
could be distinguished narrowlyos from Bence Graphics, while Auld LJ, criticising the rule 
under Slater4o, did not agree with his reasoning and suggested that Slater should be 
reconsidered at least where the buyer has claimed for damages on account of breach of 
warranty and he had successfully sold on the purchased goods in their original or modified 
form without being sued by his sub-buyers. 410 
English commentators have taken different views. While some authors have accepted 
that the law stated in Wertheim was a good law and should be followed where the seller has 
delayed in delivering the goods4l', the others have agreed with the Slater case and commented 
that the Wertheim case is hard to fit with general principles. 412 
'07 Ibid., at 23 and 24. 
408 [1997] 1 All E. R. 979 at 988. 
409 Ibid., at 994. 
CO Ibid., at 992. 
411 For instance, see Waddarns, S. M., (1983) Paras. 200-202 (particularly, Para. 201), distinguishing late 
delivery from the two other cases, argues the considerations applicable to the cases of non-delivcry and 
defective delivery are not easily applicable to the case of late delivery, Burrows, A. S., (1994), at 146. 
412 See e. g., Treitel, G. H., (1995) at 857; Beale, Bishop and Furmston, (1995) at 581(with doubty, Guest, A. G., 
et al, (1997) Paras. 17-038 and 17-053 (with doubt); Goode, R. M., (1995) at 402; McGregor, H., (1997) 
Paras 342,857; ); Guest, A. G., et al, (1994) vol. 2 at Para., 41-300; Ogus A. I., (1973) at 345-, Street, H., 
(1962) at 185; Greig, D. W., (1974) at 289-291 (the author, although criticises the reasoning upon which the 
decision was based, acknowledges that the decision itself is consistent with the international trade, see 290- 
291); Bridge, M., (1997) at 584-5, in which the authorhas seen the case as a decision "is probably right" (see 
also, Bridge, M., (1988) at 786). In respect of Wertheim, Professor Bridge also observes that "if the buyers 
were locked into the head contract in their dealings with the sub-buyere', the sub-sale price should be taken 
into account (Bridge, M., (1997) at 583, and, Bridge, M., (1988) at 784). In comparison, %ith the new decided 
case, Bence Graphics, Trcitcl has preferred the reasoning of Slater (Treitel, G. H., (1997) at 195). 
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2.4.5. Time of Assessment 
The time by reference to which damages are assessed gives rise to no difficulty where the 
method of assessment is the actual substitute contract; for in that case assessment is in 
principle the difference between the purchase price and the contract price. The problem as to 
the time of assessment does, however, arise where damages are to be quantified by reference 
to the market price. In English law, the starting principle is that damages are to be assessed by 
reference to the market price at the time of breach. 413 So far as contracts for the sale of goods 
are concerned, the principle is stated in the Sale of Goods Act 1979 where the buyer has 
claimed damages for non-delivery. In this regard, section 51 (3) provides: 
"Where there is an available market ... the measure of 
damages is prima facie to be 
ascertained ... at the time or timeSI14 when they ought to have been delivered4 or (if no 
time was fixed) at the time of the refusal to deliver. "415 
However, this is a general rule applicable to the case of late delivery as well as 
defective delivery. Tbus, where the seller has delayed in his delivery the buyer's damages are 
to be assessed by reference to the market value of the goods from the date when he should 
have delivered the purchased goods in accordance with the contract. The same is true where 
the seller has delivered non-conforming goods. IEs liability is measured by reference to the 
value of the goods at the time of delivery to the buyer and the value they would have had if 
they had fiilfilled the warranty (s. 53 (3). 
The rule that the buyer's damages should be assessed by reference to the market price 
at the time of delivery is only a 'ptima facie' rule from which the court may depart in 
appropriate circumstances. For instance, it will not apply when, for some reason, it is not 
416 
reasonable for the injured party to make a substitute contract at that time. Likewise, where 
the defect in the goods is not discovered at the time of delivery the time when the value of the 
goods in their defective state is to be assessed may be postponed until the time when the buyer 
can reasonably be expected to discover the defect. 417 It may also be postponed where the buyer 
413 See generally, Waddams, S. M., (1981) 445; Mann, F. A., (1969) 516. 
414 As in the case of delivery of instalments within several successive times. 
415 As in the case of contract to deliver goods on demand or as required by the buyer. However, the concluding 
part of s. 51 (3) of the Act dealing with the situation where no time was fixed for delivery, is said to be 
inapplicable to cases of anticipatory breach (see Millett v. Van Heek & Co. [1921] 2 Y-B. 369 at 376-377 
(Atkin L. J. )). Thus should the seller repudiate the contract before the date for delivery arrives, damages are to 
be measured by reference to the market price at the time when the goods must be delivered not that prevailing 
at the date of repudiation. However, although the buyer, as already pointed out, is not bound to accept the 
seller's repudiation when it is first made (FMite & carter (Councils) Ltd. v. McGregor [1962] AC 413), if he 
accepts the repudiation he is under the duty to mitigate his loss. See also, Guest, A. G., et al., (1997), Paras. 
16-075 - 16-076,17-013 - 17-015. 416 Johnson v. Agnew [1980] A. C. 367. See in this connection, Guest, A. G., et al, (1994) vol. 2, Para. 41-290. 417 Naughton V. O'Callaghan [1990] 3 All E. R. 191. This is the case where a c1f buyer paid against the 
documents and later discovered that the goods were defective, and reject them. In such a situation, it has been 
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has resold the goods to a sub-buyer before examining them because they were packaged. In 
such a case, the date of examining would be the date for assessing the buyer's damages for 
defective goods, provided that the seller knew that the buyer intended to resell the goods at 
another place. 418 
It is to be noted that although s. 51 of the Act speaks of the time of delivery of goods, 
the courts have interpreted the statutory wording in a broader sense to cover the cases of 
documentary sales under which the seller's duty to deliver the goods is performed by tendering 
the documents representing the goods . 
419 Accordingly, in a c. i. f. contract, the time in which the 
goods ought to have been delivered is prima facie the time when the documents should have 
been tendereeo and not the time when the goods themselves should have arrived at the 
destination and this is the time from which the buyer ought to have bought on the market. 421 
An illustration of the rule can be found in Sharpe & v. Nosawa itself. The case was 
concerned with a contract under which the sellers agreed to sell two parcels of Japanese peas 
c. i. f. London at LIO 15s. per ton. One parcel to be shipped in May and the other in June, 
1914. The whole of the first parcel was shipped, and part of the second was shipped at the 
proper time. A dispute arose and the sellers refused to ship the rest of the second parcel; but 
the buyers did not accept the repudiation. No time for tender of documents was specified 
under the contract. But if shipment had been made by the end of June, the documents 
representing the goods would have reached the buyer on 21st July, and the goods themselves 
would have arrived by the end of August. During the period the market price had risen and 
reached L12 per ton in London at the end of July and L17 10s. at the end of August. The 
question was whether the damages were to be measured by the market price in July, when the 
documents would have arrived in the ordinary course, on a June shipment of goods, or the 
price in August when the goods would have arrived, on the assumption that the voyage took 
suggested that damages would no doubt be measured by reference to the date of rejection rather than the date 
of tender of documents (Guest, A. G., et al, (1997) Para. 19-16 1). 
`8 See e. g., Van Den Hurk v. R Martens & Co. Ltd. [1920] 1 K. B. 850 (packaged goods which the seller knew 
that the buyer intended to re-sell and which it was not practical to examine before they were despatched to the 
sub-buyer abroad). 
"" For instance, in C. Sharpe & Co. Ltd. v. Nosawa [1917] 2 K. B. 814, Atkin I observed: "... the time or times 
when the goods ought to have been delivered, within the meaning of s. 51 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893, it 
seems to me that the words of that section mean the time or times when they ought to be delivered according 
to the mode of delivery contemplated by the contract. If the contract provides for delivery of the goods by 
delivery of the shipping documents, or by handing over to the buyer the key to the warehouse, the date for that 
event is the time 'when they ought to have been delivered" (ibid., at 821). 
'0 This is because their tender is a constructive delivery of the goods giving the buyer the power to deal with 
them- 
421 See also, Garnac Co. v. HMF. Faure & Fairclough [1966] 1 QB. 650 at 675. 
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about two months. In that case, Atkin J. held that the buyers' damages were to be assessed 
with reference to the London market price at the end Of jUI Y. 422 
There is No Fixed Time for Delivery. Where the contract does not fix a particular time 
for delivery of the goods, the prima facie rule for the assessment of damages is based on the 
market price "at the time of refusal to deliver". However, the question which arises here is 
whether a contract for delivery of the goods within a reasonable time is a contract with a fixed 
time for delivery. In one case, 423 it was held that such a contract is not a contract with a fixed 
time for delivery. 424 The editor of Benjamin's Sale of Goods, however, suggests that "where 
delivery is to be made within a reasonable time of the making of the contract or from some 
other fixed point of time, the relevant market price should not necessarily be that prevailing at 
the date of the seller's refusal to deliver ... but at the time, perhaps later than the refusal, when 
it would have been reasonable for the seller to deliver. 15 This is because from the latter time 
the seller will be in breach of the contract. 
The principle is based on the view that any loss resulting from market movements after 
the time of breach is not caused by the breach but by the injured party's failure to mitigate by 
making a substitute contract. Since, however, the mitigation rule only requires the injured 
party to act reasonably, it follows that the principle of assessment by reference to the time of 
breach allows him some latitude. Tlius where a seller failed to deliver and an exact substitute 
could not be obtained at the time of that failure, it was said that the buyer ought to have "a 
reasonable time to consider their position, 426 -amounting to about ten days- and the damages 
427 were assessed by reference to market prices at the end of the ten clays . 
2.4.6. Relevant Place 
Further question which arises from the application of the market price rule is to ascertain the 
place at which the market price to be referred to. The Act does not make any express 
provision as to the place at which the market price is to be measured. In some cases, various 
possible markets may be relevant for this purpose. For instance, in a c. i. f contract, different 
422 Ibid., at 821. In contrast, in a classic f, o. b. contract, damages for on-delivery may be assessed with reference 
to the time at which the seller should have put the goods corresponding with the contract conditions on board 
a ship which has to be nominated or designated by the buyer (Guest, A. G., et al, (1997) Para. 20-099), for 
under such a contract, this is the time at which the seller will perform his delivery obligation (ibid., Paras. 20- 
0 11 and seq. ). 
423 Afillett V. Van Heek &Co. [1920] 3 K. B. 535. 
424 But the Court of Appeal in the same case expressly reserved the court's decision on this point ([ 1921] 2 K. B. 
369. 
425 Guest, A. G., et al, (1997) Para. 17-009. See also, Guest, A. G., et al, (1994) vol. 2, Para. 41-298. 426 C. Sharpe & Co. Ltd. v. Nosawa & Co. [1917] 2 K. B. 814 at 821. 
427 Wroth v. Tyler [1974] 1 Ch. 30. See also, Treitel, G. H., (1988) Para. 104. 
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at which the documents should be tendered, or at the place of the seller's failure to deliver or 
to appropriate goods may become relevant. 42' It is not infrequent that there is an available 
market for the purchased goods in more than one of these places but with different prices. The 
question arises according to what place damages ought to be assessed? No clear authority can 
be found on the point. Some authors have suggested that the relevant place is generally the 
place at which the goods were to be delivered under the contract, since this is usually the 
market on which the buyer will buy. 429 Nevertheless, it has been held that 'where' to the 
knowledge of both buyer and seller, goods are bought c. i. f and f. o. b. for shipment to a 
particular market, the relevant values to be taken into consideration are the values of the goods 
upon that market on arrival there. 4'0 This clearly means that the market price in c. i. f. and 
f. o. b. contracts is that which prevails in the place of destination of goods. 
Conclusion 
In light of this study it was seen that in English law primacy is given to damages as a remedy. 
An injured buyer is given a general right to claim damages for any loss he suffered as a result 
of the seller's breach of contract. Damages are awarded to compensate the injured buyer. The 
compensatory nature of damages has a number of consequences. First, the buyer is not entitled 
to claim damages unless he has suffered loss. Second, damages are not awarded to prevent the 
seller profiting from a breach of contract; its primary purpose is to put the injured buyer, so 
far as money can do so, into the same financial position in which he would have been, had the 
contract been performed properly. Third, fault is irrelevant: if the seller is in breach and the 
breach causes loss the seller is liable whether the breach was deliberate or accidental. 
This could be linked to the absence of a separate right of price reduction in English law. 
Price reduction, as will be seen in the next chapters, is not compensatory, but primarily 
restitutionary in nature and is designed to prevent the seller from unjust enrichment. It is 
possible to say that problems such as those the English Court of Appeal had in Bence 
Graphics International Ltd. v. Fasson UK Ltd, 4" is due to the absence of price reduction as a 
separate remedy. In that case, the plaintiffs had claimed damages for losses they had not in 
428 Guest, A. G., et al, (1997) Para. 19-164. 
429 Atiyah, P. S. & Adams, J., (1995) at 484 (relying on Attorney-General ofRep of Ghana v. Texaco Overseas 
Tankships Ltd. (The Texaco Melbourne) [199311 Lloyd's Rep, 471). On this view, where there is no market 
at the place of delivery, recourse should be had to the nearest market in which the goods are bought and sold 
(see Altorney-General Rep of Ghana v. Teaco Overseas Tank Ships Ltd. (The Texaco Melbourne) [1993] 1 
Lloyd's Rep, 471; see also, Bridge, M., (1994 ) at 157. The same rule is accepted by the Convention (Art. 76 
(2). 
430 See e. g., Aryeh v. Lawrence Kostoris & Son Ltd. [1967] 1 Lloyd's rep. 63, per Diplock L. J. at 71 and 73-4. 431 [1997] 1 All E. R. 979. 
Chapter Two: Buyer's Remedies Under English Law 114 
fact suffered. 432 Accordingly, holding the defendants liable of that damages would have given 
the plaintiffs a windfall. On the other hand, holding the suppliers non-liable would have 
enriched them by allowing to receive money without giving a proper consideration. The court 
in fact resolved the problem by measuring the recoverable damages on the ground of the re- 
sale price formula. But one may argue that in such situations the doctrine of price reduction 
would work effectively. 
It was also seen that English law gives little significance to specific performance. In this 
system specific performance is rarely awarded as a remedy. For this reason, it is less likely 
that an order is granted where the buyer has demanded that the seller cure his non-conforming 
performance by replacement or repair. 
It has also been made clear that although English law seems to permit termination 
relatively easily by recognising the "theory of condition" and pre-classifýring certain contract 
terms as "conditions", it has restricted the right to terminate the contract for breach, by 
developing the "theory of serious breach" and the 1994 Sale of Goods Act reforms. It seems 
that by having two different tests the law is seeking to achieve a balance between two 
competing policies: certainty and fairness. However, the law is doubly uncertain here because 
outside the area of legally classified terms (such as those in the implied terms of the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979) is very difficult to know which approach the court will adopt. 
It was also shown that there are certain areas in which the law is not clear. First is that 
although the classification of the contract terms is justified on the grounds of the needs for 
commercial certainty, there is a surprising degree of uncertainty in relation to the relationship 
between rejection and termination and the existence and otherwise of a right to cure. Similarly, 
the law is not clear in respect of the time and degree of foresecability of consequences required 
to justify termination under the theory of serious breach. The same is true as to the 
relationship of the tests of foreseeability in contract and tort, the effects of resales on the 
buyer's right to claim damages and the place at which the market price is to be measured. 
432 The plaintiffs had claimed the amount of the whole price as damages, while in fact they had not sustained 
such losses, since they had used a considerable number of the vinyl supplied by the defendants in their 
manufacturing process and had apparently lasted for part of the stipulated five-year period. Moreover, 
although the plaintiffs were, for the defect in the material, clearly in breach of their contracts with their 
customers and extensive complaints were subsequently made from the users of the containers, in fact only one 
minor claim had been made even up to the time when the case was considered by the Court of Appeal against 
the plaintiffs, who settled it by the supply of new decals at their own expense and in turn received agreed 
damages from the defendants (see Bence Graphics International Ltd. v. Fasson UKLtd. [l 997] 1 All E. R. 979, 
per Otton LJ at 982). See also, ibid., per Auld LJ at 991 where he said it should not be set aside in that 
way so as to produce a result where the claimant will clearly recover more than his true loss. " 
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Introduction 
Having considered the remedies available for the aggrieved buyer under English law, it is now 
time to examine the position of the Convention. Generally, under the Convention, two series of 
remedies are elaborated, one of them governing all the species of non-performance by the 
seller, the other governing all the non-performances of the buyer. As far as the buyer is 
concerned, Art. 45 opens the section on remedies for breach of contract by the seller by listing 
the remedies available to the buyer. Under this provision, the buyer may resort to the 
following remedies where the seller has failed to perform his obligations under the contract 
and the Convention: 
(i) claim for damages (Art. 45 (b)) as provided in Arts. 74-77; 
(ii) require the seller to perform his obligations (Art. 46 (1)); 
(iii) require delivery of substitute goods by the seller (Art. 46 (2)); 
(iv) require the seller to remedy the lack of conformity by repair (Art. 46 (3)); 
(v) declare the contract avoided (Arts. 49 (1) (a) (b)) and 51 (2); 
(vi)reduce the contract price (Art. 50); 
(vii) refuse to take delivery (Art. 52). 
However, closer observation reveals that the list is far from being exhaustive. Further 
remedies are expressed in Arts. 71-73. Likewise, some commentators have suggested that a 
through reading of the remedial provisions of the Convention shows that the buyer is also 
given a general right to 'refuse to take delivery' where the seller fails to perform his delivery 
obligations in accordance with the contract and the Convention. ' This remedy, as will be seen 
later is controversial. 
These remedies are subject to an important provision. Under this provision, the buyer 
will lose the right to rely on non-conformity of the goods if he does not notify the seller of the 
lack of conformity within a reasonable time after he has, or ought to have discovered it, (Art. 
39 (1))2 ; and in any event within two years of actual delivery (unless this period is extended by 
the contract) (Art. 39 (2))3 unless the lack of conformity relates to facts of which the seller 
knew or could not have been unaware and which he did not disclose to the buyer (Art. 40). 4 
I Maskow in: Bianca, C. M.; Bonell, M. J., (1987) at 390 and seq.; Enderlein; F.; Maskow, D., (1992) at 229 
and seq. 
2 Art. 39 (1): "The buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does not give notice to 
the seller specifying the nature of the lack of conformity within a reasonable time after he has discovered it or 
ought to have discovered it. " 
3 Art. 39 (2): "In any event, the buyer loses the right to rely on a lack of conformity of the goods if he does not 
give the seller notice thereof at the latest within a period of two years from the date on which the goods were 
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As in English law, a general look at the remedial provisions of the Convention shows 
that they can be placed into three general categories: those which enable the buyer aggrieved 
by the seller's breach to withhold performance of his contractual obligations and bring the 
contract to an end, those which enable him to require the defaulting seller to fulfil the contract 
and those which provide for him some monetary relief. The following sections will examine in 
detail the provisions which provide the above remedies for the buyer where the seller has made 
a non-conforming delivery. 
Section One 
Withholding Performance and Termination 
1.0. Introduction 
The Convention contains some provisions which can be said to allow the buyer to withhold 
5 
performance of his contractual obligations. However, as indicated in the English law chapter , 
there must be theoretically a distinction between the remedy under which he is simply given a 
right to withhold performance as long as the seller has not fulfilled his contractual obligations 
and the remedy under which he is entitled to terminate the contract. There can be found some 
provisions in the Convention under which the buyer is only given a right to withhold 
performance of his obligations without being entitled to terminate the contract. Termination in 
such cases will be justified where certain requirements are satisfied. The first part of this 
section determines where an injured buyer is entitled simply to refuse to perform his 
obligations and the second part ascertains where he is entitled to terminate the contract if the 
seller fails to perform his delivery obligations in accordance with the contract and the 
Convention. 
2.0. Part One. Withholding Performance 
2.1. Concept and Importance 
Withholding performance under the Convention, as in English law, means that the buyer is 
entitled to refuse to perform his obligation without being required or even being entitled to 
terminate the contract. Obviously, if the requisites for the latter remedy are met and the buyer, 
actually handed over to the buyer, unless this time-limit is inconsistent with a contractual period of 
4 
guarantee. " See also Art. 43 and then cf. Art. 44. 
See also Art. 43 (2) where the seller has delivered goods contrary to Arts. 41 and 42. 5 See Chapter Two, Section One, 1.1. 
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before fulfilling his obligations has declared the contract avoided in accordance with Arts. 49, 
51,72 or 73 of the Convention, he is no longer obliged to perform his obligations (Art. 81 
(1)). But such requisites may not be met or the buyer may not wish to declare the contract 
terminated, but rather demand goods fully conforming with the contract. 
In the provisions regulating the buyer's remedies for seller's breach, although the 
Convention gives specific rights to withhold performance in certain cases, it does not make a 
general statement that the buyer is entitled to withhold performance of his obligations. ' The 
question is, therefore, whether the buyer has a general right to withhold performance of his 
obligations under the contract where the seller has performed his delivery obligations in a way 
which does not correspond with the contract or the Convention. 
In this respect, some commentators, as pointed out above, have tried to infer from the 
Convention provisions that the buyer should be given a general right to refuse to take delivery. 
But it seems that they have failed to distinguish between the buyer's right to refuse to 
recognise goods the seller delivers as the contract goods and his right to refuse to take delivery 
and consequently they have relied on the provisions which concern the former rather than the 
latter. It is probably for the reason that the Convention has not expressly imposed on the buyer 
a duty to accept what the seller delivers as the contract goods. It is, however, proposed to 
examine these two possible rights separately. Although in practice both may often arise at the 
same time, in some cases the right to refuse to accept arises where the buyer has already 
performed his duty to take over the goods as defined in Art. 60. 
From the buyer's point of view, the existence of the right to refuse to recognise the 
goods offered as the contract goods seems important, since the buyer will thus be entitled to 
resort to the remedies provided under Art. 46 (2) or (3). But what significance follows from 
the right to refuse to take delivery? It seems that the existence of the right to refuse to take 
delivery would also be significant for the buyer, not only in respect of the link between 
delivery and payment (Art. 58 (1) (2)), but also in regard to the passing of the risk (at least 
where the case falls into the scope of Art. 69). That is to say, as long as the seller does not 
deliver the goods in accordance with the contract and the Convention the buyer can refuse to 
take delivery and thereby return the risk to the seller. The seller would face delay, and in order 
to avoid the undesirable consequences of delay, he would strengthen his efforts to perform. 
Since taking delivery and payment of the price generally are linked, the buyer would have the 
6 As a matter of temiinology, the Convention, in different places, speaks of the right of "suspension" - in the 
case of prospective non-pcrfomiance (Art. 71 (1)) -, the right to "refuse" - in the case of early or excess 
quantity delivery - (Art. 52) and the right to "reject" (Art. 86 (1)) -, but in this study the right is described by 
"-aithholding perfonnance". All of these expressions are in fact particular instances of the application of a 
general right to %rithhold performance. 
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fiirther advantages of paying later and not for non-conforming goods, for the seller who wants 
to obtain payment must take action against the buyer. 
More importantly, the right will be significant where the seller fails to fulfil his 
obligations with respect to the place of delivery (Art. 3 1), or to specify the goods by notice 
(Art. 32 (1))'. The significance of the right is for the reason that the remedy prescribed under 
Art. 46 (2), (3) does not apply here, since it only relates to the seller's obligation to deliver 
conforming goods under Art. 35 and probably Arts. 41 and 42. In such cases, if the buyer has 
such a right he can refuse to take delivery and subsequently require performance according to 
Art. 46 (1), and fix an additional period of time in accordance with Art. 47 (1). ' 
The remedy will also be significant for the buyer where the seller partially or fully fails 
to perform his obligations relating to the quantity, quality and other description required by 
the contract (Art. 35) or fails to fulfil his duty under Arts. 41 and 42, that is where the goods 
delivered are not free of the rights or claims of third parties. In such cases the right to refuse to 
take delivery would be useful for the buyer where he wishes to require the seller to repair the 
non-conformity under Art. 46 (3). In such situations the buyer can, if he is entitled, by turning 
the risk of the goods to the seller persuade him to cure the non-conformity as quickly as 
possible. Accordingly, in the case of the seller's failure to deliver goods in accordance with 
Arts. 35,41 and 42 the buyer is not required to take delivery of them in order to have them 
cured later but he can refuse to take delivery until cure is made. 
Having considered the concept and importance of the remedy, the following discussion 
will try first to answer the question whether the Convention has recognised a general right to 
withhold performance and then to ascertain how the given right will work in different types of 
failure by the seller to perform his obligations. 
2.2. Withholding Performance as a General Right 
A close examination of the Convention provisions will clearly show that the Convention has 
recognised the right to withhold performance for an aggrieved buyer on some occasions. 
7 Art. 3 1: "If the seller is not bound to deliver the goods at any other particular place, his obligation to deliver 
consists: (a) if the contract of sale involves carriage of the goods - in handing the goods over to the first carrier 
for transmission to the buyer, (b) if, in cases not within the preceding subparagraph, the contract relates to 
specific goods, or unidentified goods to be drawn from a specific stock or to be manufactured or produced, and 
at the time of the conclusion of the contract the parties knew that the goods were at, or were to be 
manufactured or produced at, a particular place - in placing the goods at the buyer's disposal at that place; (c) 
in other cases - in placing the goods at the buyer's disposal at the place where the seller had his place of 
business at the time of the conclusion of the contract. " 
8 Art. 32 (1): "If the seller, in accordance with the contract or this Convention, hands the goods over to a carrier 
and if the goods are not clearly identified to the contract by markings on the goods, by shipping documents or 
otherwise, the seller must give the buyer notice of the consigninent specifying the goods. " 9 See also, Nfaskow in: Bianca, C. M.; Bonell, M. J., (1987) at 390,391. 
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However, in some cases the Convention has expressly applied the rule and in others it has 
impliedly recognised it. 
2.2.1. Prospective Non-Performance 
The Convention has expressly applied the right to withhold performance in Art. 71 (1) under 
the heading of the right to 'suspend the performance of obligations'. 10 Under this provision 
whenever it is apparent that a party, say the seller, will not be able to deliver goods or 
documents, the buyer is given a right to suspend the required steps leading to payment, such 
as the establishment of a letter of credit (Art. 54). However, the provision comes into 
operation only where it becomes apparent that the seller is about to commit non-performance 
of a substantial part of his obligations; " it does not concern where the seller has performed his 
delivery obligations in a way which do not correspond with the contract requirements. 
For the provision to be applied certain requirements are to be satisfied. First, the 
inability to perform must be 'apparent' after the conclusion of the contract. If it was already 
apparent at the time of making the contract that one party would not be able to perform, the 
other party is not entitled to suspend his obligations. Second, the appearance of prospective 
failure to perform must be caused by either a serious deficiency in the ability to perform, or in 
the creditworthiness, or by conduct in preparing to perform or actually performing the 
contract (Art. 71 (1) (a) and (b)). Third, the expected failure must relate to a 'substantial part' 
of the obligations of the party who is about to commit the breach. There is, thus, no right to 
suspend where the prospective breach only relates to a minor part of the obligations. 
2.2.2. Actual Non-Performance 
The right to withhold performance is also impliedly recognised by Art. 58 (1)12 of the 
Convention. Under this provision, where the contract is silent as to the time of payment the 
buyer is under the duty to pay only when the seller places the goods or the documents 
controlling their disposition at the disposal of the buyer. Hence, where the seller has failed to 
place the goods or documents at the buyer's disposal the latter is entitled to refuse to pay as 
long as the seller's failure continues. 
10 Art. 71 (1): "A party may suspend the performance of his obligations if, after the conclusion of the contract, it 
becomes apparent that the other party will not perform a substantial part of his obligations as a result of. (a) a 
serious deficiency in his ability to perform or in his creditworthiness; or (b) his conduct in preparing to 
perform or in performing the contract. " 
11 See e. g., the statement of Bulgaria in: Official Records, (1981) at 375 para. 57; Secretariat Commentary, 
(1979) at 52-53; Bennett in: Bianca-Bonell, (1987) at 518; Honnold, (1990) at 484. See generally, Strub, M. 
G., (1989) 475. 
12 Art. 58 (1) provides: "... the buyer ... must pay it (the price) when the seller places either the goods or 
documents controlling their disposition at the buyer's disposal ...... 
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Similarly, it seems that the Convention has also accepted the right to withhold 
performance where the seller has delivered non-conforming goods. In that event, the buyer is 
impliedly given a right to refuse to recognise the seller's non-confom-Ling delivery as a 
conforming delivery. The buyer's entitlement to refuse to accept the seller's non-confom-dng 
delivery can be inferred when it is proved that under the Convention the buyer is under a 
further duty to accept what the seller delivers in performance of the contract. The Convention 
provides no clear provision for this purpose. It simply provides: "The buyer must pay the 
price for the goods and take delivery of them as required by the contract and the Convention" 
(Art. 53). 
What is certain is that recognising the goods delivered as conforming to the contract is 
not the same as taking delivery or even taking over the goods as prescribed by Art. 53. The 
duty to take delivery is defined by Art. 60. Under this Art. the buyer's duty to take delivery 
consists of two elements: The first element is that he must do "all the acts which could 
reasonably be expected of him in order to enable the seller to make delivery. " For example, if 
the contract requires him to arrange for the carriage of the goods (as is often the case under 
the terms of fob contract), he is bound to make the necessary contracts of carriage in order to 
enable the seller to deliver (hand the goods over to the first carrier for transmission to the 
buyer (Art. 31 (a)). The second element of the buyer's duty to take delivery is to take over the 
goods. It is the case where the seller is bound under the contract to make delivery by placing 
the goods at the buyer's disposal at a particular place or at the seller's place of business (Art. 
31 (b) and (c). In such cases the buyer will be regarded as having taken delivery where he has 
physically removed the goods from that place. " 
As is seen, taking delivery, as defined under Art. 60, is not inconsistent with the case 
where the buyer has done all the acts which enabled the seller to make the delivery but he is 
nonetheless required to accept the goods in the sense that he is not allowed to reject them. This 
is where the buyer after receiving the goods when examining them (Art. 3 8) has realised that 
they are in conformity with the contract and the Convention. Accordingly, taking delivery does 
not include what is called here the duty to accept the goods. Under this interpretation, the 
buyer is under two separate duties: to take delivery of the goods and to accept ( not reject) 
them if they are in conformity with the contract. 
This duty is clearly inferable from the provisions of Arts. 46 (2) and 49 (1) (a). The 
first provision gives the buyer a right to require the seller to tender replacement goods and 
the second entitles him to avoid the contract provided that the seller's breach amount to a 
fundamental breach. Similarly, Art. 46 (3) enables the buyer to demand that the seller repair 
13 See Secretariat Cormnentary, (1979) at 47. 
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the lack of conformity where it is reasonable having regard to all the circumstances. Beyond 
these circumstances, the buyer is not entitled to resort to these remedies but he has to accept 
them as the contract goods, otherwise he will be in breach of the contract. Accordingly, the 
buyer is under the duty to accept the seller's delivery where the lack of conformity does not 
fall into the foregoing circumstances. 
Assuming that the buyer is under a reciprocal duty to accept the seller's delivery, where 
it accords with the contract and the Convention, he will be entitled to refuse to accept where it 
does not conform to the contract terms and the Convention. " This right not only corresponds 
with commercial practice", but can clearly be inferred from the provisions allowing the buyer 
to require the seller to tender substitute goods or to make them repaired (Art. 46 (2) and (3)). 
These provisions, by allowing the buyer to require the seller to make a fresh tender or cure the 
non-conformity by way of repair (as the case may be) where the seller has delivered goods 
which do not conform with the contract and this Convention, presuppose that the buyer is 
entitled to refuse to accept them as the contract goods. Accordingly, it is quite possible for the 
buyer to retain his right under Art. 46 (2), (3) after having taken delivery or taken the goods 
over. T*his is the reason why Art. 86 (1) speaks of the buyer's right to reject after he has 
received the goods from the seller. 
2.2.3. Early or Excessive Delivery 
A further application of the right to withhold performance can be found under Art. 52.16 Under 
this provision, where the seller has made an early delivery the buyer is entitled to refuse to 
take delivery of such a delivery (Art. 52 (1)). He is also given a right to refuse to take delivery 
of the excess quantity where the seller has delivered greater than the contract quantity (Art. 52 
(2)).. 
Buyer's Right to Refuse to Take Delivery as a General Remedy. Although the refusal to 
take delivery under this Art. is mentioned in the catalogue of the buyer's remedies in Art. 45, it 
can only be exercised in reference to the special case of early or excess quantity delivery under 
Art. 52. No clear provision is provided by the Convention to determine whether the buyer is 
entitled to refuse to take delivery of the goods delivered to him by the seller where they do not 
" See also, Enderlein; F.; Maskow, D., (1992) at 229. 
'5 In the event of a tender of non-conforming goods or documents, the buyer may very well want to keep the 
contract alive, even be entitled to terminate the contract, but at the same time not be interested in accepting 
the actually tendered goods or documents. 
16 Art. 52 provides: "(1) If the seller delivers the goods before the date fixed, the buyer may take delivery or 
refuse to take delivery. (2) If the seller delivers a quantity of goods greater than that provided for in the 
contract, the buyer may take delivery or refuse to take delivery of the excess quantity ...... 
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accord with the contract terms and the Convention, such as the cases where the seller has 
failed to perform his duty under Arts. 31,32 (1), 35,41 and 42. 
Some commentators, as already pointed out, have suggested" that such a right, to some 
extent, can be inferred from the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Convention. In 
justifying the view, they argue that this rule can be inferred not only from the express granting 
of that right under Art. 52 for cases of early delivery and delivery of excess quantity, but also 
from the fact that Art. 86 (1) presupposes the existence of a right to reject. " The advocates of 
the existence of this general remedy have also resorted to the link between payment and 
delivery (Art. 58 (1), (2)) and the right of the buyer to examine the goods under Art. 58 (3)", 
and to Arts. 46 (1)" and 47 (1)" by saying that they are at least consistent with the 
assumption of the buyer's right to refuse the taking delivery under certain conditions. ' 
However, it seems that although the view can be supported under the Convention, the 
provisions referred to above do not help to establish such a rule. This is because, first, 
although the first paragraph of Art. 52 can be relied on for this purpose, it is only applied to 
the case of early delivery. The second paragraph is entirely irrelevant. It simply provides that 
the buyer can refuse to accept the seller's offer of an extra quantity where he has delivered a 
quantity of goods greater than that provided for in the contract. It dose not say that the buyer 
is entitled to refuse to take delivery of the whole goods the seller has delivered as contract 
goods. Secondly, Art. 86 presupposes that the buyer who has received the goods which do not 
correspond with the contract requirements is entitled to reject them. Such a statement, as 
indicated previously, is consistent with the principle that he can refuse to accept them as 
contract goods not that he is entitled to refuse to take delivery which this Art. presupposes has 
taken place in advance. This is the reason why these two Arts. used different terminologies. 
Nevertheless, it can be said that the Convention has irnpliedly recognised a right to 
refuse to take delivery for an aggrieved buyer under certain circumstances. This rule is 
inferable from taking into consideration the question in the light of the principles of the 
Convention upon which it is based. Under these principles it might be concluded that the buyer 
is not obliged to take delivery where the seller's delivery is not in conforn-dty with the contract 
and the convention. For it is one of the principles of the Convention that the seller has to 
17 Enderlcin; F.; Maskow, D., (1992) at 229 and seq.; Maskow in: Bianca-Bonell, (1987) at 389 and seq. 
18 Art. 86 (1) provides "If the buyer has received the goods and intends to exercise any right under the contract 
or this Convention to reject them (italic supplied),... " 
19 Art. 58 (3) provides "The buyer is not bound to pay the price until he has had an opportunity to examine the 
goods, ... " 20 Art. 46 (1): "Ile buyer may require performance by the seller of his obligations unless the buyer has resorted 
to a remedy which is inconsistent with this requirement. " 
21 Art. 47 (1): "The buyer may fix an additional period of time of reasonable length for performance by the seller 
of his obligations. " 
22 Enderlein; F.; NWkow, D.,, (19 92) at 229; Maskow in: Bianca-Bonell, (1987) at 3 90,3 9 1. 
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deliver in full conformity with his obligations and the buyer is only required to take delivery of 
such a performance. This principle can be inferred through the examination of the relationship 
between the main duties of the parties under the Convention. The essential duties of both the 
seller and the buyer; i. e., delivery, taking delivery of the goods and payment of the price, are 
provided by Arts. 30 and 53 of the Convention. Although the relationship between the buyer's 
duty to take delivery and the seller's obligation to deliver goods is not expressly defined by the 
Convention, it seems that these two duties are interdependent. Some commentators have 
argued that such a relationship can be inferred from Art. 58 (1) and (2) by saying that this 
Art. qualifies the buyer's duty to pay the price to the condition that the seller's delivery is to be 
in accordance with the contract and the Convention. ' However, it seems that Art. 58 is 
provided only to state that the seller's duty to deliver and the buyer's duty to pay the price are 
concurrent obligations and they are to be performed at the same time when the contract is 
silent as to the time of payment. It is not intended to define the main duties of the parties. The 
main obligations of the parties are defined by Arts. 30 and 53. Although these two Arts. do 
not expressly refer to each other, it is suggested that they must be read in connection with each 
other. Thus, the seller is obliged to deliver the goods provided that the buyer is ready and 
willing to pay the price for the goods and take delivery of them "as required by the contract 
and this Convention", and the buyer is bound to pay and take delivery provided that the seller 
is being ready and willing to deliver the goods "as required by the contract and this 
Convention". Accordingly, the buyer's duty under Art. 53, i. e., taking delivery and pay in 
exchange for the seller's delivery , is conditioned 
by the qualification that the seller's delivery 
conforms with the terms of the contract and this Convention. In accordance with this 
interpretation the buyer's duty to take delivery and pay the price under Art. 53 may be re- 
phrased as follows: 
"It is the buyees duty to take delivery of goods delivered to him by the seller provided 
they are delivered in accordance with the term of the contract and this Convention". 
On this interpretation, where the seller has delivered goods in a way which do not 
conform with the contract terms and the Convention the buyer is not in principle bound to take 
delivery of them. In more clear words, as long as the seller has not fulfilled his duty to deliver 
in accordance with the contract and the Convention the buyer's duty to take delivery has not 
indeed arisen. He is, therefore, under no obligation to perform his duty to take delivery under 
Art. 53. 
23 IbicL 
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2.3. Withholding Performance for Partial Delivery and Partial Non- 
Conforming Delivery 
Although Art. 52 (2) entitles the buyer to refuse to take delivery of the excess quantity, it does 
not make clear whether the buyer has the right to refuse to take delivery where the seller 
delivers less than the contract quantity. It could be argued that according to the principles 
already dealt with the buyer can refuse to perform his obligations on account of the seller's 
partial non-delivery. The view can also be supported by the fact that short delivery gives the 
buyer the right to terminate the contract in its entirety in certain circumstances (Art. 51 (2) 
which includes the right to refuse to perform his obligations insofar as this has not taken 
place. The same logic justifies the buyer's right to refuse to perform until complete delivery in 
conformity with the contract is offered. 
A fiirther question is "Does the buyer have the option to refuse to perform in respect of 
the missing part or non-confbrn-ýing part where the seller has delivered goods some part of 
which conform with the contract? " Art. 51 (1) seems to enable the buyer to treat the missing 
and the non-conforming part (as the case may be) as the subject of separate contracts for the 
purpose of remedy and resort to his remedies under Arts. 46-50. But those provisions do not 
include such an option. Can the buyer treat the missing or non-conforming part as the subject 
of a separate contract for the purpose of the right to refuse to perform for the proportion of the 
missing or the non-conforming part? Since he is entitled to terminate the contract with respect 
to the missing or the non-conforming part if the requirements of fundamental breach or 
Nach t notice procedure are satisfied, it can be said, by analogy, that he is entitled to refuse Iflis 
to perform the contract to the proportion of the missing part. The view can also be supported 
by Art. 58 (1) which provides that the buyer is not bound to pay only when the seller places 
the goods at the buyer's disposal in accordance with the contract. By analogy, the same rule is 
applicable where only part of the goods is in conformity with the contract. The same rule 
would be applicable to an instalment where the seller has delivered a defective instalment, 
since Arts. 51 and 73 are in fact concerned with a similar case, i. e., where the contract is 
severable. 24 
2.4. Grounds for the Right 
In the absence of an express statement by the Convention in describing the right its legal basis 
must be identified by interpreting the provisions of the Convention and taking into account the 
general principles upon which it is based. As pointed out above, the Convention, when 
24 For further discussion, see 3.2.3.1., and the accompanying footnotes. 
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supplying the provision regulating the timing of the performance, has at least referred 
implicitly to the interdependence of the seller's obligation to deliver and the buyer's duty to 
pay. In that case, Art. 58 (1) provides that the buyer, unless otherwise agreed, "must pay the 
price when the seller places either the goods or the documents controlling their disposition at 
the buyer's disposal in accordance with the contract and this Convention". It seems that this 
sub-paragraph intends to state that the seller's obligation to deliver the goods and hand over 
the documents controlling their disposition and the buyer's duty to pay the price are tied 
together so that failure of one party to perform his duty would entitle the other to rely on the 
rule. A close examination of Arts. 46,52,58 and 71 of the Convention leads one to the 
conclusion that the Convention has based the right to withhold performance on the theory of 
"reciprocal obligations". It is under this rule that the obligations are to be exchanged for each 
other's performance at the same time, and refusal of one party justifies the other party's refusal 
to perform as long as the defaulting party continues his refusal. 
The question which arises here is what degree of lack of conformity enables the buyer 
to refuse to perform his duty to accept and take delivery of the goods? No clear provision can 
be found under the Convention for this purpose. It can be said4 however, that since the buyer 
by refusing to accept and take delivery of the non-conforming performance simply refuses to 
perform his counter-obligation, his option to do so need not be based on a showing of 
"fundamental breach". He is only required to demonstrate that the seller's delivery is not in 
accordance with the contract and the Convention. This is because the right of refusal is based 
on the theory of reciprocity of the parties' obligation rather than the theory of fundamental 
breach. ' However, in granting the right to refuse one cannot be generous. Accordingly, the 
substance and the limits of the right to refuse to accept and take delivery have to be 
determined in detail according to the system of the buyer's remedies under the Convention. The 
proposition would not, therefore, be acceptable that the goods should be in conformity of the 
contract in every aspect, otherwise there shall seemingly be a right of refusal. " Such a broad 
proposition seems to undermine the system of remedies prescribed by the Convention. In one 
case, the Convention has referred to the criterion upon which the buyer may withhold 
performance (Art. 71 (1)). In that case, it provides that the buyer will be entitled to do so 
25 The view can be supported by Arts. 71 (1) and 72 (1). Under these Arts. the Convention has differentiated 
between the right to suspend and that of avoidance. A buyer will be entitled to resort to the remedy under Art. 
71 (1) if the seller's prospective non-performance relates to a 'substantial part of his obligation', whereas for 
avoidance it must be 'fundamental' (Art. 72 (1). The legislative history of these provisions shows that it must 
be, at least in theory, assumed that such a differentiation is possible. This is because the Egyptian proposal to 
make the right to suspend conditional on a prospective 'fundamental breach', was rejected by the delegations 
(see, Official Records, (1981) at 129 para. 10,419422 and 431433. See also, Schlechtriem, (1986) at 93 and 
95-96; Bermett in: Bianca-Bonell, (1987) at 521; Strub, M. G., (1989) at 494; Kritzer, Albert H., (1989) at 
457. 
26 Tercier, cited in Enderlein; F.; Maskow, D., (1992) at 230. 
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where the seller's non-performance relates to a 'substantial part of his obligations'. However, 
it is not clear what lack of conformity will able the buyer to refuse to accept the goods and 
take delivery of the non-conforming goods. It seems that the buyer is certainly not entitled to 
refuse to accept the goods for minor non-confonnity. This right may be available for him 
where the seller's failure to perform his obligations in accordance with the contract terms and 
the Convention has attained a certain degree of seriousness. 27 Close consideration of Arts. 46 
(2), (3) and 71 (1) of the Convention supports this restriction. Moreover, it accords with the 
21 principles of good faith (Art. 7 (1))" and mitigation (An. 77). 
2.5. Right to Refuse for Tender of Non-Conforming Documents 
Although the Convention has referred to the seller's duty to deliver goods and documents in 
accordance with the contract terms (Arts. 30 and 34), it does not deal properly with the issue. 
It is therefore not quite clear whether the buyer has two separate rights to refuse to accept 
non-conforming documents and goods, and if so, what relation is there between these two 
rights? It appears that the question must be examined according to the same principles as 
elaborated for goods. 
According to the principles explained above, it seems that where the seller fails to 
tender the shipping documents the buyer is entitled to refuse to pay the price, since where the 
contract does not specify otherwise, the buyer is under the duty to pay the price only "when 
the seller places the ... documents controlling their disposition at the 
buyees disposal" (Art. 58 
(1). In other words, the seller's duty to hand over the documents controlling the disposition of 
the goods at the buyer's disposal and the buyer's duty to pay the price are to be fulfilled at the 
same time. However, it seems that the rule prescribed under Art. 58 (1) would not be 
applicable to all shipping documents, since the Convention qualifies the non-defaulting buyer's 
right to withhold performance of his obligation to pay the price to the qualification that the 
documents should be those "controlling their disposition". Accordingly, the seller's failure to 
tender documents which lack this qualification is to be placed within the category of defective 
delivery rather than non-delivery. 
Where the seller tenders docwnents which do not correspond with the contract 
requirements the buyer is not required to take delivery" and pay the price in exchange for such 
27 See also, Enderleirr, F.; Maskow, D., (1992) at 201 and 230, Maskow in: Bianca-Bonell, (1987) at 392. 
28 Art. 7 (1) provides: "In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character 
and to the need to prompt uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade. " 
29 See also, Maskow in: Bianca-Bonell, (1992) at 392. 
30 It is worth noting that the Convention fails to mention any statement that the buyer is bound to take over the 
documents tendered to him by the seller. Nevertheless, this failure can be justified by the fact that in the case 
of documentary sales, insofar as documents are concerned, any document which is necessary for taking 
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documents, since, as the last phrase of Art. 30 and Art. 58 (1) provides, the seller must tender 
documents which are in conformity with the contract, otherwise the buyer is not obliged to 
accept and pay for them. Furthermore, it seems that the right to refuse to take over the 
documents could be inferred from the obligation of the seller under Art. 34. " Under this Art. 
the seller is obliged to hand over the documents at the time and place and in theform required 
by the contract. " In addition, rejection of non-conforming documents is a wen-accepted 
customary law which is to be given effect under Art. 9.33 Accordingly, where documents 
tendered by the seller do not show the respective conditions in respect of the goods and 
documents the buyer would be entitled, under some circumstances, to refuse to accept them. 34 
Rejection of Goods and Documents. From the preceding discussions it has been made 
clear that the Convention allows the buyer to reject defective documents. However, it contains 
no clear provision to regulate the case where the subject of the documents is defective. Is the 
buyer have a further right to reject the non-conforming goods when they are landed? 
It seems that since the seller's duties to deliver the goods and the relevant documents are 
two separate obligations (Arts. 30-34) breach of each would give rise to a separate right to 
refuse to accept. Accordingly, the buyer should be given the right to refuse to accept the goods 
when they arrive. He should also be entitled to reject documents which do not comply with the 
contract even though the goods themselves are perfectly in accordance with the contract. 35 
On the above interpretation, the question arises whether the right of rejection of non- 
conforming goods is impaired by the acceptance of the documents. What is certain is that 
where the given defect is reflected on the documents, the buyer's acceptance may be treated as 
a waiver of his right to reject for the defect in the goods. But where the buyer accepts the 
documents, for example a bill of lading, which turns out to have been falsely dated, it would 
not, it seems, prevent him refusing to take delivery of the goods on discharge from the ship. 
Although, the question is not expressly addressed by the Convention, it can be argued that 
delivery of the goods, e. g. documents of title, the obligation to take delivery of the goods regularly comprises 
an obligation to take those documents. 
Art. 34; "If the seller is not bound to hand over documents relating to the goods, he must hand them over at 
the time and place and in the form required by the contract. 
32 See also, Enderlein; F.; Maskow, D., (1992) at 23 1. 
33 Art. 9: " 1. The parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by any practices which they 
have established between themselves. 2. The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have 
impliedly made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew or ought to have 
known and which in international trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of 
the type involved in the particular trade concerned. " 
' it is worth noting that where the parties make payment through the system of letters of credits banks, of 
course, have very strict requirements in regard to the adequacy of documents where letter of credit are issued. 
Ilat is, they will refuse to pay against documents which do not strictly comply with the requirements of the 
contract. See in this connection: Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits (1993 Version), Art 
13. 
35 See in this respect, Guest A. G. et al, (1997) para. 19-126, no. 91. 
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under the Convention the buyer would lose the right to rely on the lack of conformity of the 
goods only "if he does not give notice to the seller specifjing the nature of the lack of 
conformity within a reasonable time after he discovered it or ought to have discovered it" 
(Art. 39 (1)). " Therefore, he can rely on an unspecified defect if at the time of acceptance he 
had neither knowledge nor means of knowledge of it. He can also rely on the non-conformity 
of the goods, even if at the time of acceptance of the documents with a minor defect he had 
neither knowledge nor means of knowledge of another defect in respect of the goods. 
3.0. Part Two. Termination of Contract 
3.1. Introduction 
In the preceding part it was seen that the Convention has given the buyer a right to withhold 
performance of his obligations as long as the seller has not fulfilled his delivery obligations in 
accordance with the contract and the Convention. This remedy, as already indicated, is 
distinguishable from the remedy of termination in terms both of the ground on which it is 
available and its effects. Withholding performance is based on the theory of "reciprocity of 
obligations" and will be justified where the lack of conformity is not minor, while termination7 
is primarily based on the doctrine of 'fundamental breach. Termination, as will be seen 
below, will bring the contract to an end, while withholding performance will not affect the 
legal existence of the contract. 
The following discussion first examines the circumstances in which the buyer will be 
entitled to terminate the contract for the seller's non-conforming delivery and then addresses 
the mechanism of exercising the right and the circumstances in which the buyer may lose his 
right to terminate. Finally, it has a short look at the effects termination may have on the rights 
and liabilities of the parties. 
3.2. Grounds for Termination 
General Review. As a general rule, the Convention grants an aggrieved buyer the right to 
declare the contract tenninated provided that the failure by the seller to perfonn any of his 
obligations amounts to a "fundamental breach of contract" as defined in Art. 25. However, the 
36 See also Art. 43 (1). 
37 The term employed by the Convention to describe the concept of bringing the performance of the contract to 
an end is "avoidance". As to the history of using the tam in the context of international conventions on 
contracts for the sale of goods see, Official Records, (1966), vol. 2 at 236 No. 3); UNCURAL, Yearbook, vol. 
IV (1973), at 41 para. 36; Honnold, (1989) at 119, para. 38). The Convention also uses the term "termination" 
for describing the given concept when the parties to the contract bring the contract to an end by mutual 
consent (Art. 29 ). As to the history of using this term see, Honnold, ibid., at 304 para. 141,379); Official 
Records, (1981) at 7,27-28,76,181, and 157). 
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buyer may also be entitled to terminate the contract without being required to rely on the 
doctrine of "fundamental breach". This possibility arises where the buyer resorts to the 
provision authorising him to request the seller to perform within a specified additional period 
of time of reasonable length (commonly referred to in the literature as the Nachfrist notice) 
(Art. 47). Failure to comply with this request may, as will be seen, be regarded as another 
ground upon which the buyer's termination may be justified (Art. 49 (1) (b)). 
3.2.1. Fundamental Breach 
3.2.1.1. Significance and Concept of the Test 
"Fundamental breach" is one of the pillars of the Convention because various sanctions 
available to the buyer and seller as well as certain aspects of the passing of risk depend on this 
concept. ' Above all, the concept of fundamental breach is a key to the system of termination 
under the Convention. The Convention in several places bases the buyer's right of termination 
on the fundamental breach test . 3" Accordingly, the main question is: what is. /undamental 
breach? Art. 25 of the Convention defines it in the following terms: 
"A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results in such 
detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to 
expect under the contract, unless the party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable 
person of the same kind in the same circumstances would not have foreseen such a 
resuivs 40 
In international sale contracts it is a "fresh legal concept, born from compromise"" and 
open to different interpretations. ' It should be, therefore, interpreted in its own context by 
taking into account the legislative history of its development. 
38 Arts. 46 (2), 49 (1) (a), 51 (2), 64 (1) (a), 70,72 (1), and 73 (1) and (2). 
39 See e. g., Art. 49 (1) (a), Art. 51 (1) -avoidance for partial non-conforming; delivery-, Art. 72 (1) -avoidance 
for anticipatory breach- and Art. 73 for breach of a contract for delivery of goods by instalments. 
40 Effort to dcfme the fundamental breach test has undergone substantial changes over the years during the 
development of the international sale law. These changes can be found in the following documents: The 1939 
and 1951 Rome Drafts, the 1956 and 1963 Working Committee Drafts, the Text Presented by the Drafting 
Committee to the 1964 Hague Conference, the 1964 Hague Uniform Law (LTLIS) Text, the 1975 Text of the 
UNMRAL Working Committee, the 1977 Vienna UNCURAL Text, and fmally the Text of the 1980 
Convention. For more information as to the history of the test see, Official Records, (1966) vol. 2 at 50 (Art. 
55 (3) of the 1939 of the Rome Draft), 108,124,125,138,169,183,214,378; Official Records, (1966) vol. I 
at 35-36,337; Graveson-Cohn-Graveson, (1968) at 55; Eorsi G., (1983) at 338-339; Will in Bianca- 
Bonell, (1987) at 206, Honnold, (1989) at 64-65,88-90,219,220,244,324; Official Records, (1981) at. 157, 
206,295-303,425. 
41 Will in Bianca-Bonell, (1987) at 205. It has been said that the concept of "Amdamental breach", in the 
Convention sense, is an "unfamiliar concept in many parts of the world" (Will, in Bianca-Bonell, ibid. ). For 
instance, I& Guevara (delegation of Philippines) at the Vienna session of UNCrMAL in opposing the last 
phrase of Art. [25] said: the term "fundamental breach" was not very familiar to him but he took it that it 
meant a serious breach (as cited in: Michida, S., (1979) at 285). 
42 For instance, Peter Schlechtriem suggests that it approximates to the German test of whether the injured party 
can be said to have no further interest in the performance Of the contract (Schlechtriem, P., (1986) at 59, while 
Nicholas likens it to the HongKong fir test which is examined in the previous chapter (see Nicholas, B., 
(1989) at 218). 
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3.2.1.2. Elements Constituting the Test 
Art. 25 of the Convention sets up two major criteria for defining "fundamental breach". First, 
the breach must result in a detriment to the innocent party; second, it must substantially 
deprive the innocent party of what he is entitled to expect under the contract. The last phrase 
of the Art. also provides for the party in breach an avenue to escape from the drastic effects of 
his breach, if he can prove that he did not foresee (or could not have foreseen) the 
consequences of his breach. Meditation over the key words of definition employed in Art. 25: 
"detriment", "substantial" and "foreseeability", gives rise to some constructive questions: what 
is detriment? what detriment is substantial? and when is theforeseeability test applied? 
(A) Dettiment 
The first foundation for a breach being fundamental is that it must cause the non-breaching 
party detriment. The Convention itself does not contain any definition of the term "detriment". 
Nor does it give any example of detriment that rises to the level of a fundamental breach. 
Confronted with such a "newcomer"' word in the field of international sale, commentators 
have taken diverging views in its interpretation. " 
In the absence of precise definition, it seems that the term must be interpreted in light of 
the Convention! s legislative history as well as its intended purpose. The legislative history of 
Art. 25 shows that the test developed out of the debate over the weaknesses of the 1964 
Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (herein after, ULIS)'s criterion for defining 
the "fundamental breach" doctrine. The Draftsmen in avoiding the difficulty of subjectivity of 
ULIS test accepted the "detriment" criterion so as to present an objective test for determining 
the fundamentality of the breach. ' But the history of the word "detriment" is short. It was 
`3 Will in Bianca-Bonell, (1987) at 210. For instance, Van Der Velden says: "detriment is hardly of a term of 
art. It is rarely used in (international) legal terminology. Is detriment damage or loss, or damage and loss? Is 
consequential damagelloss included, or has detriment to be interpreted in a specific way... " (see Van Der 
Velden in: Voskuil C. C. A. and Wade JA., (1983) at 64-65). 
For instance, Van Der Velden suggests: "a paraphrase of detriment, acceptable for international use could be 
one given by the Corpus Iuris Secundum, namely, '... the detriment need not be real and need not involve 
actual loss, nor does it necessarily refer to material disadvantage to the party suffering it, but means a legal 
detriment as distinguished from a detriment in fact and has been defined as giving up something which one 
had the right to keep, or doing something which one had the right not to do'. " (Van Der Velden in: Voskuil 
C. C. A. and Wade J. A., (1983) at 64-65. Interpretation of this term in this way is arguable. Such an 
interpretation seems to relate to an entirely different conteA i. e., the doctrine of consideration, whereas 
detriment in the Convention sense is designed to describe the circumstances in which the remedy of 
termination or demanding substitute goods are available. It is perhaps for this reason, Professor Will describes 
the test in an entirely different way (see Will, in Bianca-Bonell, (1987) at 211-212). See also Schlechtriem, P., 
(1986) at 60. 
45 See in this respect, UNMRAL, Yearbook, VI (1975) at 53, Honnold, (1989) at 244. The legislative history 
of fimdamental breach test as defined by Art. 10 of ULIS shows that it was subject to serious criticisms by the 
delegations to the Hague Conference itself (see e. g., observation of the Austrian Federal Government, the 
Government of the Netherlands, the UK Goverimient (Official Records, (1966) vol. 2 at 108,138 and 169) 
respectively, in the course of debate: delegations from Austria, Israel, UK; against: delegations of France, 
Ireland, who definitely believed the subjective notion appropriate (see Official Records, (1966) vol. 1,35-36). 
See also (Official Records, (1966) vol. 2 at 124-125, academic writers (see e. g., Graveson-Cohn-Graveson, 
Chapter Three: Buyer's Remedies Under The Convention 131 
proposed in the sixth session of the UNCITRAL Working Group in 1975 and was retained in 
the 1978 Draft proposal. ' The nature and concept of the term has not been examined, neither 
during the UNCITRAL Working Group's sessions nor in the 1980 Diplomatic Conference. ' 
The only thing said with respect to the term "detriment" was that the Working Group report 
was quoted as having the advantage of stressing that the term dettiment "had to be interpreted 
in a broader sense and set against the objective test of the contents of the contract itself'. ' 
However, an unofficial commentary by the UNCITRAL's Secretariat on Art. 23 of 
1978 Draft Convention may provide some guidance as to its meaning and application. The 
drafters' commentary stated that "[tlhe determination whether the injury is substantial must be 
made in the fight of the circumstances of each case, e. g., the monetary value of the contract, 
the monetary harm caused by the breach, or the extent to which the breach interferes with 
other activities of the injured party. " From this comment, it is possible to conclude that the 
drafters intended the word "detriment" to be synonymous with "injury" and "harne', and it can 
also be exemplified by monetary harm and interference with the other activities. " 
The term can be further clarified by considering its purpose. The purpose is simply to 
allow the injured party to terminate the contract, demand substitute goods or to prevent the 
risk of loss from passing to the buyer. " These purposes, as will be seen later, clearly require a 
broad sense which is beyond the realm of compensation for damages. " Accordingly, keeping 
in mind both its history and purpose, the term has to be interpreted in a broad sense and any 
narrow construction must be excluded. 
(B) Substantial Deprivation 
The second major requirement for a breach to be regarded as fundamental is that the detriment 
caused by the breach must have some degree of seriousness so that it substantially deprives 
the victim of breach of what he is entitled to expect under the contract. Unlike the nature of 
detriment which was not much at issue neither by UNCITRAL Working Group nor in the 
Diplomatic Conference, the degree of its effects was and still is controversial. In this 
(1968) at 55) and the UNCMZAL Working Group (see Hormold, (1989) at 64-65,88-90,220,244). The 
drafting party considered the revised text of ULIS Art. 10 unsatisfactory since it relied on an impractical test 
that requires the breaching party to anticipate whether the non-breaching party would have entered into the 
contract had he foreseen the breach and its effects. 46 See LTNCrIRAL, Yearbook, VI (1975) at 53, VM (1977) at 31; The Official Records, (1981) at 7; Honnold, 
(1989)at244,324,384. 
47But see Official Records, (1981) at 329-330. 
48 Official Records, (1981) at 330 para. 33. 
49 Secretariat Commentary, (1979) at 26 para. 3. 
' See also WiH in Bianca-BoneU, (1987) 1 at 211; Babiak, A., (1992) at 119-120. 
51 See Arts. 49 (1) (a), 64 (1) (a), 51 (2), 72 (1), 73 (2), '46 (2) and 70. 
52 See also Will in Bianca-Bonell, (I 987) at 211. Tlle Brazilian delegate, in contrast, observed that Art. [25] was 
related to Art. [74], see Official Records, (1981) at 296. 
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connection the first question is that: what criteria should be applied to detennine whether the 
detriment sustained by the victim of breach has resulted in fundamental breach? 
The legislative history of the provision shows that it was controversial. Examination of 
the legislative history of Art. 25 shows that it was first suggested that to ascertain whether 
breach was fundamental, it should have been proved that detriment caused by the breach was 
substantial and the Committee welcomed that proposal and inserted it into the definition of 
fundamental breach. " In the Diplomatic Conference, however, the debate on the words 
"substantial detriment to the other party" was extensive. ' Some delegations labelled it 
something between "vague", "subjective" and "objective and flexible". " The main objection on 
the "substantial" criterion was that "substantial" as an adjective caused as much uncertainty as 
"fundamental" itself, and, therefore, required an objective yardstick. Various proposals were 
offered for this purpose. Eventually, in order to reconcile the different proposals, it was 
decided that for a breach to be fundamental, it must result in such detriment as substantially to 
deprive the victim of breach of what he is entitled to expect under the contract. " 
However, in relying on the phrase "the buyer was entitled to expect" one should be 
careful. It does not mean that the only criterion for this purpose is the buyer's expectations 
from the contract, as the language of Art. 25 seems to suggest. Flis expectations are qualified 
by the last phrase "what he is entitled to expect under the contract". It seems that this 
limitation introduces an important qualification and ensures that it is not solely the buyer's 
expectations which are relevant. The buyer is clearly entitled to expect to receive the 
performance promised by the seller, but since this depends on the seller's contractual 
undertaldng it is defined as much by the seller's expectations as by the buyer's. Thus, suppose 
that the buyer is deprived of the opportunity to obtain a particular benefit he expected to 
receive from the seller's performance but of which he has not informed the seller. Can it be 
said that the buyer is "entitled" to expect that benefit under the contract? Moreover, as will be 
seen in detail, the test of the buyer's expectations is further limited by the qualification, which 
53 In 1971 at the second session a proposal was presented by the Mexican delegation. It contained a single 
objective criterion- "whether the breach substantially alters the scope or contents of the rights of the other 
party. " On the basis of this proposal, the proposed revision of Art. 10 was drafted as follows: "For the purpose 
of the present law, a breach of contract shall be regarded as fundamental wherever such breach substantially 
[to a significant extent] impairs the value of the performance required by the contract and the present Law. " 
(see, Honnold, (1989) at 219-. 220) This was further developed at the sixth session in 1975 when the 
definition was revised by introduction of the word "detriment" and the requirement that the party in breach 
should have had reason to foresee this consequence (see, Honnold, ibid., at 244. ). This survived the seventh 
session of the Working Group in 1976 (see, Honnold, ibid., at 324). Consequently, the proposed Art. 10 of the 
Working Group was drafted as follows: "A breach committed by one of the parties to the contract is 
flindamental if it results in substantial detriment to the other party and the party in breach foresaw or had 
reason to foresee such a resulf' (Honnold, ibid., at 324) (italic supplied). 
-54 Official Records, (19 8 1) at 98-99,295-303,32 9-330 and 425-426, then 206. 
55 Official Records, (19 8 1) at 296-297,299-300 329-330. 
56 Official Records, (198 1) at 425, para. 13. 
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takes account of what the seller could reasonably foresee. This makes clear that if the buyer is 
deprived of a benefit which the seller could not foresee and could not reasonably be expected 
to foresee, the breach is not fundamental. Accordingly, the degree of the requisite 
substantiality of deprivation caused by detriment must be ascertained within the framework of 
the amount of detriment incurred by the buyer in respect of those expectations required under 
the contract. The "legitimate expectation interest" test of Art. 25 as described above is, 
therefore, the only criterion in determining whether or not deprivation is substantial. 
The question which arises here is whether the only source for the buyer's expectation 
interests is the terms of the contract, as the language of Art. 25 shows where it says "he is 
entitled to expect under the contract"- which in principle refers to all the terms of the contract 
whether express or implied-. Does it mean that any other circumstances of the case are not to 
be taken into account? The question came into view at the Vienna Conference when the 
German delegation proposed to amend the draft article 23 on fimdarnental breach so that the 
determination of whether or not a detriment was substantial would have been determined by 
the express or implied contract terms themselves. " His amendment was criticised by a number 
of representatives as too narrow. A substantial number of delegations suggested that the court 
had to examine the terms of the contract as well as the surrounding facts' It was on this 
general understanding that the text accepted by the Conference referred to the phrase "what he 
is entitled to expect under the contract". 
On this interpretation, the extent to which a party suffers an injury to its expectations 
will, therefore, be found not only in the language of the contract but in the circumstances 
surrounding the contractual relationship of the parties. " However, it does not mean that the 
assessment of the existence of substantial detriment will depend on the circumstances of any 
individual cases even those circumstances take place after the time of making the contract. If 
some particular circumstances are significant for a contracting party he should bring them into 
the other party's attention at the time of contract. Accordingly, it is fair to say that the 
Convention has not left the determination of the degree of a given detriment and drawing the 
line between substantial and insubstantial deprivation to the judge's sole and sovereign 
appreciation but requires him to decide in the framework of the contract and the circumstances 
existed at the time it was made. 
57 Official Records, (1981) at 99, Para. 3. 
See, Official Records, (1981) at 301, Paras. 74,75, and, at 300 Para. 70. It was the reason why the German 
representative responded that "he had not intended to restrict [by his proposal] the definition of substantial 
detriment or to exclude the circumstances of the case" (Official Records, (198 1) at 300 Para. 68; at 301 Para. 
78, and, at 329 Para. 23). 
59 See also Babiak, A., (1992) at 120; Will in Bianca-Bonell, (1987) at 213; Schlechtriem, P., (1986) at 59-60. 
In contrast, see Van Der Velden in: Voskuil C. C. A. and Wade J-A., (1983) at 64. 
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After all above, the main question still remains; at what point depriýation resulting from 
detriment would reach the threshold of substantial deprivation? Ile Convention has failed to 
introduce any concrete factors to guide the judges to decide whether the detriment sustained 
has attained the sufficient degree of substantial deprivation. "' The Convention seems to have 
left the question of determining the sufficient substantial deprivation of the buyer from his 
contractual expectations to the arbitrators to decide in the light of the circumstances 
surrounding any particular case. " In any case, the court should decide the case by taking into 
account the value of the goods, the purpose for which the buyer has purchased the goods, and 
the degree of actual and prospective detriment caused by the breach and other interference 
caused by the breach into his activities. " 
(C) Foreseeability 
The foreseeability test in the final conditional clause of Art. 25 constitutes a flirther 
qualification. Although the sustained detriment which resulted in substantial deprivation prima 
facie makes breach fundamental, a breach will not be fundamental if the seller can rely on the 
last sentence of Art. 25. The legislative history of Art. 25 reveals that the burden of proving 
foresecability of loss was originally on the party in breach. The 1976 Draft Convention put 
the onus on the aggrieved party both to show that the breach of contract resulted in a 
substantial detriment to him and that the party in breach foresaw or had reason to foresee such 
60 To know what the Convention commentators suggest in this respect, see e. g., Schlechtriem, P., (1986) at 59- 
60, see also p. 77). 
61 In a considerable number of the Convention cases the courts and arbitral tribunals have addressed the 
doctrine of 'fimdamental breach'. For instance, in a case decided by an Italian court, it was held that the delay 
by the seller in delivering the goods, together with the fact that two months after the conclusion of the contract 
the seller had delivered only one third of the goods sold, amounted to a fundamental breach of the contract 
according to Art. 49 (1) (a) (see, Italy 24 November 1989 Pretura circondariale di Parma (Foliopack Ag v. 
Daniplast S. p. A), (CLOUT, abstract no. 90). Likewise, in a case decided by the German Court of Appeal (see, 
Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt A. M.; 5U 164/90 (17 September 199 1), (CLOUT, Case No. 2: ), an Italian seller 
had agreed to manufacture and deliver a number of shoes with a particular trademark, to be used as a basis for 
further orders. Ile manufacture was allowed to use the trademark only with special permission from the 
buyer. At a trade fair, the manufacturer displayed some shoes produced according to the buyer's specifications 
and did not remove them upon the buyer's demand. In that case, the German Civil Court of Appeal held that 
the manufacturcts breach of the ancillary duty of preserving exclusivity constituted a fundamental breach of 
the contract under Art. 25 of the Convention, since it endangered the purpose ofthe contract to such a degree 
that, as was foreseeable to the manufacturer, the buyer had no more interest in the contract (see in this regard, 
the Editorial remarks by Albert H. Kritzer attached to the abstract case; Behr, V., (1993) at 271-275). For 
further cases, see, Diederichsen, E., (1995) at 177-181 (a comment on a German court decision: 17 September 
1991 Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt); Karollus, M., (1995) at 51-94. In the latter reference, the author has 
gathered a number of cases decided by the German courts, including those referred to Art. 25. But, no detailed 
analysis, as far as the English abstract shows, can be found in them. 
62 It seems that the problems of defiriing 'substantial deprivation' are unavoidable and that it is neither practical 
nor useful to try to solve them in the abstract 'Me problem the cornmentators face here is very similar to that 
faced by judges and commentators in defining when under English law a breach will be sufficiently serious to 
justify termination under the HongKong Fir test, or in deciding how foreseeable loss has to be recoverable as 
damages. In all these cases any attempt at "definition" is likely to result in replacement of one analogy or 
metaphor with another. See the problems the House of Lords had in Koufos v. Czarnikow Ltd. (The Heron H) 
[1969] 1 AC 350. 
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a result. ' The Philippines' delegate to UNCITRAL subsequently objected that this 
formulation was unfair to the injured party and that the burden should not rest on him to show 
that the breaching party ought to have foreseen the result of his conduct. In the light of this 
objection, the wording of the definition was amended at the 1977 session of UNCITRAL so as 
to require the defaulting party to show that he could not reasonably have foreseen the 
consequences of his breach. " At the Vienna Diplomatic Conference the Egyptian delegation 
sought to amend the Draft Art. 23 on fundamental breach by including express language 
indicating a shift in the burden of proof. " The drafters refused to include the language which 
would raise questions of civil procedure. However, there was a consensus that this burden 
should be on the party in breach because of the logical difficulty of requiring the non- 
breaching party to prove what the party in breach actually foresaw or a reasonable man in its 
position could have foreseen. " 
The concept of foresecability developed out of Art. 10 of ULIS which completely based 
fundamental breach on the foreseeability of events. Art. 25 of the present Convention, 
however, adds an objective test into the determination of whether a breach is fundamental by 
asking two questions: (1) did the party in breach foresee that the breach of contract would 
result in a substantial deprivation of the non-breaching party; and (2) would a "reasonable 
person of the same kind in the same circumstances" have foreseen such a result. These two 
questions will require the court to view the contract from the subjective perspective of the 
party-in-breach, as well as from the objective perspective of a reasonable merchant of the 
same kind in the circumstances of the party in breach. These subjective and objective elements 
are cumulative, not alternative. The outcome is that a breach would be regarded as non- 
fundamental only where courts or tribunals are satisfied that both elements are proved. " 
The first requirement for negativing the claim for breach under Art. 25 is whether or not 
the party in breach actually foresaw the harm caused by the given breach. Whether the 
63 Honnold, (1989) at 244. 
"Honnold, (1989) at 324, Mchida, S., (1979) at 285. 
61 Their amendment read as follows: "A breach committed by one of the parties is fimdamental if it results in 
substantial detriment to the other party unless the party in breach proves that he did not foresee such a result 
and that a reasonable person of the same kind in the same circumstances would not have foreseen it", (Official 
records, (1981) at 99,295). 
66 See for instance, Official records, (1981) at 296, para. 13,297, paras. 21 and 26. 
67 It is to be noted that the 1976 UNCrMAL Working Groupýs Draft Convention contained the conjunction "or" 
instead of "and"(Honnold, (1989) at 244, No. 45). At the Vienna Working Group session in 1977, as a result 
of the American delegations proposal the word "or" was replaced by "and" (Summary Record, as referred to 
by Michida, S., (1979) 285). The word "and" survived an attempt to switch back to "or" at the Vienna 
Conference (Official Records, (1981) at 296 para. 13 and 298 para. 41). The purpose of replacement was that 
just as the subjective test alone is not enough, the objective test alone would not suffice either, for it may well 
happen that an overly astute merchant in fact knew and foresaw more than his peers would have known and 
foreseen. In such a case the real person should not be allowed to hide behind the reasonable person of the 
same kind in the same circumstances. See also, Will in: Bianca-Bonell, (l 987) at 220. 
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detriment caused by the breach was actually foreseeable by the seller depends on his 
knowledge of the facts surrounding the contract. In this respect, as some commentators 
suggested", factors such as the seller's experience, level of sophistication, and organisational 
abilities should be considered in showing whether or not the harm in question was foreseeable. 
In the light of such factors the court may be satisfied that the seller was able to anticipate and 
recognise problems in the transaction. However, this requirement is a purely subjective one 
which focuses solely on the personal position of the breaching party. Certainly, any party who 
has committed a breach of contract resulting m serious consequences will hardly accept that 
he foresaw those consequences, but will most likely insist that unfortunately he did not 
foresee, as the article describes it, "such result". " The mere allegation, however, does not 
suffice but, as explained above, the party in breach must prove his allegation. 
In this connection, Art. 25 provides a further requirement. This is an objective one 
requiring the party in breach to show that a reasonable person of the same kind in his 
circumstances would not have foreseen that the given default would have caused the injuries in 
question to the innocent buyer. Since parties to international sales contracts are presumed to 
be merchants, a "reasonable person" can be construed as a reasonable merchant. A reasonable 
merchant would, therefore, include "all merchants that satisfy the standards of their trade and 
that are not intellectually or professionally substandard". " The features that may characterise 
reasonable merchants include: (1) the merchant's degree of skill and professional 
qualifications (for example specialised licenses); (2) the merchants professional associations 
or affiliations which may set competency standards; (3) the length of the merchant's business 
experience; and (4) the geographic region in which the merchant does business. 
The phrase "of the same kind" is the first element of precision intended to mitigate the 
effects of subjectivity of the first criterion of foreseeability. The meaning of the phrase 
has to 
be apparently inferred from the purpose of the clause. It is, as Professor Will" suggested, 
provided to tailor a reasonable person to the likeness of the party in breach. The hypothetical 
merchant ought to be engaged in the same line of trade, doing the same function or operations 
as the party in breach. Not only must business practices be taken into account but the whole 
socio-economic background as well, including average professional standards. ' 
Further element is also provided by Art. 25 for the purpose of precision. Under this 
requirement, the court must take into account the reasonable merchant "in the same 
"Babiak, A., (1992) at 122. See also Will in- Bianca-Bonell, (1987) at 217. 
" See also Will in: Bianca-Bonell, (1987) at 217. 
70 See also, Will in: Bianca-Bonell, (1987) at 219; Babiak, A., (1992) at 122. 
71 Will in: Bianca-Bonell, (1987) at 219. 
72 See Official Records, (1981) at 261 Para. 30; Will in: Bianca-Bonell, (1987) at 218-219. 
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circumstances", in which the party in breach was. By this requirement, the court should take 
into account "conditions on world and regional markets, legislation, politics and climate, ..., in 
short: [the] whole range of facts and events at the relevant time. " 
As was seen, a party alleged to be in breach thus has a difficult burden, but if he can 
show that he did not foresee the drastic effects of his default, and can prove that a reasonable 
merchant facing the same market conditions would not have foreseen such results, then the 
party claiming breach will not be able to rely on the seller's breach for termination. 
Time for Foreseeability. The other issue that arises out of the definition of Art. 25 is at 
what time the foresight of the party in breach is to be judged? Is the relevant time when the 
contract was concluded or when the breach was committedý or does it depend on the 
circumstances of each case? Unlike Art. 10 of ULIS which was quite clear that the time point 
should have been "the time of the conclusion of the contract", the language of Art. 25 does not 
expressly answer the question. This ambiguity has generated a substantial literature. ' 
It seems that like the other issues it would be more helpful to analyse the present issue 
in the light of legislative history of the provision. In the UNCITRAL Working Group's 
sessions and at the 1980 Vienna Conference some delegates proposed that this element be 
amended to restrict consideration to those circumstances that the party in breach could have 
foreseen when the contract was made. In UNCITRAL's final [1977] review of the "sales" 
provisions, one delegate proposed to limit the time for foresecability to the time of "the 
conclusion of the contract. " Under another view it was thought that "it would be fairer to refer 
to the time at which the breach was committed. " The decision was recorded as follows: "The 
Commission, after deliberation, did not consider it necessary to specify at what moment the 
party in breach should have foreseen or had reason to foresee the consequences of the 
breach". " Finally, the UNCITRAL Draft Convention after some discussion preferred not to 
specify that point, thus leading the Secretariat's Commentary to note that "in case of dispute, 
that decision must be made by the tribunal. "I 
As has been seen, the general understanding of the issue prior to the Vienna Diplomatic 
Conference was that the relevant time for foreseeability was left open. At the 1980 Diplomatic 
Will in: Bianca-Bonell, (1987) at 219, as under Art. 8 para. (3) of the Convention which provides: "due 
consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case". 
74 See e. g., Ziegel, in: Nina M., Galston; Hans Smit, (1984) at 9-20, (arguing that "it would surely be 
anomalous if a buyer were able to avoid the contract for breach by the seller if the grounds justiPjing 
avoidance were regarded as too remote for the recovery of damages under Art. 74"); Honnold, (1991) at 257- 
258 (in contrast, on the basis of the legislative history of the provision, he concludes that information received 
after formation but prior to performance can be relevant and could fall within the scope of Art. 25); Will in: 
Bianca-Bonell, (1987) at 220-221; Schelchtriem, P., (1986) at 60; Feltham, J. D., (1981) at 353; Speidel, K 
E., (1983) at 444; Flechtner, H. M., (1988) at 76-79; DTTs Consultative Document (1989) at29-30. 
73 Honnold, (1989) at 324. 
76 Official Records, (1981) at 26. 
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Conference, the issue again came into focus and there were various attempts to specify the 
point in time at which the foreseeability standard is to be applied. One proposal would have 
limited Art. 25 to foreseeability "at the time when the contract was concluded. " The right to 
damages under Art. 74 is so limited. Had the proposal to similarly limit Art. 25 been 
approved, it would clearly have eliminated the possible anomaly of a right to avoid a contract 
even where there is no right to damages. However, this proposal was not approved nor did the 
delegates approve a related proposal which would have required foreseeability to be related to 
"the reasons for the conclusion of the contract, or any information disclosed at any time before 
or at the conclusion of the contract". The Official records indicate that the latter proposal was 
withdrawn following the statement that "information provided after the conclusion of a 
contract could modify the situation as regards both substantial detriment and foresight. ' 
Although the other delegates were not unanimous, a substantial number favoured leaving the 
question at large to be decided by the adjudicating body, taking into account the circumstances 
surrounding the case in question. 
As the preceding analysis shows, the travaux preparatoires offer no help to the court. 
Accordingly, one may argue that the question was deliberately left unanswered because the 
working groups could not agree on the answer. They therefore left the question to the courts. 78 
There is, therefore, no reason to impose an interpretation on Art. 25's foreseeability 
requirement that ignores post-formation developments. However, on this approach, one has to 
be in conformity to Honnold's view that information received by the seller later than the breach 
should not have attached to it any value. " 
Nevertheless, there is the possibility of arguing in support of the first approach. As 
explained when dealing with the concept of the injured party's expectations under the contract, 
whether or not the injured party was entitled to expect to have a particular benefit should be 
ascertained within the contract terms and other circumstances which came into the attention of 
the party in breach at the time of making the contract. The same analysis seems to be 
applicable to the measurement of foreseeability of the consequences of the breach. It can even 
go fiirther and argue that the language of Art. 25 is in line with this approach, since it defines 
the consequences relevant to the determination of fundamental breach in terms of what a party 
"is entitled to expect under the contract" and the second sentence of the Art. refers to the 
foreseeability of "such result" by the party in breach. Accordingly, as contractual expectations 
77 See Official Records, (1981) at 99 and 302. 
' On this reading, there is, of course, no guarantee of consistency in interpretations. 
79 Homold, (199 1) at 257-258 
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are formed at the time of contracting, foreseeability of substantial deprivation of those 
expectations by the reason of breach should also be measured at that time. " 
3.2.2. Nachfrist 
As already pointed out, termination of contract is primarily to be justified on the basis of the 
doctrine of "fundamental breach". This criterion is to be applied even where the seller fails to 
perform his obligations within the contract time. Under this requirement termination can be a 
thorny problem, for in any case the buyer must be sure that the breach is fundamental. This 
will not always be a proper solution for him. Once the seller is, for instance, late in 
performing, the buyer may rightly be doubtful whether the seller's delay amounts to a 
fundamental breach. One way to circumvent this problem is by use of the German law 
solution of Nachfrist according to which, where one party is in default the other party may 
give him a reasonable time within which he should perform his obligations. If at the end of this 
additional period of time, the defaulting party has not performed the innocent party can 
terminate the contract. " In the case of buyer's remedies, Art. 47 (1) adopted a version of this 
concept. The provision authorises the buyer to fix an additional period of time of reasonable 
length for performance by the seller of his obligations. The wording of the provision appears 
to cover the whole range of obligations arising under the contract and the Convention, such as 
delivery of all or part of the goods, the remedy of any lack of conformity by repair of the 
goods or by delivery of substitute goods or performance of any other act which would 
constitute performance of the seller's obligations. However, Art. 49 (1) (b) only refers to the 
case where the seller has failed to deliver the goods. Accordingly, the question is whether the 
buyer's right to terminate the contract on the basis of Nachfiist notice arises only where the 
seller has failed to deliver on the date set for delivery in the contract or if it also comes into 
operation in respect of failure to perform other obligations. 
Although ULIS started with the idea that the buyer could avoid a contract only for a 
fundamental breach (Art. 43)1, it also allowed the buyer to demand that the seller cure the 
defect within a reasonable time and, if the seller did not, the buyer could declare the contract 
so See also, Schlechtriern, P., (1986) at 60. Speidel articulates, but does not necessarily endorse, a similar 
argument. Speidel, R. E., (1983) at 441,444. 
31 See Art. 326 (1) of The German Civil Code. It provides: "If, in the case of a mutual contract, one party is in 
default in performing, the other party may give him a reasonable period within which to perform his part with 
declaration that he will refuse to accept the performance after the expiration of the period. After the expiration 
of the period he is entitled to demand compensation for non-performance, or to withdraw from the contract, if 
the performance has not been made in due time; the claim for performance is barred. If the performance is 
only partly made before the expiration of the period, the provision of Art. 325 (1) sent. 2 applies mutatis 
mutandis. " 
82 ULIS Art. 43: "Me buyer may declare the contract avoided if the failure of the goods to conform to the 
contract and also the failure to deliver on the date fixed amount to fundamental breaches of the contract.. " 
See also, Arts. 27 (2) 31 (2). 
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avoided (Art. 44 (2)". The UNCITRAL Working Group's early drafts were also broad and 
covered any failure of the seller to perform his any non-fulfilled obligations within the 
additional period of time. " However, in -1973 at the fourth session several representatives 
advanced proposals to restrict the notice-avoidance procedure to cases where the seller has not 
delivered goods. UNCITRAL accepted those proposals on the ground that the procedure could 
be abused to convert a minor breach into a fundamental breach by using the Nachfrist system 
provided under Art. [47 (1)] and avoid the contract where the seller did not perform his 
obligations within the additional time. " The restricting provision survived in Art. 45 (1) (b) of 
the UNCITRAL's 1978 Draft Convention. " At the Vienna Conference, the question of 
extension of the buyer's right to avoid the contract on the ground of Nachfrist notice was again 
proposed by some delegations. " The debate over the issue centred on whether a distinction 
should be drawn between non-delivery and non-conformity. Some delegations proposed that 
since the aggrieved buyer by virtue of draft Art. 43 (1) was empowered to fix an additional 
period of time for the seller to perform any of his obligations it was appropriate to widen the 
sphere of application of draft Art. 45 (1) (b) to give the buyer necessary remedies when the 
seller disregarded his fundamental obligations arising from the additional period of time. ' But 
as a result of the opposition of the State delegations, the Diplomatic Conference rejected the 
proposals to broaden the scope of notice-avoidance to include non-conformity and in order to 
avoid any possible misunderstanding, it added the phrase "in case of non-delivery" at the 
beginning of the notice-avoidance provision in Art. 49 (1) (b). "' Based on this amendment, it 
can be concluded that the buyer's right to avoid the contract on the ground of Nachfilst notice 
is restricted to non-delivery cases. Accordingly, the buyer will not be entitled to resort to the 
Nachfrist-notice rule to terminate the contract if the seller has failed to perform his duty to 
deliver substitute goods or other obligations under the contract and the Convention within the 
additional time. 90 
83 LTLIS Art. 44 (2): "The buyer may however fix an additional period of time of reasonable length for the 
further delivery or the remedying of the defect. If at the expiration of the additional period the seller has not 
delivered the goods or remedied the defectý the buyer may choose between requiring the performance of the 
contract or reducing the price in accordance with Art. 46 or, provided that he does so promptly, declare the 
contract avoided. " 
84 Honnold, (1989) at 98-99,109-111,130-132,136,147. 
Hormold, (1989) at 147-148. 
Hormold, (1989) at 148,155,201,247,339 and 387. 
87 Official Records, (1981) at 79,116-117. 
88 Official Records, (1981) at 354, paras. 67 and 68,356, para. 87. 
89 Official Records, (1981) at 354-56, then 211 para. 12. 
90 In contrast, see, Karollus, M., (1995) 51-94 where the author (relying on a Convention case decided by a 
German court in 1994, see, Germany 10 February 1994 Oberlandesgericht Dasseldorf [6 U 119/93], CLOUT 
abstract no. 82) suggests that since the substitute delivery is regarded as a delivery under Arts. 31-33, Art. 49 
(1) (b) is to be applied where the buyer has demanded delivery of substitute goods under Art. 46 (2). As the 
language and the history of Art. 47 makes clear, by virtue of this provision the Convention grants the buyer a 
general right to request the seller to Perform his obligations during the period of time fixed by him. Yet, it is, 
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The buyer will be entitled to terminate the contract on the Nachfrist-notice procedure 
where he satisfies the court that he has fixed an additional period of time of reasonable 
lengtl? ' and demanded that the seller deliver the goods within that period (Art. 47 (1)). 92 He 
also has to prove that the seller has not delivered the goods or had declared that he would not 
have delivered them within the period so fixed (Art. 49 (1) (b). 
No clear provision, however, can be found in the Convention to be relied in 
ascertainment of this vague term. Professor Will suggests that it must be ascertained on the 
particular circumstances of each case. He also suggests that among the various elements to be 
taken into consideration are "the nature, extent and consequences of the delay, the seller's 
possibilities of and time needed for delivery, and the buyer's special interest in speedy 
performance. " 
(A) Perfect Conforming Delivery or Substantially Conforming 
Where the seller has delivered the goods subsequent to the buyer's request the latter will not 
be allowed to refuse to accept them and terminate the contract. The question which arises here 
is whether only a perfect tender would deprive the buyer of the right to rely on Nachfrist 
avoidance or a delivery which is substantially in conformity with the contract. Suppose, for 
example, that the seller is late in delivering the goods and the buyer sends a Nachfrist notice 
requiring complete delivery and within a reasonable period fixed by the buyer's notice the 
seller delivers all but a small portion of the goods or delivers all, but all or part of them do not 
conform to the contract terms, can the buyer avoid the contract? Art. 49(l)(b) permits the 
buyer to avoid if the seller fails "to deliver the goods" within the period fixed by a Nachfilst 
as was pointed out at the Vienna Conference (Official Records, (198 1) at 211, para. 13 and 354, para. 68), 
strange that the Convention protects the buyer only in the case of non-delivery but without giving him any 
remedy against the seller's failure to comply with the buyer's request under Art. 47 (1). It is not in fact obvious 
what purpose Art. 47 (1) serves in giving a broad right to the buyer to fix an additional period of time for the 
seller to perform his obligations other than delivery of goods. The only advantage seems that the Nachfrist 
procedure may provide for the buyer is to give him time to consider what course of action to adopt in relation 
to the scllees breach and to encourage him to perform. See also, DTTs Consultative Document, (1989) at 37; 
Nicholas, B., (1989) at. 225; Ziegle in: Nina, M.; Galston and Hans Smit, (1984) at 9.03 at 9.17. 
91 Although whether or not a particular period of time is reasonable depends on the facts of the case, in a case 
decided by a German court it was held that the additional delivery period of two weeks was too short. 
According to the court, the period of seven weeks between announcement and actual declaration of avoidance 
was reasonable (see Germany 24 May 1995 Oberlandesgericht Celle (CLOUT, abstract no. 136). 
92 The question whether the fting of an additional time period must be done in such a way as to make it clear 
to the party in breach that the additional period sets a fted and final limit on the date for performance or 
whether no such unequivocal warning is necessary is controversial. Will and Knapp (see Bianca-Boncll, 
(1987) at 345 and 461 respectively) and Honnold (see Hormold, J., (1991) at 370) support the former view and 
Endcrlein & Maskow (see Enderlein F., & Maskow, D., (1992) at 238) support the latter view. However, in a 
Convention case decided by ICC the arbitral opinion appears to support the latter view (see ICC Arbitration 
Case No. 7585 of 1992, the case was concerned with the seller's right to avoid the contract on Nachfrist 
notice. ). See also the Editorial remarks by Albert H. Kritzer attached to the abstract case. 93 Will in: Bianca-Bonell, (1987) at 345. 
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notice -a standard that could be construed to apply even though such failure does not amount 
to a fundamental breach. 
It might be argued that the position is apparently covered by Art. 51 (2)"'. Under this 
Art. a buyer who has received goods a part of which is not in conformity with the contract or 
is missing can avoid the contract in its entirety "only if the failure to make delivery completely 
or in conformity with the contract amounts to a fundamental breach of contract. " Thus a 
buyer who has received delivery of less than the required amount or non-confom-dng goods 
cannot avoid the contract as a whole by using the Nachfiist procedure. Termination can be 
justified in such a case where the lack of conformity amounts to a fundamental breach. The 
question can also be answered by the proper construction of the general principles on which 
the Convention is based (Art. 7 (2)). " One of those principles is that avoidance of the contract 
is effective only where the other side has committed a fundamental breach. Art. 7(l)", 
furthermore, requires that the Convention is to be interpreted "to promote ... observance of 
good faith in international trade. " The Nachfhst provisions of the Convention can and should, 
therefore, be interpreted in a manner that does not undermine the fundamental breach standard 
for avoidance accepted as a general criterion by the Convention. In the light of these 
considerations, Art. 49 (1) (b) should be construed to permit avoidance only where the seller 
fails to deliver within the additional time fixed by the buyer in accordance with Art. 47 (1) a 
substantial part of the goods or the delivered goods are substantially contrary to the contract. " 
""' Nachfyist Notice and Non-Conforming Documents ("I 
The other question which arises is whether the NachfiIst-notice avoidance can be extended to 
the case of non-tender of documents. There is no express provision in the Convention for such 
an extension, but Art. 49 (1) (b) expressly refers to the case of non-delivery of goods. 
However, some commentators have suggested that "[B]y analogy, the provision also applies to 
the failure to transfer documents of title". " This can be justified on the ground of the fact that 
94 Art. 51 (2): "lle buyer may declare the contract avoided in its entirety only if the failure to make delivery 
completely or in conformity with the contract amounts to a flindamental breach of the contract. " 
95 Art. 7 (2): "Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly settled in it 
are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is based or, in the absence of such 
principles, in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of the rules of private international law. " 
96 Art. 7 (1): "In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to the 
need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in international trade. " 
97 See also Flechtner, H. M., (1988) at 71-73 in which he raises the question as to the buyer's failure to pay in 
full within the additional period of time. At the Vienna Diplomatic Conference, both the Netherlands and 
Canada delegations proposed amendments that would have allowed a buyer to avoid if the seller failed to 
perform any obligation within the extended period of time. However, the Canadian proposal would have 
permitted avoidance only where the seller's failure consisted of non-delivery or failure to fulfil another 
'material obligation' (see, Official Records, (1981) 116,354-356). Although the proposal was consisted of two 
separate questions: the question of the materiality of the seller's delayed performance and that of extension of 
the Nachfrist notice to breaches other than late performance, the first issue was confused with the second and 
consequently the whole proposal was defeated. 
" Schlechitriem, P., (1986) at 78. 
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in an international sale of goods the parties normally bargain for documents. Without the 
documents of title the buyer cannot access or resell the goods bargained for. Accordingly, the 
same logic which justifies the provision in the case of non-delivery of goods exists in the case 
of failure to transfer the documents of title. " 
3.2.3. Breach of Severable Contract 
In the preceding discussions it became clear that the buyer may be entitled to terminate the 
contract either on the basis of the doctrine of "fundamental breach" or the Nachfrist rule. 
Application of these rules has been examined in respect of the case where the buyer wishes to 
terminate a non-severable contract as a whole for the reason of the seller's non-conforming 
delivery and late delivery. The Convention, in addition to that, provides some provisions under 
which the buyer may be able to terminate the contract in respect of some part of the subject- 
matter of the contract and keep the contract alive with respect to the other part (Arts. 51 (1) 
and 73 (1). In the following, the application of the doctrine of fundamental breach as well as 
Nachfiist rule is assessed in respect of such cases. 
3.2.3.1. Fundamental Breach and Severable Contracts 
Where the seller makes a delivery which includes some non-conforming goods or of less than 
the required quantity of goods, Art. 51 (1)"' entitles the buyer to exercise his remedies under 
Arts. 46-50, including Art. 49 which gives him the right to avoid the contract. Although the 
Convention does not expressly make a distinction between cases where the contract is or is not 
severable, it seems that by recognising partial avoidance Art. 51 (1) presupposes that it should 
be the case where performance of the seller could be divided into conforming and non- 
conforming parts. Where the non-conforming part is severable the reference means that both 
the conditions and the effects of Arts. 46-50 can be applied to that part. "' It follows that the 
buyer can treat the missing or non-conforming part as the subject of a separate contract that is 
severable for remedy purposes, and consequently terminate the contract in respect of that part, 
provided that the seller's failure constitutes ajundamental breach with respect to that part. In 
such situations the buyer can avoid the contract "in its entirety" only if the seller's default 
"amounts to afindamental breach of contract (italic added)" as a whole (Art. 52 (2). 
99 See also, Guest A. G. et al, (1997) Para. 19-123, no. 62. 
100 Art. 51 (1): "If the seller delivers only a part of the goods or if only a part of the goods delivered is in 
conformity with the contract, articles 46 to 50 apply in respect of the part which is missing or which does not 
conform. " 
"' See in this respect, Will in- Bianca-Bonell, (1987) at 378. In contrast, see DTTs Consultative Document, 
(1989) at 42; Ziegel, J., & Samson, C., (1981) Art. 51 where the authors argue that the article does not make 
such a distinction. However, they do not answer the question: how can the breach in respect of a particular 
part be determined fimdamental if it is non-severable. 
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Similar provision is provided where the seller has committed a breach of contract in 
respect of one or more instalments under an instalment contract. Art. 73 (1)102 permits the 
buyer to avoid the contract "with respect to [an] instalment" if the seller's failure to perform 
any of his obligations "constitutes a fundamental breach of contract (italic added) with 
respect to that instalment". " He is also empowered to avoid the contract in respect of future 
instalments if the seller's default in relation to any instalment gives the buyer "good grounds to 
conclude that a. /undamental breach of contract (italic added) will occur with respect to future 
instalments" (Art. 73 (2)"'. Likewise, Art. 73 (3) grants the buyer who declares the contract 
avoided in respect of defective instalments an opportunity, at the same time, to declare the 
contract terminated "in respect of deliveries already made or of future deliveries if, by reason 
of their interdependence, those deliveries could not be used for the purpose contemplated by 
the parties at the time of the conclusion of the contract". 
3.2.3.2. Nachfrist Notice and Severable Contracts 
As the language of Art. 49 (1) (b) shows, the rule comes into operation where the seller fails 
to deliver goods. This phrase raises the question whether the Nachfrist procedure can be 
applied to the case of partial delivery and instalment contracts or is confined to situations 
where the seller has not delivered any part of the goods within the contract period. Art. 51 (1) 
entitles the buyer to exercise his remedies in Arts. 46-50, including the Nachfrist procedure, if 
the seller makes a delivery that contains less than the required quantity. In such a case it 
therefore allows the buyer to fix an additional period of time for performance. Where the seller 
does not deliver, or informs the buyer that he will not deliver, the missing part within the time 
fixed in a Nachfrist notice the buyer has a right to avoid the contract with respect to that part. 
However, Art. 73 (1) does not, by its terms, permit the buyer to use the Nachfrist 
procedure to create grounds for avoidance with respect to an instalment if the seller is late in 
delivering the instalment. According to Professor Honnold "an analogy to Art. 51 (1) suggests 
that a Nachfhst notice should be effective with respect to overdue perfonnance". " It seems 
102 Art. 73 (1): "In the case of a contract for delivery of goods by instalments, if the failure of one party to 
perform any of his obligations in respect of any instalment constitutes a fundamental breach of contract with 
respect to that instalment, the other party may declare the contract avoided with respect to that instalment. " 
103 If ArL 51 (1) is provided to cover severable contracts one may argue that what is the role of Art. 73 (1). The 
legislative history of the provision shows that the point was noted by the 1977 Comn-Lission. The Commission 
then argued that the provision was necessary to enable the seller to avoid the contract equivalent to the 
provision in what is now Art. 5 1, which permits the buyer to do so (see, UNCITRAL, Yearbook, vol. VM, 
(1977) at 55, paras. 422425. Under this construction, the language of Art. 51 is broad. It is not directed to 
contracts which provide for delivery of goods in separate lots. It applies to any contract its subject-matter is 
commercially severable. 
104 Art. 73 (2): "If one party's failure to perform any of his obligations in respect of any instalment gives the 
other party good grounds to conclude that a fundamental breach of contract will occur with respect to future 
instalments, he may declare the contract avoided for the future, provided that he does so within a reasonable 
time. " 
105 Honnold, (1991) at 501 No. 3. 
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that there is no clear reason to treat the analogous non-delivcry situations covered by Arts. 51 
(1) and 73 (1) differently; a buyer who is awaiting a late instalment delivery should be able to 
use the Nachfiist procedure to establish grounds for avoiding with respect to the instalment. 
Similarly, Art. 73 (2) does not mention avoidance of the contract for future delivery on 
the ground of the Nachfrist notice. Professor Honnold, however, argues that Nachfrist 
avoidance is "intrinsically inapplicable" to the situation addressed in Art. 73 (2), i. e., 
avoidance as to future performance. "' It seems that the basis of his argument is that the 
Nachfiist avoidance rule is designed to justify the buyer's avoidance where the seller fails to 
perform within a reasonable time beyond the contractual time for performance (Arts. 47,49 
(1) (b). It is not designed to deal with avoidance as to performance not yet due. 
3.3. Buyer's Right to Terminate and the Seller's Right to Cure 
The Convention, for the purpose of minimising the hardship and economic waste involved in 
termination of the contract for international sales, provides appropriate rules permitting the 
defaulting seller to "cure" a defect in his performance by way of replacing or repairing 
defective documents and goods. For this purpose, Art. 34 enables the seller who handed over 
documents before the contract date to cure any lack of conformity in the documents before the 
time for performance is expired. "' The same power is given to him by Art. 37 when he has 
delivered goods which do not conform to the contract. 1011 The right to cure is also extended by 
Art. 48 to the case where the contract time for performance has expired. "' The general 
language of Arts. 34 and 37 raises a significant question: Is the seller entitled to cure any lack 
of conformity even in case where it constitutes a fundamental breach of contract? The 
particular language of Art. 48 raises also the question: Does the buyer's right to avoid have 
priority over the seller's right to cure under Art. 48? 
The Convention provides no clear provision to ascertain the relationship of the buyer's 
right to avoid the contract on account of fimdamental breach with the seller's right to cure 
106Honnold, (1991) at 501, and, fin. 3, see also at 401. 
107 Art. 34: "If the seller is bound to hand over documents relating to the goods, he must hand them over at the 
time and place and in the form required by the contract If the seller has handed over documents before that 
time, he may, up to that time, cure any lack of conformity in the documents, if the exercise of this right does 
not cause the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable expense. However, the buyer retains any 
right to claim damages as provided for in this ConvcntiorL" 
108 Art. 37: "If the seller has delivered goods before the date for delivery, he may, up to that date, deliver any 
missing part or make up any deficiency in the quantity of the goods delivered, or deliver goods in replacement 
of any non-conforming goods delivered or remedy any lack of conformity in the goods delivered, provided that 
the exercise of this right does not cause the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable expense. 
However, the buyer retains any right to claim damages as provided for in this Convention. - 
109 Art. 48 (1): "Subject to Art. 49, the seller may, even after the date for delivery, remedy at his own expense 
any failure to perform his obligations, if he can do so without unreasonable delay and without causing the 
buyer unreasonable inconvenience or uncertainty of reimbursement by the seller of expenses advanced by the 
buyer. However, the buyer retains any right to claim damages as provided for in this Convention. - 
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under Arts. 34 and 37; it does not determine when the seller 's right to cure would stop the 
buyer's right to terminate under Art. 49 (1) (a). It simply says that the seller may, up to the 
contract date, cure any lack of conformity (by repair or replacement) or deficiency in the 
goods delivered under certain circumstances provided by Arts. 34 and 37. To solve this 
conflict, one way is to say that where the seller is ready and able to offer reasonable cure the 
breach is not effectively fundamental. Professor Honnold is one of the commentators who 
support this constmction. "' In contrast, Professor Will suggests that the same object can be 
achieved by determining the fundamentality of breach on the basis of the mere lack of 
conformity (without having regard to cure), but the existing right to avoid is merely suspended 
when a rightful offer to cure arrives. "' 
However, it seems that the legislative history of Art. 48 tends to support Honnold's 
view. "' But it is suggested that it does not mean that the mere possibility of remedying the 
defect by the seller should change the character of an actual fundamental breach, otherwise the 
right of avoidance conferred on the buyer by Art. 49 (1) (a) would be limited to very 
exceptional cases. In addition, it would certainly increase the uncertainty. A commercial seller 
is expected to act in a reasonable manner. It would not be fair to keep the buyer waiting for 
the seller to be able and willing to cure. 
110 Honnold, relying on the legislative history of Art. 25 concludes that "the question of whether a breach was 
'fundamental' for the purpose of avoidance must be answered in light of the effect of a rightful offer to cure or 
price adjustment, for otherwise [the] seller's exercise of this right would be futile. " (see Hormold, 1991) at 
258-25 9. See also, Ziegel in: Nina, M.; Galston and Hans Smit, (1984) at 9-23. The Secretariat's Commentary 
on Art. 45 (1) (a) also notes: "In some cases the fact that the seller is able and willing to remedy the non- 
conformity of the goods without inconvenience to the buyer may mean that there would be no fundamental 
breach unless the seller failed to remedy the non-conformity within an appropriate time" (Secretariat 
Commentary, (1979) at 41 para. 6). 
111 Will in: Bianca-Bonell, (1987) at 357-358. The same difficulty arises in respect of the buyer's right to 
demand that the seller deliver substitute goods under Art. 46 (2). Will the seller's offer to repair the lack of 
conformity exclude the buyer's right to require substitute goods if the lack of conformity is fundamental? 
Professor Will argues that to confine the buyer's right to require substitute goods under Art. 46 (2) to the case 
where the seller was not able and willing to offer to repair may make little sense, since it would be restricted 
to the few situations where repair is impossible. Such a rigid construction of Art. 46 (2), was certainly not in 
the mind of the drafters, who had originally dedicated all of Art. 46 to the right to require substitute goods 
(ibid., at 357). See also, Secretariat's Commentary, (1979) at 38-39; Official Records, (1981) at 332-333. 
112 In this regard, the Drafting Committee, during its consideration of Art. [48] in Tenth Session (1977) 
considered a proposal under which ArL [25] was to be changed as follows: "A breach committed by one of the 
parties to the contract is fundamental if, under all the circumstances, including a reasonable offer to cure, it 
results in substantial detriment to the other party and the party in breach foresaw or had reason to foresee such 
a result (emphasis added). " In support of this proposal the US delegate explained that the proposed addition to 
the definition of fundamental breach was meant to protect the defaulting party against technical avoidance of 
the contract where there had been an offer to cure under Art. [48]. However, the majority did not support the 
US proposal, arguing that the change was unnecessary because the problem was fully covered by the specific 
provision dealing with the seller's right to cure and if there was no offer to cure, the situation was governed by 
Art. [25] (see UNCITRAL, Yearbook, VM (1977), 31-32; Honnold, (1989) at 324, paras. 93-95. See also, 
Nfichida, S., (1979) at 287-289 in which he explained in more detail the history of that proposals). As is seen, 
the general understanding of the members of the Committee was that the problem was covered by a specific 
provision- However, they did not doubt the fact that in determining whether or not the breach was 
fundamental, the seller's rightful offer to cure should be regarded as a decisive factor 
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Art. 48 by its language raises a further question: Does the buyer's right to avoid the 
contract have priority over the seller's right to cure after the contract date? This Art. by 
expressly reserving Art. 49, appears to underline the priority of the buyer's remedy of 
termination over the seller's right to cure. Is this appearance true? Things are not as simple as 
that. The interplay between termination and cure was a highly controversial issue throughout 
the UNCITRAL Working Group's sessions and the Vienna Conference and is still among the 
commentators on the Convention. 113 
It seems that a precise answer to the question requires one to examine the issue in light 
of the legislative history of the provision. Initially, the UNCITRAL Working Group, in 
examining the provision which is now Art. 48, took into consideration the relationship of the 
seller's right to cure with the buyer's right to terminate the contract and the reduction of price. 
Several proposals were considered. The central issue in discussion of those proposals was 
whether the buyer may preclude the seller from curing any failure to perform his obligations 
where the cure can be effected without such delay as would amount to a fimdamental breach 
and without causing the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable expense. This 
issue was discussed in the context of a defect in the goods which, in the absence of repair, was 
so serious as to constitute a fundamental breach but where the delay in remedying that defect 
would not constitute a fundamental breach and would not even cause the buyer unreasonable 
inconvenience or unreasonable expense. Different views were rendered by the members of the 
Comn-dttee. However, there was considerable opposition in the Committee to the idea that the 
buyer's right to declare the contract avoided could be affected by an offer to cure the defect 
after the time for performance. The seller was in breach and a possibility to cure was a 
privilege which depended upon the consent of the buyer who had the right to declare the 
contract avoided. There was, on the other hand, substantial support for the proposition that the 
buyer's right to declare a reduction in the price was subject to the seller's right to cure 
provided that the seller bore all expenses of such cure. As a result, the Committee accepted the 
majority's view and reworded para. I of the draft Art. 30, which was renumbered as Art. 
44(l) of the Draft Convention 1978, as follows: "[U]nless the buyer has declared the contract 
113 For instance, Professor Hormold, emphasising the replacement of UNCrIRAI2s Draft Art. 44 -i. e., "Unless 
the buyer has declared the contract avoided ... " 
by the present words of Art. 48 -i. e., "Subject to Art. 49... ", 
argues that the change in words leaves little doubt that the seller's right to cure prevails over the buyer's right 
to avoid. To find otherwise, he observes, would make meaningless the sellees right to cure (see, Honnold, 
(1991) at 375-376, particularly, footnote no. 6 at 376, see also, p. 259). In contrast, Professor Ziegel argues 
that the offer to cure must be made before the injured party exercises the right to avoid the contract (Nina, M.; 
Galston and Hans Smit, (1984) at 9-23). See also, Enderlein in: Sarcevic P. -Volken P., (1986) at 193; 
Schlechtriem, P., (1986) at 77). Professor Will, on the other hand, believes that one cannot answer with 
certainty the question whether avoidance or cure will prevail, since the language of para. I of Art. 48 is no 
clearer than that of 1978 Draft (Bianca-Bonell, (1987) at 349-351). 
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avoided in accordance with Art. 3 1, the seller may, ..., remedy ... 
". 114 T11e Secretariat's 
Commentary on Art. 44 of the 1978 Draft in line with this general understanding notes that 
"the seller would have the right to remedy the non-conformity in the goods by repairing or 
replacing them, unless the buyer terminated the seller's right by declaring the contract 
115 
avoided". 
The issue again became the subject of considerable debate at the Vienna Conference. 
This provision, which explicitly gave the priority to buyer's right to avoid the contract over the 
seller's right to cure, was opposed by some delegates at the Conference who sought to delete 
these limiting words. "' Three alternative proposals were considered by State delegations. "' 
Because of the strong opposition by some delegations the proposals which sought to delete the 
limiting phrase were rejected"' and the Conference finally adopted the second alternative as 
Art. 48(l) which opens with the words "subject to Art. 49, the seller may ... remedy ...... 
As seen, the legislative history of the provision clearly shows that the majority of 
delegations at the Conference were opposed to the approach which sought to give absolute 
priority to the seller's right to cure over the buyer's right to avoid the contract under Art. 49 
(1) (a). The opening words of Art. 48 were adopted upon this general understanding. "' 
Accordingly, where the fundamental breach test is satisfied the buyer would be entitled to 
terminate the contract. The buyer is not required to accept the seller's offer to cure and give 
him an opportunity to cure the defect under Art. 48. This is because the language of para. I of 
Art. 48 subjects the exercise of the right of cure to the buyer's right to avoid the contract under 
Art. 49. In addition, there is no provision under the Convention to require the buyer to give the 
seller in breach an opportunity to cure before exercising his right of avoidance. Moreover, 
para. 2 of Art. 48 implicitly permits the buyer to reject the seller's request to remedy the defect 
114 uNcrrRAL, Yearbook, VIII (1977) at 4445; Honnold, (1991) at 337-338; Official Records, (1981) at 40. 
"'Official Records, (1981) at 40 para. 3. 
"' Official Records, (198 1) at 78-79,114-116,341-344 and 351-353. 
117 Official Records, (1981) at 115. 
"I Official Records, (1981) at 341-344, paras. 44,45,48,51,55,56, and 66-68. 
"9 In a case decided by ICC arbitration in 1994, the Tribunal confirmed the point. In that case a buyer from 
Austria sued a seller from China. The contract involved 80,000 scaffold fittings delivered to buyer's customer 
in England. The Tribunal found that there was a lack of conformity of an important part of the goods giving 
rise to the right to avoid the contract In justifying the buyer's avoidance, the Tribunal stated: "The lack of 
conformity of an important part of the goods supplied amounts to a breach of the contract which, under Art. 
25, is fundamental since the buyer is deprived of substantially what he was entitled to expect under the 
contract. " The Tribunal also stated: "According to Arts. 49(l) (a) and 51 (2) of the Convention [the buyer] may 
declare the contract avoided. " The seller, in contrast, argued that subject to Art. 49, Art. 48(l) permits a seller 
to cure, if he can do so without unreasonable delay, unreasonable inconvenience to the buyer or uncertainty of 
reimbursement of expenses incurred by the buyer. However, on the facts of the case (declaration of avoidance 
pursuant to Art. 49 (1) (a)), the Tribunal held that "[the seller] is not entitled to supply substitute items after 
the delivery date specified in the contract without the consent of [buyer]. w See in this respect ICC Arbitration 
Case No. 7531 of 1994. See also, the Editorial remarks by Albert H. Kritzer attached to the abstract of the 
case. 
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within a reasonable time. "' Under this provision, the buyer is deprived of the right to resort to 
remedies which are inconsistent with the seller's performance only when he accepts the seller's 
request. There is no express provision in the Convention to deprive the buyer of his right of 
avoidance in accordance with Art. 49 (1) (a) for the seller's mere offer to cure his default after 
the contract date. The only thing provided by the Convention is the last phrase of Art. 50 
under which the buyer who rejects the seller's offer to cure under Art. 48 is deprived of his 
right to claim price reduction. 
However, the above construction would raise the question what purpose Art. 48 (1) 
serves for the seller. Is it true, as Honnold observes, that giving priority to the buyer's right to 
avoid the contract would frustrate the seller's right to cure under Ad. 48 ? 121 The answer to the 
question needs to take into account the relationship between the two provisions under Arts. 48 
and 49. Under Art. 48 (1) the seller is empowered to cure at his own expense "any failure to 
perform his obligations". Therefore, this is a general provision, contrary to Honnold who 
believes that it is a specific one'22, which covers fundamental and non-fundamental breaches. 
On the other hand, by virtue of Art. 49 (1) the buyer is given an option to avoid the contract 
where the seller's failure amounts to a fundamental breach, whether the seller offers to cure or 
not. On this interpretation, giving priority to the buyer's right to avoid does not make the 
seller's right to cure futile, since the seller can exercise his right under Art. 48 (1) where his 
breach does not amount to fundamental breach for the purpose of precluding the buyer from 
exercising his right to reduce the price under Art. 50. `1 The buyer would be able to exercise 
his right under Art. 49 (1) where the seller does not show his ability and willingness to cure 
the breach, since the buyer should not be deprived of his right for the mere possibility of 
curing the breach by the seller. This is because the buyer, as indicated before, is not under any 
duty under the Convention to discover the possibility of cure by the seller and to give him an 
opportunity to cure. 
The controversial case is where the buyer has not declared the contract terminated and 
the seller, after becoming aware of the defect, informs the buyer of his readiness to cure . 
124 
Which of these two rights has priority? The language of Arts. 48 (1), 49 (2) (b) (iii)125 and 50 
as well as the legislative history of the provision demonstrate that in such a situation the buyer 
120 See also Art. 49 (2) (b) (iii). 
121 Honnold, (1991) at 376. 
122 Honnold, (199 1) at 376 and the accompanying Ea. 6. 
123 Art. 50 provides where the buyer refuses to accept the sellers offer to cure in accordance with Arts. 34,37 
and 48 he may not reduce the price. 
12" However, this would be the case where the buyer is not deemed to have lost his right to avoid the contract 
because of lapse of a reasonable time (Art. 49 (2) (b) (i). 
125 This provision provides that the buyer will not lose his right to avoid the contract if he has declared that he 
will not accept performance made under Art. 48 (2). 
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is entitled to disregard the seller's offer to cure and tenninate the contract on account of seller's 
fundamental breach. However, Art. 48 gives the seller the right to make clarify the position by 
asking the buyer to make known whether he will accept late performance within a period 
specified by the seller in accordance with Art. 48 (2), (3), (4). Where the buyer does not 
expressly declare his contrary view the seller would be entitled to cure (Art. 48 (2)). In the 
meantime the buyer may not resort to any remedy inconsistent with the seller's performance. 
Likewise, one may say that the seller's right to cure under Art. 48 would also arise 
where he has made a partial non-conforming delivery. In that case, where the lack of 
conformity does not constitute a fundamental breach of the whole contract the seller may be 
entitled to cure even though breach in respect of the non-conforming part is fundamental. In 
that case, it can be argued that the seller's right to cure has priority over the buyer's right to 
avoid the contract in respect of the non-confom-dng part (Arts. 51 (1) and 73 (1)), since Art. 
48 only refers to Art. 49 which is only concerned with the avoidance of the whole contract. 
3.4. Mechanism of Termination 
3.4.1. No Automatic Termination 
Under ULIS two types of avoidance of the contract were provided for. The first was ipso 
facto avoidance, that is, the right to continue performance under the contract would come to 
an end without needing a declaration by the victim of breach"', and the second was avoidance 
by declaration or notice from the innocent party to the breaching party. Ipso facto avoidance 
was eliminated from the remedial system of the present Convention on the ground that it led to 
uncertainty as regards the rights and obligations of the parties, e. g., in the case of late 
delivery, the seller needs to know when he must reship or resell the goods or take other actions 
to prevent their wastage or spoilage. "' Under the present Convention, where the seller's breach 
amounts to a fundamental breach or the seller disregards the additional period of time fixed by 
the buyer in accordance with Art. 47 (1), the buyer has an immediate right to declare the 
contract avoided, but he is not bound to make use of this remedy. He can, if he wishes, resort 
to other remedies. "' However, it is to be noted that this does not necessarily apply where the 
126 See e. g., Arts. 25,26 (1) and (2), 30 (1) and (2) of ULIS. 
127 See generally the study of the secretary-general, A/CN. 9/W. G. 2/W. P. 9, reprinted in UNMRAL, Yearbook, 
111 (1972) at 41-54; A/CN. 9/35, reprinted in UNCMIAL, Yearbook, 1 (1971) at 176-188, paras. 94 ff., and 
annex 2, reprinted in UNCrrRAL, Yearbook, 1 (1971) at 188-198, paras. 70 ff.; AICN. 9/62, annex 2, 
reprinted in UNCURAL, Yearbook, M (1972) at 83-90 paras. 29 ff.; Secretariats Commentary, (1979) at 41; 
Berman H. J.; Kaufmann C., (1978) at 269; Goldenhielm, B., (1966) at 35; Hormold, (1965) at 384; Honnold, 
(1979) at 228; Treitel, G. H., (1988) paras. 250,281; Treitel, G. H., (1976) paras. 154,178. 
128 Arts. 49 (1), 72 (1) and 73 (1) -may declare the contract avoided. As the word "may" shows, under the 
Convention the remedy of avoidance is always at the option of the aggrieved party. For justification of this 
rule, see, A/CN. 9/35, reprinted in UNMRAL, Yearbook, vol. 1 (1971) pp. 176-188, para. 96; A/CN. 9/62, 
annex 2, reprinted in UNCURAL, Yearbook, vol. 3 (1972) at 83-90 para. 30. ). 
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failure in performance is due to a supervening event for which neither party is contractually 
responsible. Such an event may lead to automatic discharge, but this differs from termination 
for contractual default, most obviously in that it excludes all claims for damages. 
Under the Convention, termination of the contract is always at the option of the 
aggrieved buyer. He is under no duty to give the defaulting seller prior notice of the proposed 
avoidance or give him an opportunity to provide an assurance of performance. "' He is also not 
required for this purpose to resort to a court's judgment 130, and the court is not allowed to give 
a period of grace to the defaulting seller (Arts. 45 (3) and 49). It is in his hand to exercise if he 
wishes unless he has lost his right under the Convention. 
3.4.2. Electing to Terminate the Contract 
Termination under the Convention in all cases can be effected by a simple declaration of the 
buyer to the seller. "' If the injured buyer does not declare the contract avoided the contract 
continues in force. Under the Convention the avoiding buyer must declare affirmatively that he 
avoids the contract and must transmit advice of his decision to the seller by an appropriate 
means of communication (Arts. 26,27). There must be a positive act on the part of the buyer 
to declare his intention to tenninate. This principle is of a general nature applicable to all 
cases of avoidance under the Convention whether it afficts the whole contract or only part of 
it, and irrespective of whether it is based on an actual or anticipatory breach. 
Form of Declaration. An entire Art. of the Convention, Art. 2611, is dedicated to the 
declaration of avoidance, requiring that it be made by a notice. The Convention does not, 
however, require that the notice of termination must be in a particular form or by a specific 
means of transmission. It may, therefore, be written or oral, and may be transmitted by any 
means whatsoever. "' 
Unlike in the case of acceptance of an offer where the Convention puts the risk of loss 
etc. on the person sending the acceptance (i. e., offeree), Art. 27 lays down the opposite 
principle (i. e., the dispatch principle) as governing any notice, request or other 
129 The rule is subject to an exception. In the case of avoidance for the "anticipatory fundamental breach" Art. 
72 (2) requires the party intending to declare the contract avoided "to give reasonable notice to the other party 
in order to permit him to provide adequate assurance of his performance' provided the time for performance 
allows. 
130 This point has been expressly referred to by ICC arbitration in the Convention case of ICC Arbitration Case 
No. 7585 of 1992. The full text of the decision is cited in: UNILEX, E. 1992-32. 
See in this respect the opening word of Art. 49 which provides: "The buyer may declare the contract avoided: 
132 Art. 26: "A declaration of avoidance of the contract is effective only if made by notice to the other party. " 
133 This was the clear position of the draftsmen where all suggestions opposing this principle were expressly 
rejected (such as the suggestion that notice must be made in writing (A/CN. 9/125, add. 1. comment of USSR 
on Art. 10 reprinted in: UNCHRAL, Yearbook, VIII. (1977) at 130) or, alternatively, be immediately followed 
by written notice (A/32/17, annex 1, para. 102, reprinted in: UNCrrRAL, Yearbook, WI, (1977) at 32). 
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134 
communication, unless otherwise expressly provided in the Convention . The risk therefore is 
prima facie on the person to whom the communication is addressed. Accordingly, what the 
buyer is required to do is to declare his intention to avoid the contract by an appropriate 
means. It is assumed, however, that failure to comply with the method of transmission does 
not mean the nullity of the notice; it simply means that a party who gives it in an inappropriate 
means would run the risk of its transmission if, for instance, it fails to arrive in time. 13' The 
notice has to make clear to the seller that the contract is avoided. Although the degree of 
clarity required in the notice is not clearly ascertained, 136 in a Convention case, 137 a German 
court provided guidance with respect to the type of declaration that must be made in order for 
the contracts to be avoided in accordance with the Convention's provisions. First, the court by 
implication recognised the use of telex or fax as a proper means to declare avoidance. Second, 
and more significantly, the Court concluded that a party declaring a contract avoided need not 
use exact language, such as, "I hereby declare our contract avoided. " Rather, the Court 
acknowledged a more pragmatic form for declaration of avoidance, that is, that the 
communication must contain language which clearly operates to put the party in breach on 
notice that the party not in breach will no longer fulfil. In that case, the buyer had informed 
the seller that the shoes remaining to be made would be made by another Italian company and 
that their joint venture under the contract for sale of shoes had ended. This notice was 
regarded by the court as sufficient for an effective declaration of avoidance. " Likewise, in 
another case, a German court stated that the buyer's refusal to take delivery would suffice. 139 
This would be the case where termination is based on the late delivery, since refusal to accept 
has a clear meaning. However, the meaning would not be clear where the buyer rejects 
defective goods, for rejection could be understood as a demand for replacement goods under 
Art. 46 (2). 
3.4.3. Election of Affirmation 
The Convention provides a number of circumstances in which the buyer may be treated as 
having affirmed the contract and as a result have lost his right of termination. These 
134 Such as the seller's request or notice to cure beyond the contract time under Art. 48 (1) which is to be 
received by the buyer (see Art. 48 (4). 
135 See also, Graveson-Cohn-Graveson, (1968) at 60 where it is said that a communication made in an unusual 
manner would appear to be satisfactory if it reached the addressee in due course and was not promptly (Art. 
II of LTUS) rejected by him. 
136 See, Karollus, M., (1995) 51-94. 
137 See, Germany 17 September 1991 Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt (CLOUT abstract no. 2). 138 See in this respect, Babiak, A., (1992) at 126; the editorial remarks by Albert H. Kritzer attached to the 
abstract case. 
139 see, Germany 24 April 1990 Amtsgericht Oldenburg (CLOUT, abstract no. 7). See also, Karollus, M., 
(1995) at 51-94. 
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circumstances can be divided into three general categories: (a) failure to notify the seller of the 
lack of conformity in accordance with Art. 39; (b) lapse of a reasonable time without giving 
notice to the seller of his avoidance (Art. 49 (2))"; and (c) restitution of the goods becon-dng 
impossible (Art. 82)). 
Under the first rule, the buyer may lose his right to reject the non-conforming delivery 
and terminate the contract if he does not give notice to the seller specifying the nature of the 
lack of conformity within a reasonable time after he has discovered or ought to have 
discovered it (Art. 39 (1)). 141 Similarly, in the case of latent defects he may lose his right under 
this rule if he does not give the seller notice thereof at the latest within a period of two years 
from the date on which the goods were actually handed over to him, unless this time-linfit is 
inconsistent with a contractual period of guarantee (Art. 39 (2)). 
Under the second rule, the buyer may lose his right where the time limit expires. In the 
case of late delivery, the time runs from the buyer's becoming aware that delivery has been 
made (Art. 49 (2) (a)). In the case of any other breach it runs either from the moment when the 
buyer knew or ought to have known of the breach (Art. 49 (2) (b) (i)); or, where he has given 
a notice under Art. 47 (1) requiring the seller to perform within a reasonable period of time, 
140 Art. 49 (2): "However, in cases where the seller has delivered the goods, the buyer loses the right to declare 
the contract avoided unless he does so: (a) in respect of late delivery, within a reasonable time after he has 
become aware that delivery has been made; (b) in respect of any breach other than late delivery, within a 
reasonable time: (i) after he knew or ought to have known of the breach-, (ii) after the expiration of any 
additional period of time fixed by the buyer in accordance with paragraph (1) of Art. 47, or after the seller has 
declared that hewill not perform his obligations wit1iin such an additional period; or (iii) after the expiration 
of any additional period of time indicated by the seller in accordance with paragraph (2) of Art. 48, or after the 
buyer has declared that hewill not accept performance. " 
14l It is to noted that in a number of Convention cases the courts have applied this rule in a severe sense. For 
instance, in a case decided by an Austrian court (Austria 29 March 1994 Landgericht (i. e., District Court) 
Feldkirch), it was held that two months after delivery of the goods was a reasonable period of time within 
which the buyer should have discovered the lack of conformity of the goods. The decision of the district court 
was affirmed in: Austria I July 1994 Oberlandesgericht InnsbrucL- Dansk Blumsterexport A/s v. Frick 
Blumenhandel, CLOUT abstract no. 107). The same position has been taken by the German courts. For 
instance, in a case heard by a Stuttgart court, a German buyer of Italian shoes claimed that it had examined 
several samples, but that the defects could not have been discovered before the buyees clients brought them to 
the buyer's attention. The shoes were delivered on May 25,1988 and the buyer gave notice of lack of 
conformity of June 10,1988. 'Me court held that the buyer was in contravention of the "reasonable time" 
requirement of Art. 39 (1), reasoning that the buyer had a duty to examine the goods minutely and 
scrupulously. 'Me court noted in this context that the buyer previously had identified flaws in a prior 
shipment, and that it therefore had been on notice of problems. The court thus held that notice to be tardy 
When it was given sixteen days after delivery (see, Germany 31 August 1989 Landgcricht Stuttgart (CLOUT 
abstract no. 4). ). Likewise, in the case of OLG Dusseldorf 8 January 1993, the German court held that seven 
days constituted an unreasonably long time period. In another case before a German court, notice of lack of 
conformity was deemed unreasonable where it was given two months after the delivery of the purchased 
goods, and where the court found that the claimed defect in packaging could have been discovered 
immediately (Germany 20 April 1994 Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt (CLOUT, abstract no. 84). In other cases 
before German courts, notice of lack of conformity was held not to have been given within a reasonable time 
period when it was given more than two months after the delivery of shirts of the wrong size (see Germany 10 
February 1994 Oberlandesgericht Dasseldorf [6 U 32/93] (CLOUT, abstract no. 81), and in other cases it is 
measured about one month (see e. g., Germany 8 March 1995 Bundesgerichtshof (CLOUT, abstract no. 123; 
Germany 21 August 1995 Oberlandesgericht Stuttgart). See in this respect, Curran, V. G., (1995) at 175-199. 
These instances show that the period of reasonable time would vary according to the nature of lack of 
conformity and goods. 
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from the expiration of that period, or from the seller's declaration that he will not perform his 
obligations within that period (Art. 49 (2) (b) (ii)). 
A fiirther general rule is that the buyer may lose his right of terrnination if he cannot 
restore the goods in substantially the condition in which he received them (Art. 82 (1)). Thus, 
he may lose his right if he has consumed, altered or resold the goods to a third party provided 
that he has done so after he discovered or ought to have discovered the lack of conformity 
(Art. 82 (2)). One may argue that acts such as sale, pledge or any other disposition of 
documents by the buyer may be placed in this category, since dealings with the documents 
controlling the goods will usually place them out of the buyer's control. This may be the case 
where he transferred the documents representing the goods or pledged them to the bank for 
credit. In both cases, he will hardly be able to reject the goods unless the sub-buyer himself 
rejects, or in the case of pledge, the pledgee approves rejection of the goods. Accordingly, 
unless the sub-buyer rejects or the buyer pays off the bank to obtain release of the documents, 
he will not be able to enforce his right to reject because of the impossibility of returning the 
goods to the seller. 
However, he will retain his right where the impossibility of restoration was not caused 
by his acts or omission (Art. 82 (2) (a)). Similarly, he will not lose his right by this method 
where it was due to examination of the goods in accordance with Art. 38 (Art. 82 (2) (b); or 
was because of reselling the goods in the normal course of business, consuming or transferring 
them in the course of normal use before he discovered or ought to have discovered the lack of 
conformity (Art. 82 (2) (c)). 142 
3.5. Effects of Termination 
As in English law, under the Convention, tennination affects the legal life of the contract and 
the contractual relationship of the parties. In the following, the effects of termination on both 
the contract, rights and duties of the parties will be referred to in brief. 
3.5.1. Effects on the Contract 
As regards the question whether termination has retrospective or prospective effects on the 
contract, it is hard to say that the Convention adopted any single approach. "' This is because 
it provides, on the one hand, that avoidance releases both parties from the obligations they 
142 Giving the buyer who resells, transforms or consumes the goods the right to avoid the contract raises the 
question whether it has any legal justification. See in this respect, Tallon in: Bianca-Bonell, (1987) at 609; 
Honnold, J., (1991) at 568. 
" For different views see Enderlein; F.; Maskow, D., (1992) at 341-342; Schlechtriem, p., (1986) at 107; 
Tallon iw. Bianca-Bonell, (1987) at 604. 
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have undertaken under the contract without affecting any rights to claim damages caused by 
breach. It also emphasises that avoidance does not affect any provision of the contract 
concerning dispute-settlement mechanism (arbitration and forum or re-negotiation clauses)'" 
or any other provision of the contract governing the rights and obligations of the parties 
consequent upon the avoidance of the contract, such as liquidated damages and penalty 
clauses or clauses restricting or excluding liability (Art. 81)". On the other hand, the 
Convention requires both parties to return all benefits of possession (profits and advantages of 
use). If the seller is required to return the price, he must also pay interest from the date on 
which the price was paid. Similarly, in contrast to the seller who is bound to pay interest on 
the refundable price, the buyer is only required to account to the seller for all benefits which 
he has actually derived from using the goods or part of them (Art. 84 (1))". In addition, it 
imposes on the parties reciprocal duties of restoration (Art. 82). An obvious example of 
adoption of the retrospective effect of termination by the Convention can be found when an 
instalment contract is entirely terminated after delivery of some defective instalments. Under 
this provision all instalments are to be returned even though some of them are perfect. These 
instances reveal that, although the Convention does not pose the problem in abstract terms of 
retrospectivity, its wording implies retrospective effects of avoidance. Accordingly, it can be 
said that the Convention has adopted a quasi-rescission and not a real one, that a contract 
becomes void ex tunc, as in the context of defects of consent. 
3.5.2. Effects on the Duties and Rights 
Under the Convention termination releases both parties from their primary contractual 
obligations: The seller is not required to perform his delivery obligation and the buyer is under 
no duty to pay the price (if he has not paid in advance) and accept the seller's performance. 147 
144 The 1976 UNCHRAL Arbitration Rules (General Assembly Resolution 31/98) in Art. 21 (2) protects this 
basic function by providing that an arbitration clause, although included in the contract, "shall be treated as an 
agreement independent of the other terms of the contract"; the arbitrators "have the power to determine the 
existence or the validity of the contract of which an arbitration clause forms a part". See also, the draft 
"Principles of International Commercial Contracts" proposed by International Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law (UNIDROIT) in 1994 (Art. 7.3.5. ); 'Me Principles of European Contract Law (Version 1996), 
Art. 9.305. 
145 Art. 81 (1): "Avoidance of the contract releases both parties from their obligations under it, subject to any 
damages which may be due. Avoidance does not affect any provision of the contract for the settlement of 
disputes or any other provision of the contract governing the rights and obligations of the parties consequent 
upon the avoidance of the contract. (2) A party who has performed the contract either wholly or in part may 
claim restitution from the other party of whatever the first party has supplied or paid under the contract. If 
both parties are bound to make restitution, they must do so concurrently. " 
146 Assuming that the buyer was able to bencfit from the non-conforming goods, as the case may be in the latent 
defect which affects the capability of the item some time after taking over and putting it in use. Art. 84 (1) 
provides so: "If the seller is bound to refimd the price, he must also pay interest on it, from the date on which 
the price was paid. " 
147 If the contract is partially avoided, the parties are released from their obligations only as to that part of the 
contract which has been avoided. 
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However, the injured buyer retains his claim for damages caused by the seller's breach before 
the avoidance (Art. 82 (1)). After the contract is validly terminated both parties have a right to 
claim restitution from the other party of whatever he has supplied or paid under the contract. 
If both parties are bound to make restitution, they must do so concurrently (Art. 81 (2)). " 
Section Two. Specific Performance 
1.0. Introduction 
The third remedy provided for an aggrieved buyer by the Convention is the right to require the 
seller to perform his obligations in accordance with the terms of the contract and the 
Convention. As far as the buyer's remedies are concerned, the right is, in principle, recognised 
by the Convention under Art. 46, by virtue of which the buyer is given an option to "require 
performance by the seller of [his] obligations ... " The remedy may be exercised in one of the 
three following forms. As long as the seller has not delivered the goods or the relevant 
documents, the buyer is given a right to demand that the seller deliver the goods or documents 
(Art. 46 (1)). Where delivery has already been made, but the goods delivered do not conform 
with the contract requirements sub-paras. (2) and (3) of Art. 46 provide for the buyer two 
flirther variants of specific performance, allowing him to: demand that the seller in breach 
supply substitute goods or repair the non-conforming goods. 
2.0. Specific Performance 
By virtue of An. 46 (1) of the Convention, "Me buyer may 14' require performance by the 
seller of his obligations unless the buyer has resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with 
such requirements. " The language of the provision seems broad in scope. It may be invoked in 
a wide variety of circumstances. It does not make any distinction between different sorts of 
148 It is interesting to note that a proposal for the purpose of applying such a right to the case of the buyer's right 
to require the seller to deliver substitute goods was made by the Norwegian delegation at the Vienna 
Diplomatic Conference but it was rejected (Official Records, (1981) at 387 para. 68. See also Schlechtriem, 
P., (1986) at 107). Accordingly, the buyer has no lien on the non-conforming goods and is not entitled to 
refim to return them to the seller for the purpose of requiring the seller to tender substitute goods. 
"'Me language of Art. 46 (1) which provides "the buyer may require" may be somewhat misleading. Although 
the provisions governing the remedy of specific performance are phrased in terms of the "rights" of the parties 
(as the language of Art. 45 (1) suggests), they, as Secretariat's commentary clearly indicated, anticipate that, if 
one of the contracting parties does not perform, a court will order such performance upon the other party's 
request and will enforce that order by the means available to it under its procedural law. Accordingly, where 
an injured buyer applies the court for a decree ordering the seller to perform his obligations specifically on 
account of Art. 46 the court lacks the discretion to refuse to issue such an order unless the case falls within 
Art. 28. See Secretariat Commentary, (1979) at 27, Art. 26 (now Art. 28), para. 4, and, ArL 42 (now Art. 46), 
at 38, para. 8). See also: Kastely, A. H., (1988) at 614 n. 40; Walt, S., (1991) at 214 n. 9. 
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breaches. The buyer can, therefore, require the seller to perform all "his obligations" under the 
contract and the Convention. The most common example is when the seller fails to procure or 
produce the goods or to deliver them at the right place (Art. 3 1) or date (Art. 33) provided by 
the contract. "O It may also be resorted to where part of the purchased goods are missing, or, 
the seller refuses to hand over the documents and do all other acts necessary to fulfil the 
contract as originally agreed. "' 
3.0. Right to Demand Cure 
As indicated above, the right of the buyer to demand that the seller cure the non-conforming 
delivery may be exercised in the form of requiring him to tender substitute goods or to repair 
the defect in the goods. It is to be noted that although the language of Art. 46 (2) and (3) 
shows that the remedies provided under these two sub-paragraphs are separate remedies, they 
are not to be regarded as alternatives but can both be resorted to in the same case. Thus, it is 
possible for a buyer to request both substitute goods and the repair of goods depending on the 
circumstances. For instance, the seller may only be able to supply a portion of replacement 
goods but be in a position to repair the remainder of the defective goods. "' 
3.1. Demand Substitute Goods 
Art. 46 (2) of the Convention gives the buyer a right to request the seller to deliver 
replacement goods where the latter has delivered non-confom-dng goods. However, since it 
could be expected that the cost of shipping a second lot of goods to the buyer and of disposing 
of the non-conforming goods already delivered might be considerably greater than the buyer's 
loss from having non-conforming goods, the Convention adopts the approach that a buyer will 
be entitled to resort to require the seller to deliver replacement goods only where the non- 
conformity is serious enough to constitute a 'fundamental breach'. Accordingly, relatively 
trivial defects do not justify a claim for substitute delivery, though in appropriate cases they 
'" It is worth noting that in the latter case, it may sometimes be difficult to decide whether the buyer, by 
demanding late performance, does demand that the seller perform under Art. 46 (1) or whether he does offer 
voluntarily to modify the contract pursuant to Art. 29 (1). If his demand is interpreted as a demand for 
performance he can claim damage for any loss he may have suffered as a result of the late delivery, while if 
his statement is interpreted as a modification of the delivery date he could receive no damages for late 
delivery. The question was posed by Secretariat's Commentary (see. Secretariat Commentary, (1979) [Art. 46] 
at 38, Para. 5)., but it was not Ruther pursued at the Vienna Conference. It is a matter of construction of the 
buyer's declaration which is to be made under Art. 8. However, it has been suggested that in the case of doubt 
the declaration should be interpreted as requiring performance under Art. 46 (Will in: Bianca and Bonell, 
(1987) at 340). 
... See also, Enderlein, FA Maskow, D., (1992) at 178; Will In: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 335-336; 
Kastely, A. H., (l988)at6l3; ShenJianming, S. J. D., (1996)at261. 
" See also, Babiak, A., (1992) at 130. 
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may entitle the buyer to require the seller to remedy the lack of conformity by repair (Art. 46 
(3)). 153 
The question which arises here is whether the buyer of specific goods can require the 
seller to deliver substitute goods on the basis of para. (2) of Art. 46. Although the question 
was expressly addressed by ULIS, which provided that the buyer could only require the seller 
to deliver substitute goods where the sale related to unascertained goods"'. the present 
Convention does not expressly state that the remedy should only be applied to unascertained 
goods. Nevertheless, it seems that the same rule should be applied here since under a contract 
for specific goods the seller has not undertaken any duty other than to deliver the particular 
goods. Requiring him to deliver substitute goods would be contrary to the mutual agreement of 
the contracting parties. 155 However, it should be stressed that in the case of sale of 
unascertained goods, the buyer is not required to request delivery of substitute goods; he can 
keep the defective goods and resort to the remedy of requiring the seller to repair the lack of 
conformity. 156 
The buyer may also be entitled to require delivery of substitute goods where the seller's 
delivery only partially fails to conform with the contract. Art. 51, addressing the question, 
provides: "If only part of the delivered goods is in conformity with the contract, Arts. 46 to 50 
apply in respect of the part ... which does not conform. " Thus, by virtue of Arts. 46 (2) and 51 
(1) the buyer may accept the conforming parts and require the seller to deliver substitute 
conforming goods for the defective units, provided that the lack of conformity constitutes a 
fundamental breach of the contract with respect to the part affected, 
3.2. Demand Repair 
The remedy seems slightly stronger than that which is provided under Art. 46 (2). " The latter, 
as already seen, will be available only when the non-conformity constitutes a fundamental 
breach of contract, while the former will be available "unless this is unreasonable having 
10 The provision has been criticised by some academic writers (Horacia A. Grigera Naon, in: Horn R.; 
Schmitthoff, C. M., (1982) at 114. ). 
154 Art. 42 (1) of ULIS: "The buyer may require the seller to perform the contract: ... (c) 
if the sale relates to 
unascertained goods, by delivering other goods which are in conformity with the contract or by delivering the 
missing part or quantity, except where the purchase of goods in replacement is in conformity with usage and 
reasonably possible. " 
155 In practice, sellers prefer to accept the buyers' demand in order to avoid further damages for late delivery. 
'm See also, Will in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 336. 
157 The 1978 draft version of Art. 46 (then 42) did not contain this remedy. It was incorporated into the 
Convention by an amendment introduced by a joint proposal at the Vienna Diplomatic Conference (see 
Official Records, (1981) at 112-113). Of course, the remedy was proposed during the preparation of the Draft 
Convention by UNCrI`RAL but the committee did not accepted it (see, UNCURAL, Yearbook, VIE (1977) at 
43 paras. 243-260; Honnold, (1989) at 336. During debate on the amendment, some delegates noted that the 
right to repair was necessary to protect the buyer where delivered goods were defective but the defects did not 
constitute a fimdamental breach (Official Records, (1981) at 335-336). 
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regard to all the circumstances" (Art. 46 (3). According to the wide language of the provision 
the buyer will have a general right to require the seller to cure any form of lack of conformity 
by way of repair except in cases where it is unreasonable, having regard to all the 
circumstances. 
The flexible language of the provision is designed to encourage a reasonable and 
flexible approach to cases where the buyer can readily make repair, particularly when the 
seller's facilities for repair are in a distant country. Accordingly, a buyer will not be entitled to 
require the seller to make good n-dnor defects which can readily be repaired by him. 
The reasonableness of the request to repair does not depend on the nature of breach, 
but, as some commentators have suggested"', on the character of the goods delivered, 
technical difficulties and all the other circumstances. It would, for instance, be so regarded if 
repair is impossible, whether because of the nature of the goods, such as agricultural products, 
or because of technical difficulties. A claim for repair may also be unreasonable if the costs 
involved are disproportionate to the price of the goods or if the seller is a dealer who does not 
have the means for repair, or if the buyer himself can repair the goods at least cost. "' 
However, the Convention does not expressly provide that the right to ask for supply of 
substitute goods should be subject to some requirements such as, economic facility or even 
practical possibility. Accordingly, the question which arises here is: is the right to be subject 
to some qualification, and, if so, what degree of "difficulty" or "impossibility" should be 
sufficient to free the seller of his obligation to deliver substitute goods? "' It seems that the 
remedy under Art. 46 (2) is to be restricted to the same qualification to which the remedy of 
repair under paragraph (3) of the article is made. There is no clear argument to distinguish 
these two remedies which are in fact both particular forms of the general right to specific 
performance. 
The point which deserves to be noted here is that unlike ULIS which entitled the buyer 
to require the seller to repair provided that the seller was also manufacturer of the goods, "' 
under the present Convention such a right exists, no matter whether the seller is in a position 
to repair the goods by his own means or by utilising the facilities of the market. If he is not in 
" Will in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 338; Enderlein, Fritz, in: Sarcevic, Petra; Volken, Paul, (1986) at 192; 
Enderlein, F. and Maskow, D., (1992) at 18 1. 
I" See also, Schlechtriem, P., (1986) at 76; Will In: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 339; Enderlein, F. and 
Maskow, D., (1992) at 180. 
" See also: Rolf Herber, in: Herber, Bobbs Herry, (1980) at 118-119. 
161 Art. 42 of ULIS made a difference between producer and manufacturer, on the one hand, and distributor and 
dealer, on the other. Art. 42 (1): "The buyer may require the seller to perform the contract (a) if the sale 
relates to goods to be produced or manufactured by the seller, by remedying defects in the goods, provided the 
seller is in position to remedy the defects; (b) if the sale relates to specific goods, by delivering the goods to 
which the contract refers or the missing part thereof-, (c) if the sale relates to unascertained goods, by 
delivering other goods which are in conformity with the contract or by delivering the missing part or quantity, 
except where the purchase of goods in replacement is in conformity with usage and reasonably possible. " 
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a position to do so at all, this could indeed amount to unreasonableness. However, it should be 
mentioned that the mere fact that repair is not possible, does not automatically turn the defect 
into a fimdamental breach of contract. But the buyer is left only with the right to claim a 
reduction of price and/or compensation for damages. "' 
4.0. Restrictions on the remedy 
Despite the broad language of Art. 46, the buyer's remedies under this Art. are subject to a 
number of substantial restrictions. These restrictions differ according to whether the case 
involves a claim under the first paragraph of Art. 46 or the second or third. "' 
4.1. Resorting to an Inconsistent Remedy 
The first restriction is expressed by Art. 46 (1). By virtue of this sub-paragraph, the buyer 
will be entitled to apply for specific performance only when he has not "resorted to a remedy 
which is inconsistent with this requirement". Despite the express language of this provision, it 
is not quite clear which remedies are incompatible with the remedy of requiring performance. 
The buyer's exercise of his right to declare the contract avoided would certainly be an 
"inconsistent" remedy for this purpose. '" This inconsistency will become plain when we look 
at what Art. 81 provides. Under this Art., avoidance "releases both parties from their 
obligations under [the contract] subject to any damages that may be due. " The same is true in 
the case where the buyer has claimed price reduction in the case of non-conforming delivery 
pursuant to Art. 50, "' since it would re-establish equivalence. 166 
The question whether a claim for damages would be an inconsistent remedy, depriving 
the buyer of the right to require performance gives rise to some doubt. What is certain is that, 
under the Convention, the buyer is not deprived of his right to claim damages by exercising his 
right to claim performance (Art. 45 (2); but is the converse necessarily true? The Convention 
does not make the position clear. It has, therefore, been suggested that a distinction must be 
drawn between the case of a claim for damages for late delivery and that of non-delivery. "' 
Where the buyer has claimed damages for delay in delivery he would not be pursuing a 
162 See also, Enderlein F.; Maskow D., (1992) at 18 1. 
163 See generally, Flcchtner, H. M., (1988) at 59-60; Timothy, D., Hughes, in: Hancock, William, (1990) at 101- 
60 and seq.; Fitzgerald, J., (1977) at 291-313 Shenhamning, S. J. D., (1996) at 274-277. 
'" Professor Honnold says that the rule of inconsistency under Art. 46 (1) is based on the likelihood of reliance 
of the seller on the buyer's declaration by stopping production, reselling the goods, or cancelling the 
reservation of shipping space (Honnold, (1991) at 362). 
'65 See, Secretariat Commentary, (1979) [Art. 46] at 38. See also Rolf Herber, irr. Herber, Bobbs Herry, (1980) 
at 117; Enderlcin, Fritz, in: Sarcevic, P. -Volken, P., (1986) at. 189; Schlechtriem, P., (1986) at. 76; Alejandro 
U Garro, (1989) at 459 footnote 69; Ndulo, Muna, (1991) 21; Walt, S., (1991) at 214. 
I" Will in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 336; Enderlein, F.; Maskow, D., (1992) at 178. 161 Rolf Herber, in: Herber, Bobbs Hcrry, (1980) at 117; Walt, S., (1991) at 214, no. 11. 
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remedy 'inconsistent' with that of requiring performance"', while a claim for damages for 
non-delivery would be inconsistent with requiring performance, since such a claim for 
damages can only be brought 'If the contract is avoided'. "' 
Although the requirement is expressly provided under Sub-para. (1) of Art. 46, it seems 
that the buyer's right to resort to the remedies under sub-paras. (2) and (3) of this Art. should 
also be subject to the same requirement; the buyer will not be entitled to require the seller to 
deliver replacement goods or repair defects in the goods where he has already resorted to an 
inconsistent remedy. 
4.2. Forum Approach Rule 
A further restriction is provided under Art. 28. Pursuant to this Art., "a court is not bound to 
enter a judgment for specific performance unless the court would do so under its own law in 
respect of similar contracts of sale not governed by this Convention. " The provision which is 
designed to compromise the divergent common law and civil law perceptions of the role of 
specific performance in sales contracts of movables, empowers the state members' courts to 
follow their traditional position. Three different situations may arise in this connection. The 
first is where the court is under a mandatory duty to order specific performance under 
domestic law. In this case, the court is bound to accept the buyer's application for specific 
performance where the required conditions under the Convention are met. The second is an 
extreme situation where the national law disallows the court to order specific performance. In 
this case, the court is not bound to disregard its domestic law and to give effect to the buyer's 
application even though the requisite requirements provided by the Convention are met. But, it 
has discretion to decide the case either on the basis of the Convention or domestic law. 170 The 
third case is where the court under the national law has a discretion as to whether or not to 
accept the buyer's application. The question is whether the court would still be free to 
continue its discretion under national law or it becomes bound to decide the case on the 
Convention provisions. The answer depends upon how the word "would" in Art. 28 is 
interpreted. Does the phrase under Art. 28 "unless the court would do so under its own law 
... 
" include the case where the court could accept the buyer's application under the national 
law? It seems that the legislative history of Art. 28 suggests that in the latter case the court 
would be able to disregard the Convention provision. This is because the UNCITRAL Draft 
168 This view is supported by Art 47 (2) sent 2 which provides "However, the buyer is not deprived thereby of 
16 
any right he may have to claim damages for delay in performance. 
9 Art. 76 (1), applicable to breach by seller, cf Art. 75. See Treitel, (1988) para. 43. See also: Enderlein, F.; 
Maskow, D., (1992) at 178; Booysen, Hercules, (1991-1992) at 82. 
"" See also, Hormold, J., (199 1) at 273. 
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Art. 28 used the word "could" instead of "would". Under that version, the court was certainly 
bound to give effect to the buyer's application even it has discretion under its domestic law in 
the similar cases. However, at the Vienna Diplomatic Conference, some common law 
delegates opposed to this wording and as a result, the word replaced by "would" . 
171 
It is to be noted that Art. 28 only permits the court to deviate from the rules of the 
Convention where the buyer may "require performance of any obligation of the other party"; it 
does not affect the Convention's restrictions on specific performance. " For this reason the 
buyer cannot, relying on the law of forum, seek to require a seller to deliver substitute goods 
even though the lack of conformity is not a fundamental breach as required by Art. 46 (2), or 
seek for repair of the goods even though, pursuant to Art. 46 (3), under "all the 
circumstances" requiring the seller to repair is "unreasonable". Art. 28 applies only when the 
buyer is entitled to performance in accordance with the provisions of this Convention. " 
The Forum Approach Rule and the Remedy of Repair. As the language of Art. 28 
shows, the Art. only refers to the term "specific performance". The question arises here is 
whether the restrictive aspect of the provision covers the remedies of requiring the seller to 
deliver substitute goods and repair defects. The answer depends on the meaning of "specific 
performance" under Art. 28. The secretariat's Commentary makes it clear that it does include 
an order requiring the seller to deliver goods pursuant to Art. 46 (2). 11 Does it include, in 
addition, an order requiring the seller to remedy the defects by repair under Art. 46 (3)? 
The drafting history of the Art. does not help. During the preparation of the Convention 
the question whether an order for repair should be covered by Art. 28 was not addressed. The 
Secretariat's Commentary also lacks any guideline in this respect, since the remedy was not 
included in the 1978 Draft Convention recommended by UNCITRAL. It is therefore difficult 
to determine whether the restriction under Art. 28 applies to an order requiring the seller to 
repair defective goods under Art. 46 (3). 
Considering the purpose of Art. 28, one may, however, reach the conclusion that the 
objections to an order requiring a seller to deliver contract goods or substitute goods should 
apply as well to an order requiring the seller to make repairs, since in all of these cases, the 
court is indeed requiring the seller to perform one of his obligations. "' Nevertheless, treating 
an order to require the seller to make repair as an order for specific performance would result 
171 Official Records, (1981) at 76,100,304-5. See also, Shen, hanming. SID., (1996) at 271-3. 
172 See also, Honnold, (1991) at 274. 
'73 See also, Honnold, (199 1) at 365-366. 
174 ArL 46 (1) and (2). The Commentary on Art. 42 (now 46) expressly refers to Art. 26 (now 28). See 
Secretariat Commentary, (1979) at 27, para. 3. 
175 See also, Kastely, A. H., (1988) at 635. See also: Sutton, K. C., (1977) at 57. 
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in an unreasonable consequence. Accepting the view that the right under Art. 46 (3) is 
enforceable subject to the court's discretion under Art. 28 would severely restrict this remedy, 
since many legal systems are not familiar with it in their domestic law. " The legislative 
history of the provision shows that the remedy was adopted as an alternative to the remedy of 
requiring the seller to deliver substitute goods where the delivery of them clearly would be 
wasteful. " If an order to repair is treated as an order to perform which is subject to the 
discretionary power of the courts under Art. 28, this alternative remedy may rarely be invoked 
because most courts could disregard it as a remedy inconsistent with their national law. Such 
an interpretation would substantially restrict the effect of this remedy which seems to be far 
from what the drafters had intended in incorporation of it into Art. 46. 
It is difficult to find a solution for this problem. Both the language and purpose of Art. 
28 support the approach that an order to make repair is to be subject to the restrictive 
provision under Art. 28. Accordingly, the courts have the power to treat an application for 
repair as they do one for the other forms of specific performance. " 
4.3. Time Limit Restriction 
The Convention provides a fiwffier requirement which is applicable to the remedies prescribed 
under Art. 46 (2) and (3). Under this requirement the buyer must request supply of substitute 
goods or repair from the seller in conjunction with notice he has to give under Art. 39 so as to 
inform the seller of the lack of conformity (Art. 46 (2) and (3). "1 If the buyer does not request 
cure at the very moment of giving notice, he has to do so within a reasonable time after he has 
given notice to the seller that the goods delivered do not correspond to the contract. Failure to 
request the remedy either in conjunction with the notice given under Art. 39 or within a 
reasonable time thereafter would deprive him of the right to require the seller to deliver 
substitute goods or repair the defects. On this provision, in the case of latent defects the buyer 
may be entitled to demand that the seller cure the lack of conformity up to two years from the 
date in which the goods are actually handed over to him. 
176 When an amendment to Art. 46 for the purpose of incorporating the remedy into the article was proposed 
several delegations commented that the right to repair was unknown in their domestic laws (Official Records, 
(1981) at 335-336). 
177 Official Records, (1981) at 335-336. 
17g However, Kastcly suggests that in order to promote international harmony a court should exercise its 
discretion under Art. 28 to order specific performance, sometimes in the form of an order to repair, even if it 
would not do so in a dispute involving a domestic contract (Kastely, A. H., (1988) at 636). 
179 See also, Knapp in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 566. 
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4.4. Whether Goods Must be Ascertained? 
The question arises here whether the goods must be identified before the buyer of 
unascertained goods can resort to the remedy of specific performance. As far as Art. 46 is 
concerned, it does not expressly provide that the goods are to be identified to the contract 
before the buyer can resort to the remedy. Nor can such a requirement be inferred from Art. 
46. Accordingly, in the case of sale of unascertained goods, identification of the goods to the 
contract should not be regarded as a pre-requisite to a claim for the remedy of requiring 
performance. "' 
On this interpretation, if a contract, for example, requires the seller to arrange for 
shipment, the seller would be in breach of contract if he fails to do so"" and as a result the 
goods are not marked or otherwise identified, The seller's failure to arrange for shipment is 
presumably a breach of one of his obligations under the contract and Art. 46 (1) may thereby 
entitle the buyer to apply for an order requiring the seller to arrange for carriage of the 
contract goods. 
4.5. Whether the Purchased Goods Should be Unavailable in the 
Market? 
A further possible restriction is that the buyer seeking to resort to the remedy is required to 
show that he cannot reasonably procure the purchased goods from another source. The 
Convention does not expressly provide this requirement. However, a close interpretation of the 
relevant provisions of the Convention, particularly, taking into consideration the drafting 
history clearly supports the conclusion that resorting to the remedy does not require the buyer 
to demonstrate that he is not able to obtain equivalent goods from another source before he 
can resort to the remedy. 
Art. 25 of ULIS precluded the buyer from requiring performance by the seller "if it is in 
conformity with usage and reasonably possible for the buyer to purchase goods to replace 
those to which the contract relates. ""' An UNCnTAL Special Working Group proposed a 
lu See also, Walt, S., (199 1) at 214. 
181 See Art. 32 (2): "if the seller is bound to arrange for carriage of the goods, he must make such contacts as are 
necessary for carriage to the place fixed by means of transportation appropriate in the circumstance and 
according to the usual terms for such transportation. " 
182 Art. 25 of ULIS' "The buyer shall not be entitled to require performance of the contract by the seller, if it is 
in conformity with usage and reasonably possible for the buyer to purchase goods to replace those to which the 
contract relates. In this case the contract shall be ipso facto avoided as from the time when such purchase 
should be effected. " See also Art. 42 which provides: "(1) The buyer may require the seller to perform the 
contract: (c) if the sale relates to unascertained goods, by delivering other goods which arc in conformity with 
the contract or by delivering the missing part or quantity, except where the purchase of goods in replacement 
is in conformity with usage and reasonably possible. " 
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version of what is now Art. 46 which retained the language of Art. 25 of the ULIS. " 
However, the UNCITRAL Committee rejected this version of the Art.. In justifying its 
rejection, the Committee noted that 'Vie proposal, if accepted, would unjustifiably restrict the 
rights of the buyer to require performance of the contract". "' Again, in response to the 1978 
Draft Convention, the United States delegate proposed a new paragraph for what is now Art. 
46, by which the buyer could not resort to the remedy where he "can purchase substitute 
goods without substantial additional expense or inconvenience". "' The proposal was repeated 
by the same delegate at the 1980 Vienna Diplomatic Conference"', but it was also rejected by 
the majority. "' Likewise, the legislative history of Art. 77 of the Convention shows that the 
United States delegate made efforts to amend Art. 77 to minimise any claim against the party 
in breach if the injured party failed to mitigate damages. The language of the proposal was 
broad and would have applied to any form of relief, "' but that proposal was also defeated. "' 
Relying on the foregoing arguments, as some commentators concluded"O, it can be said that 
Art. 46 does not require the unavailability of substitute purchase as a pre-requisite for 
ordering specific performartce. 
4.6. Rule of Mitigation 
As explained above, the remedy of requiring performance is not excluded merely because the 
buyer could, acting reasonably, have found a substitute source. However, is there any way to 
say that the deficiency arising from the lack of a particular provision restricting the buyer's 
right to specific performance to the case of lack of equivalent goods could be compensated by 
the principle of mitigation of damages provided by Art. 77. By virtue of this Art., an injured 
buyer is required to take reasonable steps to mitigate his losses caused by the seller's default. 
183 See "Report of the Committee of the Whole I Relating to the draft Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods", reprinted in UNCURAL. Yearbook, VIIL (1977) at 42, para. 239 (Annex 1). 
184 Ibid., para. 240. 
185 Pre-Confierence Proposals on the 1978 Draft, art. 42, reprinted in, Official Records, (1981) at 78,111; 
Honnold, (19 8 9) at 399 para. 3. 
Honnold, (1989) at 551 para. 47. 
Hormold, (1989) at 551 paras. 71-72. 
Hormold, , (1989) at 617, para. 55. 189 Hormold, (1989) 619, para. 78. It is interesting to note that prior to the Diplomatic Conference, a similar 
proposal was made to restrict the seller's right under Art. 62 if the buyer had not taken delivery of the goods 
and the seller could resell them without unreasonable or substantial additional expense or inconvenience (see, 
ibid., 400). But this proposal was apparently withdrawn. 
190 Waltý S., (1991) at 215-216; Shen, Jiamning, SID., (1996) at 263-265. However, some observers appear to 
be of the view that the omission of the ULIS qualification from the present Convention is not fatal and that the 
seller may still be entitled to rely on trade usage under Art. 9 (1) of the Convention to resist a claim for 
specific performance (see e. g., Rolf Herber, in: Herber, Bobbs Herry, (1980) at 116). According to this view, 
if the seller can prove the existence of such a usage he may be in a stronger position than he would be under 
LTIIS since it will not be necessary for him to show that it was also reasonably possible for the buyer to 
procure the goods elsewhere. However, it is difficult to conceive of a usage that would lead to such an 
anomalous result. See in this respect, Ziegel, Jacob S. in: Nina M. Galston and Hans Smit, (1984) at 9-3. 
Chapter Three: Buyer's Remedies Under The Convention 166 
This presumably includes the purchase of substitute goods by the buyer. Assuming that the 
Art. applies to Art. 46, then it would effectively restrict the buyer's right under Art. 46 
whenever substitute goods are reasonably available. In other words, Art. 77 would mean that 
the buyer must mitigate loss through the choice of remedy. 
However, the language of the Convention on this point is not clear and the 
commentators differ. Some of them suggest that the duty to mitigate would be important to 
prevent injustice and waste resulting from the exercise of specific performance. "' In contrast, 
others, relying on the drafting history of Art. 77, "' conclude that an aggrieved buyer's failure 
to mitigate his loss is irrelevant when he applies for an order requiring performance in a 
jurisdiction where domestic law authorises this broad approach to "requiring performance" 
under the Convention. "' 
Nevertheless, it seems that the language of Art. 77, the structure of the Convention and 
its drafting history do not support the idea that the mitigation principle is a restriction on the 
right to specific performance under the Convention. First, the second sentence of Art. 77 
continues that if the party relying on the breach "fails to take such measures, the party in 
breach may claim a reduction in the damages in the amount by which the loss should have 
been mitigated". As can be seen, the provision is hardly expressed as a bar to requiring 
performance. It simply specifies the consequences for failure to mitigate one's loss: The party 
in breach may only claim a reduction in damages. "" Under this wording, the duty to mitigate 
only applies when the injured party claims damages, not when that party resorts to the right to 
require performance. '" Secondly, Art. 77 is placed within a section of the Convention which 
contains the rules governing the entitlement to claim "damages". Art. 45, which specifies the 
remedies available to a buyer, distinguishes between the rights established in Arts. 46 to 52 
and damages as provided in Arts. 74 to 77. A similar distinction is made by Art. 61 in respect 
of the seller's remedies for the buyer's breach. The structure of these remedial provisions 
constitutes a significant distinction between the right to require performance and a claim for 
"' See e. g., Honnold, (1991) at 518-520. Honnold, emphasising the restriction of the seller's right to recover 
the price on reasonable attempt to resell, argues that the mitigation rule is lex specialis in relation to the 
general rule requiring performance (ibid., at 521). See also: Sutton, K. C., (1977) at 57; Lookofsky, Joseph 
M, (1989) at256). See also generally, Thomas S. Men, (1984) at 390-393. 
" Official Records, (1981) at 396-398; 429430. Bearing in mind that two significant restrictive provisions of 
LTUS (Arts. 25 and 61 (2)), which provided that "the buyer shall not be entitled to require performance-, if it 
is ... reasonably possible 
for the buyer to purchase goods to replace those to which the contract relates ... " have been dropped. See also: Gabriel, H., (1994) at 87. 
'93 See e. g., Schlechtriern, P., (1986) at 99. See also: Knapp in: Bianca and Boncll, (1987) at 564-567; 
Farnsworth, A, (1979) at 249-251 (concluding that Art. 77 does not apply to an action for specific 
performance); Ziegel in: Nina, M.; Galston and Hans Smit, (1984) at 941 to 942; Kritzer, Albert H., (1989) 
at 220,473 and 495496. For more views see, Enderlein, F. and Maskow, D., (1992) at 308-309. 194 See also, Feltham, J. D., (1981) at 355. 
195 See also, Kastely, A. H., (1988) at 622; Treitel, G. H., (1988) 145 para. 72; Kritzer, Albert H., (1989) at 
473. 
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damages, including the duty to mitigate in Art. 77. "' Finally, the drafting history of Art. 77 
clearly shows that it does not concern the right to specific performance under Arts. 46 and 
62. ` As indicated abovel", at the Vienna Conference, several amendments were proposed in 
order to impose a duty to mitigate under Arts. 46 and 62 but all of them were defeated. For 
instance, the United States delegate proposed to amend Art. 46 so as to restrict the buyer's 
right to specific performance if he could "purchase substitute goods without substantial 
[unreasonable'99] additional expense or inconvenience. "' The proposal was rejected by the 
delegates, "' following a long debate in which several representatives stated that the 
amendment would result in depriving the injured party of his contractual right to performance 
and would cause great uncertainty in international contracts. "' After the rejection of the first 
amendment proposed by the US delegate, he tried to propose another which provided that a 
failure to mitigate would allow the party in breach not only to reduce any damages claim but 
also to claim "a corresponding modification or adjustment of any other remedy. "" This 
proposal was also decisively rejected by a large majority of the delegates as it restricted the 
right to performance by imposing a duty to mitigate. "' Accordingly, Art. 77, as some 
commentators suggest"', should not be extended to Art. 46 so as to restrict the buyer's right 
206 under Art. 46. 
196 See also, Kastely, A. H., (1988) at 622; Walt, S., (1991) at 215-216. 
197 See in this regard, Farnsworth, A., (1979) at 250. At the Vienna Conference the Irish delegation argued that 
the first sentence of Art. [77] establishes a general duty to mitigate applicable to any remedy and that the 
second sentence is just one of several possible consequences of a failure to mitigate. In response to this 
interpretation, the United States' delegation observed that although he hoped such an interpretation would be 
made, he doubted that the prevision would be read in that way (Official Records, (1981) at 396-397, paras. 61, 
62). 11e Secretariat's Commentary does also explicitly state that Art. [77] does not affect the seller's claim for 
payment of the price under Art. [62] and the buyer's claim a reduction in the price pursuant to Art. [50] 
(Secretariat Commentary, (1979) at 61 para. 3). 
198 Section Two, 4.5. 
'" As the US delegate amended his proposal during the debates (Official Records, (1981) at 330, para. 47). 
200 Official Records, (198 1) at I 11, para. 3 (ii). A similar amendment was proposed to limit the seller's right to 
20 
specific performance under Art. 62 (ibid., at 79). 
1 Official Records, (1981) at 113 para. 6. 
202 Official Records, (1981) at 330-332, in particular, paras. 58-59,61,66 
203 Official Records, (1981) at 133. 
204 Official Records, (1981) at 133 para. 5 and at 398 para. 78. See also, ibid., at 396 paras. 64,65,67,68 and 
73. 
205 See also: Kastely, A- IL, (1988) at 622 and seq. 
206 Further restriction can be found under Art. 82 (1). Under this Arts. if the buyer is not able to make 
restitution of the goods in essentially the condition in which he received them he will lose the right to require 
substitute goods. Similarly, the rule on the requirement of the observance of "good faith" in interpretation of 
the Convention's provisions may come into play as a restriction on the remedy of requiring performance. Art. 
7 (1) (see in this respect, Kastely, A. H., (1988) at 620-1). 
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Section Three. Monetary Relief 
1.0. Sketch of Discussion 
Under the Convention a buyer who has suffered loss as a result of the seller's breach is given 
two forms of monetary relief. a right to claim damages for any loss resulting from the seller's 
breach and a particular right to reduce the contract price where he has been tendered goods 
which do not conform to the contract terms. The following section will examine first the 
buyer's right to claim damages for the losses he may suffer as a consequence of the seller's 
non-conforniing delivery and then the right to claim price reduction. The first part will try to 
answer the questions (1) whether an injured buyer is granted a general right to claim damages 
for any loss he may suffer through the seller's breach of contract and then (2): "under what 
circumstances may he be entitled to recover damages? " Finally, the formulae by reference to 
which the damages are to be measured will be discussed. The second part will examine the 
remedy of price reduction as well as its relationship to the right to claim damages. 
2.0. Part One. The Claim For Damages 
2.1. General Principle 
The buyer's right to claim damages is recognised under Art. 45 (1) (b). 207 Under this 
provision, an injured buyer is granted a general right to claim damages whenever the seller 
fails to perform "any of his obligations under the contract or this Convention". According to 
the broad language of the provision, the buyer has a right to claim damages for any sort of 
breach, no matter what form it may take. 
As in English law, the purpose of awarding damages under the Convention is to 
compensate the party who is injured as a result of the other party's breach by putting him, as 
far as money can do it, into the same fmancial position in which he would have been, had the 
contract been performed. 208 
As Art. 45 (2) provides, the right to claim damages can be exercised with any of the 
other remedies provided for by the Convention. Accordingly, a buyer may be entitled to 
207 Art. 45 (1): "If the seller fails to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this Convention, the 
buyer may. ... (b) claim damages as provided in Arts. 74-77.1' It is this Art., not Art. 74 as the language of Art, 78 seems to suggest, which grants the buyer a general right to claim damages. Art. 74 sets-forth a general rule 
for the calculation of damages for loss suffered as a consequence of a breach of contract and the substantive 
requirements for exercise of the right to claim damages but does not expressly provide that damages are to be 
awarded where the seller has broken one of his obligations under the contract and the Convention. See also, 
Secretariat Commentary, (1979) at 37, Honnoldý (199 1) at 356; Will irr. Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 330, and 
Knapp in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 540; Enderlein, F. and Maskow, D., (1992) at 300. 
208 Secretariat Commentary, (1979) at 59 para. 3. 
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recover damages in accordance with Art. 74 if he resorts to price reduction under Art. 50, 
seeks substitute goods under Art. 46 (2), or demands repair of defective goods under Art. 46 
(3). 
2.2. Grounds for Claiming Damages 
The general principle explained above comes into operation when the seller has broken one of 
his obligations under the contract or the Convention. The Convention, unlike the English Sale 
of Goods Act, does not provide different damages provisions for breach of warranty or failure 
to deliver, but rather applies a general provision to all damages for breach of contract. The 
second significant element of the principle of damages is that the buyer must have suffered 
some loss from the seller's breach. Accordingly, where a buyer suffers no loss through the 
seller"s breach there will be no damages. 209 
Similarly, according to Art. 74, damages "... consist of a sum equal to the loss, 
including loss of profit, As the language of this provision shows, the rule is intended to 
provide a general rule that any loss, whether it results directly and naturally from the breach 
or results from it under special circumstances, is recoverable, provided that the requirements 
prescribed under the second sentence of Art. 74 and Art. 77 are satisfied. "' However, it is 
worth noting that according to Art. 5 of the Convention, claims for damages in the case of 
death or personal injuries caused by the defective goods, irrespective of whether or not the 
buyer himself or a third party is involved, are excluded from the Convention. "' Exclusion of 
such losses can also be inferred from the language of Art. 74 which appears to be concerned 
with a commercial measure of damages. "' Thus, an international buyer should look to national 
law for recovery for death or personal injuries. 
It seems that one should distinguish between the case in which a buyer makes a claim 
on the basis of injuries he has personally suffered as a result of using the purchased defective 
products and that in which he has paid damages for personal injuries which a sub-buyer has 
209 The point can be clearly inferred from the language of Art. 74 which lays down: "Damages for breach of 
contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, including the loss of profit suffered by the other party 
as a consequence of the breach. " According to this provision, damages should not be awarded where the 
victim of breach has suffered no loss and also they will not be awarded as such where they exceed the loss 
resulted from the breach. Under this interpretation, it can be said that under the Convention no nominal 
damages are recognised, as they are awarded in English law 
210 It is worth noting that of the different types of loss the buyer may suffer from the seller's breach, Art. 74 only 
makes express reference to "loss of profit". It was perhaps due to the fact that in some legal systems the 
concept of loss standing alone does not include the loss of profit. See in this respect, UNMRAL, Yearbook, 
VII (1976), at 134 para. 2. See also Secretariat Commentary, (1979) at 59 para. 3; Knapp in: Bianca and 
Bonell, (1987) at 543; Vilus, in: Sarcevic, P. -Volken, P., (1986) at 247y, Graham, C., (1993) at 55. 21 'Art. 5: "This Convention does not apply to the liability of the seller for death or personal injury caused by the 
goods to any person. " See generally, Lookofsky, Joseph M., (1989) at 294 and seq. 212 See also, Sutton, J., (1989) at 744. 
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suffered as a consequence of consumption of the defective goods. The first case is expressly 
excluded from the scope of the Convention by Art. 5, but the position of the second case is not 
quite clear. One may argue that the general language of Arts. 75 and 76 which enable the 
injured party to claim further damages in accordance with Art. 74 allows the buyer to be 
indemnified against such a subsidiary claim. A broad interpretation of Art. 5 may support 
such an inference, for it provides: "The Convention does not apply to the liability of the seller 
for death or personal injury caused by the goods to any person", while the buyer's claim is not 
based directly on the personal injury, but on the liability he has incurred to a sub-buyer by the 
reason of defective goods delivered by the seller. However, it seems that the express language 
of Art. 5 which excludes the seller's liability for death and personal injury caused by the 
goods to anyperson, would reject such a broad interpretation. 213 
The point which deserves to be noted here is that, since the Convention does not 
expressly exclude damages or injury to property, they would be governed by the 
Convention. ` But some commentators have raised the question whether such losses are 
recoverable under the Convention in those countries under whose national laws claims for 
211 such damages are placed into the tort category. It might be argued that such a claim does not 
arise from the contract of sale to be covered by the Convention provisions, while "Ms 
Convention governs only the formation of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of 
211 the seller and the buyer arlsingfrom such a contract (Ad. 4). It seems that such a narrow 
interpretation of Art. 4, as some commentators pointed out". is arguable. The mere fact that 
such claims are presented in the form of the claims in tort does not take them out of the 
Convention if the Convention would otherwise apply. 
213 However, in a Convention case decided by a German court (Germany 2 July 1993 Oberlandesgericht 
Dasseldorf (CLOUT, abstract no. 49), it was held that the obligation to the third party was to satisfy an injury 
claim that stemmed from defects in the goods sold. The court ruled that indemnification of such an obligation 
is an allowable element of damages under the Convention. Although the court so held, it did not refer to the 
rule under Art. 5. The Convention commentators, however, have criticised the decision. See, the Editorial 
remarks of Albert Kritzer and Peter Schlechtriern attached to the abstract of the case. See also, Karollus, M., 
(1995) at 51-94. It is to be noted that where the buyer is forced to pay his sub-buyer damages for loss he has 
sustained as a consequence of lack of conformity he would be entitled to sue the seller. It is the point to which 
a German court referred in a Convention case (Germany 21 May 1996 Oberlandesgericht K61n (CLOUT 
abstract no. 168). In this case, the appellate court held that a German buyer of a used car could claim damages 
under Arts. 35 (1), 45 and 74 of the Convention. The court argued that the buyer's damages caused by its 
liability to its customer could be claimed under Art. 74 of the Convention because such damages are 
foreseeable if goods are sold to a dealer who intends to resell them. 
214 Schlechtriern, P., (1986) at 97. See also, Schlechtriem, (1988) 467, particularly, at 471 and seq. 215 See e. g., Murphey A. G., (1989) at 454. 
216 Art. 4: "This Convention governs only the formation of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of 
the seller and the buyer arising from such a contract. In particular, except as otherwise expressly provided in 
this Convention, it is not concerned with: (a) the validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or of any 
2 
usage; (b) the effect which the contract may have on the property in the goods sold. " 17 Khoo, in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 49-50. 
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2.3. Principles Restricting Recoverable Losses 
Under the Convention the recoverable damages are subject to certain restrictive rules which 
are briefly examined under the following headings. 
2.3.1. Causal Connection 
One of the crucial principles restricting the recoverability of damages for any particular head 
of loss is that that loss must have a causal link with the breach. This principle is impliedly 
recognised by Art. 74 where it provides that damages will be awarded for losses suffered by 
one of the contracting parties "as a consequence of the breach". According to this principle 
damages will only be awarded for a particular loss where he can show that it resulted from the 
fact that the contract has not been performed properly. 
However, some commentators raised the question whether the party in breach is liable 
only for the loss caused to the injured party by a direct causality or whether his liability 
extends to losses by indirect causality. "' It seems that although the Convention does not 
expressly address the issue, it can be inferred from the second sentence of Art. 74 that the 
party in breach should be held liable even for loss indirectly caused to the other party provided 
that this loss was or ought reasonably to have been foreseeable by the parties where the 
contract was made. "' 
2.3.2. Foreseeability of Loss 
The recovery of damages as laid down by the Convention is also subject to another significant 
restrictive principle, under which the buyer can recover damages only for losses which were 
foreseeable by the seller. "' In the language of Art. 74, the amount of the injured buyer's 
damages "may not exceed the loss" the seller "foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time of 
the conclusion of the contract, in light of facts and matters which he then knew or ought to 
have known ...... 
Under this rule the loss for which an injured party claims damages must be that which 
the defendant actually foresaw or ought to have foreseen. 221 The same division is also applied 
218 Knapp in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 540. Such a distinction is made in French Civil Code (Art. 1151). 
See in this respect Treitel, G. H., (1988) para. 140. 
219 See also, Ziegel J., & Graham, W. C., (1982) at 48; Knapp in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 540; Enderlein, 
F. and Maskow, D., (1992) at 298. In contrast, under the French Civil Code, in addition to foreseeability, the 
loss must be also an "immediate and direct consequence" of the non-performance of the contract (Art. 1151). 
See also, Treitel, G. H., (1988) para. 140. 
" There was, however, a proposal to delete the foreseeability from the Convention text on the ground that it 
was a limitation on the right of full damages, but the Working Group did not retain that proposal (see 
UNCHRAL, Yearbook, VI (1975) at 62 para. 114; see also the suggestion of ICC in UNCITRAL, Yearbook, 
VM (1977) at 142, para. 56). 
11 Accordingly, it is not sufficient that the party in breach could foresee the losses to be caused by his breach of 
contract when he commits breach of the contract. Ile party in breach rather should have been able to foresee 
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to the sources of facts and matters in light of which the party in breach foresaw or ought to 
have foreseen the loss resulted from his breach. That is, the facts and matters must either 
actually be knownPI and/or at least must be such (like seasonal market fluctuations, 
difficulties in transport caused by bad weather etc. "') that the defaulting party ought to have 
known them at the time of the conclusion of the contract. 
In theory, the distinction between actual and presumed knowledge may be important 
where the seller, for example, may possess actual knowledge of some facts which might lead 
to actual foreseeability, at a time when he ought not to have known those facts or foreseen the 
results of his breach. A further difference appears between these two types of knowledge in 
that in the case of imputed knowledge the party in breach is assumed to know the 
consequences of his breach at the time of the contract, while in the case of actual knowledge 
the injured party must prove that the defendant was in the position in which he did foresee or 
ought to have foreseen the consequences of his breach in light of the knowledge of facts and 
matters were available to him at the time of the conclusion of the contract. What was actually 
foreseeable or reasonably foreseeable will therefore depend on the actual knowledge of the 
party in breach and what reasonable merchants in the defaulting party's position would have 
known. 2N 
2.3.2.1. Degree of Foreseeability 
There is no doubt that under the Convention, a particular head of loss will be recoverable only 
when it was foreseeable by the party in breach at the time of making the contract. However, 
the question which arises here is whether the Convention's test is wider than that reflected in 
the English case of Hadley v. Baxendale as reinterpreted in the Victoria Laundry (Windsor) v. 
Newman Industries Ltd. "' and Yhe Heron IV` Art. 74, in presenting the criterion upon which 
losses at the time of making the contract (cf. also Arts. 35 (2) (b) and 42 (1) (a)). Cf the foreseeability test in 
the case of fundamental breach discussed in the first section of this chapter. In contrast, under ULIS such 
division was disregarded. According to that Convention, a defaulting party is liable for losses "which should 
have been foreseen by the party in breach... " (Arts. 82 and 86). 
222 They may be known from the specific purpose of the goods which the buyer has made known to the seller. 
For this reason, should the buyer consider the seller's breach as such which would cause him exceptionally 
heavy losses he has to make this known to the seller, the result is that the latter becomes liable for these 
losses. In his commentary of Art. 82 of ULIS, Professor Tunc had pointed out to the point long time ago (see 
Tunc, A., (1964) at 386). 
m It is significant to note that the facts or matters leading to foreseeability need not be given by the buyer 
himself, indeed, they may be derived from any other source whatsoever, e. g., an economic magazine predicting 
the rise of market price. 
224 For instance, in a Convention case decided by a German court (Germany 14 May 1993 Landgericht Aachen 
(CLOUT, abstract no. 47), it was held that the buyers liability to third parties was foreseeable when the goods 
were not timely delivered. Similarly, in another case (Germany 17 September 1993 Oberlandesgericht 
Koblenz ), the court held that the buyer could foresee that non-payment would force the seller to obtain credit 
(see, Karollus, M., (1995) at 51-94). 
225 [1949] 2 K. B. 528. 
226 [1969] 1 AC 350 (H. L. ) 
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the recoverable loss should be determined, provides that the injured party can recover damages 
for losses which the party in breach "foresaw or ought to have foreseen .... in the light of facts 
and matters of which he then knew or ought to have known, as a possible consequence of the 
breach of contract. " There is no provision to explain the term "possible". Various phrases are 
used by the Convention commentators to describe this test and the divergence which exists 
between the two tests. Sutton, for instance, in a comment on an earlier draft of the Convention 
asserted that "the common law criterion, that is the loss must be one which was "not unlikely" 
or was "liable" to result, may indicate a difference from Art [74] where the loss which must be 
foreseen need be no more dw a possible consequence of the breach. "' Professor Farnsworth, 
in contrast, attaches less significance to this phrase. In this respect, he observes: "Although 
the use in Art. [74] of 'possible consequence' may seem at first to cast a wider net than the 
Restatement's 'probable result', the preceding clause ("in the light of facts ... ') cuts this back 
at least to the scope of the Code language. 9T228 
However, it is suggested that when interpreting the Convention text, one should be 
careful to avoid approaching it from its traditional background in national law. The 
Convention test must be seen in its own context. The drafters of the Convention have 
apparently intended to provide an easy formula in order to protect an injured party who 
suffered as a consequence of the other party's breach. Requiring him to prove that the 
incurred loss was foreseeable by the breaching party as more than a possibility would place 
him in a difficult position, for in many cases he may not be able to satisfy the court that the 
loss in question attained the given degree of probability. Accordingly, it would be sufficient if 
he can show that the party in breach did actually foresee, or, ought to have foreseen the loss in 
227 Sutton, K. C., (1977) at 102. See also, Murphey A. G., (1989) at 439-440 (in which he says: "the language 
of the Convention ostensibly widens the area of liability imposed upon a breaching party", see also, ibid., at 
474y, Darkey, (1995) at 145 (describing the Convention foreseeability standard as "less stringent, which 
increases the liability of the breaching party"); Ferrari, F., (1993) at 1268); Nicholas, B., (1989) at 230 (in 
which he says that the Convention rule is "a weaker requirement than that which results from recent English 
decisions"); Ziegel, Jacob S. (199 1) at 14 (in which he says: "It may be safely assumed that this test (that is, 
'substantially foreseeable' as reflected in The Heron II) is substantially more demanding than the Convention 
prescription that the breaching party must have foreseen the damages 'as a possible consequence of the breach 
of contract'. Many consequences are possible though not probable or likely. "); Ziegel, Jacob S. , in: Ziegel, J., & Graham, (1982) at 48; Ziegel, J. & Samson, C., (1981) Art. 74. He also described the term 'possible' as a 
very broad word (see, Ziegel, Jacob S., in: Nina M. Galston and Hans Smitý (1984) at 9-38). 
228 Farnsworth, A., (1979) at 253. In a Convention case decided by an American court (United States 6 
December 1995 U. S. Cir. Ct (Delchi Car? ier, S. p. A. v. Rotorer Corp. ), (CLOUT, abstract no. 138), the U. S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals (2d. Cir. ) the Circuit Court observed that the right to collect damages is "subject ... to the familiar limitation that the breaching party must have foreseen the loss as a probable consequence". 
The case was an appeal from the decision of a New York district court, i. e., United States 9 September 1994 
U. S. Dist. Ct. (Delchi Carrier S. p. A. v. Rotorex Corp. ), CLOUT, abstract no. 85). The court's interpretation, 
however, has been criticised by the Convention commentators who said that the court have been much 
influenced by the national law rather than the Convention text and its legislative history and that several 
Convention commentators' interpretation were not taken into account. See in this respect, Darkey, J. M., 
(1995) at 145-147; Schneider, Eric C., (1995) at 630,666; Cook, V. S., (1997) at 257-263. See also, the 
Editorial remarks by Albert H. Kritzer attached to the case. 
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light of knowledge he actually had or ought to have had at the time of contract as a possible 
result of his default. 229 
2.3.2.2. Quantum or Type of Loss? 
A further question arises whether, under the Convention's test as adopted in Art. 74, it is 
necessary that the party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen the exact amount of the 
loss, or whether it is sufficient that he could have foreseen the type of loss suffered by the 
injured party as a "possible" consequence of the breach of contract. It n-dght be argued that 
the buyer need show only foreseeability of circumstances which embrace the head or type of 
loss in question, and need not demonstrate foresecability of the quantum of loss under that 
head or type. " 
But this interpretation is questionable. It has been suggested" that reading the second 
sentence of Art. 74 with the first sentence may lead one to conclude that under this provision 
damages for breach of contract must consist of a sum equal to the loss and this sum should 
not exceed the loss which was foreseeable by the party in breach. This wording makes it clear 
that it is the amount of the loss suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach 
which is to be foreseen by the party in breach. 
2.3.3. Mitigation Principle 
A further restriction on the full recovery of damages arises from the injured party's duty to 
12 
take reasonable measures to mitigate the loss (Art. 77). The doctrine of mitigation as 
provided in the Convention is derived from common law systems and it is substantially in line 
with English law. Accordingly, there is no need to reiterate what has been stated in respect of 
English law. It suffices to say that a buyer who wants to claim damages for the seller's default 
is under a duty to minimise the losses resulting from the seller's breach. To comply with this 
duty, the buyer must take all measures reasonable in the circumstances, 231 and at the same time 
229 It is interesting to note that the draft "Principles of International Commercial Contracts" proposed by 
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) in 1994 suggests that the results of 
failure should be "likely to resulf' (see, Art. 7.4.4. ). See also, Art. 9: 503 of The Principles of European 
Contract Law (Version 1996). 
1 As in the English case of Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham & Co. Ltd. [19781 Q. B. 791 at 804. 
231 See Knapp in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 54 1. 
211 Art. 77: "A party who relies on the breach of contract must take such measures as are reasonable in the 
circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss of profit, resulting from the breach. If he fails to take such 
measures, the party in breach may claim a reduction in the damages in the amount by which the loss should 
have been mitigated. ". 
233 He may for example be bound to accept the defaulting party's offer if it is lower than the market price. The 
question arose in a Convention case decided by ICC arbitration (see, ICC Arbitration Case No. 6281 of 26 
August 1989 (CLOUT, abstract no. 102). In that case the seller contested the buyer's substitute purchase and 
asserted that he had offered the steel at a lower price and in addition, his steel was of a better quality. The 
Tribunal did not reject the relevance of the reasonable offer on the part of the seller in principle, but it stated 
that the seller's offer was not at a lower price taking into consideration the fact that buyees substitute price 
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he is not bound to do more than is reasonable. "Failure to take such reasonable measures 
would entitle the party in breach to claim a reduction in the damages. The amount of reduction 
is, in the language of Art. 77, equal to that "by which the loss should have been mitigated". 23' 
Where the buyer, in fulfilling his duty to mitigate, has actually minimised any part of 
his loss he will not be able to claim recovery for that part. Although there is no provision to 
that effect in the Convention, this is a corollary of the doctrine. Moreover, such a rule is in line 
with the principle of compensation of the actual loss the victim of breach has sustained as a 
consequence of the breach. On the other hand, it may well be that the buyer is allowed to 
recover any reasonable expenses incurred by him as a result of falfilling his duty to mitigate. 
This rule, as discussed in the second chapter, has been suggested in English law. 236 In this 
legal system, it is also suggested that such expenses are recoverable even if the buyer's 
attempt has led to greater loss. The reason for that is, as said, to protect the plaintiff who 
attempts to mitigate his loss. ' Whether this approach is to be followed in the Convention is 
doubtful, however. This is due to the fact that the purpose of the doctrine is to reduce the loss 
and not to augment it. In addition, it can be said that where the buyer's attempts to minimise 
lead to converse result, namely to greater loss, it may then be sound to conclude that he has 
not acted, at least in some cases, in a reasonable manner. 
2.3.4. Relevance of Fault 
The question of the relevance of 'Taulf' on the entitlement of the injured party to claim 
damages is a controversial question in domestic law. Some legal systems, as Professor 
Honnold pointed out, "that have espoused this doctrine have seen the principle become 
eroded and unclear. Other legal systems reject the 'negligence' principle. " In preparing 
uniform rules for international sales law, the drafters of the Convention saw necessary to 
make a clear choice among these different approaches. That choice is expressed by the clear 
language of Art. 45 (1) (b) which states: "If the seller fails to perform any of his obligations 
under the contract or this Convention, the buyer may: (a) ..., (b) claim 
damages as provided in 
came with a reduced freight charge. See also, the Editorial remarks Albert H. Kritzer attached to the abstract 
of the case. 
2' See also, Secretariat Commentary, (1979) at 61 para. 4; Knapp in: Bianca and Boncll, (1987) at 560; 
Enderlein, F. and Maskow, D., (1992) at 308. 
235 In the case of buyer's failure to mitigate, his damages will be measured as follows: (a) first, full damages are 
to be determined in accordance with Art. 74, or as the case may be, according to Arts. 75 or 76; (b) then the 
amount by which the loss should have been mitigated is determined, and (c) the latter is deducted from the 
former. See also, Knapp in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 562. 
11 See, Chapter Two, Section Three, 2.3.3. 
237 See Knapp in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 561; Enderlein, F. and Maskow, D., (1992) at 308. 
2m Honnold, (199 1) at 357. 
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Arts. 74-77", " unless the case falls into scope of Arts. 79 or 80. By this language the 
Convention rejects the view that one who fails to perform his contract is not responsible in 
damages unless he has been negligent. " He will be liable for loss resulting from his non- 
performance unless he can prove that "the failure was due to an impediment beyond his 
control and he could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at 
the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome it or its 
consequences" (Art. 79 (1)), or the non-performance was caused by the buyer's act or 
omission (Art. 80). 
To sum up, provided that the buyer can show that he has suffered a loss which resulted 
from the seller's breach, and was foreseeable241 by the seller, and that he has satisfied the 
requirement of mitigation, he will be entitled to recover damages. Damages are awarded no 
matter what degree of seriousness the seller's breach attains, whether it is fimdamental or non- 
21 fimdamental. It is also irrelevant whether the seller has committed the breach with fault or 
negligently, in good faith or bad faith. 
2.4. Measure of Damages 
Having examined the general principles governing the recoverable losses, it is appropriate to 
consider the formulae by reference to which the recoverable damages are to be measured. In 
this connection, the Convention sets forth a general formula applicable to all cases and some 
particular formulae which come into operation under certain circumstances where the contract 
has been avoided. 
2.4.1. General Formula 
For the purpose of quantification of recoverable damages Art. 74 provides the basic and 
general rule applicable to every loss suffered as a consequence of the breach. On the basis of 
this formula, the recoverable damages must be "a sum equal to the loss" plus lost profit, 
"suffered ... as a consequence of the 
breach". However, this general criterion is implemented 
by Arts. 75 and 76 which provide the means of calculating damages in certain defined cases 
239 Secretariat's Commentary, (1979) at 37 para. 4; Rabel, E., (1953) at 180-188. See also, Treitel, G. H., 
(1988) at 7 and seq., 340 and seq.; Enderlein, F., and Maskow D, (1992) at 176,301; Will in Bianca and 
Bonell, (1987) at, 331 seq.; Kritzer, Albert H., (1989) at 340; ClementNe One Ola, (1995) at 245. 
240 See generally, Lookofsky, Joseph M., (1983) particularly, at 129 and seq.; Enderlein, F. and Maskow, D., 
(1992) at 30 1. 
241 Some commentators have argued that the plaintiff is not required to prove that the defendant did actually 
foresee or ought to have foreseen the loss in question. Rather, it will be sufficient for him to prove, as in the 
case whether the breach is fundamental, the breach of contract, the loss and the causal connection between 
thern. It is in fact up to the party in breach to object that the loss could not be foreseen by him (See Enderlein, 
F. and Maskow, D., (1992) at 302). 
21 Will in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 331; Enderlein, F. and Maskow, D., (1992) at 298; Clement Ne One 
Ola, (1995) at 245. 
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when the contract has been avoided. Art. 74 provides the general rule for the measurement of 
damages whenever and to the extent that Arts. 75 and 76 are not applicable, irrespective of 
whether or not the contract has been avoided. ". Similarly, where the buyer's loss exceeds the 
amount recoverable under Arts. 75 or 76, then he may be entitled to recover fiirther damages 
according to the general rule provided under Art. 74 (Arts. 75 and 76 (1). 
Accordingly, where the contract has not been avoided, damages are to be measured in 
accordance with the general rule prescribed by Art. 74. That is, where the seller delivers and 
the buyer retains non-conforming goods, the loss suffered by the buyer might be measured in 
different ways. If the goods delivered had a recognised value which fluctuated, the loss to the 
buyer would be equal to the difference between the value of the goods he actually received and 
that of goods he would have had had the seller performed his duty to deliver as stipulated in 
the contract. '" The same criterion is suggested to be applied where the buyer claims damages 
for late delivery. In such situations, the contract price is irrelevant in the calculation of 
damages, since the object of this formula is to restore the buyer to the economic position he 
would have had if the contract had been performed properly. However, the buyer may also be 
entitled to claim additional damages he has incurred as a result of the breach, provided that the 
requirement of foreseeability discussed before is satisfied. " 
No particular provision is provided to specify the time and the place at which the loss to 
the injured party should be measured under the general rule prescribed by Art. 74. This issue 
is likely to arise in international contracts, in particular those involving goods whose price 
fluctuates significantly. However, in a footnote to Art. 70 of the 1978 Draft Convention, the 
UNCITRAL Secretariat has suggested that presumably it should be at the place the seller 
delivered the goods and at an appropriate time, such as the moment the goods were delivered, 
the moment the buyer learned of the lack of conformity of the goods or the moment that it 
became clear that the non-conformity would not be remedied by the seller under Arts. 37,46, 
47 and 48. " In order to avoid the potential ambiguity of this aspect of Art. 74, the contracting 
parties are better advised to include a clause in the contract that specifies time and place by 
reference to which damages are to be measured. 14' 
243 See Secretariat Commentary, (1979) at 59 paras. 1,2. See also, Knapp in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 539; 
Ziegel, in: Nina, U; Galston and Hans Smit, (1984) at 9-3940; Sutton, J., (1989) at 742 and 745. For 
example when the goods to be delivered under the contract consist of a unique product manufactured under 
special order by the buyer, the general formula will apply even though the contract has been avoided. See also, 
Babiak, A., (1992) at 140. 
244 See also, Babiak, A-, (1992) at 139, no. 188. 
245 See also, Knapp in: Bianca and Boncll, (1987) at 546-547. 
246 Secretariat Commentary, (1979) at 59, para. 7. See also, Knapp in. Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 547-548; 
Gabriel., H., (1994) at 23 1, Sutton, J., (1989) at 743. See Sutton, K. C., (1977) at 102, in which he suggests 
that the loss is to be assessed at the time of avoidance where the contract comes to an end as a result of the 
breach. 
' See also, Sutton, J., (1989) at 743. 
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2.4.2. Special Formulae 
These formulae come into operation where the contract has been actually avoided; the mere 
fact that the contract is avoidable does not suffice. Where the contract has been lawfully 
avoided by the injured party damages are to be calculated by reference to the particular 
formulae prescribed by Arts. 75 and 76, i. e., the sub-transaction or current price formula as 
the case may be. 
2.4.2.1. Sub-Contract Price Formula 
In the case of avoidance of the contract by the injured party Art. 75 of the Convention gives 
priority to the sub-purchase price formula. 24' Application of this formula is subject to certain 
requirements. First, there must be an actual substitute transaction by the buyer. The 
possibility of making a substitute transaction will not justify the application of the provision, 
although if the injured buyer fails to avail himself of such an opportunity, it could be 
considered as a failure to take reasonable measures to mitigate the loss, as required by Art. 
77.1 It is also assumed that the formula does not apply if the buyer has purchased only part 
of the equivalent goods in replacement not all of them. 
Secondly, the substitute purchase must be made in a reasonable manner. What is 
reasonable is always a question of fact dependent on the circumstances and may thus vary 
from case to case. "' However, as a general guideline, for the substitute transaction to have 
been made in a reasonable manner within the context of Art. 75, it must have been made in 
such a manner as is likely to cause a substitute transaction to have made at the lowest price 
reasonably possible. " Therefore, the substitute transaction need not be on identical terms in 
respect of such matters as quantity, credit or time of delivery as long as it was in fact made in 
substitution for the transaction avoided. "' However, if the substitute transaction was made in 
a different place from the original transaction or on different terms, the amount of damages 
must be adjusted to recognise any increase in cost (such as increased transport cost) less any 
expenses save as a consequence of the breach. " Moreover, the Convention requires that the 
substitute transaction must be made within a reasonable time after the contract has been 
248 Art. 75: "If the contract is avoided and if, in a reasonable manner and within a reasonable time after 
avoidance, the buyer has bought goods in replacement..., [he] may recover the difference between the contract 
nce and the price in the substitute transaction 24r o See also Enderlein, F. and Maskow, D., (1992) at 303, in which he suggests that mere offer should not be 
considered neither in this regard nor as to the reasonableness of the substitute transaction. 
' See also, Knapp in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 551; Enderlein, F. and Maskow, D., (1992) at 303. 
251 Sutton suggests that the term "reasonable manner" may be described as acting as a prudent man of business 
would act in the circumstances of the case (Sutton, K. C., (1977) at 103. ). 
252 Vilus, in: Sarccvic, P. -Volken, P., (1986) at 248. 2-53 Secretariat Commentary, (1979) at 60 para. 4. See also, See also, Sutton, K. C., (1977) at 103, Knapp jr. 
Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 550; Sutton, J., (1989) at 745. 
254 Secretariat Commentary, (1979) at 60 para. 3. 
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avoided. Thus, the reasonableness of the period of time for the substitute transaction will not 
start until the buyer has in fact declared the contract avoided. Accordingly, an avoiding buyer 
may not shift to the seller the risk of a rise in price which may occur subsequent to avoidance 
by delay in making substitute transaction. "' 
In the event of failure of one of the foregoing requirement, damages would be measured 
as though no substitute transaction has taken place and as a result they are to be assessed by 
reference to the provision prescribed under Art. 76, and, if applicable, to the general rule 
provided under Art. U. "' 
The Convention provides no fiwffier restriction upon the injured party; " thus the sub- 
transaction may be made privately or by auction, and the sub-contract price may be equal to, 
or in certain circumstances, even more or less than, the current price. Although the buyer is 
under no duty to notify the seller of his intention to purchase substitute goods"', his conduct is 
restricted by the requirement of reasonableness. 
It is to be noted that the Convention does not expressly require the buyer to make a 
substitute transaction. It follows that he has the choice to make a substitute transaction or rely 
on the current price formula. "' However, his option is subject to his duty to mitigate the loss, 
in particular, when the market price increasingly rises. In such a case, substitute purchase is 
obviously one mode of mitigating the loss. 
According to this provision, where the buyer has made a substitute transaction his 
damages are basically equal to the difference between the contract price and the price he has 
actually paid for the purchase of substitute goods. However, the language of Art. 75 is 
255 Secretariat Commentary, (1979) at 60 para. 5. See also, Knapp in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 550; Sutton, 
J., (1989) at 745. Ile rule that the sub-transaction must occur "within a reasonable time after avoidance" is in 
fact in line with the performance of the injured party's duty to mitigate the loss. By providing the formula, the 
Convention intends to prevent an avoiding party shifting to the party in breach the loss resulting from a 
subsequent change in the market The same criteria are applicable to a claim for damages based on Art. 76. In 
that case, as will be seen, it is necessary that the "current price" must be ascertained as of the "time of 
avoidance" or in some circumstances at the time of '%aking over" the goods. Thus, claims based on Arts. 75 or 
76 seldom raise "mitigation7' problems under art. 77. See also See Enderlein, F. and Maskow, D., (1992) at 
303,305; Vilus, Sarcevic, P. -Volken, P., (1986) at. 250. 
256 Secretariat Commentary, (1979) at 60 para. 6; Honnold, (1991) at 512; Vilus, Sarcevic, P. -Volken, P., 
(1986)at 248; Knapp in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at547-548; Gabriel., H., (1994) at233-234. 
25'7 Although Art 75 does not specifically require that the substitute transaction be made in good faith, the 
general mandate in Art. 7 (1) requiring the Convention to be interpreted in a manner that "promotes" the 
observance of good faith in international trade" would enable the judge to disregard the substitute transaction 
mad in bad faith (see also, Flechtner, H. M., (1988) at 98). 
2m This point has been expressly confirmed by I. C. C. arbitration in a case between a buyer from Egypt and a 
seller from Yugoslavia in 1989. In that case, although the tribunal found the Convention inapplicable at that 
time (because the Convention was not then in effect in any country. ), it made an obiter reference to the 
Convention and interpreted the provisions relating to damages. In this case, the seller contended that buyer' s 
substitute purchase "cannot be interpreted as a purchase in replacement, since [seller] was not informed in 
advance of [buyees] specific purchasing intention. However, the Tribunal dismissed this contention and held 
that the buyer's notice to seller of his intent to cover is not a prerequisite to a claim for the difference between 
the option price and the cover price. See in this regard, ICC Arbitration Case No. 6281 of 26 August 1999 
(CLOUT, abstract no. 102). 
` See also, Enderlein, F. and Maskow, D., (1992) at 306. 
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somewhat vague; it refers to the buyer who "may" recover that difference, and the key 
question is whether the application of this formula is mandatory or permissive. In other words, 
can an aggrieved buyer who has made an actual substitute transaction subsequent to 
avoidance of the original contract measure his damages by reference to the current price 
formula? The legislative history of the provision shows that the draftsmen's intention was that 
the injured party who had in fact arranged a substitute contract of the nature described above 
should not be allowed to claim damages under the current price formula where the formula 
would provide for a higher measure of damages. " 
The rule has been described as "harsh"" in that it allows the party in breach to benefit 
from a good bargain made by the injured party. However, it has been justified on the basis 
that the rule was adopted in the interest of certainty and to prevent abuse. "' Moreover, the rule 
is in line with the philosophy upon which awarding damages is justified to put the aggrieved 
party into the same, but not a better, financial position as if the other party had performed the 
contract. Therefore, whenever this purpose can be achieved by the substitute contract price 
formula, which is presumed to have met its requirements, there is no reason to justify the 
reference to the current price formula. "' However, the injured party is given a right to claim 
damages for any additional loss he may have suffered as a consequence of the other party's 
breach, provided the requirements of Art. 74 are satisfied. 
The question arises here whether the injured buyer can recover the difference between 
the contract and substitute contract price even though it exceeds the current price. The 
language of Ad. 75 does apparently entitle him to do So. 264 However, where the difference is 
considerable it may be possible to assume that the injured buyer has not acted in a reasonable 
manner, nor has he met his duty to mitigate the loss. As a result, he is entitled to recover as 
damages the difference between the contract price and the current (but not 'the substitute 
contract) price . 
2'5This is so unless there are circumstances justifying the substitute contract 
161 uNcrnzAL, Yearbook, VIII (1977) at 59 para. 472. See also, Treitel, G. H., (1988) para. 102; Ndulo, M., 
(1991)at23. 
261 Nicholas, B., (1989) at231. 
262 Honnold, (1991) para. 414. 
263 It has also been argued that to allow the injured party who has made a substitute transaction to resort to the 
current price formula because it is more favourable to him, would encourage him to act dishonestly and to 
violate the principle of good faith. Moreover, he has in fact acted in accordance with his duty to mitigate the 
loss underArt 77 (Enderlein, F. and Maskow, D., (1992) at 305). See also, Flechtner, H. M., (1988) at 101; 
Ziegel, in: Nina, M.; Galston and Hans Smit, (1984) at 9-39/40. 
' Enderlein, F. and Maskow, D., (1992) at 305. 
265 For this reason, although in the case of existence of a substitute transaction, the injured party is not generally 
required to prove the 'current price' for the goods, prices that were available on the market may be relevant if 
a dispute arises as to whether the substitute transaction was effected "in a reasonable manner" (Honnold, 
(199 1) at 508). However, in the case of dispute it is the seller who has to prove that the substitute contract 
was not effected in a reasonable manner. 
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for a price more than the current price; for example, if the market price rose while the buyer 
was in negotiations with the original seller for amicable settlement of their dispute. 
2.4.2.2. Current Price Formula 
Where the formula prescribed under Art. 75 fails to come into operation the case may fal I 
within the provision under Art. 76 (1). 266 This alternative means does not come into operation 
unless (1) when the contract is actually avoided, the injured party has not made an actual 
substitute transaction described under Art. 75 and (2) there is a current price for the 
purchased goods. The formula also applies where a substitute transaction is made in an 
unremonable manner, or not made within a reasonable time after avoidance, or the formula is 
entirely inapplicable. The latter is the position where it is impossible to determine with 
certainty whether a substitute contract has been made or which contract was made in 
replacement of the avoided contract. For instance, where the buyer is consistently in the 
market for goods of the type in question, it may be difficult or impossible to determine which 
167 of many contracts of purchase was made in replacement of the one avoided. 
(A) Relevant Place 
International contracts for sale of goods are made between traders who are in different 
countries. The goods may be situated in a different place. The question arises as to the current 
price of what place reference is to be made for the purpose of assessment of damages? The 
Convention provides that the place of the current price is that in which delivery "should have 
been made or, if there is no current price at that place, the price at such other place as serves 
as a reasonable substitute, making due allowance for differences in the cost of transporting the 
goods"(Art. 76 (2)). 
Accordingly, the starting point in determining the relevant place is to ascertain the place 
at which the seller is discharged of his duty to deliver. No major difficulty will arise where the 
contract determines, whether expressly or impliedly, the place at which the goods must be 
delivered. Problems may arise where, for instance, the contract provides that delivery is to be 
made in more than one place; the question which arises here is whether all these places should 
be considered for determining the current price, or if the court is likely to concentrate only on 
one place according to some relevant factors, e. g., the quantity of the goods to be delivered in 
that place. 
266 Art. 76 (1): "If the contract is avoided and there is a current price for the goods, the party claiming damages 
may, if he has not made a purchase ... under Art. 75, recover the difference between the price fixed by the 
contract and the current price ... " 267 Secretariat Cominentary, (1979) at 60-61 para. 2. See also, Knapp in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 554; 
Enderlein, F. and Maskow, D., (1992) at 306; Sutton, J., (1989) at 746; Nicholas, B., (1989) at 23 1. 
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If strictly followed, the former approach necessarily leads to adopting several 'current 
prices' for quantifying damages in relation to one bargain. In addition to that, this method 
would complicate the matter. Its application may not be possible in a given case if, for 
example, the subject-matter of the goods constitutes, by its very nature, parts of an integrated 
whole such a large machine. "" Similarly, the adoption of the other approach raises the 
question: what factors are to be considered when applying the current price prevailing in only 
one place? "' 
As the language of Art. 76 (2) provides, the formula only refers to the place of delivery 
of the goods. Such a formula may give rise to the difficulty of ascertaining the relevant place 
of market in a documentary sale contract. For instance, in a c. i. f. contract it is not clear 
whether the buyer's damages are to be assessed by reference to the market of the place of 
'handing over the goods over to the carrier' (Art. 31 (a)), or to the place of 'tender of shipping 
documents' (Art. 34), or to the place of 'physical delivery of the goods to the buyer'. No 
particular view has been suggested by the commentators on the Convention. It is suggested 
that the place of handing over of documents should be decisive, since this is the place at which 
a c1f, seller is discharged from his duty to deliver under such a contract. However, there is a 
possibility to argue that the place of the buyer's destination might be significant, since this is 
usually the market in which the buyer will buy the replacement goods. " 
Substitute Place 
Where no current price is available in the place at which the seller's duty to deliver should be 
fulfilled Art. 76 (2) refers the deciding court to another place which serves as a reasonable 
substitute. Obviously, this expression empowers the court to play a main role in determining 
which place may be regarded as a reasonable substitute; and in doing so, trade usage may be 
given considerable regard. But since the buyer would normally be required to transport the 
substitute goods from that market, the court should make 'due allowance for differences in the 
cost of transporting the goods" (Art. 76 (2)) from that place to their place of delivery as 
provided under the contract. It should be noted that in such circumstances damages would be 
assessed by reference to the current price at a place different from the place at which the 
goods should have been delivered, provided that this current price can serve as reasonable 
2's This may be the case where the seller is an international manufacturer who makes different part of a large 
machine by its different branches in different places. In such a case, different parts, depending on the type of 
the contract may be delivered in different places. 
' For further criticism on the rule, see Sutton, J., (198 9) at 746-747. 
270 This view is suggested by some authors in English law. See e. g., Atiyah & Adams, (1995). at 484; Guest 
A-G. et al, (1997) paras. 19-164 and 20-102. See in this respect, the English Chapter, Section Tbree, 2.4.6. 
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substitute to the non-existing current price at the place of delivery. "' The question whether or 
not the price at a particular substitute place is reasonable cannot easily be answered; it must 
be determined in each case from the point of view of an average merchant, in light of the 
justifiable interests of both parties. "' 
2.5. Time of Assessment 
When damages are assessed on the sub-transaction price formula no difficulty arises as to the 
time point because it is fixed by the date of the substitute transaction. General damages, in 
such cases will be the difference between the two contract prices. However, the question 
becomes more relevant where damages are to be measured by reference to the current price. In 
such situations, because the current price may vary from time to time, a primary question is 
what is the relevant time for specifying the current price or the substitute current price, if one 
is to be used in calculation of damages under Art. 76. 
The question of determining a point of time at which the injured party's damages are to 
be assessed was one the draftsmen of the Convention had encountered. Art. 84 of ULIS 
provided that the current price is to be determined at the date at which the contract becomes 
avoided whether by operation of the law Qpsofaco) or by the aggrieved party's declaration, as 
the case may be. The potential result of this provision is that, an injured party who has the 
right to avoid the contract, may not avoid the contract unless and until the mark et price 
changes in his favour. So, if the current price formula is to be applied, this would certainly 
increase his damages but at the other's expense. Owing to the potential for harsh results 
created by a provision of ULIS, " the draftsmen's main intention was to prepare a text which 
could eliminate the possibility of such speculation by the aggrieved party. Many suggestions 
to achieve this were laid before the Working Group of UNCITRAV" and consequently Art. 
72 of the UNCITRAL's Draft Convention stated that the relevant time for determining the 
amount of the current price should be the time at which the injured party "first had the right to 
271 See also, Knapp in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 557-559. If the difference in transportation costs is 
excessively high, the question may be asked whether the price at the other place is a "reasonable substitute" 
(Sutton, K C., (1977) at 104). 
1 Knapp in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 557. However, some commentators have described the provision as 
"a vague and uncertain test" and inappropriate formula for the businessmen whose suppliers or buyers are 
great distances away from them. In addition, the expression "making due allowance' is, according to them, 
one which is open to varying interpretations (see, Sutton, K. C., (1977) at 104). 
273 Art. 94 of ULIS (1): 'In case of avoidance of the contract, where there is a current price for the goods, 
damages shall be equal to the difference between the price fixed by the contract and the current price on the 
date on which the contract is avoided. (2) 1n calculating the amount of damages under paragraph I of this Art., 
the current price to be taken into account shall be that prevailing in the market in which the transaction took 
place or, if there is no such current price or its application is inappropriate, the price in a market which serves 
as a reasonable substitute, making due allowance for differences in the cost of transporting the goods. " 
2' See e. g., UNCHRAL, Yearbook V (1974) at 4445 paras. 170-177; IV (1975) at 62, para. 116; VM (1977) at 
59-60, paras. 485488. 
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declare the contract avoided" - in other words, the time when the contract became avoidable. 
At the Vienna Conference several delegations objected to the proposed formula. "' The 
Conference felt that the proposed wording was not clear enough and was too elastic, so that in 
practice it might be very difficult to determine when the contract could first have been avoided 
by the injured party. Such a determination would have been particularly difficult in an 
anticipatory breach of contract. " 
Following these objections, several amendments to the Draft wording were proposed. 171 
As a result of a lengthy discussion, the Vienna Conference ultimately adopted the 'time of 
avoidance formula' as prescribed in Art 76 (1). 27' The provision under this Art. provides a 
two-fold formula. First is that the current price is to be determined at the time of avoiding the 
contract . 
27' To this extent, therefore, the present text does not achieve the drafters' intention 
and one may say that the door is still open to speculation. Moreover, it may well be that the 
scope within which the speculation operates under the present Convention is larger than that 
under its predecessor. This is due to the fact that the ipso facto avoidance in the latter, which 
limits the possibility of speculation, is excluded from the Convention. The second comes into 
operation where the party claiming damages has avoided the contract after taking over the 
goods. In such a situation, the current price is to be determined by reference to the time of 
such taking over rather than the time of avoidance (Art. 76 (1) sentence. 2). 1" 
The formula provided in the last part of Art. 76 (1) seems to be vague, and in practice, 
it may lead to some difficulties. For instance, it is not quite clear what is the meaning of the 
expression "taking over" the goods? "'. The Convention does not contain any provision 
determining the meaning of the term. One may, therefore, argue that this problem is to be 
solved according to the domestic law applicable to the contract. It is granted, however, that 
275 See Official Records, (1981) at 132,222-223,394-396 and 415. 
276 See also, Knapp in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 556. 
277 Suggested solutions were to make the relevant time for determining the current price the time where the 
contract is avoided, or that of delivery, or the time of delivery or alternatively the time of avoidance, 
whichever of the two came first (Official Records, (198 1) at 80-81,132-133). 
" Art. 76 (1): "If the contract is avoided and there is a current price for the goods, the party claiming damages 
may, ..., recover the 
difference between the price fixed by the contract and the current price at the time of 
avoidance ..., 
however, the party claiming damages has avoided the contract after taking over the goods, the 
current price at the time ofsuch taking over shall be applied instead of current price at the time of avoidance. " 
(Art. 76 (1). (Italic supplied) 
2" Which is exactly the same which was adopted in UUS. 
280 However, the alternative criterion should not apply when an aggrieved buyer rejects the goods immediately 
after the inspection permitted by ArL 38. 
" As it is not clear whether the formula applies to the seller or it is confined to the buyer. See, in this respect, 
Treitel, G. H., (1988) at 120. According to the legislative history of the provision (Official Records, (1981) at 
222-223), the object of this provision was to prevent the buyer from speculating at the expense of the seller by 
holding the non-conforraing goods and then avoiding the contract after the market has risen (see also Knapp 
in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 556; Kritzer, Albert H., (1989) at 491). This risk has, however, been 
described as slight in view of the fact that the buyer loses his right to declare the contract avoided within a 
reasonable time after he knew or ought to have known of the breach (Art. 49 (2)). Treitel, G. H., (1988) at 
119; Nicholas, B., (1989) at 232; Schlechtriem, P., (1986) at 98; Ndulo, M., (1991) 23. 
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'delivery' by the seller is different from 'taking over' by the buyer. Sometimes, they take place 
at the same time; this is so whenever the seller delivers the goods directly to the buyer who 
takes them. In other situations, the time of delivery may differ from that of taking over the 
goods; this may occur, for example, when delivery is effected by handing the goods over to the 
carrier for transmitting them to the buyer (Art. 3 1). In such an event, the buyer's duty of 
taking the goods may only be fulfilled by removing them from the carrier. 
Likewise, Art. 76(l) raises another problem. If, for example, the buyer has avoided the 
contract after he has taken only part of the goods and not all of them. The key question is: 
which time is relevant for determining the current price? Is it the time of avoidance or the time 
of such taking over? Once again, it is suggested that the court in such a case may be thrown 
back to the general rule as prescribed under Art. 74. 
The alternative formula will, nonetheless, not be an effective one where it is likely to 
cause prejudice to the buyer. This is the position where he could not reasonably have been 
expected to discover the defect at the time of taking over, because the goods, for instance, 
were in sealed packages, which would not normally be opened before use. In such a case, the 
proper solution, as suggested by some commentators", is to assess damages by reference to 
the time of avoidance. The same is true where, after taking over the goods and discovering the 
defect, the buyer calls on the seller to cure the defect (Art. 46) and the seller fails to do so. "' 
Further difficulty may arise from this provision in respect of documentary sales. 
However, with a broad interpretation of the phrase 'taking over" in Art. 76 (2), it can be said 
that in such a case damages are to be measured from the time of taking over the documents, 
since the term does not only refer to the physical possession of the goods but includes also 
control over them. 284 
3.0. Part Two. Price Reduction 
3.1. Introduction 
The other type of financial retnedy available under the Convention to a buyer injured by the 
seller's non-confonning delivery is the right to reduce the contract price. It enables the buyer 
unilaterally to adapt the contract to the delivery actually made, if he is in principle willing to 
keep the defective goods. Of course, the buyer's calculation may later be questioned by the 
232 Treitel, G. H., (1988) at 119; Nicholas, B., (1989) at 232; Ndulo, M., (1991) at 23. See also, Kritzer, Albert 
H., (1989) at 491. Schlechtriern describes the case as "difficult to understand" (Schlechtriem, P., (1986) at 
98). 
2n Treitel, G. H., (1988) at 119-120. 
' See also, Babiak, A., (1992) at 140. 
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seller. In such a case, to determine the amount of reduction in price the court will refer the 
case to an expert. 
A series of questions must be considered in relation to this remedy. First, what is its 
legal nature? Second, how is the amount of the reduction to be assessed? Third, is this remedy 
is subject to any restrictive provisions? Finally, what relation is between this remedy and 
damages? 
3.2. Nature and Origin of the Remedy 
The Convention's remedial provisions do not always, as Bergsten and Miller pointed Out285 
reflect merchants' practice but sometimes reflect the efforts of lawyers from different legal 
systems to reconcile their views on the appropriate action to be taken by the contracting 
parties and by a tribunal in the event of breach of contract by one of contracting parties. 
Although the reconciliation has apparently resulted in a series of provisions which are in 
general harmony with one another, it presents certain provisions which are unfamiliar to 
286 lawyers of some legal systems. Accordingly, it is quite possible that such provisions are 
confused with other similar provisions applied within the domestic law context. Among such 
provisions is Art. 50 which entitles the buyer to reduce the price under certain circumstances. 
Since the remedy of price reduction is similar to that of damages in that both give some relief 
to the injured buyer measured in money, it is quite possible to confuse one with the other. The 
drafting history of the provision shows that such confusion was made by participants from 
some legal systems, in particular those from common law systems who saw the provision as a 
type of set-off rule as provided in common law jurisdictions. 2" During preparation of the draft 
Convention by the UNCITRAL Working Group, some common law commentators 
recommended that the Art. relating to the remedy of price reduction be redrafted "so as to 
provide that a buyer may deduct all or any part of the damages resulting from breach from 
any part of the price due under the contract. "' Accordingly, in order to avoid such confusion 
and to clarify the field of application of the remedy of price reduction it seems necessary to 
explain the nature of the remedy to determine how the provision entered into the Convention 
remedial provisions. 
2" Bergsten & Miller, (1979) at 255. 
286 Ibid. 
287 See UNCnRAL Yearbook., 111 (1972) at 89 paras. 109-113; IV (1973), at 56-57 paras. 146-152 and at 71 
paras. 119-126. See also: Enderlein, F. and Maskow, D., (1992) at 196; Schlechtriem, P., (1986) at 79. 
Confusion of the remedy with that of damages was also made during the preparatory work for ULIS. Common 
lawyers experienced great difficulty in understanding the nature of the remedy of price reduction and its 
relationship with the that of damages (see, Bergsten & Miller, (1979) at 266-270; Will in: Bianca and Bonell, 
(1987) at 369). 
1 Sutton, Y- C., (1977) at 100. 
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The drafting history shows that the remedy was incorporated as a separate remedy at 
the insistence of civil law participants. Under civil law systems, price reduction is a separate 
rmedy from damages. "' It arises only where the seller has delivered goods which do not 
correspond to the contract quality but the buyer decides to keep them. "' 
The idea of price reduction emerged from the idea of restricting the right to claim 
damages to cases where the party in breach was at fault or guilty of fraud. Under Roman law 
an injured buyer was entitled to claim damages only where he could prove that the seller was 
at fault or guilty of a degree of fraud, whereas delivery of non-conforming goods was not 
considered fault or fraud. " On the other hand, it was thought unfair to require the buyer to 
pay the full price for defective goods. To prevent unjust enrichment, Roman law developed the 
action for the reduction of the price (actio quanti minoris"'), which was adopted later by the 
civil law systems. " 
3.3. Price Reduction under the Convention 
Although the Convention included price reduction as a separate remedy, as will be seen, it 
may in some respects be more expansive in effect dm price reduction in many civil law 
jurisdictions. "" Art. 50 of the Convention provides: 
289 See e. g., The German Civil Code, Arts. 462 and 472; The French Civil Code, Art. 1644. Art. 462 of the 
German Civil Code provides: "On account of a defect for which the seller is responsible under the provisions 
of Arts. 459,460, the purchaser may demand annulment of the sale (termination), or reduction of the purchase 
Xncc (reduction). " 
20 See e. g., The German Civil Code, Art. 462, and, The French Civil Code, Art. 1644 (both Codes placed the 
provision under the heading of "Warranty Against Defects in the Goods). On the influence of civil law 
tradition some representatives declared that the remedy under the Convention must also be applied only to the 
case of defective delivery (see Report on Fourth Session reprinted in: UNCrrRAL, Yearbook, IV (1973) at 71 
para. 120). 
291 See Treitel, G. H., (1988) paras. 90,100. A degree of this severe rule is reflected in the French Civil Code 
where it provides: "A debtor is judged liable, the case arising, to the payment of damages, either by reason of 
the inexecution of the obligation or by reason of delay in the execution, at all times when he does not prove 
that the inexcusion came from an outside cause which cannot be imputed to him, and further that there was no 
bad faith on his parV (Art. 1147). This traditional basis for recognition of the special price-reduction 
mechanism was removed by the Convention's adoption a unitary contractual approach. As already seen, the 
buyer is given a general right to claim damages for seller's breach without he has to prove any degree of fault 
or fraud on the part of the seller. 
292 This action in turn originated from an order of Roman Governors (Ediles Curules) seeking to protect the 
parties who bought slaves and cattle in the City markets against the defects which were easily concealed. In 
this respect, see Bcrgstcn & Nfiller, (1979) at 256 and the references cited in footnote 5-, Abd al-Razzaq 
Ahmad al-Sanhori, (1952), vol. 4, at 711; Winship, P., (1982) at 1233); Treitel, G. H., (1988) para. 90; 
Nicholas, B., (1989) at225. See generally, Zimmermann, R., (1996) at 318 andseq. 
293 See also, Szakats, A-, (1966) at762-763; Bergsten & Mller, (1979) at257; Ziontz, MartinL., (1988) at 171; 
Gonzalez, Olga, (1984) at 91; Will in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 368; Zwart, Sara. G., (1988) at 121; 
Treitel, G. R, (1988) para . 90,100; Hormold, (1991) at 395. See also: Report on Fourth Session, UNCMIAL Yearbook, IV (1973) at 71 para. 12 1. 
294 Under French law, for example, there is a "need for judicial action to reduce the price of goods". This is "in 
contrast to Art. 50 of the Convention, which permits the buyer himself to reduce the price in the event of non- 
conforming goods" (Kritzer, Albert H., (1989) at 20,344). See also: Claude D. Rohwer and Jack J. Coe, in: 
Campbell, D., and, Rohwer, C., (1994) at. 285. 
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"If the goods do not conform with the contract and whether or not the price has already 
been paid the buyer may reduce the price in the same proportion as the value that the 
goods actually delivered had at the time of the delivery bears to the value that 
conforming goods would have had at that time... " 
According to the language of this provision, price reduction may be made either where 
95 
the seller has delivered but "the goods do not conform with the contract" in quantity' , quality 
and description or are not contained or packaged in the manner required by the contract (Art. 
35 (1). The provision seems also to be applied where the seller has rendered a partial non- 
conforming delivery, particularly where partial non-conformity does not justify partial 
avoidance. "' 
Application of Art. 50 raises the question: can it be extended to other types of breaches 
such as delay, delivery at the wrong place, defects in documents and the like? At the Vienna 
Diplomatic Conference, the question was raised in particular as to cases where the seller has 
delivered goods which are not free from third-party rights or claims. Some delegations put 
forward a proposal whereby the provision under Art. 50 would have extended to the case of 
defects in title. The proposal attracted conflicting views, and consequently was withdrawn. As 
a result, no decision was reached as to whether the price may be reduced for defects in title or 
third-party claims based on industrial or other intellectual property rights. 291 
Different views are expressed by commentators on the Convention. For instance, 
Professor Schlechtriem argues that 'Vie general similarity of the prejudice caused by these 
defects with that caused by other defects justifies the availability of price reduction in these 
cases as Wellý9.298 In contrast, Professor Hormold concludes that the price-reduction formula of 
295 However, some commentators have doubted that the remedy under Art. 50 comes into operation where the 
goods fail to meet the quantity obligations of the contract (see e. g., Flechtner, H. U, (1995) at 170 and seq. ). 
other commentators such as Honnold (Honnold, (1991) at 397) and Will (Will in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) 
at 373 and seq. ) failed to answer whether the remedy is available where the seller delivers the wrong quantity 
of goods. Nevertheless, some other cornmentators on the basis of the text of Art. 50 declared that failure of 
quantity constitutes "non-conforniity" and as a result reduction of price is available where the goods are 
insufficient in quantity (see e. g., Bergsten & hfiller, (1979) at 259). In a Convention case (United States 6 
April 1994 U. S. Dist. Ct. (S. V Braun, Inc. v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S. p. A., decided by an American 
court, the court, however, showed its tendency to apply Art. 50 to such a case, although because of facts of the 
case the court was satisfied that the seller had stipulated that "full delivery had in fact been made". See also, 
Flechtner, R M., (1995) 170). 
296 See also Axt. 51 (1) which applies all remedies provided under Arts. 46-50 to the case of partial non- 
conforming delivery. 
297 Official Records, (1981) at 360-361 (discussion on defects in title). lle Norwegian sponsor maintained that 
he withdrew his proposal "on the understanding that it would be up to the courts to decide whether and to 
what cxtcnf' the price reduction provision would apply to third-party claims. However, this was a statement 
from an individual delegation. No significant weight should be given to such a statement as long as there is no 
evidence on the fact that the Conference agreed to such an "understanding". See in this respect Honnold, 
(1991) at 141-142 and 397. 
2" Schlechtriem, P., (1986) at 79. However, he acknowledges that Art. 50 formula is not a proper one to tackle 
the question but it certainly would have required thorough deliberations. However, due to lack of sufficient 
time the Conference failed to address the point. See also: Will, in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 375 (Will 
argues lack of time led to the decision not to amend the present text of Art. 50 but to leave the solution for the 
courts (ibid. )); Enderlein, F. and Maskow, D., (1992) at 195. 
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Art. 50 is a special rule and should not be extended outside its stated sphere, i. e., claims of 
non-conformity. 299 
The better view seems to be that the remedy should be limited to cases where the seller 
has delivered goods which do not conform with the requirements of Art. 35 (1). This view can 
be supported by the language of the Art. which states that the remedy is available when the 
"goods do not conform with the contract. ""O Using the words "goods do not conform with the 
contract" means that breach of duties such as that to deliver at the place and time provided for 
delivery of goods and documents (Arts. 31-34) and other obligations imposed by contract 
(Art. 30) are excluded from Art. 50. This construction can also be supported by the heading 
approved by the Vienna Diplomatic Conference for Section II (Arts. 35-44), that is, 
"Conformity of the goods and third party claims". By adoption of this heading the 
Convention, in fact, has distinguished between two types of breaches: breach of duty to deliver 
conforming goods (subject of Art. 35) and breach of duty to deliver goods free from a third- 
party rights or claims (subject of Arts. 41,42). Moreover, as far as the third-party rights or 
claims are concerned, different notice requirements are established for claims of "lack of 
conformity of the goods" (Arts. 39,40) and claims that the goods are subject to a "right or 
claim of a third party" (Aft. 43). "' 
T'his interpretation may be weakened by Art. 44.302 By referring expressly to Art. 50 it 
seems to indicate that a buyer who fails to give notice of the existence of third-party rights or 
claims, but has a reasonable excuse, may nevertheless claim a price reduction. It is, as some 
commentators indicated", hard to accept that a buyer should have the right to resort to the 
price-reduction remedy only if he fails to give notice, but not if he gives notice in time. 
However, it seems that Art. 44 should be taken into account with caution. It was not 
included in the 1978 Draft Convention. It is, in fact, a compromise developed late at the 
Vienna Diplomatic Conference to meet objections to the notice requirements of Art. 39 (1) 
(conformity of goods). 304 It is true that the Art. includes references to the notice requirements 
of Art. 43 (1), and adds that these requirements do not affect the buyer's rights to various 
remedies available under the Convention, including Art. 50. But the point which weakens the 
reading that Art. 44 is intended to expand the scope of application of price reduction is that 
2" Honnoldý (1991) at 397. 
3m Likewise, according to the language of the second sentence of ArL 50 which only refers to Arts. 37 and 48 
but not to Art. 34, it seems that the remedy does not apply to non-conforming documents. 
301 See also, Honnold, (199 1) at 397. 
"2 Art. 44: "Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of Art. 39 and paragraph (1) of ArL 43, the buyer 
may reduce the price in accordance with ArL 50 or claim damages, except for loss of profit, if he has a 
reasonable excuse for his failure to give the required notice. " 
303 Endcrlein, F. and NIaskow, D., (1992) at 195-196. See also, Will, in- Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 375-376. 
3" Official Records, (1981) at 108,159 and 208. See also, Honnold, (1991) at 338-340. 
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the legislative history of the provision shows no indication that Art. 44 was understood to 
amend Art. 50. Indeed, the debate that led to the delegations' refusal to accept the proposal 
which recommended the extension of price reduction to the case of third-party rights or 
claims, did recognise that it is difficult to apply the remedy under Art. 50 outside claims for 
non-conformity. " Accordingly, it is quite possible to say that Art. 44 was only intended to 
meet the concerns of developing countries about the severity of Arts. 39 (1) and 43 which 
deprive the buyer of his remedies and not to amend the scope of Art. 50 and extend it beyond 
its stated scope. The Art. therefore should be read as saying: "Notwithstanding ... the buyer 
may reduce the price or claim damages as appropfiate ...... That is, the buyer, who, having a 
reasonable excuse, fails to give the required notice may be entitled to reduce the price and/or 
claim damages for the lack of conformity or for the existence of the third party rights or 
claims, as appropriate. 
The last point which deserves to be pointed out here is that, as sub-paragraph (2) of 
Art. 45 provides, exercise of any remedy provided in Arts. 46 to 52 (note the inclusion of Art. 
50) does not bar a claim for damages under Art. 74. On this basis, the right of price reduction 
does not preclude the buyer from claiming damages for any consequential losses he has 
sustained. Accordingly, the buyer could claim both price reduction and consequential damages 
for -e. g., delays in production because of defects in the goods. Art. 45 should not however be 
construed to permit double recovery based on the reduced value of the goods. "' 
3.4. Assessment of the Ratio of Reduced Price 
According to Art. 50, price reduction involves a proportional reduction of the price of goods 
according to the ratio of the value of conforming goods to that of the goods actually delivered. 
In calculating that reduction the value of conforming goods is not just treated as equal to the 
price under the contract, which may well be below or above it. Accordingly, in order to 
measure the amount of reduction it is first necessary to determine the value which the actual 
goods delivered have at the time of delivery and then to ascertain what value the goods would 
have had if they had been delivered properly. Ilie actual value may be determined from the 
market price, if any, of the defective itern, or from other relevant factors including the cost of 
repairing or remedying the defect. When the two different values of the goods are ascertained 
the contract price should be reduced on the basis of the ratio of difference between these two 
values, not the real difference. 
305 Official Records, (1981) at 360 paras. 69-76; Honnold, (1991) at 397. 
306 Honnold, (1991) at 395. See also: DITs Consultative Document, (1989) at 38-39); Nicholas, B., (1989) at 
225-226; Gonzalez, Olga, (1994) at 92-93. 
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3.4.1. Time of Assessment 
One contentious aspect of the remedy of price reduction is the date at which the actual value 
of the conforming and non-conforming goods should be assessed. One alternative is the time 
when the defect was or ought to have been discovered. Another is the date of the action. A 
third contends that the Roman law history of actio quanti minotis logically points to the date 
of the conclusion of the contract. 10" 
According to the Convention, the decisive time for calculation of the price difference 
between conforming and non-confornfing goods is the time of delivery of the goods rather than 
that of conclusion of the contract"' or of examination by the buyer of the goods delivered. The 
position presents a change from the 1978 UNCITRAL Draft Convention which had suggested 
measuring the requisite proportion by reference to the "time of the conclusion of the contract". 
As a result of proposals by some delegations the contract formation criterion was changed to 
the delivery date criterion. " The criterion was apparently chosen partly because account is 
better taken of fluctuations in market value between the conclusion of the contract and the date 
of delivery, since the non-conforming goods might not have existed at the time of the 
contract, "' and partly because, at least as far as the common law participants were concerned, 
the value at the time of delivery would be a more adequate substitute for damages. "' 
The significance of the time point at which the proportion is measured will appear 
where the value of non-conforming goods rises or falls disproportionately to that of 
conforming goods from the time of fonnation of contract. This significance can be illustrated 
by the following example. Suppose that at the time of formation of the contract the value of 
conforming goods was 000,000 and of non-conforming goods was L200,000, but at the 
time of delivery the value of conforming goods has risen to L600,000, whilst that of non- 
conforming goods actually delivered increased only by one-half, so that at the time of delivery 
they had a market value of E300,000. If the price reduction proportion is assessed at the time 
of the contract, the contract price would be reduced by one-third, or EIOO, 000. If, on the 
other hand, the time of delivery is chosen, the price will be reduced by one-half, or E150,000. 
See also, Clement Ng' One Ola, (1995) at 241. 
As was laid down in Art. 46 of ULIS. See also Art. 472 (1) of the German Civil Code. 
3" See Official Records, (1981) at 357-36,1 particularly, at 357 para. 23. 
310 T'he current value at the time of delivery is easier to establish, whereas the current value at the time of 
formation of the contract (except for stock market goods) always tends to be somewhat hypothetical (see 
Enderlein, F. and NWkow, D., (1992) at 1978). 
311 official Records, (1981) at 357-358, in particular, paras. 23,25,26 and 27. See also Will, in: Bianca and 
Bonell, (1987) at 369-370 and 371; Gonzalez, Olga, (1984) at 94. For instance, the US delegation indicated 
that it could support either of the draft proposals, but it suggested that the proposed text would be more 
consistent and easier to explain to US lawyers familiar with UCC provisions calculating damages as of the 
time of delivery (Official Records, (1981) at 358 para. 26). This is one of the aspects which shows that price 
reduction under the Convention is partly not an exact analogue of the civil law equivalent. 
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If the time of the contract is used to assess the proportion, there may be times when, due to 
price fluctuations, the remedy of price reduction would actually be more advantageous than 
normal damages. For example, if the price of conforming goods was 1400,000 and of non- 
conforming goods was L200,000, but at the time of delivery the first price increases to L500, 
000 and the second rises to L400,000, damages would only be 000,000, while the amount 
of price reduction will be L200 000. However, if the time of delivery, rather than the time of 
contract formation, is used, the price reduction will be L80,000. Thus, by choosing the time 
of delivery to measure the proportion of conforming and non-conforming value, the 
Convention lin-dts the circumstances under which the price reduction remedy might be used. "' 
3.4.2. Place for Assessment 
Another issue raised at the Vienna Conference but on which no decision was taken is which 
market should serve as a basis for determining the comparable value. "' What is certain is that 
there is no question that the value of both conforming and non-conforming goods must be 
assessed with reference to the same time and place of delivery; otherwise the comparison 
would be meaningless. The main question is whether the value of the delivered goods must be 
compared with the value goods would have at the place of destination or supply of goods. 
In the absence of a clear provision in this respect, some commentators have suggested 
that "according to the sense and purpose of the price-reduction provision, the place of the 
seller's performance would determine the comparable market price. In a sale involving 
carriage, the destination would provide the appropriate basis of comparison". '". In contrast, it 
has been said that: "in view of the close relationship between date and place of delivery, the 
place of delivery should be decisive. It is not excluded, however, that buyers may consider the 
place of destination. ""' Some other commentators have suggested a three-step solution: the 
place of destination, then the place of delivery and finally the place of business of either the 
buyer or the seller, depending on where a market price can best be assessed. "' 
It seems that the Convention has left the question to be decided by the court according 
to the special circumstances of any particular case. However, according to the sense and 
312 See Gonzalez, Olga, (1984) at 94. See also: Schlechtriern, P., (1986) at 79; Enderlein, F. and Maskow, D., 
(1992) at 198. 
313 OfrICial Records, (1991) at 358-359 para. 42 and seq. 
314 Schlechtriern, P., (1986) at 79 footriote 311. Some conunentators on the early draft of the Convention have 
suggested that the value of the goods must be contrasted with the value of the goods actually supplied at the 
seller's place of business (Sutton, Y, C., (1977) at 100). 
315 EnderIcin, Fritz, in: Sarcevic, P. -Volken, P., (1986) at 197. See also: Enderlein, F. and Maskow, D., (1992) 
at 197. 
316 Will in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 375. 
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purpose of the price-reduction remedy, the place where the seller has to perform his delivery 
obligation is of particular significance. 
3.5. Restrictions on the Remedy 
As was made clear, the remedy of price reduction is a separate remedy which can be utilised 
by the buyer in certain circumstances. In view of the Convention, the remedy is effectuated by 
the unilateral declaration of the buyer. Tlius, no court action or even seller's agreement is 
required, unless the seller disagrees with the buyer as to the existence of a non-conformity or 
to the monetary consequences of that non-conformity. '" 
Such a declaration is not subject to the various defences applicable to a claim for 
damages. Accordingly, the buyer may be entitled to reduce the price even if the seller is 
excused from paying damages for the lack of conformity under Art. 79. Again, the remedy "is 
not affected by the limitation to which a claim for damages is subjected under [Art. 74] i. e., 
that he has to prove that he has suffered loss as a consequence of the seller's breach and that 
the amount of damages may not exceed the loss which the seller in breach foresaw or ought to 
have foreseen at the time of the contract. ""' A further advantage of this remedy can be found 
in the fact that unlike Arts. 46 (specific performance) and 49 (avoidance), Art. 50 does not 
contain the element "within a reasonable time'. "' Likewise, the Secretariat Commentary 
suggested that "[T]he sanction provided by [Art. 771 ... does not affect ... a reduction 
in price 
by the buyer pursuant to [Art. 50]. "'. The suggestion may be justified on the basis that, first, 
it is consistent with the literal language of the second sentence of Art. 77 which refers only to 
the injured party's duty to take reasonable measures to mitigate damages for breach of 
contract, and, secondly it is in line with the legislative history of Art. 77. At the Vienna 
Conference, as discussed in the first part of this section, some delegates proposed a suggestion 
to extend the scope of Art. [771 to make it applicable to a wider range of remedies, but it was 
defeated. "' 
317 Bergsten & Miller, (1979) at 263-264; Gonzalez, Olga, (1984) at 92; Winship, P., (1982) at 1233; Win in: 
Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 372; Ndulo, M., (1991) at 24. Enderlein, F. and Maskow, D., (1992) at 196. 
However, it is surely always more appropriate that the parties agree on the amount of the reduction. 
3'8 Secretariat Commentary, (1979) at 42 para. 5; Kritzer, Albert R, (1989) at 375 and 376. See also, Bergsten 
& lMer, (1979) at 265-266. 
319 See also, Will in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 372ý, Kritzer, Albert 11, (1989) at 344,496. In the absence of 
time-limit guideline under the Convention, Will suggests: the domestic laws on limitation period determine if 
the seller is left in uncertainty for an excessive period of time (ibid. ). 
320 Secretariat Commentary, (1979) at 61 para. 3. See also, Knapp in Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 564-566; 
Kritzer, Albert I-L, (1989) at 496. In contrast, Professor Honnold argues that ArL 77 should be read into a 
wide range of remedies (Honnold, (199 1) at 520-522). 
321 Official Records, (198 1) at 3 96-3 98. See also, Farnsworth, A., (1979) at 250; Ziegel in: Nina, M., Galston 
and Hans Smit, (1984) at 942. 
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Furthermore, to be effective price-reduction needs no special form of notice. In order to 
invoke the reduction, the buyer need only dispatch notice thereof... Another point to be noted 
in this regard is that the Convention does not restrict the remedy to the case of specific goods, 
but applies it also to all goods, whether identified to the contract or not. 323 
Nevertheless, the remedy is subject to some significant restrictions some of which are 
provided by the second sentence of Art. 50 itSelf. 324This provision subjects the exercise of this 
remedy to two major limitations: actual remedy of the lack of conformity by the seller and his 
offer to cure under Arts. 37 or 48. Where the seller has cured according to Art. 37 this should 
be quite natural. And also if he remedies the defect in accordance with Art. 48 there will be no 
need for a price reduction because equivalence will be re-established and consequently the 
buyer will get what he is entitled to receive under the contract. What is of significance here is 
that the buyer will lose his right to price reduction when he refuses to have the defect cured by 
the seller. However, in practice, buyers would justify their refusal on the grounds of 
unreasonable inconvenience (Art. 48). Accordingly, it is the court's duty to decide whether or 
not the seller's offer was unreasonable. It is to be noted that the legislative history of Arts. 48 
and 50 shows that the drafters of these provisions have intended to restrict the right to price 
reduction to the actual cure or the seller's reasonable offer to cure after he is notified of the 
lack of conformity. Certainly, they did not intend to bar the buyer of his right to reduce the 
price for the mere possibility of cure even though the seller has not shown any readiness and 
willingness to remedy the defects in accordance with the requirements of Arts. 37 and 48.325 
The remedy is also subject to another important restrictive rule, that under which the 
buyer is required to notify the seller of any lack of conformity within a reasonable time after 
he discovered or ought to have discovered it (Art. 39 (1)). For instance, in a Convention case 
decided by a German court it was held that the buyer lost the right to rely on non-conformity 
of goods and to reduce the price proportionally, since it gave notice of the non-conformity only 
when the goods arrived in Germany, i. e. seven days after the buyer had the opportunity to 
exan-dne them at the place of delivery in Turkey. '2' 
322 Ile declaration by the buyer is governed by Art. 27, i. e., it will be effective, even if it does not reach the 
seller. 
323 See also, Gonzalez, Olga, (19 84) at 95. 
324 Art. 50: "... However, if the seller remedies any failure to perform his obligations in accordance with Art. 37 
or Art. 48 or if the buyer refuses to accept performance by the seller in accordance with those Arts., the buyer 
may not reduce the price. " 
325 See in this respect, UNCHRAL, Yearbook, VM (1977) at 44 paras. 271-277, and 46 paras. 299-301; 
Honnold4 (1989) at 337 and 339. 
326 See Germany 8 January 1993 Oberlandesgericht Dilsseldorf (CLOUT, abstract no. 48). 
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3.6. Price Reduction and Damages 
As pointed out above, the remedy of price reduction is distinct from that of damages which is 
regulated by Arts. 74-77. They are two separate remedies which can be exercised separately 
or cumulatively. Nevertheless, commentators on the Convention have given various examples 
to illustrate that this remedy in practice has a narrow scope, since on most occasions when the 
buyer is entitled to claim damages under Arts. 45 and 74, the difference between damages and 
a reduction in price under Art. 50 will generally not be significant; a buyer claiming damages 
is in effect claiming a reduction of the price. 327 They note that "the price reduction formula 
applies only where the buyer accepts and retains non-conforming goods, and plays an 
important role only when the seller is not liable for the non-confonnity. "" However, the utility 
of the remedy should not be underestimated. Although both remedies give the injured buyer 
monetary relief, various reasons justify distinction between these two remedies. 
First as to their function they are totally distinct. Damages are awarded in order to 
compensate the injured buyer's losses, while price reduction tends to prevent the seller from 
receiving a windfall. By application of the reduction, the seller will get proportionately less 
than the price he would have received had he delivered conforming goods, and, the buyer will 
pay proportionately less for keeping the non-conforming goods. "' 
Second, it is a non-judicial remedy in the sense that it may be resorted to unilaterally 
without a prior judicial adjudication. However, if the seller considers that it has been resorted 
to wrongfully, "' he may go to court to challenge the price reduction or the quantum of it. The 
non-judicial character of the remedy of price reduction would seem to be the main difference 
between it and damages. A buyer may only claim damages and unless and until a court or 
arbitral tribunal or the seller has accepted this claim, the damages remain unliquidatcd. 
However, a claim to reduce the price is liquidated by the buyer's unilateral quantification of it, 
subject always to challenge in the courts. "' 
327 See also: Ziontz M. L., (1980) at 172. Long years ago the current utility of the remedy based on the Roman 
law traditional rule, i. e., actio quanti mino?!, was doubted by some lawyers (see Rable, E., (1953) at 191. 
328 Honnold, (1991) at 393. 
' Will in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 372. 
330 For example, the seller may satisfy the court or tribunal that the price reduction was not basically justified 
because it jeopardised his right to cure the defects. 
331 However, this advantage will be questioned when the buyer has prc-paid. In such a case price reduction is 
not a self-help remedy, but will need to be enforced with judicial assistance. The case becomes more 
significant where, as it may often be the case in international sales, the price is paid by documentary credit. In 
that case the buyer cannot reduce the price, since the seller has a separate entitlement to be paid the contract 
price under the credit The buyer may still be able to recover part of the price on the grounds of price 
reduction but it will no longer be a unilateral action- This is in fact one of the limitations which in practice 
makes this remedy of little use in the context of international sale of goods. 
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The third divergence is that damages are to be measured as of the time of delivery, 
while reduction in price is measured as of the time of conclusion of the contract. "' 
Fourth, the right to reduce the price, as indicated above, is not affected by the 
limitations to which a claim for damages is subjected under Arts. 74 and 77. '. 
Fifth, the seller may be exempted from liability for damages pursuant to Art. 79, if he 
proves that the failure was due to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not 
reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the 
conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome it or its consequences, whereas the 
remedy of reduction in price is not subject to such a defence. "'. Accordingly, from the 
standpoint of the buyer who is willing to accept the goods even though they do not conform to 
the contract, Art. 50 is a better route to follow when the seller is excused from damages 
because Art. 79 ousts the application of Art. 74, but not Art. 50. 
The final difference between price reduction and damages is the formula used to 
quantify them. The quantification of the amount of monetary relief under price reduction is 
made by reference to the ratio between the value of the goods as contracted for and the value 
of the goods as delivered, while damages are measured by reference to the real difference 
between the value of the goods contracted for and those delivered at the delivery date. 
Accordingly, the buyer's recovery under Art. 50 can be different from his recovery in an 
action for damages under Art. 74. It may sometimes turn out to be less, equal or even more. " 
The following examples will illustrate these different results. 
(A) First Example 
Suppose the seller contracted to sell a certain quantity of first grade wheat worth $300,000 to 
a buyer in Iran and that delivery was to be 30 September, "Ex Ship" from United States to a 
port in the buyer's country. The seller dispatched goods conforming with the contract 
requirenimts. Owing to problems, the ship was delayed at the Suez canal for a month, and the 
wheat deteriorated so that on arrival it was of lower grade than the wheat contracted for. At 
the time of delivery, wheat of the quantity and quality contracted for was valued at the 
contract price, while the non-conforming wheat sold for one-half the contract price, or 
$150,000. The buyer decided to keep the non-confonning wheat and to reduce the price under 
332 See in this respect, Bergsten & 1ý, Iiller, (1979) at 259; Ziontz, M. L., (1980) at 171. 
333 Secretariat Commentary, (1979) at 42 para. 5. 
334 Ibid. The distinction can be justified on that the reduction of price, irrespective of the seller's responsibility, 
serves to re-establish equivalence between performance and counter-perforniance (Enderlein, F. and Maskow, 
D., (1992) at 196). In any case where the buyer is in doubt as to the availability of damages, it has been 
suggested that he can seek relief under both Art. 50 and Art. 74 and take the best relief he can ultimately 
establish (Kritzer, Albert H., (1989) at 2 1). 
" See also: Will In: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 373; Kritzer, Albert H., (1989) at 376. 
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Art. 50 of the Convention. Under Art. 50, the buyer could reduce the price of the contract by 
one-half, which would be the ratio of the value of the wheat actually delivered to that of 
conforming wheat at the time of delivery. Under this situation, there will be no difference 
between price reduction and damages, if the buyer is able to claim damages, (though it is in 
the interest of the buyer to resort to price reduction rather than to claim for damages). 
However, different results occur when the price level changes. 
I'll Second Example VY 
Assuming that the facts are the same as in the first example, expect that, due to a shortage of 
wheat, the price of wheat rises in the market so that, at the time of delivery, the value of 
conforming goods is $600,000 and the value of the goods actually delivered is $300,000. 
Under these facts, the buyer relying on Art. 50 can refuse to pay more than one-half of the 
agreed price, i. e., $150,000 (or can reclaim $150,000 if the price has been paid in advance). 
Therefore, the price he must pay for the delivered wheat is $150,000, even though it is now 
worth $300,000 on the market. " On the other hand, damages would be $300,000. In this 
case, as pointed out above, it is the interest of the buyer to declare first price reduction and 
then sue the seller for remaining loss ($150,000), if he could claim damages in a price increase 
situation. 
(Q Third Example 
Assuming similar facts but that the market value falls between contract and delivery so that 
the market value of conforming grade of wheat at the time of delivery is worth $150,000, and 
that of the wheat actually delivered is $75,000. In this situation, the reduced price will be 
$150,000, whereas an award of damages will yield $75,000. However, if the non-conformity 
amounts to a fundamental breach the buyer will usually be advised to avoid the contract and 
recover the price. 
(D) Fourth Example 
If the contract price was $300,000 but at the date of delivery the market value of conforming 
goods at the time of delivery has fallen to $225,000 and the actual value of the goods is $166 
. 375, the buyer will pay 
$221,83 1, a saving of $78,169, whereas damages will yield only 
$5 8,625. Accordingly, in such a situation, price reduction is the only effective remedy for the 
injured buyer. 
336 Paying only $150,000 for wheat is worth $300,000, might seem to give the buyer a windfdl. However, this 
advantage to him reflects a portion of the protection that performance would have provided. If the ship had not 
been interned, the buyer would have received wheat that had increased in value to $600,000 but would have 
paid $300,000 (see Honnold, (199 1) at 393). 
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It is, therefore, up to the buyer to decide which is more advantageous for him: price 
reduction, or damages, or a combination of the two. "' Where the buyer has paid the price in 
advance and the amount of the price reduction is less than, or, equal to that of the damages 
which he may claim, price reduction will not offer any advantage over a claim for damages . 
However, where the amount is more than of damages, the buyer will certainly choose 
reduction in price. 
Where the amount of reduction is less than that of damages and the buyer has not yet 
paid the price, it is in the buyer's interest to resort first to price reduction and then sue for the 
remaining damages. If the amount of the price reduction is equal to or greater than the 
damages which the buyer would ordinarily be able to claim, it is in the interests of the buyer to 
reduce the price and not claim any damages. In such a case, he buyer gets an extra monetary 
remedy without having to sue for damages. 3-1 
Conclusion 
The preceding examination has shown that the Convention gives great significance to specific 
performance; an aggrieved buyer is given a general right to require the seller to perform 
specifically what he is required to do. However, damages are also treated as an important 
remedy available for any default. This remedy can be exercised in separate as well as with any 
of the other remedies provided for by the Convention. In addition to this, the Convention 
affords an aggrieved buyer a further right to reduce the contract price where the seller has 
made a non-conforming delivery. It is not a compensatory remedy, it is primarily a 
restitutionary remedy based on the principle of "unjust enrichment". It may be granted without 
the buyer is required to prove that he has suffered loss as a consequence of the seller's non- 
confom-dng delivery. 
The preceding discussion has also shown that the Convention considerably restricts 
termination of the contract, by basing it on the doctrine of "fimdamental breach". This may 
cause great uncertainty, particularly in the case of delay in performance. However, the 
Convention does not leave the buyer in a sea of uncertainty. By recognising the Nachfrist - 
notice procedure, it allows the buyer to treat a delay in delivery as a ground to terminate the 
contract if it is not cured within a reasonable time fixed in the notice in accordance with Art. 
47. Dealing with termination in this way shows that the Convention in principle favours 
flexibility and fairness over certainty. 
337 Secretariat Commentary, (1979) at 43 para. 13; Nicholas, B., (1989) at 226; Knapp in: Bianca and Bonell, 
(1987) at 563-564, Example C. 
31 See also, Will in: Bianca and Bonell, (1987) at 373; Babiak, A., (1992) at 131. See also: Enderlein, F. and 
Maskow, D., (1992) at 196. 
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It was also seen that, unlike English law, the Convention has sharply distinguished 
between the right to withhold performance from the right to terminate the contract and has 
given the seller in default a general right to cure his default, either before or after the date for 
performance has expired. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of areas of uncertainty in respect of the buyer's right 
to re ect the non-conforn-drig delivery and to terminate the contract under the doctrine of 
fundamental breach or Nachfrist-notice procedure. There is further uncertainty in regard to 
the relationship between the seller's right to cure and the buyer's right to avoid the contract. In 
addition to that, there are some areas of uncertainty in relation to the remedies of specific 
performance and claim for damages. This is perhaps the result of the compromises made 
during drafting. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
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Sketch of Discussion 
In the two previous chapters, the law governing the buyer's remedies for the seller's non- 
conforming delivery has extensively been examined under two modem legal systems in order 
to identify the issues and the way these systems deal with in this connection. It is now time to 
deal with the remedies available to the aggrieved buyer under ShVah law. As indicated in the 
first chapter and, as will be shown in detail below, ShVah law, as reflected in the present 
ShPah jurisprudence, lacks a developed law of remedies. ShPah jurists have concentrated on 
very simple, and mostly, hypothetical instances rather than modem and concrete cases and 
consequently a number of important questions which arise in this connection are left 
unanswered. Likewise, the way by which the jurists have examined the law governing 
remedies is not a proper way. They have not exan-dned the remedies available for an injured 
party in any one place and thus they are not easily accessible. The rules relating to remedies 
are dispersed in various places such as, (a) where the pron-dsor fails to perforni shurat 
(stipulations within the contract)', (b) where the seller fails to deliver mabP (subject of sale) 
or the buyer refuses to pay thaman (price)', and, (c) when dealing with kheydrdt (options to 
terminate the contraCt)3. More importantly, damages which almost all legal systems have 
recognised as a remedy for breach of contract are not addressed by the jurists at all. 
This chapter intends (1) to present a general picture of various rules governing the 
buyer's remedies for the seller's non-conforming delivery by gathering, classifying and 
interpreting the rules scattered within the above-mentioned discussions, (2) to identify gaps in 
the law in respect of the issue under consideration, and, (3) finally to show how the gaps could 
be filled by employment of the suggested methodology. 
Generally, as in the two other systems, the remedial provisions of this system can be 
divided into three general categories: (i) those which allow the buyer to withhold performance 
of his contractual obligations and to bring the contract to an end; (ii) those giving him a right 
to require the seller to perform his obligations in accordance with the contract, and; (iii) those 
which entitle him to claim monetary relief. 
See e. g., AnslH, M., (1375 H. Q. ) at 283 and seq.; Najaf, M., and, Ndeini, M. H., (1358 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 126 
and seq.; ToWdi, M. A., and Khaei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 366 and seq.; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 429 
and seq. 
2 See e. g., NaJafl, M. H., (1981) vol. 23 at 145; Ansafi, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 312. 
3 See e. g., NaJafi, M. H., (1981) vol. 23 at 3 and seq.; Anszui, M., (1375 H. Q. ) at 216 and seq.; KhalkMli, S. 
M Y-, & Rashti, M H., (1407 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 26 and seq.; 
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Section One 
Withholding Performance and Termination 
1.0. General Introduction 
A general look at what ShPah jurists have addressed when dealing with the seller's duty to 
deliver mabP shows that it is a well-accepted rule that the buyer under certain circumstances 
is entitled to withhold payment of the price as long as the seller's refusal continues. The 
4 expression haqq-e-habs is used in the jurists' terminology to refer to this concept. The jurists 
have also accepted the view that in some cases the buyer may be entitled to reject the seller's 
non-conforming delivery' and in some other cases he is free to reject it and bring the contract 
to an end. 6 The expression haqq-e-radd refers to the first righf7 and the term haqq-e-faskh is 
used to describe the second right. However, they have not examined withholding performance 
as a general remedy separate from termination. They have also not examined the relationship 
between this remedy and haqq-e-faskh (right of termination). More importantly, the right of 
cure by the seller is unknown in ShPah jurisprudence. Nor have they addressed the case where 
the seller has broken his obligations to hand over the documents in accordance with the 
requirements of documentary sale contracts. 
The following section aims to show where the buyer may be entitled to resort to one or 
both of these two remedies, how the consequences of the seller's failure to fulfil his duties to 
tender documents could be analysed under ShPah law and how one can reconcile the seller's 
right to cure with the general principles of ShPah contract law. 
2.0. Part One. Withholding Performance 
2.1. Introduction 
As indicated above, ShPah jurists have in some instances recognised that the buyer who is 
aggrieved by the seller's breach is entitled to withhold performance. However, the position of 
the right to withhold performance as a general right is not quite clear. For instance, in the case 
of the seller's failure to deliver mabi'the jurists speak of haqq-e-habs, whereas in the case of 
4 See e. g., Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 312; TWddi, M. A., and Khaci, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 592; 
Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 371-372. Ile only jurist who disagreed with this well-settlcd view is 
Muhaggheq Ardebili, in Sharh al-ErshAd, (as cited in: NaJafl, U R, (1981) vol. 23, at 146. For criticise on 
this view see, Shahidi, M. F., (1375 H. Q) at 617. 
See e. g., Yazdi, S. M. Y-, (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 70; Iravini, A., (1379 H. Q) vol. 2 at 50; Tahidi, M. A., and 
Khffe4 S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 60; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) vol. 4 at 419. 'See e. g., Ansari, K (1375 H. Q. ) at 283; Khumayni, S. PL M., (1363 H. S. ) vol. 5 at 209; Shirazi, N. M., (1413 
H. Q. ) vol. I at 38-39. 
7 Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) vol. 4 at 419. 
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seller's non-conforming delivery they talk of haqq-e-radd. Apart from using different 
terminologies, they have not answered the question whether the latter is a particular form of a 
general right to withhold performance, or something else. And if it is not so, on what ground 
should it be based? 
It seems that the availability of this remedy, as a general rule, should be analysed on the 
division of contracts into uqfld mua ývwad (synallagmatic contracts) and uqUd qayr- 
mua'wwad or tabarra'i (nudum pactum) on the one hand, and classification of contractual 
obligations into eltezdm-e-asli (literally, principal obligation) and eltez. 71m-e-Jarei (literally, 
collateral or subordinate obligation), on the other hand. For, as will be seen later in detail, 
Shi'ah jurists have justified the remedy of refusal to perform on the ground of the theory of 
mutuality of obligations on the one hand, and have said that such mutuality only exists 
between principal obligations rather than between them and subordinate ones, on the other 
hand. 
Accordingly, before entering into examination of the circumstances where this remedy 
may be available, it seems necessary to consider two preliminary issues: classification of 
contracts and of contractual obligations. The topics have ran-dfications that go beyond the 
scope of the study, but there will be an attempt, so far as intelligibility allows, to limit the 
discussion to what exploration of this remedy requires. 
2.1.1. Classification of Contracts 
One of the significant classifications of contracts is the distinction between muaWwadand 
tabarrue'i contracts. Under the first type both parties to the contract undertake an obligation. 
The contract of sale is a typical muaWadcontract in ShPah jurisprudence so that almost all 
rules applicable to such contracts are examined under this heading. in contrast, under the 
second category only one of the parties undertakes an obligation to do or forbear to do 
something! UqCd muaWad themselves are divided into two divisions. Under the first 
division, the contract is only bilateral, in the sense that each party undertakes an obligation!, 
whereas under the second, the contract is not only bilateral but has the characteristic that each 
8 As an example of the second category reference can be made to the contract of donation. See e. g., IsfahAni, S. 
A., and Gulpaygdni, S. M. R., (1977) vol. 2 127 
Such as hebeh-e-muawwad (bilateral donation) (see, e. g., I. C. C. Art. 801). In this type of the contract two 
obligations are not exchanged with each other, but they are two independent obligations. However, if the 
donee fails to perform his contractual obligation the donor is entitled to require him to fulfil his duty otherwise 
he can terminate the contract on the ground of the option of kheyar-e-takhalluf an al- shart (unfulfilled 
condition). See e. g., Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 80; TDhidi, M. A., and Kh-aei, S. A. (1369 H. S. ) vol. 3, at 14. 
Isfahani, S. A-, and Gulpaygdni, S. M. R., (1977), vol. 2 at 129 (question no. 11); Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 2 
at 52 (question no. 11). 
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party undertakes an obligation vis-i-vis the other party because the latter has undertaken an 
obligation in his favour. " It follows that each party's duty is tied to the other's. " 
As far as the remedy of withholding performance is concerned, the latter is the most 
significant category. The synallagmatic nature of such contracts is said to be 'generic' and 
'functional'. The first concept refers to the creation of contract (in the sense that it will fail to 
come into existence if either of the two promised performances is impossible)" and the second 
to its performance, i. e., failure by one party to perform his part of the promised exchange will 
justify the other party's refusal to perform. 
2.1.2. Classification of Contractual Obligations 
The parties' obligations under a reciprocal contract are classified into two general categories: 
eltemim-e-ash (principal obligation) and eltez&n-e-fard (collateral or subordinate 
13 
obligation). 
2.1.2.1. Eltaffm-e-Asli (Principal Obligation) 
The term is used to describe those obligations which constitute the heart of the contract and 
play a central role for making the contract. As an example, in a sale contract the basic aim of 
the seller and buyer is to exchange the goods against the price. On this basis, the seller's duty 
to deliver goods and the buyer's duty to pay the price are regarded as "principal" obligations. 
Referring to this concept, the jurists have concentrated only on the seller's duty to 
deliver the subject of sale and the buyer's duty to pay the price; they have failed to answer the 
question whether the buyer is under a fiirther principal duty to accept (not reject) the goods the 
seller delivers in performance of the contract. It seems that this is a crucial question, a clear 
answer to which will clarify the position of the buyer's right to reject the non-conforming 
delivery (i. e., haqq-e-radd) under this legal system. As will be explained later, the buyer's 
duty to accept the seller's delivery should be regarded as a principal obligation which is 
undertaken in exchange for the seller's duty to deliver in accordance with the contract terms. 
Accordingly, these two obligations should also be regarded as principal obligations under a 
sale contract. 
10 For this reason the jurists defte the contract of sale "Disposition of res (a ýw) in return for a known 
consideration", (see e. g., Ans, %i, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 79; I. C. C. Art. 338. ). 
11 All expressions such as: (Mu'rtwa&h), (mubadalah), (mu'A'maleh), and (ewada)m), in the jurisprudential text 
books, indeedý are used to indicate such a nature of the reciprocal contracts. 
12 See e. g., NaJafi, M. H., (1981) vol. 22 at 390; Ansiri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 185; NaJafi, M., and, Ndeini, M. H., 
(1373 H. Q. ) vol. I at 378-, Gharavi Isfahard, M. H., (1408 H. Q. ) vol. I at 201-2. See also, hnAmi, S. H., (1363 
H. S. ) at 219-220; KAtflziAn, N., (1992) vol. I at 30,36 and 140-142; KAtozian, N. (1990) vol. 4 at 83-86. For 
this reason Art. 348 of I. C. C. states- "The sale of something which is not within the seller's power to deliver is 
null and void. " 
13 See e. g., Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) vol. 4 at 375. 
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2.1.2.2. Eltagm-e-Fare'i (Subordinate Obligation) 
The theory of "subordinate obligation" and its relation to the principal ones, in particular, the 
effects of void subordinate obligations is one of the most complicated and controversial areas 
of ShPah contract law. A fill consideration of the issue is beyond the scope of the present 
research and requires a separate work. However, as far as the remedy of withholding 
performance is concerned, some significant aspects of the theory will be examined. 
"Subordinate" obligations refer to those obligations which are technically collateral to 
the principal obligations. In the language of the jurists, they are those contractual obligations 
which are not exchanged with the principal obligations, but whose main role is to restrict or 
detennine the scope of the principal obligations. For instance, Shaykh Murtadd Ans5ri, a 
leading ShVah jurist, observes: 
"Shart (subordinate obligation) is only for the purpose of conditioning a principal 
obligation. It is not exchanged with a part of the consideration. The exchange is only 
made between two considerations (goods and price). Condition (in his words, qayd) is 
not regarded as property (mlo to be exchanged with other property, although the value 
of consideration may be changed for it. ', 14 
"Subordinate" obligations are often described by the term shart, pl. shurat (stipulation 
within the contract). " As with the tenn "condition in English law which is used in different 
meanings, the term shart in ShPah law is used in different senses. " As far as the present study 
is concerned, the most important meaning of the term is that which is used to describe an 
eltezdm (covenant or agreement) within another eltezam (a main covenant). 17 Shart in this 
sense is divided into three types: (1) shart-e-sefat; (2) shart-e-fe 7; and (3) shart-e-natijah. ` 
14 See Ansdiri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 285, see also at 286 in which he says in clear words: " An undertaking, when 
is classified as shart is not exchanged with the consideration! '. See also, NaJafi, M., and, Ndeini, M. H., 
(1358 RQ) vol. 2 at 138; and 142 and seq.; Gharavi Isfahani, M. H.. (1408 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 159; Midi, M. 
A-, and Klinei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7, at 376; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 226,238; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. 
Q. ) vol. 4 at 444,450. See in contrastý Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 130 
It seems that the reason of calling such an obligation as 'shart (literally, condition) is that it is, in fact, 
undertaken as a subsidiary obligation (as opposed to the principal one), and the enforceability of the principal 
obligation is qualified by performance of such an obligation. 
See generally, ImAmi, S. H., (1363 H. S. ) vol. I at 268; KAtazidn, (1989) vol. 3 at. 122. 
17 The term is sometimes used in the sense of an "event" when the jurists describe a conditional contract or an 
obligation. In this sense, the term "sharf' is used to refer to an event on which the existence of a principal 
obligation or the occurrence of the whole contract depends (see in this respect, Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 99; 
Shahradi, S. A. and, Khilei, S. A., (1409 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 134 and seq.; Shirazi, N. M., (1413 H. Q. ) vol. I at 
143 and seq. See also, Katozian, (1989) vol. 3 at 124-5. 
18 See generally, Ans, %i, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 283; Tflhidi, M. A., and Khdei, S. A., (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7, at 359-360; 
KatfWan, N., (1989) vol. 3, at 154. Since shart-e-natijeh has no relevance to the present study, it is not 
examined here. It is only used to refer to terms under which a particular juristic act occurs when the main 
contract is validly concluded (see e. g., I. C. C., Art. 234 (2)). The main emphasis of this part of the study is on 
the consequences of breach of the two other categories. 
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(A) Shart-e-Sefat 
The expression is used to refer to any term indicating characteristics which define the subject- 
matter of contract, such as terms indicating the quality", quantity and other characteristics. " 
The expression "shart-e-sefat" is, however, only used in the case of sale of specific goods. In 
the case of sale of unascertained goods, it is said that use of the term is technically 
inaccurate. " The reason is that where the contract is for unascertained goods a promise about 
quality etc. defines the seller's duty to deliver rather than the goods, since the goods to be used 
in performance of the contract are not yet identified by the contract terms. The seller's 
statement of quality etc. must be a promise relating to his future conduct -I will deliver goods 
of a certain quality - not a promise of existing fact. ' Accordingly, such a duty is in fact to be 
placed into the category of shart-e-fe 7 rather than shart-e-sefat. " 
(B) Shart-e-Fe'l 
This expression is used to describe terms indicating a promise to do or refrain to do 
something. " Unlike shart-e-sefat which is commonly used to refer to all descriptions made in 
defining the subject-matter of the contract, shart-e- fe 7 is used to refer to an obligation 
undertaken by one of the contracting parties within a contract to perform or refrain from doing 
a particular act. Any shart requiring the promisor to do a positive act in favour of a 
contracting party or even a third party is placed into this category. Accordingly, a seller's 
obligation to ship the goods within the contract time, or to notify the buyer of the consignment 
where the goods are not clearly identified to the contract, or a c. i. f. seller's obligation to 
arrange a contract with a carrier for transportation of goods to the buyer's destination or his 
19 It should be noted that technically, the jurists use a particular term, that is, wasf-e-salamat (literally, health) 
or wasf-e-sehhat (literally, correctness) to describe the 'quality' of the subject of sale. 
20 See generally, Ansdri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 283; TOhidi, M. A., and Kh-dei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7, at 359-360; 
I. C. C., Art. 234 (1). In comparison, the terms "shart-e-sefat" and "sehhat" in Shilah law may be likened to 
those terms referred to in ss. 13-15 of the English Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
21 A general examination of what the jurists have statcd, %hcu discussing shurat, kheyar-e-? Vayat (the option of 
inspection) and kheyar-e-takhallufan al- shart ( the option of unfulfilled condition) will make clear the point 
(see e. g., Anski, M (1375 H. Q. ) at 283,285 and 249). In Iranian law, see Imarni, S. H., (1363 H. S. ) vol. I at 
282 who suggested that the term "shart-e-sefat" used by Art. 234 of the Iranian Civil Code is to be restricted 
to the case of contract for sale of specific goods. In contrast see, KataziAn, N., (1989) vol. 3 at 149. 
The view can also be supported by the statements of some jurists who, raising the theory of shart within the 
grounds of termination (options), describe shart-e-sefat as the terms indicating the characteristics of specific 
goods See e. g., Ansdri, M. (1375 I-I. Q. ) at 283; Bujnilrdi, K H., (1389 H. Q) vol. 3 at 259. 
It seems that this is perhaps the reason why almost all the jurists hold that in the case of sale of unasccrtained 
goods the mere lack of conformity does not entitle the buyer to terminate the contract, but only to require the 
seller to deliver goods conforming with the contract terms, since the seller is able to select some other 
consigiizzient which conform to the required conditions. Whereas, in the case of specific goods since the seller 
cannot be required to deliver conforming goods, the buyer is given an immediate right to terminate the 
contract 
See generally, Ansdri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 283; TOhidi, M. A-, and Khaei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7, at 359; 
I. C. C., Art. 234 (3). 
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duty to make a contract with an insurance company to insure the goods in transit as well as his 
obligation to transfer the relevant shipping documents are to be placed into this category. 
2.2. Buyer's Right to Withhold Performance 
As pointed out above, although in the case of the seller's failure to deliver goods the jurists 
have expressly recognised that the aggrieved buyer has a right to refuse to perform his 
payment obligation, they have failed to answer the question whether he has a general right to 
withhold performance of his obligations where the seller has failed to perform his delivery 
obligations in accordance with the contract terms. Whether the buyer has or has not a general 
right to withhold performance without being required, (and in some cases without being 
entitled) to terminate the contract seems to be analysed on the legal bases upon which the 
jurists have justified the buyer's right to refuse to pay. Examination of them will help as to 
understand whether or not the logic behind the right is of general application. 
2.2.1. Theoretical bases of the Right 
Although the jurists have not examined the legal base of haqq-e-habs in detail, they have 
occasionally referred to the legal ground upon which this right is to be based. In this respect, 
some jurists have observed that the right is to be justified on the ground of the theory of shart- 
e-&mni (implied stipulation). That is to say, at the time of making the contract, as each party 
expressly undertakes an obligation to do something in exchange for the other's undertaking, 
each of them also impliedly promises to perform his obligation simultaneously in exchange for 
the other party's performance. For instance, the late Shaykh Ansdri says: 
"Some jurists have expressly said that there is no dissenting view between Shilah 
jurists as to 'haqq-e-habs' for a party where the other has refused to perform. This is 
perhaps because the contract of sale is based on the 'concurrent performance'. That is, 
two performances must be made in exchange of each other. Accordingly, either party 
has undertaken to perform his obligation at the same time when the other performs 
and he is allowed to refuse when the other refuses. " 25 
In contrast, some statements can be found which show that some jurists are inclined to justify 
the right on the theory of mutuality of obligations; the right of refusal is justified by the very 
nature of a aqd-e- mua ývwad For instance, Shaykh Muhammad Hassan Najafi (S5heb 
Jawaher), in justi4ing the view that the performance of counter-obligations must be made at 
25 See AnsZui, U (1375 RQ. ) at 312). See also, Gharavi IsfahAni, M. H., (1408 H. Q. ) vol. 2, at 198-199 (in 
which the late Kumpani explains this theory in very detail); Najafi, M., and, Naeini, M. H., (1358 H. Q. ) vol. 2 
at 188; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 371. 
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the same time, observes that it is because of the reciprocal nature of transaction. " Sin-fflarly, 
the prominent Shiah jurist, the late Mirza Habibullih Rashti, explains this doctrine in clearer 
words: 
"One of the well-accepted principles between Shiah jurists, as they stated in the 
contract of sale as a typical synallagmatic contract, is that the nature of reciprocal 
contract requires that two performances must be made concurrently". 27 
As was seen, the first approach is based on a presumed mutual agreement on the part of 
the contract makers. It seems, however, that it is hard to prove that in any case it is impliedly 
agreed that the parties will perform at the same time. Although the parties at the time of 
concluding the contract are thinking of an entire performance of the obligations which they 
have undertaken, it adds nothing to the common concept of the reciprocal contract. To gain 
and benefit from the other party's performance is, indeed, the motive of each party in making 
the contract. But, that does not mean that the parties have in fact mutually agreed to perform 
their obligations concurrently in exchange for each other. " Tbus, it seems that the best way to 
justify the right is to analyse it on the basis of the nature and definition of a synallagmatic; 
contract. As explained earlier, aqd-e- muawwad consists not merely of two separate 
obligations, but contains the exchange of two reciprocal promises at the stage both of 
formation and of performance of the contract. In both stages, the parties' counter-obligations 
are correlated together. 
(A) Consequences of Correlation of Obligations 
The correlation of the parties' obligations under a synallagmatic contract has a number of 
consequences, the most significant being that these obligations are exchanged with each other, 
both at the stage of formation of contract and at the stage of performance. Failure of one of 
them at the stage of formation may result in the nullity of the contract and at the stage of 
performance, any failure on the part of one contracting parties will entitle the other to 
withhold performance of his part. 29 
26 NaJafi, U R, (1981) vol. 23, at 144 ("Apparently, since the contract is a synallaginatic contract it is 
necessary that the performance must be made concurrently. As the ownership of the considerations is 
transferred so. " 
' See Rashti., U H., al- Ijarah, at I 11. See also, Ale Bahr al- U'lam, S. M., (1396 H. G. ) vol. I at 157; Imffmi, 
S. R, (1363 H. S. ) vol. I at 458; Sanhtry, A., vol. I at 730-1. 
28 See also, Khurasani, M. K., (1406 H. Q. ) at 275 where this jurist, in a short comment on Ansiri's statement 
quoted above, said that the contract does not contain such an implied undertaking. 
29 Although Shiah jurists expressly justify the remedy of withholding performance on the theory of mutuality of 
obligations, they have not expressly referred to the principle of correlation of reciprocal obligations under a 
synallagmatic contract Nonetheless they have adopted the logical consequences of the principle in different 
places. See generally, Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 185; Najafi, M., and, Nacini, M. H., (1373 H. Q. ) vol. I at 
378; Gharavi Isfahani, M. H., (1408 H. Q. ) vol. I at 201-2; Imami, S. H., (1363 H. S. ) at 219-220; KlWziý 
N., (1990) vol. 4 at 83-6 and 109-112; KAtazian, N., (1992) vol. I at 36). It is to be recalled that I. C. C. does 
not indicate any express statement as to this principle. However, a close consideration of the legal grounds of 
Arts. 377 and 1085 (concerning the right of refusal) and Arts. 238 and 239 (regarding the innocent party's 
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(B) Correlation of Obligations and Subordinate Obligations 
However, as already stated, the common view is that the correlation only exists between the 
principal obligations. The subordinate obligations are only for the purpose of defining the 
principal obligations. They only influence the parties in maldng the contract and from the 
point of view of their mutual intention they are less important, even though they may in fact be 
more significant. They are not exchanged with the principal, or part of, principal obligations. 
For this reason, it is said that where the parties to a contract of donation make a stipulation 
within the contract that the donee is to do some thing in favour of the donor it will not change 
the nature of the contract of donation into a reciprocal contract. This is because the mutual 
intention of the parties is that the subject-matter of the "condition" is not exchanged with that 
of the donation contract, even though it costs much more than the subject-matter of the 
30 contract of donation. 
2.2.2. When Can the Buyer Withhold? 
Having examined the concept of the remedy and its legal bases in general, it is now time to 
answer the question: when is the buyer entitled to withhold performance of his obligation on 
account of the sellees breach? As seen above, where the seller wholly fails to deliver, the 
buyer may refuse to pay the price as long as the seller's refusal continues. However, the 
position is not quite clear when the seller performs his delivery obligations in a way which 
does not conform with the contract conditions. The following discussion will try to ascertain in 
what circumstances the buyer may be entitled to withhold performance of his obligations on 
account of the seller's non-conforming delivery. 
2.2.2.1. Non-Conforming Delivery 
As already indicated, Shiah jurists simply say that if the seller delivers non-conforming goods 
the buyer is entitled to reject them, but they do not explain why, or what degree of non- 
conformity will entitle him to do so. The question may become more serious taking into 
account the fact that the jurists have only recognised, the right of refusal (haqq-e-habs) where 
a reciprocal obligation is broken, whereas, non-confonnity is always caused by breach of a 
right to require the refusing party to perform his contractual obligations) as well as Art. 387 (relating to the 
automatic termination of the contract in the case of the impossibility of performing one of the reciprocal 
obligations) reveals that this Code has impliedly adopted the principle of correlation of obligations under a 
synallagmatic contract. See in this regard: - Imami, S. R, (1363 H. S. ) vol. I at 225-226. 
3' On this basis, it is said that where the shart is null it does not, except in some exceptional cases, make the 
main contract void (see Ansari, K (1375 H. Q. ) at 287 and seT, Khumayni, S. R. M. (1362 H. S. ) vol. 5 at 
243; Midi, NL A., and Khxlei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 389 and seq.; TabrizL J., (1412 H. Q. ) vol. 4 at 
455), while in the case of nullity or impossibility of the performance of one of the principal obligations the 
contract would be void (see Ansdri, M (1375 H. Q. ) at 185; Najafi, Nt, and, NfLeini, M. H., (1373 H. Q. ) vol. 
I at 378-379). 
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contract term (shart) which is commonly regarded as a subordinate obligation. In the absence 
of a clear jurisprudential statement it is therefore necessary to examine the case on the basis of 
general principles prescribed above. 
A close examination of the jurists' judgements in respect of the buyer's right to reject 
the non-conforming delivery, on the one hand, and the principle of correlation of reciprocal 
obligations, on the other hand, demonstrates that the buyer has a general right to withhold 
performance of his obligation under certain circumstances where the goods delivered do not 
conforin with the contract requirements. However, the crucial task is to determine whether or 
not the seller's duty to deliver the goods in accordance with the contract terms is a reciprocal 
duty and if it is so, with what duty of the buyer it is exchanged? 
2.2.2.2. Non-Conforming Delivery and the Theory of EltezRmAt-e-Mua'wwad 
As explained above, a common understanding among ShVah jurists is that all obligations 
arising from shurat within a sale contract (as a typical synallagmatic contract in Shiah 
jurisprudence) are subordinate obligations rather than reciprocal duties, although undertaking 
such obligations may result in a considerable increase of the amount of the other partys 
obligations. Therefore, there would be no bilateral correlation between those obligations and 
the principal obligations the contract itself requires. As a result, failure to perform them will 
not in principle give the aggrieved promisee haqq-e-habs. 11 For example, the seller's obligation 
under a shart indicating the required quality, quantity, time performance and other 
specifications of the goods sold is not regarded as a principal obligation or part of such an 
obligation which is exchanged with the buyer's duty to pay the price or some part of it but 
simply defines the seller's duty to deliver. " On this construction, it is said that the seller's 
failure to deliver goods in accordance with the contract terms does not entitle the buyer to 
haqq-e-habs. 1 Nevertheless, almost all of them accept the view that where the seller delivers 
goods contrary to the contract description or quality the buyer is entitled to haqq-e-radd 
(reject the goods). But they do not explain the nature of the right to reject the seller's non- 
conforming delivery and the reason why the buyer is entitled to such a right. 
The crucial point is, therefore, to determine the legal ground upon which the buyer's 
right to reject is based. Analysing this right shows that it is not a separate remedy but is in fact 
a form of the general right to withhold performance, justified on the basis of the theory of 
31 See e. g., Ansari, K (1375 H. Q. ) at 285 and 286; Najafi, M., and, Nacini, U H., (1358 H. Q. ) Vol. 2 at 137- 
138 and 142-144; Khurnayniý S. R. M., vol. 5, at 225-6 and 23843; Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2, at 
129-31; Y. Atiazidn, N. (1990) 9 vol. 4 at 84; Kitazian, N. (1989) vol. 3 at 141. 3' This rule is stated in Shilah jurisprudence: "laysa leshshart-e-qhestun men al thaman" (No part of the 
consideration is exchanged with shart. ). See in this respect, Ans"Iri, M., (1375 H. Q. ) at 286. 33 See e. g., KAtazidn, N., (1989) vol. 3 at 90-9 1. 
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correlation between two reciprocal obligations, that is, the seller's duty to deliver goods in 
accordance with the contract terms and the buyer's duty to accept such a delivery. The 
common view, concentrating on the buyer's duty to pay the price in exchange for the seller's 
duty to deliver goods, fails to take into account the buyer's duty to accept what the seller 
renders in performance of his delivery obligation. It is true that the seller's obligations under 
shurat are not exchanged with a part of the buyer's reciprocal duty to pay the price. However, 
the position is not so clear in respect of the buyer's duty to accept what the seller tenders in 
performance of his delivery obligation. A close analysis of the nature and definition of the sale 
contract as a synallagmatic contract demonstrates that both the seller and buyer are under two 
reciprocal obligations against each other. 
To explain, although Shiah jurists have not expressly examined the buyer's duty to 
accept the seller's delivery, it seems that a validly concluded sale contract imposes such an 
obligation on the buyer. ' The buyer's obligation to accept can be proved by the following. 
First, in the context of a contract for sale of unascertained goods, where the seller's tender 
does not conform to the contract terms the buyer is given a right to reject it and request a 
further tender, whereas if the seller's tender conforms to the contract terms the buyer is not 
entitled to reject. " Acceptance of the fact that in some cases the buyer is not entitled to reject 
the seller's tender shows that he has a duty to accept it. Second, where the buyer rejects the 
seller's conforming tender the seller is entitled to apply to the court to require him to accept 
them. ' It can also be proved by the principle of ufa bel WqCd. " The buyer's refusal to accept 
the seller's delivery would be a contravention of the contract and against the above principle. 
However, the question is for what duty of the seller is this duty exchanged? It seems 
that such an obligation is undertaken in exchange for the seller's obligation to perform his 
delivery obligation in accordance with the contract terms. Put in other words, a sale contract 
imposes on each party two reciprocal obligations vis-A-vis the other. The seller is required to 
deliver the goods and to ensure that the delivery is in accordance with the contract terms and 
the buyer is also obliged to accept them and pay in exchange for such a performance. These 
two obligations on the both sides are to be performed at the same time. Thus, as long as the 
3' The duty to accept has been expressly addressed in the case of payment of the price and other monetary debts. 
See e. g., Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 306. However, the late Sayyed Yazdi recognises the duty to accept in a 
general form (see Yazdi, S. M. K, (1378 H. Q) vol. 2, at 178-179. See also, Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 554. 
In Iranian Civil Code the buyer's duty to accept can be inferred from Art. 273. 
35 See e. g., Makki, M. (Shahid Awwal), and Ameli, Z. (Shahid Thini), f 1309 H. Q. ) vol. I at 364; GulpdygAni, 
S. UKM., (1371 H. S. ) at 359 questions 2122,2123; Khumayni, S. R. M., (1369 H. S. ) at 371, questions 
2114,2115. 
36 See Katazidn, (1992) vol. I at 167. 
37 The principle has also been relied on by the late Sayyed Yazdi for this purpose (see Yazdi, S. M. K, (1378 
RQ) vol. 2, at 179) where he says "the requirement of performance (waja' bel aqd) means delivery (dafa') 
and acceptance (qabWy'. 
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seller has not delivered goods corresponding with the contract requirements the buyer cannot 
be required to perform his acceptance obligation. 
2.2.2.3. What Degree of Non-Conformity Gives Rise to the Right? 
Assuming that the buyer has a general right to refuse to accept the seller's non-conforming 
delivery, a further question is: under what circumstances is the buyer entitled to refuse to 
accept it? Can he reject for any non-conformity or only where the non-conformity attains a 
certain degree of seriousness? No clear statement can be found in ShVah jurisprudence in this 
connection. The only thing which may afford some help for this purpose is the jurists' 
discussions about the concept of a: yb (defect) which gives rise to the 'option of defect' 
(kheyffr-e-a ýb) including the right to reject and terminate the contract. In that case, after great 
efforts to produce a precise definition for the term "a ýF giving rise to the 'option of defect', 
they eventually adopted the view that the case must be referred to the court to decide 
according to the relevant custom (Wrfi. m However, as their discussion shows in that case, the 
given criterion has only been applied to ascertain whether the goods delivered are defective or 
not. It has not been extended to the case of other lack of conformity. In addition, they have 
examined it under the heading of "the option of defecf' under which the buyer is given the 
right to reject the defective goods and terminate the contract. They have not distinguished 
between the right to reject and that of termination. Apparently, the same defect which gives 
rise to the right of rejection entitles the buyer to terminate the contract. Third, since the option 
of defect, as will be seen later, is only applied to the case of specific goods, the position of 
unascertained goods is not clear. As will be seen in detail in the second part, in the case of 
unascertained goods the buyer is only given a right to refuse to accept the non-conforming 
tender. But, it has not been made clear for what non-confom-dty the buyer should be given a 
right to reject. " 
One may argue that the general theories explained as to the case of non-delivery should 
be applied to the case of non-conforming delivery, since, as described above, rejection is a 
form of the remedy of withholding performance. Adoption of each of the two above-mentioned 
theories would result in different consequences. If it is accepted that withholding performance 
is to be justified on the basis of the theory of shart-e-&mni (implied stipulation) any lack of 
conformity will entitle the buyer to reject. In contrast, if the second approach is adopted it 
See for this purpose, Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 265 and seq., in particular, p. 267 in which the late Ansrui 
refers eventually definition of the term to the custom of traders. The same criterion has been adopted by other 
jurists. See e. g., TfIhidi, M. A., and KhOei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) Vol. 7 at 237 and seq., particularly, p. 247; 
Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 118 and seq.; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 349. 
39 However, under I. C. C. whether or not the buyer is entitled to refuse to accept the seller's non-conforming 
performance is left to the court to decide according to the relevant custom (see Art. 279). 
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cannot be said that the nature of the reciprocal contract requires that any party should have 
the right to refuse to accept the other's performance for any lack of conformity. However, 
assuming that custom, as the jurists suggest in the case of defective delivery, is a general 
criterion applicable to all cases may afford some criterion. On this approach, it is suggested 
that the buyer should not be given a right to reject for minor non-conformity but only where 
the lack of conformity attains such a degree of seriousness that it is not customarily ignored. 
This suggestion not only favours safeguarding the contractual relationships against minor non- 
conformity but also can be justified on the basis of the general principle of ufa bel u'qw 
under which the buyer is obliged to accept the seller's delivery. This principle should be 
disregarded only when the lack of conformity between the contract goods and what actually 
delivered attains some degree of seriousness, since it is in such circumstances the principle of 
1i darar"comes into operation and allows the buyer to treat himself as discharged from his 
duty to accept. Whereas, when the non-conformity is minor it is doubted whether the buyer is 
required to continue his performance. In such a situation the principle of isteshaib comes into 
operation in favour of the principle of ufd bel uqW. Accordingly, it is suggested that in any 
case the court should look at the effects of the non-conformity to ascertain whether they are 
such that rejection would be customarily unreasonable for the buyer. If so, the buyer will not 
be able to justify his rejection. 
If this suggestion is accepted the buyer's right to reject the seller's non-conforming 
delivery should be distinguished from his right to treat himself as discharged from the contract 
and terminate it. Termination, as will be seen later, is an exception to the principle of uf17 bel 
u'qW and will be justified by taking into account various factors, such as the actual and 
foreseeable diarars, the seller's ability and willingness to cure and the practicality of requiring 
the seller to perform his obligations. 
2.2.3. Delivery of Partial non-Conforming Goods or Wrong Quantity 
The preceding discussions were concerned with the buyer's right of refusal where the seller 
delivers the right quantity of goods none of which confonns to the contract. The present 
discussion deals with the cases where the seller (a) delivers the whole contract quantity but 
only part conforms to the contract or (b) delivers the wrong quantity. In this case the following 
questions arise: 
I This principle is based on the statement of the Prophet of Islam who said "la darar wa la &rArfi al- Islam 
(No detrimental decree is provided in Islam. )". The concept of the statement, as will be seen when dealing 
with the legal grounds for claim of damages (see Section Three, 2.2.3. ), is controversial between the jurists. 
However, according to most of the commentators on the principle, the principle comes into operation in order 
to negative a harmful religious rule. 
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(i) whether the buyer is entitled to refuse to accept the seller's non-conforming delivery; 
(ii) assuming that the buyer is entitled to reject, whether the buyer can accept the 
conforming and reject the defective part, or accept the lesser quantity and refuse to pay 
for the non-delivered part; 
(iii) whether the buyer is entitled to terminate the contract in respect of the non- 
conforming 
part or missing part. 
In the following, the two first questions are examined under two separate headings: partial 
non-conforming delivery and wrong quantity delivery. The third question will be discussed in 
the second part of this section when dealing with partial termination. 
2.2.3.1. Partial Non-Conforming Delivery 
The jurists have not addressed directly the question whether the buyer has the right to withhold 
performance of his obligations where the seller has delivered a partially non-conforming 
delivery. What they have discussed is whether the seller's partially defective delivery would 
result in the right to terminate a contract for sale of specific goods. However, in that case no 
jurist has disputed the buyer's right to reject and terminate the contract as a whole. Any 
dispute is concerned with the buyer's right to terminate the contract as to the part affected.. " 
A number of them suggested that the buyer can only accept or reject all, and may not accept 
the conforming and reject the non-conforming part. " In contrast, others suggested that the 
buyer is entitled to reject non-conforming goods and retain the rest. 43However, as their 
discussions show, the subject of discussion is only the case where the seller of specific goods 
has delivered goods some of which do not conform to the contract quality. They have not 
addressed the case where the seller of unascertained goods has tendered goods part of which 
conform to the contract conditions, or where the seller of specific goods has delivered goods 
part of which does not conform with the contract terms other than the quality one. 
A general look at their discussions as to the issue shows that the subject of discussion 
has not been clarified. There is some confusion between several entirely different issues. 
Accordingly, in order to answer the questions it is necessary to determine the reason why they 
have taken different opinions. What is certain is that where the contract is for sale of a non- 
41 See e. g., Ansrui, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 258; Yazdi, S. M. K, (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 81; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 
5, at 56; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 298-299. 
42 Helli, M. M. (Allknah Helli), and, Ameli, S. M. I H., vol. 4 at 629-630, and 660; Bahrkii, Y., vol. 19 at 90; 
Ansiri, U (1375 H. Q. ) at 258-259; Yazdi, S. M. Y-, (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 81; Khalkhali, S. M. Y-, & Rashti, 
U H., (1407 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 627 (in which he claims that he could not identify a jurist who disagreed with 
this view) and 629-630; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 56. lie same view is accepted in Art. 431 of the I. C. 
C. 
See e. g., Gharavi Isfahdni, M. H., (1408 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 108; Midi, U A., and Kh-aei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) 
vol. 7 at 146 and seq.; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 299-300. 
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severable item any breach of contract conditions in respect of any part of it will be treated as a 
breach of the whole contract giving rise to a right to reject it. In such a case, almost all the 
jurists have no doubt that the buyer should not be given the right to accept the conforming and 
reject the non-conforming part. " Conversely, where the contract is for sale of several 
identified things each of which is exchanged for a certain portion of the contract price it hýs 
not been questioned that the buyer is entitled to do so. "' In fact in such cases there are a series 
of certain separate contracts each of which has a separate subject-matter. The main debate of 
the jurists is in fact concerned with the case where the seller is required to deliver a severable 
consignment such as 1000 cars against a fixed total price without specifying that a certain 
part of the consideration is exchanged with some part of the subject of sale. In such a case, 
where the seller has delivered a consignment part of which does not conform with the contract 
conditions the question arises whether the buyer is entitled to keep the conforming and reject 
the non-conforming part or must either reject or accept all? This is the case where some of the 
jurists favoured the partial rejection and others disagreed with it. ' 
It seems that the different views are in fact due to whether or not the mere severability 
of the subject-matter of contract makes the contract itself severable. The question what 
contracts are severable has not been clearly examined by Shiah jurists. As it appears from 
their discussions as to the buyer's right to terminate the contract in respect of the defective 
part, the mere severability of the subject of sale does not suffice for a contract to be 
severable. ' Shaykh Ansdri gives a general criterion for this purpose. He says: 
"Where more than one consideration is mentioned within the contract the contract 
would be regarded severable. 48 
However, others have questioned this criterion. According to them, a contract would be 
regarded as severable where both parties' performances are severable. "' 
It seems that what is required to make a contract severable is that it can be severed in 
terms of performance so that there is severability of performance on one side and 
consideration for each partial performance on the other, thus creating a contract within a 
contract and making delivery of each severable part a separate, self-contained part of the 
delivery obligation. " 
44 See e. g., Najafi, M. H., (1981) vol. 23 at 248; Khalkhali, S. M. Y-, & Rashti, M. H., (1407 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 
625; TUhidi, X A., and Khfiei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 145; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 299. 45 See e. g., Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 258; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 56. ' See generally, TQddi, M. A., and Khiiei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 146-147. 47 Khalkhali, S. M. K., & Rashti, M. H., (1407 R Q. ) vol. 2 at 64 1; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 57. 48 Ansdri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 25 8. 
See e. g., Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 81, Khalkhali, S. M. K., & Rashti, M. H., (1407 H. Q. ) vol. 2 
at. 640-641. 
See also, TM-ddi, M. A., and Khfiei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 147. 
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On the basis of the above criterion, where a contract is construed as severable any 
breach as to a severable part will in fact amount to a breach of the subsidiary contract relating 
to that particular part, and consequently, the buyer will only be entitled to reject the subject of 
this subsidiary contract. Whereas, if the contract is construed as non-severable the buyer has 
no partial-rejection right, he is only entitled to reject all or accept all. Accordingly, it is the 
coures duty to decide according to the circumstances of any case and the terms of the contract 
itself whether there are several subsidiary contracts within a main contract or only a single 
contract. 
The point which deserves to be noted here is that the jurists have not addressed the 
question under what circumstances the seller's breach of contractual obligations as regards a 
severable part may entitle the buyer to refuse to accept it. It seems that the general principles 
applicable to non-severable contracts should apply to each severable part. That is to say, for 
remedial purposes each severable part is to be regarded as the subject of a distinct contract, 
although within a main contract and the principles applied to a contract containing a single 
delivery obligation apply to such a subsidiary contract. 
2.2.3.2. Delivery of the Wrong Quantity 
The question whether or not the seller's wrong quantity delivery can give the buyer the right to 
refuse to accept has not been separately addressed by the jurists. What they have discussed is 
whether breach of a quantity term would result in the right to tenninate a contract for sale of 
specific item. 51 However, in that case no jurist has disputed the buyer's right to reject and 
tenninate the contract as a whole. Any dispute is concerned with the buyer's right to tenninate 
the contract as to the missing part. 52 
Nevertheless, it is not clear whether the buyer can reject for any shortfall or excess. 
There is no rule such as the English de minimis rule or the test of "unreasonableness" 
provided by s. 30 (2A) of the English Sale of Goods Act 1979 for commercial contracts. 
Accordingly, it might be thought that in Shiah law the buyer may reject for a minor non- 
13 
conformity with the quantity stipulation. 
2.2.4. Seller's Failure as Regards the Shipping Documents 
In the context of international sale transactions, the seller's duty to arrange the proper shipping 
documents and transfer them to the buyer is of great importance. As in the case of goods the 
51 See generally, Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 286-7; Najafi, M., and, Ndeini, M. H., (1358 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 142-44; 
Gharavi Isfahani, M H., (1408 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 162-3; Yazdi, S. M. Y-, (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 129-131, and 
133-135; Midi, M. A., andKhaei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 383-9. See also I. C. C., Art. 384. Irndmi, S. H., 
(1363 H. S. ) vol. I at437-39; Katazimi, N., (1992) vol. I at 120- 126; YAtazi&i, N., (1989) vol. 3, at 210-215. 52 In this respect, see, 3.2.6.2. 
53 For a new suggestion see, Chapter Five, 1.1.3. (Delivery of Wrong Quantity). 
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seller may fail to render the relevant documents to the buyer on due time or the handing over 
may be contrary to the contract conditions. As indicated above, no ShVah jurist has addressed 
the question. It is therefore important to answer the question: how can such an issue be 
analysed within the principles prescribed above? The issue raises a number of questions: 
(a) is the buyer entitled to refuse to pay the price where the seller fails to hand over the 
proper shipping document on due time?; 
(b) is he entitled to refuse to accept non-conforming documents and suspend payment of 
the price?; 
(c) can he terminate the contract for the seller's failure to tender the shipping documents 
in accordance with the contract requirements?; 
(d) assuming that the buyer has the right to reject non-conforming documents, has he a 
further right to reject the defective goods?; and 
(e) assuming that he has both the right to reject documents and goods, how are these 
two rights exercised? 
Some of these questions will be considered later. In this part, the right of refusal will be 
discussed. 
2.2.4.1. Non-Delivery 
In ShPah law, the seller's duty to prepare and hand over proper shipping documents seems to 
be analysed on the basis of the doctrine of shart-e- fe'l, i. e., a stipulation requiring the 
promisor to perform a particular act in favour of the promisee. In this way, the first question 
which arises is whether the seller's duty concerning the shipping documents is a subordinate 
obligation or a principal one. 
A close analysis of the parties' common intention in respect of the arrangement and 
delivery of shipping documents demonstrates that this duty is a reciprocal obligation which is 
fully correlated to the buyer's payment obligation. Furthermore, common sense and custom 
governing documentary sales confirms that the seller's duty to prepare and hand over the 
required documents is of such a character. The parties to a documentary sale contract, in fact, 
deal with documents. The seller receives the price by placing at the disposal of the buyer the 
shipping documents with which the buyer can sell or pledge the goods while they are in transit. 
Therefore, in the parties' view tender of the documents under such contracts is no less 
important than the delivery of the goods themselves in an ordinary sale contract. 
The other question posed here is whether if the seller fails to hand over some of the 
relevant documents, the buyer can refuse to take delivery and suspend payment of the price. It 
is suggested that the buyer should be given such a right, since the customary understanding of 
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a documentary sale is that the buyer only pays for the full set of documents. The rule seems 
more clear where payment must be made by documentary credit under which the bank will 
refuse to pay the seller if the whole documents are not tendered as required by the contract. -' 
2.2.4.2. Non-Conforming Delivery 
The crucial question is concerned with the situation in which the seller hands over documents 
which do not conform to the contract, as for instance, where the seller under a c. i. f. contract 
hands over a bill of lading which does not provide existence of a valid contract of carriage 
from the port of loading to the port of destination, or is not clean, or does not show that the 
goods are loaded at the time and place required by the contract of sale, and so on. Is the buyer, 
in such a situation, entitled to reject the non-conforming documents and refuse to pay the 
price? 
It seems that in such a situation the buyer should be given a right to refuse to accept the 
non-conforming documents. The legal justification for this view is that in a documentary sale 
transaction the seller is under a general obligation to prepare particular documents and hand 
them over to the buyer in accordance with the contract tenns. The buyer is obliged to accept 
and pay in exchange for such a performance. As long as the seller does not tender such a 
performance the buyer is not under any duty to accept and pay for them. 
2.2.4.3. Two Rights of Rejection 
From the above, it appears that the buyer under a documentary sale contract should be given 
the right to reject documents for defects on their face, whether it relates to the goods or 
documents themselves. The question then arises whether the buyer can reject the goods on 
arrival for defects in the goods having accepted documents representing them. It seems that 
where the defect is one which was not apparent on the face of documents he should be entitled 
to reject because his acceptance of the documents was on the basis of the belief that the goods 
would be in accordance with the contract. However, where the defect was apparent on the face 
of documents he would be taken to have accepted the non-conforming goods on the doctrine of 
isq& (waiver) which is discussed in the second part of this section when dealing with the 
circumstances under which the buyer may lose his rights to reject and terminate the contract. 
54 See in this respect, Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits -UCP- (1993 Version), Article 
13 wWch reflects customary law of this area. 
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3.0. Part Two. Termination of Contract 
3.1. Introduction 
ShVah jurists have based termination on a complex system of kheyk& (options). " Under this 
heading they have extensively examined various cases in which an aggrieved party may be 
entitled to tenninate the contract. These cases differ from one book to another. " Some have 
gathered the options under five" others under seven' and a third group have gone fiirther and 
talked of fourteen separate options. " However, it seems that the difference is in codiPyimg the 
headings of options rather than in granting the aggrieved party the right to terminate the 
contract in those circumstances. ". In order to have a general picture of the various 
circumstances identified in the leading text books, all of them will be mentioned below: 
(i) khey, 5-r-e-majlis (the option of the (contract) meeting-place)"; 
(ii) khey&-e-hqyw. 7n (the option of animal)"; 
(iii) khey&-e-taWhir (the option of delayed payment of the consideration)"; 
55 As a matter of terminology, in ShPah law the process of bringing the contract to an end on account of breach 
of contract is described by the tennfaskh and the right to do so is called khey&-e-faskh. The term faskh is 
controversial. Generally, the term has been defmed in two phrases. According to the first, faskh is to put an 
end to a valid contract (see in this respect, Karimi, S. J., and, Amuli, M. H. (1380 H. Q. ) vol. 4 at 23). 
According to the other, the term means "rejection, and, restitution of subject-matter of the contract! ' (see e. g., 
Khurasani, M. K., (1406 H. Q. ) at 266; Gharavi Isfahmd, M. H., (1408 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 45; Khumayni, S. R. 
M., vol. 5 at 258,259,270,271,327,328). The main effect of this difference appears where the subject- 
matter of the contract deteriorates, is consumed or is transferred to a third party. It seems hard to accept the 
view that the concept of termination involves rejection and restoration of the subject-matter of the contract 
Rejection can be an evidence on the intention to terminate the contract; but rejection and restoration of the 
subject-matter is in fact one of the consequences of a valid termination, or, alternatively, one could argue, a 
pre-requisite of a valid termination, but not termination itself. Accordingly, it can be said with certainty that 
the termfaskh is used to describe, the bringing a valid contract into an end. In this sense, the term refers to the 
same concept as the English term "termination". 
56 See generally, Makki, M. (Shahid Awwal), and Ameli, Z. (Shahid Thani), (1309 H. Q. ) vol. I at 372; 
57 
Bahrani, Y., vol. 19, at 3; Ansdri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 216. 
See e. g., Helli, A. N. J. (Muhaqqeq Helli), (1377 H. Q. ) at 100. 
5g See e. g., Ansdri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 216. Almost all jurists after him have also confined to the seven. 
59 See for instance, Makki, M. (Shahid Awwal), and Ameli, Z. (Shahid ThAni), C1309 H. Q. ) vol. I at 372. 
60 
However, Iranian Civil Code has listed those circumstances in ten numbers (see Art. 396). 
See e. g., NaJafl, M. H., (1981) vol. 23, at 3; Ansdri, M., (1375 H. Q. ) at 216; Midi, M. A., and KhOei, S. A- 
(1368 H. S. ) vol. 6 at 56. 
61 This option is clearly defined by Art. 397 of I. C. C. For more information see, Ameli, Z. (Shahid ThAni), vol. 
I at 177; Bahrkd, Y., vol. 19 at 4 and seq.; Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 216. 
62 Art. 398 of 1. C. C. has defixied this option. For a detailed discussion see, Mamaqkd, A., (1345 H. Q. ) at 45 
(who applies, contrary to most jurists, the option to the case of certain unascertained animals), Im&ni, S. H., 
(1363 H. S. ) vol. I at 479). See generally, Ameli, Z. (Shahid Th&-d), vol. I at 178; Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at. 
63 
224; Najafl, M., and, Naeini, M. H., (1358 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 31;. 
See for instance, Ameli, Z. (Shahid Thani), vol. I at 180; Ansiri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 244-247-, TMddi, M. A., 
and Khflei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 4 and 8-19; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 234-245; I. C. C., Arts. 402, 
407). This is only the seller who is entitled to terminate the contract where the buyer delays in payment of the 
price. It is often said that the buyer cannot do so where the seller delays to deliver the goods (see e. g., Najafi, 
M., and, Ndeini, M. H., (1358 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 94; Khalkhali, S. M. K., & Rashti, M. H., (1407 H. Q. ) vol. 2, 
at 542; 1. C. C., Art. 406. This particular option is based on the particular authorities (see in this respect, 
BahrAni, Y., vol. 19, at 44; Ansdri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 244-247; Khalkhali, S. M. K., & Rashti, M. H., (1407 
H. Q. ) vol. 2, at 543-544; Najaf, M., and, Ndeini, M. H., (1358 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 94; TWddi, M. A., and Khoei, 
S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 4-8). 
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(iv) kheyar-e-shart (the option of condition)"; 
(v) kheyAr-e-ghabn (the option of lesion)"; 
(vi) khey&-e-aýb (the option of defect); 
(vii) khey,; r--e- ri7ýat (the option of inspection); 
(viii) khey&-e-takhallufan al- wasf ( the option of incorrect description); 
(ix) kheydr-e-takhallufan al- shart (the option of unfulfilled condition); 
(x) kheydr-e-tadlis (the option of misrepresentation)"; 
(xi) kheyar -e-tabau dsafqah (the option of sales unfulfilled in part)"; 
(xii) kheyZir-e-sherkat (the option of partnership)'; 
(xiii) kheydr-e-teflis (the option of insolvency)"; 
(xiv) kheyar-e-taldhAur-e-tashm (the option of impossibility of performance); and 
(xv) kheydr-e-emtenil (the option of refusal). 
Dealing with termination in this way caused a number of important questions to be left 
unanswered. First, it is not clear what is the relationship between the buyer's right to withhold 
performance and that of termination. More importantly, it has not been made clear what lack 
of conformity will entitle the buyer to terminate the contract. Third, notwithstanding that 
almost all jurists have accepted the view that where the seller of unascertained goods makes a 
non-conforn-iing delivery the buyer has only a right to reject, they have not addressed the 
question whether the seller has a right to cure, and if so, under what circumstances he can 
exercise his right. 
It seems that the best way to deal with the issue is first to identify the grounds upon 
which the above-mentioned options are justified and then to examine the options relevant to 
the issue in question on the basis of their proper rationale and finally to evaluate the relevant 
options in accordance with their proper grounds. 
" See e. g., Ameli, Z. (Shal-dd Thani), vol. I at 179; Anski, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 228-229; I. C. C., Art. 399). 
15 See e. g., Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 234; I. C. C. Art. 416; Katilzian, N., (1990) vol. 5 at 217). 
See c. g., Hclli, M. M. (Allamah Helli), and, Ameli, S. M. J. H., vol. 4 at 644 and 645; Ansdri, M (1375 
H. Q. ) at 398. See also, Katazian, N., (1990) vol. 5, at 326,354; Owsia, P. (1992) at 297; I. C. C., Art. 438. 
67 
' see Bujnflrdi, M. H., (1389 H. Q) vol. 2, at. 137; 
MarAghei, M. F., (1274 H. Q. ) at 194; and seq). 
" See e. g., Makki, M. (Shahid Awwal), and Ameli, Z. (Shahid 115ni), (1309 H. Q. ) vol. I at 386). 
69 See e. g., Makki, M. (Shahid Awwal), and Ameli, Z. (Shahid Thani), (1309 H. Q. ) vol. I at 399, and, 402; 
Najafi, M. H., (1981) vol. 25 at 295; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 580). I. C. C. has no mention of this option but 
see Art. 380. See also, hnAmi, S. H., (1363 H. S. ) vol. I at 527; Katozian, N., (1990) vol. 5 at 393, KAtOziAn,, 
N., (1992) vol. I at 217). It is to be noted that the option is purely for the seller, the buyer cannot enjoy from 
it In the case of the seller's insolvency, the buyer can rely on the option of impossibility of performance. 
See e. g., Shahid Makki, M. (Shahid Awwal), and Amcli, Z. (Shahid Thani), (1309 H. Q. ) vol. 1 386, 
GulpaygAni, S. M. R., (1371 H. S. ) at. 361 (question 2132); Khumayni, S. R. M., (1369 H. S. ) at 373 
(question 2124)). For the position of Iranian Civil Code see, Mtflzian, N., (1989) vol. 3 at 263; Kitilzian, N., 
(1990) vol. 5 at 395. 
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3.2. Grounds for Termination 
3.2.1. General Principle 
It is commonly said that the right of termination in ShVah law is an exception to the dictum 
"asl-e-luzCBn-e- aqd" (pacta sunt servanda) rather than a rule. " An obvious consequence of 
this principle is that so long as the perfonnance of a binding contract is possible the 
contracting parties are required to perform their contractual obligations. According to this 
principle, termination should be the last option given 
to a party aggrieved by the other party's breach. I The victim of breach should be given a right 
to terminate only when he is not able to require the defaulting party to perform his obligations 
in accordance with the contract. The important question is that, if the primary principle is that 
as far as performance of the contract is practicable it should be made, on what rationale is one 
party entitled to terminate the contract unilaterally? 
3.2.2. Grounds for Khey5r5t 
Although the jurists have not examined the issue in separate, a thorough consideration of the 
jurists' arguments in justifying the grant of the option to terminate reveals three general 
principles: rewdyat, shart-e-&mnj and 15 darar. However, few of the above-mentioned 
options are solely based on particular rewayat. 1 Most of them are commonly justified on two 
general theories: that which bases the right of termination on shart-e-&mni (which can be 
described in general as "respect to the mutual will of the contracting parties') and that which 
bases the right on the principle of 19 darar which will be examined later in detail'. If in some 
cases it is seen that the jurists rely on some rewayat, it is to support the general principles 
rather than exclusive rationale. 
A number of jurists have suggested that apart from those options which are based on 
particular rewayat, an option to terminate the contract should in principle be justified on the 
basis of the contents of the contract itself. ' The view is based on the idea that the law should 
71 See e. g., Bahrani, Y., vol. 19 at 3-, Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 214-215; Khalkhali, S. M. K., & Rashti, M. H., 
(1395 R Q. ) vol. I at 50 and seq., KhalkhAli, S. M. Y-, & Rashti, M. H., (1407 It Q. ) vol. 2 at 8 and seq.; 
Najafi, M., and, Ndeini, M. H., (1358 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 4 and seq.; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 4 at 13 and seq; 
Tahidi, M. A., and Khtlei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 6, at 15 and seT, Amuli, M. T. and, Ndeini, M. H., (1413 
H. Q. ) vol. 2. at 10 and seq. Y. Atazidn, (1990) vol. 5 at 55. The principle is primarily based on a Quranic; verse 
which orders all Muslim to respect their contracts, " ufa bel uqCd' (Maedeh, Verse 5) and the saying of the 
Prophet, "at- mumenan enda shurdtehem" (all who believe Islam must respect their obligations (see, Ameli, 
IL, vol. 15, Bab 20, AbvELb al- Muhfir, hadith 4). The principle is expressly recognised in Art. 219 of L C. C. 
72 Such as the option of majlis, the option of animal and that of delayed payment of the consideration as well as 
the options of inspection and defect as some jurists suggesL 
73 See, Section Tlree, 2.2.3. 
74 The approach has been taken particularly in the case of the options of lesion and dcfecL See for instance, 
Ameli, Z. (Shahid ThAni), vol. I at 193; Ansdri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 253,262; Yazdi, S. M. K, (1378 H. Q) 
vol. 2 at 129 (in which the late Sayyed Yazdi has applied the criterion to some other options)-, Gharavi 
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not interfere in this respect but must simply confirm what the contracting parties have agreed 
on. If the contract is to be performed because the parties have so wished, the exception to the 
principle must be justified on the same ground. Basing the option to terminate the contract on 
such a subjecqve criterion, the suppqrters of this view have attempted in any case to ascribe 
the right of termination to the will of the contracting parties themselves. 
In contrast, a considerable number of distinguished jurists have suggested that the 
option to terminate can also be justified on the principle of 15 darar. 11istorically, the principle 
has occasionally been relied on by some jurists, " and presently it is supported by a number of 
eminent jurists in respect of several, options mentioned above. ' According to this approach, 
one does not always have to seek a mutual agreement in order to justify the grant of the right 
of termination, but instead, to determine the scope of the contracting parties' mutual 
agreement and its performance. 
On this approach, where an undue detriment is caused by the buyer's duty to carry on 
his own part under the broken contract the principle of Ij darar comes into operation. Put in 
other way, the contract of sale is a binding (15zim as opposed tojaeiz) contract. "The principle 
of ufd bel uqCd (fulfil your contracts) in principle obliges both contracting parties to 
accomplish their contractual obligations. However, where for the reason of the seller's default 
luzCvn-e- aqd (literally, the decree of necessity to perform the contract) results in imposing an 
undue detriment on the innocent buyer he will be released from such a detrimental decree on 
account of the principle of Ij alarar. 
(A) Different Consequences of Three Principles 
Notwithstanding that the jurists have occasionally referred to the grounds justifying grant of 
an option to terminate, they have not addressed the issue that different consequences may 
follow from applying one principle rather than the other. For instance, when a party is given 
the right to terminate the contract because a particular rewayat so authorizes, the scope of the 
Isfahani, M. H., (1408 H. Q. ) vol. 2, at 199; Najafl, M., and, Ndeini, M. H., (1358 H. Q. ) vol. 2, at 57,58; 
Karimi, S. J., and, Amuli, M. H. (1380 H. Q. ) vol. 4 at 9 and 10,325-327; TI-1hidi, M k, and Khlaei, S. A. 
(1368 H. S. ) vol. 6 at 291,292; Tahidi, Nt A., and Khfiei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 299-300,374; KhunsAri, 
S. A., (1364 H. S. ) vol. 3 at 156; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 165-166,257,277,436. Among the Iranian 
lawyer see, Burajerdi Abduh, M., (1329 H. S. ) vol. 3 Para. 977 and seq.; Amiri Qdemmaq&ni, A., (1347 H. S. ) 
vol. I at 78. 
75 See e. g., Tfisi, Nt H. (Shaykh al- Triefah), (1407 H. Q-) vol. 2 at 19); Helli, M. M. (Allamah Helli), vol. I at 
531. 
76 See e. g., Mak1d, M (Shahid Awwal), and Ameh, Z. (Shahid Thani), (1309 H. Q. ) vol. 1, at 377,378; 
Tabatabdei, S. A., (1404 H. Q. ) vol. I at 525; Ale KAshef al- Qeta, M H. (1359 H. Q. ) vol. I at 63; Najafi, M. 
R, (1981) vol. 23 at 42,95 and 97; Ans&i, Nt (1375 H. Q. ) at 198,235,244,249; Khurisdni, K Y-, (1406 
H. Q. ) at 189; Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 208; Bujnardi, M. H., (1389 H. Q) vol. 3, at 269,270; 
Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 4 at 268-270. Among the Iranian lawyers see, Imami, S. H., (1363 H. S. ) vol. I at 
499,501,502,518,526, Kltaziý N., (1995) vol. I at 99 and seq. 77 As to the definition of the terms "lazim andjaeiz contracts see, I. C. C., Arts. 185,186, respectively. 
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right should be ascertained in accordance with the express language of that authority. It 
cannot be extended to analogous cases. In contrast, if the option to terminate is to be based on 
the second principle any breach of a shart-e-sefat orfe'l, whether express or implied, will give 
rise to an immediate right to terminate the contract even though the consequences of the 
breach are slight or even cause no loss. For example, a delay of one day in delivery or a slight 
non-confom-dty of the seller's delivery with the contract description will entitle the buyer to 
terminate the contract on the option of the 'ýmffilfifled condition" and that of "incorrect 
description". respectively. Such a drastic effect is justified simply on the basis that the 
contracting parties themselves have wanted it. Whereas, if it is accepted that an option to 
terminate the contract should be justified on the third principle the buyer should only be 
entitled to terminate the contract when performance of the breached contract becomes 
detrimental. It is only in such a case that the principle of Iff diarar comes into operation and 
restricts the decree of luziim-e- aqd to the cases where the contract is not harmful at the time 
of election of the remedies. ' 
(B) Preferred View 
As pointed out above, rewriydt have no significant role in justifying the option to terminate the 
contract. Few options can be found which are solely based on rewayat. Even in cases where 
certain rew! iyat are available, the jurists are inclined to see them as ancillary reason rather 
than the main reason. For this reason, in those cases they try to justify the relevant option on 
one of the two other principles. 
Similarly, although it is possible to infer under certain circumstances a mutual intention 
on the part of the contracting parties that in the case of any breach by one of the parties the 
other has a right to terminate the contract, it is hard to say that in all cases such an agreement 
can be inferred. Although receiving the required characteristics in the subject-matter of the 
contract or the actual performance of promises by the seller has a significant role in inducing 
the buyer to make the contract, it is not such that it can be inferred that in any case they have 
impliedly agreed that if the buyer is deprived of the seller's actual performance he will have an 
option to terminate the contract, because the contracting parties normally contemplate 
performance of the contract rather than seeking ways to evade performance. " 
78 Speaking in English law context, a parallel can be drawn here: the principle of /a &rar in this context seems 
to work rather like the HongKong Fir principle, while the theory of shart-e-sefat seems similar to the rule 
that allows termination for breach of condition. For more detail, see Chapter Five, 1.2. 
79 Such as the options of defect and inspection. 
`0 The case becomes much more difficult in the case of the "option of defect". As will be seen later, it is 
commonly said that where the seller has delivered defective goods the buyer has an option either to reject the 
defective goods and terminate the contract or accept them and claim arsh on the option of defect. It is hard to 
prove that the parties have impliedly agreed on such a twofold right 
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Furthermore, ascription of the option to terminate the contract to the mutual agreement 
means that any contract containing a shart-e-sefat or fe7 consists of an implied undertaking 
that any breach of the shart gives the innocent buyer a right to terminate the contract, while a 
thorough interpretation of the contrace' and the common understanding does not accept such a 
fictitious analysis. Moreover, adoption of the view would produce the unacceptable result that 
all the options must be regarded as applications of the "option of condition", whereas the 
supporters of the view themselves make a distinction between the option of condition and the 
other options. " 
The option to terminate is therefore to be justified primarily on the theory of 
interference of the law in order to protect the party who suffers from the other party's 
violation. According to the principle of la diarar, as will be explained later in detail, "' the law 
should not disregard the losses an innocent buyer may incur due to the seller's breach. 
Accordingly, the law, respecting the lawful expectations of the innocent buyer from the 
contractual obligation broken, should give him a proper means to protect himself against the 
seller's breach. 
From what has been stated above, it can be said that no one ground can justify all the 
options provided under ShVah law, but the, most important of the three grounds is the principle 
of la darar. 
(C) Criterion for Application of the Principles 
Application of the first principle does not cause much difficulty. In any case, it has to be 
proved that a particular rewayat allows the aggrieved party to terminate the contract. When it 
is established, he will be entitled to terminate, whether the breach be minor or substantial. 
However, as pointed out above, few options are purely justified on the rewdyat. Similarly, 
when termination is based on the second principle, the aggrieved party has an absolute right to 
terminate the contract. In that event, the main issue is to show that perfect performance was 
the condition of the non-breaching party's duty to perform and that it was impliedly agreed 
that any lack of conformity would entitle him to terminate the contract. It has to be done by 
construing the contract in the light of the terms of the contract and the surrounding 
circumstances. 
81 See also, NaJafl, M., and, Ndeini, M. H., (1358 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 133. 
82 Almost all jurists have distinguished the "option of condition" from the other options, whereas if the options 
should be justified on the basis of an implied condition to terminate the contract there would be one option, 
"the option of condition". See e. g., AnsAri, M., (1375 H. Q. ) at 228 and seq. and other jurisprodcntial books 
discussing the "options". 
83 See, Section Three, 2.2.3. 
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However, application of the third principle may cause some difficulty. The jurists, when 
referring to the principle, simply say that if performance of the broken contract becomes 
detrimental for the innocent buyer the principle comes into operation and discharges him from 
performing the contract. But they do not explain what degree of detriment will be sufficient for 
the principle of 15 darar to come into operation. It is hard to find a general statement in ShVah 
jurisprudence to determine a general criterion. Accordingly, the main question here is whetheý 
the case is to be decided on the basis of personal factors so as to determine that a particular 
breach renders the contract harmful for the buyer, or on objective criteria. The only thing 
which can be found is the criterion provided in the context of the option of lesion (kheydr-e- 
ghabn) which applies where a buyer has paid an excessively high price for goods, and it has 
been suggested that the principle of 15 darar comes into operation where the price paid by the 
buyer was so excessive that a reasonable man would not have overlooked it if he knew of it. 
That is, where the difference between the contract price and the market value of the goods is 
so slight that a reasonable man would have ignored it when he learned of it, it will not be 
regarded as a ground for giving a right to terminate the contract . 
14 It may therefore be argued 
that 15 darar comes into operation when the detriment caused by the seller's non-conforming 
delivery is so serious that a reasonable man would not have disregarded it when he learned of 
the detriment caused by the breach. " 
As is seen, the given criterion refers the case to the court to decide whether or not a 
particular failure on the part of the seller results in such a detriment (darar) that a 
reasonable man would not overlook it. There is, nevertheless, little guidance to help the court 
to exercise the discretion and attempts must be made to formulate more specific guidance as to 
the degree of detriment which is required to give an injured party a right to terminate the 
contract. However, it has to be noted that in such a context it should avoid providing a single 
rule for all cases. It would suffice to determine some general factors giving general guideline 
and give the trial judge a power to decide in any case according to the relevant circumstances. 
It is suggested, therefore, that the court should take into account factors such as, the nature of 
the breach, the amount of the loss resulting from the breach, any unreasonable inconvenience 
or unreasonable expense caused by the breach, the seller's readiness and ability to tender a 
conforming delivery or repair the lack of conformity. 
" See in this connection, Helli, M. M. (Allameh Helli), vol. I at 322, Helli, A. N. J. (Muhaqqiq Helli), (1377 
H. Q. ) at 101; Fayz nshani, M., (1401 H. Q. ) vol. 3 at 73; Najafi, M. IL, (1981) vol. 23 at 43; Ansdri, M. 
(1375 H. Q. ) at 236; Najafi, M., and, Ndeini, M. H., (1358 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 67; Khalkhali, S. M. K., & Rashti, 
M H., (1407 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 415; Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 40; KAtaziln, N., (1990) vol. 5, at 
215-216. The same criterion is expressly confirmed by the revised Art. 417 of I. C. C. 
85 See also, Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 122 in which the late Imam Khumayni says: "whatever custom and 
the learned (uqala) will not disregard it would be a ývb which gives rise to the right to terminate the contract". 
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A further point which is to be mentioned here is that the jurists have not made clear 
whether in deciding that the darars resulting from the seller's breach would make the contract 
harmful the court should only take into account the actual loss resulting from the breach or it 
should also take into account those darars anticipated probably to result from the breach. It 
seems that the court must take into account both those oTarars actually resulting from the 
breach and those which are anticipated most probably to result from the breach, since the 
principle of 15 darar is general and comes into operation for the purpose of negating both 
actual and foreseeable darar. 
However, it is not clear how foreseeable must the actual, and probable, consequences of 
the breach be? Can he rely on any detriment caused by the breach, or only on those which 
were foreseeable by the seller? And if so, at what time and to what extent they have to be 
foreseeable. No jurisprdential statement can be found to answer the question. " 
3.2.3. Relevant kheydrdt 
So far as commercial contracts are concerned, the two first options mentioned in 3.1. are of 
no significance. The third option is a particular option based on particular rewdyat and in the 
context of commercial contracts is of less value. Among the rest of the options mentioned 
above, only a few are relevant to the present research. The "option of condition" comes into 
operation by the contracting parties' express mutual agreement within the contract rather than 
by operation of law in the case of breach of contract. The "option of tadlis" only arises where 
one of the contracting parties is guilty of fraud which induces the victim to enter into the 
contract. " Similarly, although the "option of lesion" is significant in the context of a 
commercial contracts, it has no relevance to the present study. It applies when a buyer has 
paid an excessively high price for goods. Options such as the "option of insolvency" and the 
"option of impossibility" of the performance of contract arise in particular circumstances 
where the buyer becomes insolvent, or, after the conclusion of the contract one of the 
contracting parties becomes unable to perform his contractual obligations. The "option of 
unfulfilled sale in part" relates primarily to cases where the contract is dissolved or treated as 
void in respect of part of the subject-matter. Similarly, the "option of partnership", as some 
jurists pointed out, " is not a separate option but it is in fact a particular form of the option of 
defect or the option of unfulfilled sale in part. As regards the last option, it is to be noted that 
no jurist has addressed emtena' as a ground for termination. The only jurist who addressed the 
86 For suggestion see, Chapter Five, 1.2. 
87 See e. g., I. C. C., Arts. 438440. 
88 Makki, M (Shahid Awwal), andAmeli, Z. (Shahid Ilani), (1309 H. Q. ) vol. I at 386. 
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"option of emtend"', as far as the present writer could identify, is the grand jurist, Ayatulldh 
Imam Khumayni. " However, he has not explained what he means by his short statement and 
how can it be justified; the only thing he mentions is that this option is 'VqaIdeiyon" (that is, 
it is a common practice between the businessmen). Second, he restricted the option to the case 
where requiring the refusing party to perform is impractical. Third, he has raised it in the 
context of the seller's refusal to deliver goods and the buyer's refusal to pay; he did not state 
whether or not it can be applied to the case of non-conforming delivery. Accordingly, it is 
difficult to find a jurisprudential statement which has regarded the doctrine of emtend' (similar 
to the doctrine of repudiation in English common law) as a ground justifying the right to 
terminate the contract. 
What follows will examine the rules relating to the "options" which may be resorted to 
by a buyer, who is aggrieved by the seller's non-conforming delivery. For this purpose the 
options of "inspection", "incorrect description", "unfulfilled conditions" and "defect" are the 
most relevant options. 
3.2.3.1. Kheydr-e-Rayat 
laey5r-e-raýat (the option of inspection) is occasionally associated with two other options: 
kheyTtr-e-takhalluf an al- wasf (the option of incorrect description) and kheyar-e-takhalluf an 
al- shart (the option of unfulfilled condition). The first question which arises here is whether 
this is a separate option, or a particular form of the others. The same question has also arisen 
as to the option of incorrect description and that of defect. 
A general look at the jurists' classification of the options shows that there are three 
views: (1) they are separate options each of which arises under particular circumstances; (2) 
they are the same and in fact the options of inspection, incorrect description and defect are 
particular instances of the option of "unffilfilled condition"; and (3) the first two are the same 
and they are to be restricted to the case of breach of shart-e-sefat, while the option of 
unfulfilled condition should be limited to the case of breach of shart-e-fe7 and the option of 
defect is to be restricted to the case of breach of shart-e-sal&nat. 
(A) Option ofInspection as a Separate Option 
A n=ber of ShVah jurists believe that the option of inspection is a particular option based on 
RewiTyat and IjmX, rather than on general principles on which the other options are generally 
justified, i. e., the principle of Lff darar or shart-e-&mni. 11 According to thern, it must be 
89 See, Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 372. 
9' These authorities are cited in: Ameli, H., vol. 12 at 361, rewayat I (Jamil In Durraj cites from ImAm 
Sadedq), and, at 362 rewlyat 2 (Zayd al-ShahhAm cites from Imam Sadeq). 
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distinguished from the option of incorrect description and the option of unfulfilled condition. 
The option of inspection, they argue, arises only where the buyer has previously examined a 
particular thing having certain specifications. At the time of making the contract the seller has 
not undertaken any obligation as to the existence or accuracy of those specifications by way of 
incorporating them into the contract as the terms of the contract, but the buyer has agreed to 
buy those particular goods simply on the basis of his personal belief that they are of those 
specifications he found by his pre-contract examination. Accordingly, there is no contractual 
obligation as to the accuracy of the buyer's belief in respect of the object sold which would 
give the buyer the option of incorrect description. His entitlement to terminate the contract in 
such a case is, according to them, for the existence of special authorities. " 
The same interpretation has been suggested in respect of the 'option of defect'. A 
number ofjurists maintain that this option is to be distinguished from the 'option of unfulfilled 
condition'. The option of defect is a particular option based on particular rewayde' and it 
arises only where it is proved that the purchased goods are not in conformity with the 
presumed quality on which the buyer has relied when the contract was made'. 
(B) Option ofInspection is the Same as the Option ofIncorrect Description 
In contrast, some other jurists believe that the option of inspection is not a separate option but 
a particular form of the option of incorrect description (as it seems that some jurists tend to 
view ie') or of the option of unfulfilled condition. " According to the latter view, these three 
options are the same except that the first two arise where an implied term is broken, while the 
third arises where an express term is broken. " According to such a broad interpretation, it has 
also been suggested that the "option of defect" should not be regarded as a separate option, 
but as a particular form of the "option of unfulfilled condition". " 
(B) Preferred Construction 
91 See e. g., Najafi, M. H., (1981) vol. 23 at 92 and 94; Gharavi Isfahani, M. H., (1408 H. Q. ) vol. 2, at 86; 
TM-ddi, M. A., and Khaci, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 55-59, particularly, at 59; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 4 at 
422427; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) vol. 4 at 256-259. 
92 These rewayat arc cited in: Ameli, H., vol. 12 at 362 andseq., Bab 15, at 418, Bab 6, hadith 1. 
93 See e. g., Helli, M. M. (Allamah Helli), and, Ameli, S. M. J. H., vol. 4 at 623; Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 253; 
TM-ddi, M. A., and Khoei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 96-99; Iravani, A., (1379 H. Q) vol. 2 at 52; Tabrizi, J., 
(1412 H. Q. ) vol. 4 at 277. 
94 See e. g., MakId, M. (Shahid Awwal), and Ameli, Z. (Shahid (1309 H. Q. ) vol. I at 377; Helli, M. M. 
(All&nah Helli), and, Ameli, S. M. I H., vol. 4 at 585; NarAqi, A., vol. 2 at 388 and 389; Khunsdri, S. A., 
(1364 H. S. ) vol. 3 at 168. See also Art. 396 of I. C. C.; Katazian, N., (1990) vol. 5 at 182-184. See in contrast, 
hnArni, S. H., (1363 H. S. ) vol. I at 491. 
95 See e. g. Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 248, see also p. 198; Khalkhali, S. M. K., & Rashti, M. H., (1407 H. Q. ) 
vol. 2 at 591 and 595; TONdi, M. A., and KhfLei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 54 (citing from some jurists such 
a broad construction). 
96 Khalkhali, S. M. K, & Rashti, M. H., (1407 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 595 in which the late Mirza Rashti expressly 
refers to this point. See also, Ansrui, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 198-199 and other sources cited there. 
97 See e. g., Najafi, M. H., (1981) vol. 23 at 235-236; Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 66; Ale nshef al- 
Qeta, M. H. (1359 H. Q. ) vol. I at 63 and seq., Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 6-7. 
Chapter Four. Buyer's Remedies Under Shiah Law 228 
It seems that it would be better to treat the option of inspection and that of incorrect 
description as a single option; both arise where an implied term of the contract indicating the 
characteristics of the article sold is broken. Nevertheless, although technically it can be said 
that these two options arise where a contractual promise (shart) is broken, it would be better 
to examine them separately from the 'option of unfulfilled condition'. This is because first the 
latter option, as will be seen, is subject to some restrictions to which the other options are not. 
Second, a general examination of the jurisprudential discussions in this respect shows clearly 
that ShPah jurists commonly use the expression khey5r-e-takhalluf an al- wasf in the case of 
breach of shart-e-sefat and the expression kheydr-e-takhallofan al- shart when discussing the 
consequences of breach of shart-e-fe T" 
Similarly, it seems that "the option of defect" is technically the same as the options of 
incorrect description and unfulfilled condition; it arises where a contract term indicating the 
quality of the object sold is broken. It is hard to accept that the relevant rew4g give the buyer 
a right to terminate the contract for the defect in the goods on the mere fact that the buyer at 
the time of making the contract has relied on his personal belief that the article which is to be 
sold has a particular quality. The seller will be responsible for the presumed quality of the 
subject of sale where he was aware of the buyer's presuniption. Assuming that the seller was 
aware of the buyer's reliance on the presumed quality of the sold article there would be in fact 
an implied undertaking breach of which gives rise to the option of defect. " Evidence in 
support of this construction is that if the contract contains an exemption clause as to the 
quality of the article there will not be the option of defect even though the buyer has relied on 
the presumed belief. "' In addition, some of these rewjyR "I expressly refer to the fact that the 
option of defect is for breach of a contract term rather than the mere belief of the buyer. 
Moreover, in a fully authentic (sahih) rewffyat, the option of defect has been applied to a case 
in which the seller had expressly undertaken an obligation that the article sold was sound. "' 
Accordingly, the option of defect arises only where the seller has undertaken, whether 
impliedly or expressly that the article to be sold has a particular quality. 
However, there are three reasons which justify why some jurists treat the option of 
defect as a separate option. First, the option of defect arises only where a contract term 
9' It is perhaps the reason why some jurists described the option of unfulfilled condition as the "option of 
Ishterat " See e. g., Makki, M. (Shahid Awwal), and Ameli, Z. (Shahid ThIni), (1309 H. Q. ) vol. I at 385; 
Naraqi, A., vol. 2 at 389-, Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 129). 
99 Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) vol. 4 at 277. 
100 See e. g., Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) vol. 4 at 277. 
101 Ameli, H., vol. 12 at 418, Bab 6, hadith 1. There are also rewayat under which a buyer was given the option 
of defect notwithstanding that their language tends to apply to the case where the contract contained an 
express term (see e. g., Ameli, H., vol. 12 at 362, Bab 16, hadith 2). 
102 See: Ameli, H., vol. 12 at 418, bab 6, hadith no. 1. 
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indicating the quality of the goods (shart-e-sehhat) is broken. Second, where the option arises 
the buyer also has an option to accept the defective goods and claim for price reduction (arsh), 
while in the case of breach of shart-e-sefat most jurists believe that he is not given such a 
twofold option. "' Third, the option of defect, as win be seen later, " is lost, as most jurists 
suggest, merely by using or altering the goods delivered, while in the case of breach of shart- 
e-sefat such a restriction is not applied. The two latter features are, as they argue, based on 
particular authorities. "' 
According to this construction, the following discussion will examine these options 
under the three separate headings: the option of incorrect description, the option of defect, and, 
the option of unfulfilled condition. 
3.2.3.2. Kheyir-e-Takhalluf an al- Wasf 
When discussing termination of the contract on the basis of the option of incorrect description, 
Shi'ah jurists make a sharp distinction between cases where the contract is for sale of specific 
goods (mabi'muaýyan) and where it is for unascertained, goods (mabi'Kulfi). 106 
(A)Mabi'Muaýyan 
In the case of a contract for sale of specific goods it is commonly said that if the seller's non- 
conforming delivery amounts to breach of sýart-e-sefat, the buyer has an immediate right to 
reject the non-conforming goods and tennipate the contract on the basis of the option of 
"incorrect description". "' 
This is the view which is supported by almost all ShPah jurists. But they do not explain 
what lack of conformity will enable the buyer to reject and terminate the contract. They also 
do not distinguish between the right to reject and that of termination. Apparently, the same 
lack of conformity which gives rise to the first right would justify the second right. However, 
as already suggested, "' the right to reject non-conforming delivery should be distinguished 
from the right to terminate the contract. Tern-dnation is an exception to the principle of ufd bel 
103 The case is, as will be seen later, controversial. Some of the jurists are of the view that the right to claim 
price reduction is a general right for breach of any contract stipulation (see e. g., Yazdi, S. U K, (1378 H. Q) 
vol. 2 at 130,134). The case will be examined law under a separate section is designed for the purpose. 
104 See Section One, 3.3.3.2., (A). 
105 Tahidi, M. A., and Khoei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 97, Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) vol. 4 at 281. 
" For a detail discussion of the terms, 'specific' and 'unascertained goods' see, Shahradi, S. A. and, Khilci, S. 
A., (1409 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 11-12; Shinvi, N. M., (1413 H. Q. ) vol. I at 23-24; Imilmi, S. R, (1363 H. S. ) vol. I 
at 425. See also, I. C. C., Arts. 350,351. 
107, AM, qri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 249 and 283 in which he observes "Where it becomes clear that a term classified 
as shart-e-sefat is broken by the seller there is no way for the buyer unless to terminate the contract"; Tahidi, 
Nt A., and Khaei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 60. See also, Arts. 235 and 410 of I. C. C. Similarly, in a case 
decided by an Iranian Court, it was held that when Art. 410 applies, any lack of conformity will give rise to 
the right to terminate the contract, whether or not it results in any loss (the decision No. 569 - 1329/3/25 cited 
in: Iranian Civil Code, Art. 410, (Nikfar, M., (1372 H. S. ). 
log See this Section, 2.2.2.3. 
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u'qCd and should be justified where the actual and foreseeable losses resulting from the breach 
makes the contract harmful for the buyer. Termination is not the only means to protect the 
injured buyer. He can be protected by the seller's offer to cure. If the seller is ready and able 
to cure the non-conformity by way of repair within the contract time without causing the 
buyer unreasonable expense or unreasonable inconvenience he will be adequately 
compensated. Under such circumstances there is no reason to justify application of the 
principle of Id darar allowing the buyer to terminate the contract. 
(B) MabiKulli 
Where the contract is for the sale of unascertained goods it is a well-accepted view that a mere 
non-conforming delivery by the seller does not entitle the buyer to terminate the contract on 
basis of the option of incorrect description. "' However, the jurists do not ascertain when the 
buyer will be entitled to terminate the contract. The only thing they suggest is that he is 
entitled to reject the non-conforming goods and request the seller to deliver goods conforming 
with the contract and if the seller refuses to make a fresh tender the buyer will be entitled to 
apply to the court for an order requiring the reffising seller to perform his obligations. "' 
Apparently, the buyer will not be entitled to terminate the contract under this view even in a 
case where the lack of conformity is substantial. 
This view may result in uncertainty. Moreover, the buyer may not be able to obtain 
what he bargained for by way of requiring performance. Accordingly, it is suggested that he 
should be given a right to terminate the contract under certain circumstances. Certainly, he 
should not be entitled to terminate for minor lack of conformity. Where the seller is ready and 
able to deliver replacement goods which conform to the contract within the contract time 
without causing the buyer unreasonable expense or unreasonable inconvenience there will be 
no reason to justify the buyer's termination. However, this is not always the case. Sometimes 
the lack of conformity is substantial and the seller is not ready to deliver replacement goods. Is 
the buyer still to be required to perform the contract and sue the refusing seller? It is submitted 
that such a rule may sometimes be contrary to the principle of Iff darar. Accordingly, there 
must be some time when the buyer is entitled to terminate the contract. It is suggested that he 
should be given the right to terminate the contract when the seller's breach results in such 
detriment that make the performance of contract harmful for the buyer. However, whether the 
lack of conformity is or is not sufficiently serious should be determined in light of relevant 
factors including the seller's ability and willingness to cure. Where the suggested criterion is 
109 Ansifi, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 249; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 4 at 427; Tfihidi, M. A., and Khffei, S. A. (1368 
H. S. ) vol. 7 at 61. See also, I. C. C., Art. 415. 
110 Talfidi, M. A., and Khnei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at. 60; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) vol. 4 at 419. 
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met the principle of Lff darar comes into operation and ceases the decree of Iuzdm-e-aqd, 
which orders the buyer to perform the contract, to operate. 
3.2.3.3. Kheyir-e-Ayb 
As in the case of the option of 'incorrect description', the jurists, when discussing termination 
of the contract on the basis of the 'option of defect', make a distinction between cases where 
the contract is for sale of specific goods (mabi'muaVan) and where it is for unascertained 
goods (mabPKuIIi). ` 
(A) Specific Goods 
Where the contract is for sale of specific goods almost all jurists hold that the seller's failure to 
deliver goods conforming with the contract quality will entitle the buyer to terminate the 
contract immediately. The only difference is that in the case of defective delivery (breach of 
shart-e-saldinat) the buyer has a twofold option: to reject the defective goods and terminate 
the contract or to accept them and claim for arsh, whereas according to most jurists such a 
twofold option is not available for the buyer where shart-e-sefat is broken. "' 
The same objections made to the previous option are applicable here. Accordingly, as 
was suggested in respect of the option of incorrect description, termination on the basis of this 
option should be subject to the same limitation applied to the former option. A fiather 
objection to this common view is that at the present time almost all jurists seem to treat arsh"' 
as a part of the option of defect. For this reason, they extend the same requirements applicable 
to the right to terminate the contract to the right to claim arsh. However, as will be discussed 
in detail, "' the right to claim arsh should be distinguished from the right to terminate the 
contract. It is a monetary relief which has its own requirements. Confusing this right with the 
remedy of termination may, as will be shown later"', result in an unreasonable effect. 
(B) Unascertained Goods 
In contrast, where the contract is for sale of unascertained goods, the buyer is only entitled to 
reject the non-conforming goods and request the seller to tender a conforming consigriment. "' 
Some jurists, however, take a different view here. According to them, where the seller of 
unascertained goods has tendered goods which do not conform with the contract quality the 
111 The distinction is clearly inferable from ArL 437 of the L C. C. 
112 See e. g., Ansdri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 253; Khumayni, S. R- M., vol. 5 at 15; Ttlddi, NL A., and KhIlei, S. A. 
(1368 RS. ) vol. 7 at 100; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) vpl. 4 at 278. 
` The term is used to refer to what is called under thb Convention "price reduction". This remedy is examined 
in detail in: Section 11iree, Part Two. 
114 Section Tliree, 3.3., and, 3.5.2. 
115 See, ibid. 
116 Yazdi, S. U K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 70; IravAni, A., (1379 H. Q) vol. 2 at 50; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) vol. 4 
at 419. 
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buyer, as in the case of specific goods, has an option to accept them and claim for arsh or to 
reject them and terminate the contract immediately. This view has been justified on the basis 
that where the seller appropriates a particular consignment to the contract, it becomes as the 
case of sale of specific goods where breach amounts to the option of defect. "' However, as in 
the case of the previous option, no jurist explains when the buyer will be entitled to terminate 
the contract for a defective tender. It is suggested that the same criterion applied to termination 
on the basis of the option of 'incorrect description' is applicable here. 
3.2.3.4. Kheyir-e-Takhalluf an al- Shart 
As already pointed out, this option arises where the seller fails to perform a term classified as 
shart-e-fe 7. Where such a term is broken ShVah jurists are of two opposing views. A number 
of great jurists are of the opinion that mere failure to perform such a term does not entitle the 
buyer to terminate the contract on the basis of the option of unfulfilled condition. He will be 
entitled to terminate the contract on the basis of this option where requiring the defaulting 
seller to perform is impractical. "' In contrast, others believe that mere failure to perform in 
accordance with the contract term enables the buyer to terminate the contract even in the case 
when he can require the seller to perform his obligations. "' 
The origin of these different views is the ground upon which the option of unfulfilled 
condition is to be justified. "' On the first view, the option is justified on the principle of Id 
darar so that this option comes into operation where the buyer cannot be adequately 
compensated by another remedy. Accordingly, as long as he can require the defaulting party to 
perform he will be compensated by the remedy of requiring performance. There is therefore no 
reason to justify an immediate termination of the contract. In contrast, according to a number 
117 See the different sources cited in: Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 70. See also Khumayni, S. R. M., 
vol. 5 at 17; hnAmi, S. H., (1363 H. S. ) vol. I at 504, in which they try to justify the view. This view has been 
rejected by most jurists. See in this respect, Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 70; GharaviIsfahani, M. H., 
(1408 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 97; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 15-18. Moreover, there is no reason to justify a 
distinction between cases of breach of shart-e-sehhat and of shart-e-sefar, the same logic which justifies the 
above-mentioned view in respect of the former would justify it as to the latter. In addition, this view would 
enable the buyer to terminate the contract for minor defects, which certainly is contrary to the principle of Id 
&rar. 
118 Makki, M. (Shahid Awwal), and Ameli, Z. (Shahid Tliani), (1309 H. Q. ) vol. I at 386-, Ameli, Z. (Shahid 
Thani), vol. I at 191; NarAqi, A., (1408) at 44, NaJafi, M. H., (1981) vol. 23 at 219; Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 
285 (in which he expressly observes that we cannot find any authority for the option to terminate the contract 
for the mere refusal notwithstanding that the innocent party is able to require the refasing party to perform his 
contractual obligations. ); NaJafl, M., and, N11eini, M. H., (1358 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 134. Iranian Civil Code, 
following this view, restricts the right of termination for breach of shart-e-fe'l to the case of impossibility of 
11 
requiring the refusing party to perform (Art. 239). 
9 Hclli, A. N. J. (Muhaqqeq Helli), (1377 H. Q. ) at 105; Makki, M. (Shahid Awwal), and Ameli, Z. (Shahid 
ThAni), [1309 H. Q. ) vol. I at 386; Qumi, M. A. (Muhaqqeq Qumi), (1371 H. S. ) vol. 2 at 193 (question no. 
119y, Nardqi, A., vol. 2 at 389; Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 129; Bujardi, M. H., (1389 H. Q) vol. 3 
at 268,270; TW-ddi, M. A., and Khaei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 374; Khilei, S. A., vol. 2 at 43 (question 
167); Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 220; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 436437,439. 120 See in this respect TOhidi, M. A., and Khilei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 373. 
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of jurists, the option of unfulfilled condition is to be based on the theory of shart-e-&mni. 
That is, at the time of making the contract the contracting parties have impliedly agreed that 
where the shart is not performed the promisee is entitled to terminate the contract. 
Applying these two approaches to the seller's failure to tender documents conforming to 
the contract requirements, one may suggest that on the first approach the buyer is only entitled 
to reject the non-confom-dng documents and request the seller to tender the conforming 
documents. He will be entitled to tenninate the contract only when he cannot require the seller 
to perform his obligations in respect of tender of the required documents. But according to the 
second approach, the buyer has a right to reffise to accept them and terminate the contract 
immediately. 
The question whether the option to temiinate is to be based on the first or the second 
ground has already been examined, and it was suggested that the option is primarily to be 
justified on the principle of Id diarar. 111 On this suggestion, the buyer should be given the right 
to terminate the contract for breach of shart-e- fe 7 when he cannot be adequately protected in 
other ways. Accordingly, where the seller is ready and able to tender conforming documents 
the buyer should not be entitled to terminate the contract provided that the seller's re-tender 
does not cause the buyer undue detriment. 
3.2.4. Seller's Right to Cure 
As already indicated, no jurist has examined the question whether the seller has a general right 
to cure a defective performance. What they have said is that where the contract is for sale of 
specific goods any breach of shart-e-sefat or shart-e-sal,; Vnat will give the buyer an immediate 
right to reject the non-conforming goods and terminate the contract, whereas where the 
contract is for sale of unascertained goods the buyer has only a right to reject the non- 
conforming goods and demand delivery of conforming goods. In the absence of clear 
jurisprudential authorities on this issue, it is proposed to deal with the issue on the basis of the 
general principles described above. A distinction should again be made between the cases of 
specific and unascertained goods. 
3.2.4.1. Sale of Specific Goods 
One may ask if the option to terminate is to be justified on the principle of Id diarar , why 
should the seller not be given a right to cure, at least in cases where he is ready and able to do 
so ? If the seller is ready and able to cure the non-conformity by, replacing or repairing the 
goods, is the contract still detrimental for the buyer? It may be said that it is logical that in 
121 See this Section, 3.2.2. 
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such cases the buyer should not be given an inunediate right to tenninate unless the seller's 
cure cannot adequately redress the buyer, or causes him unreasonable inconvenience. 
Whether the seller should be given a right to replace non-conforming goods seems 
difficult to reconcile with general principles. The point has been addressed by the late Shaykh 
Murtada Ansdri in respect of the option of inspection. Ansdri, in justifying why the seller 
should not be able to deprive the buyer of his right to terminate the contract by tendering 
replacement goods, observes: 
"The option of inspection is not lost ... by delivery of replacement goods. For, the 
contract is made on a particular specific goods and delivery of replacement requires a 
fresh transaction. ". 122 
The rule seems generally applicable to both the option of inspection and that of defect. 
In both cases, the seller should not be given a right to tender replacement. Replacement goods 
will not be regarded as a performance of the contract unless the buyer consents to it. 
However, the position of the seller's right to cure by repair is not clear. There is no 
clear reason to justify why the seller should not be given such a right. It may be argued that 
the subject-matter of the contract was a particular article possessing specific characteristics. 
Any change to the article delivered will render it other than that for which the buyer has 
bargained. As a result, it needs the buyer's consent. Moreover, deprivation of the buyer of his 
right to terminate by giving the seller a right to cure by repair would be contrary to the 
principle of istesha-b. Where it proves that the goods delivered do not conform with the 
contract requirements the right to terminate comes into existence. In such a situation, the 
seller's offer to cure the non-conformity raises the question whether the buyer's right to 
terminate derived from the lack of conformity should be continued or to be stopped by the 
seller's ability to cure. In the event of doubt as to the continuity of a pre-existent decree (right 
to terminate) it is presumed that it is still on foot on the principle of "istesha-b". 17' In addition, 
the principle of Id darar is provided in favour of an innocent party who suffers a detriment 
(&rar) from the other party's violation, and cannot be relied on by a defaulting seller against 
122 Ans5xi, M., (1375 H. Q. ) at 252. Before him the view was pointed out by the late S9-db Javaher in: Najafi, 
U H., (1981) vol. 23 at 96 ("There is no doubt that the option of incorrect description is not lost by 
replacement as it is not lost by paying the difference between the non-conforming and conforming goods. "). 
See also, TMddi, M. A., and Khoei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 77; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) vol. 4 at 271, 
Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 4 at 44 1; KAtQziAn, N., (1990) vol. 5 at 202. The late Sahib Javaher goes further and 
suggests that where the parties have agreed that in the case of non-conformity the seller is allowed to deliver 
replacement or pay the difference the contractwould be void because of qarar (see, Najafi, M. H., (1981) vol. 
23 at 96). Nevertheless, in the case of the "option of lesion", it has been suggested that where the seller is 
ready to reduce the price the buyer will not be entitled to terminate the contract on account of the option of 
lesion. See e. g., Helli, M. M. (AllAmah Helli) and Ameli S. M. I H., vol. 4 at 571; Tabatabdei, S. A., (1404 
H. Q. ) vol. I at 525; Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 39). 
123 See Qumi, M. A. (Muhaqqeq Qumi), (1371 H. S. ) vol. 2 at 117 (question no. 84) in respect of the option of 
lesion. 
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the injured buyer. On this view, the seller may be entitled to repair only where the buyer has 
accepted the seller's offer and gives him an opportunity to cure the non-conformity. 
It seems that none of the forgoing arguments is sufficient to reject the possibility of 
giving the seller a right to cure a lack of conformity by repair. The first argument applies to 
the case where it turns out that the statement of fact as to the object sold was false. In such a 
case, cure is in fact impossible. It does not apply to the case where the buyer has ordered the 
seller to manufacture and deliver a particular instrument according to his instructions. 
Second, the principle of istesha-b cannot be relied on here, for in such a case not only 
the continuance of the option to terminate on account of kheydr-e-takhalluf an al- wasf or 
kheydr-e-a ývb becomes doubtful, but the very existence of the option becomes basically 
doubtful where the seller is able and willing to repair. To explain, as indicated when 
discussing the grounds of the options, "' the option to terminate is justifiable when the contract 
becomes detrimental according to the actual and/or probable results of the default at the time 
of exercising the option, whereas, where the seller has actually repaired the lack of 
conformity, or is willing and able to do so the contract will not be harmful for the buyer when 
he wishes to exercise the option. Accordingly, in such cases the option lacks the logic 
justifying the option, since where the seller has cured the lack of conformity, or has offered to 
do so, the prospective harm justifying the right to terminate will become doubtful, while it is a 
well-settled rule that in such a case (in the terminology of the jurists, it is described as al- 
shakk, fi iqted, §' al- hukm (doubt as to the legal ground of the degree as opposed to its 
continuance), the principle of isteshaib cannot operate. 
- Moreover, if it is accepted that the option of termination is granted to an injured buyer 
in order to protect him against the losses sustained by reason of the seller's breach, such a 
protection would effectively be achieved by curing the breach by way of repair. Accordingly, 
there is no reason to justify to disregard the principle of ufd bel u'q Cd which obliges the buyer 
to be bound by the contract. 
In addition, in a rewayat cited from In-dm Sadeq, the Imam was asked about a person 
who purchased a particular plot of land of a certain area. After measurement he realised that it 
did not conform with the contract in area. In that case, the Imam held that: 
"The buyer was entitled either to reject it and take back his money or accept the land 
and take back that part of the price exchanged with the missing part. However, if the 
seller was able to cure the missing part by giving from other land (if he had any beside 
the sold land) the buyer was not entitled to terminate the contract. "125 
124 See this Section, 3.2.2. (C). 
125 See Ameli, H., vol. 12, bab 14, hadith I at 361. 
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Although the case was concerned with the sale of land, the logic behind the rule is 
generally applicable to any similar situations. Moreover, the loss of the option to terminate 
was accepted by some distinguished jurists where the defect is removed automatically before 
the buyer learns of the fact, or after he learns of it but before he has exercised his right. In 
justiPying this view, they argued that when the defect is actually removed there is no reason to 
justify termination. 126 It seems that the same logic which justifies the loss of the option will 
justify the view where the seller is ready and able to cure the defect by repair, since when the 
seller is able and willing to cure the defect by repair as prescribed above the breach would not 
be sufficiently serious to bring the principle of li &rar into operation. Accordingly, the buyer 
should not be allowed to terminate the contract unless the seller is not willing and able to cure 
or his cure causes the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable detriment. 127 
It is also worth noting that the buyer's tennination will be effective where he has 
exercised his option to terminate before the seller has informed him of his ability and readiness 
to cure, for the buyer is not under a duty to ask the seller whether he is able and ready to cure 
the lack of conformity. However, the question which arises is whether the buyer should be 
entitled to terminate the contract before the seller learns of the lack of conformity. The 
question becomes more difficult taking into account the fact that the jurists have not made 
clear whether the buyer is obliged to inform the seller of the lack of conformity and what will 
happen if the buyer fails to inform the seller. In the absence of an express jurisprudential 
authority it is suggested that if the buyer has known that the seller would be able and willing 
to repair the lack of conformity as described above he should not be given the right to 
terminate. The suggestion can be justified on the basis of that the logic of the foregoing case 
exists here. 
3.2.4.2. Sale of Unascertained Goods 
Where the contract is for the sale of unascertained goods giving a general right to cure seems 
consistent with general principles, since as already explained, in such cases where the seller's 
tender does not conform to the contract terms the buyer has only a right to reject the non- 
conforming delivery. He is not entitled to terminate the contract. On this approach, it is quite 
reasonable to suggest that the seller should be given a general right to cure his non-conforming 
126 Amch, Z. (Shahid ThAni), vol. I at 195; Ansari, M., (1375 H. Q. ) at 26 1; Khalklah, S. Nt K., & Rashti, M. 
R, (1407 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 663-664. See also, Tfihidi, M. A., and Khaei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 171-175; 
Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) vol. 4 at 311-312. In addition in the case of the option of lesion, it has also been said 
that if the seller is ready and willing to pay the difference between the contract price and the market price the 
buyer has no option to terminate the contract (see e. g-, Qumi, M. A. (Muhaqqiq Qumi), (1371 R S. ) vol. 2 at 
117 (question no. 84). See also Helli, M. M. (Allamah Helli), and, Ameli, S. M. I H., vol. 4 at 571; see also 
at 57; Tabatablei, S. A., (1404 H. Q. ) vol. I at 525; Yazdi, S. M. Y-, (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 39). 
127 This view is expressly recognised by I. C. C. in lease contract (Art. 478). 
Chapter Four. Buyer's Remedies Under Shiah Law 237 
delivery within the contract time. However, his right to cure beyond the time limit depends on 
the nature of time provisions to be discussed below. 
Similarly, it is suggested that the seller should not be given the right to cure in all 
circumstances. The right must be given according to the general criterion that it could be done 
without causing the buyer unreasonable expense or unreasonable inconvenience. The same 
suggestion seems to be applicable where the seller has tendered non-conforming documents. 
As long as the seller is able and willing to cure lack of conformity in the documents without 
causing the buyer unreasonable inconvenience or unreasonable expense he should be allowed 
to do so if the contract time allows him. 
3.2.5. Special Cases 
The preceding discussions were concerned with the buyer's right to terminate the contract 
where the seller has delivered the right quantity of goods, not all conforming to the contract. 
The present discussion exan-dnes the cases where the seller (a) delivers the whole contract 
quantity only part of which conforms to the contract terms, (b) delivers the wrong quantity, or 
(c) fails to deliver when the time for delivery has expired. Three questions will be examined: 
(i) whether the buyer is entitled to terminate the contract entirely or in respect of the 
non-conforming part for partial non-conforming delivery; 
(ii) whether the buyer is entitled to terminate the contract entirely or in respect of the 
missing part for partial delivery; 
(iii) whether the seller's mere failure to perform his delivery obligations within the 
contract time gives the buyer an immediate right to terminate the contract. 
3.2.5.1. Partial Non-Conforming Delivery 
As stated in the first part 128, the seller's partially non-conforming delivery raises a number of 
questions. (1) Can the buyer reject all the goods delivered to him because some of them do not 
conform with the contract? (2) Can he reject the non-conforming part and accept the 
conforming part? (3) Is he entitled to terminate the whole contract on the basis that some of 
the goods delivered do not correspond with the contract terms? (4) Is there any case in which 
an aggrieved buyer is entitled to terminate the contract in respect of non-conforming and keep 
it alive with respect to the conforming part? The first two questions have been discussed in the 
first part. The two other questions are now examined. 
As explained in the first part, "' the jurists have raised the issue in question where the 
seller of specific goods has delivered goods some of which are in confonnity with the contract 
129 See, 2.2.3.1. 
129 Ibid. 
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quality. In that case, no jurist has disputed the buyer's right to reject all of the goods and 
terminate the contract as a whole. "' Different views appeared in respect of the buyer's right to 
reject the non-conforming part and terminate the contract with respect to that part but keep the 
contract alive as to the conforming part. "' A number of the jurists held that the buyer is 
simply entitled to either accept all or reject all and terminate the contract, " while the others 
support the view that in such a case the buyer should be given an option to reject the defective 
part and terminate the contract to that extent and keep the contract alive in respect of the 
conforming part. " However, a number of questions are unclear: (a) is the buyer entitled to 
partial termination where the seller of unascertained goods has tendered goods some of which 
do not conform to the contract? (b) under what circumstances should he be given to terminate 
the contract partially or as a whole? (c) is there any difference to be between termination of 
the contract as a whole and termination in respect of the part affected by the breach? 
As was shown in the first part, " the different views are due to the lack of a clear 
distinction between the case of severable and non-severable contracts. Accordingly, it is 
15 
suggested that where the contract is construed as severable, as described in the first pad' , 
there is no reason to prevent the buyer to accept the conforming and reject the non-conforming 
part, whether the contract is for sale of specific or unascertained goods. Any severable part 
will in fact constitute the subject of a subsidiary contract within the main contract. As a result, 
the rules governing breach of a shart-e-sefat and shart-e-salamat under a non-severable 
contract apply to the severable part. That is, where the broken term is classified as a shart-e- 
sefat or sal5vnat with respect to the severable part the buyer is entitled to reject that part 
(subject to the limitation suggested in respect of non-severable contract) and request the seller 
to tender a conforming delivery. After the buyer has lawfully rejected the non-conforming 
part, if it is accepted that the seller should be given a general right to cure he is entitled to cure 
the default by delivering replacement in conformity with the contract, provided that he does so 
within the time limited for delivery, otherwise the buyer is entitled to terminate the contract in 
respect of the non-conforming part. 
130 See e. g., Ansari, K (1375 H. Q. ) at 259; Khalkhlili, S. NL K., & Rashti, M. H., (1407 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 627; 
Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 56 and 61. 
131 AMeli, Z. (Shahid Thani), vol. I at 189 in which the late Shahid Thani expressly refers to two opposing 
views. 
132 Helli, M. M. (AllAmah Helli), and, Ameli, S. M. I H., vol. 4 at 629-630, and 660; Bahrani, Y., vol. 19 at 90; 
Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 258-259; Khalkhali, S. M. K., & Rashti, M H., (1407 R Q. ) vol. 2 at 627 (in 
which he claims that he could not identify a jurist who disagreed with this view) and 629-630. See also, 
Ans5ri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 258; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 56. The same view is accepted in Art. 431 of 
the L C. C. 
133 Gharavi Isfahani, M. H., (1408 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 108; Yazdi, S. M. K., (1379 H. Q) vol. 2 at 81-82; TM-ddi, M. 
A., and Khaei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 146 and seq.; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 299-300. 134 See, 2.2.3.1. 
135 Ibid. 
Chapter Four. Buyer's Remedies Under Shilah Law 239 
It is also suggested that a distinction should be made between partial termination and 
termination of the contract as a whole. Partial termination should be allowed where the 
requisite requirements, as described in respect of termination of a non-severable contract, are 
satisfied. But the buyer should not be given the right to terminate the contract as a whole 
merely because the seller has broken the contract in respect of one or more severable parts, 
even if the lack of conformity is serious. Termination of such contracts as a whole is to be 
permitted only where the seller's defective delivery in respect of one or more instalments is 
such that the buyer can reasonably conclude that the contract would be harmful for him, sine 
in such a situation the principle of I! darar comes into operation. 
3.2.5.2. Breach of Quantity Stipulations 
16 As indicated in the first pan' , the jurists have not disputed the buyer's right to terminate the 
contract for breach of quantity term. Almost all jurists have agreed to give the buyer the right 
to terminate the contract where the seller delivers less than what he contracted to sell. The 
same right is given to the buyer where the seller delivers to the buyer a quantity of goods 
larger than he contracted to sell. "" The difference is in giving the buyer the right to keep the 
contract alive in respect of the goods delivered and to terminate the contract as to the non- 
delivered part. 138 
As the language of the late Shaykh Ansdri's statement 139 shows, the jurists' difference is 
concerned with the case of sale specific goods. The different views are, it seems, due to the 
nature of the contract term indicating the quantity of the object of sale. Some jurists believe 
that such a term does not differ from shart-e-sefat. It is incorporated into the contract simply 
so as to qualify the seller's delivery obligation. " In both situations no part of the consideration 
is exchanged for the shart, i. e., the contract price as a whole is exchanged with the purchased 
goods. Accordingly, the buyer is only entitled to accept the wrong items against the agreed 
price or reject them and terminate the contract. In contrast, others argue that these two 
situations must be distinguished. A stipulation indicating the contract quantity is not a mere 
descriptive shart but also constitutes a part of the subject of the seller's obligation so that it is 
136 See, 2.2.3.2. 
137 See e. g., AnsAii, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 287; Tahidi, M. A., and Khoei, S. A. (1369 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 387. 
'm For instance, the late Shaykh Ansiri says: "There is no dispute as to the buyer's right to terminate the 
contract for partial delivery. The different views arise as to the question whether or not the buyer should be 
given a right to keep the contract alive as to the part delivered and terminate in respect of the undelivered 
parV'(Ansfffi, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 286). As to the first view see e. g., Helli, M. Nt (Alldmah Helli), and, Ameli, 
S. M. I H., 4 at 734; Ansiri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 286-7 (in which the late Ansgri cites a number ofjurists who 
supported t1iis view); Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 133-134; Najafl, M., and, Ndeini, M. H., (1358 
H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 144; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 450, and as to the second view see e. g., Khumayni, S. R. M., 
vol. 5 at 238; Tfihidi, M. A., and Khilei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 393-388, in particular, at 388. 
139 See, Ansaii, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 286. 
140 Art. 234 (1) of I. C. C. does also regard stipulation as to quantiy of subject-matter of the contract as shart-e- 
s efa t. 
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exchanged with part of the price. On this construction, where the purchased items delivered 
differ in quantity from that provided for in the contract the buyer can accept them and 
terminate the contract in respect of the non-existent part. However, the jurists have not 
addressed the case where the seller of unascertained goods has made wrong quantity delivery. 
They have not also made clear what degree of non-conformity will entitle the buyer to 
terminate the contract. 
It is suggested that the buyer should be given the right to terminate the contract for 
partial delivery in both cases. Nevertheless, it is suggested to distinguish between termination 
of the contract in its entirety and termination of the contract as to the missing part. In the first 
case, the buyer should be given the right to terminate where the missing part is such that its 
absence makes the contract harmful for the buyer. But in the second case, he should only be 
entitled to terminate the contract as to the missing part where it is not so slight that it would be 
customarily unreasonable for him to do so. This should be assessed in light of the seller's 
ability and readiness to make a fresh tender or to deliver the contract quantity within the 
contract time. This suggestion is in line with the rew, ýIyat cited from In-dm SAdeq. In that case, 
it was held that if the seller was able to cure the missing part the buyer has no right to 
terminate the contract. 141 
3.2.5.3. Breach of Time Stipulations 
Although the consequences of breach of shart-e-zaman (time stipulation) have not been 
addressed by ShPah jurists, some useful discussions can be found in Shlah jurisprudence 
when dealing with the question: "Where no specific time limit is provided under the contract 
both parties are required to perform their contractual obligations 'fiiran" (promptl Y), 1.142 
A number of questions must be addressed. (i) Is a stipulation as to the time for 
performance to be regarded as of the nature of shart-e-sefat or shart-e- fe 7? (ii) Under what 
circumstances is the buyer entitled to terminate the contract for breach of a time stipulation? 
(iii) What is the position when the contracting parties have not specified a time limit for 
performance of contractual obligation? These are the questions which have not precisely been 
examined by ShPah jurists. 
141 See e. g., Ameli, H., vol. 12, bab 14, hadith I at 36 1. See also, 3.2.4.1. 
142 See generally, Qumi, M. A. (Muhaqqeq Qumi), (1371 H. S. ) vol. 2 at 144 and seq. (question no 101); 
Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 303; Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at. 174 and seq.; Gharavi Isfahk-d, M. H., 
(1408 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 191; Shahidi, M. F., (1375 H. Q) at 600-601; Midi, M. A., and Kh-dei, S. A. (1368 
H. S. ) vol. 7 at 546 and seq.; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 330 and seq.; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 540; 
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(A) Nature of Time Stipulation 
As already explained, " contractual terms are either of the nature of shart-e-sefat or of that of 
shart-e- fe 7 or shart-e-natijah. Terms indicating a time limit for performance of contract 
obligations cannot be outside this threefold classification. There is no doubt that a time 
stipulation does not fall into the category of shart-e-natijah. " The main question is therefore 
whether shart-e-zaman is to be placed into the category of shart-e-sefat or that of shart-e- 
fe 7. 
It seems that a stipulation containing a definite time or a period of time for performance 
cannot be described as shart-e-sefat because, the term shart-e-sefat, as explained earlier", 
refers to those terms which define the subject-matter of the contract, "' whereas a time 
stipulation is incorporated into the contract so as to define the contracting parties' duty to 
perform. A sale contract simply obliges the seller to deliver the Object sold and the buyer to 
pay the price. Although, as will be seen below, where no particular contractual time limit is 
provided by the parties under the contract, the nature (415q) of a reciprocal contract requires 
them to perform their obligations promptly, "" by incorporation of time stipulation they are 
obliged to perform their duties within the specified time. 'I 
Terminationfor Breach of Time Stipulation 
Having placed time stipulations into the category of shart-e- fe 7 the question arises whether 
breach of such a contract term will give rise to an immediate right to terminate the contract, or 
whether the injured party is entitled to the common remedy provided for breach of shart-e- 
fe'l, i. e., requiring the defaulting party to perform his obligation. As already pointed out", 
according to most ShPah jurists, breach of shart-e-fe7 gives an innocent party only a right to 
require the breaching party to perform rather than an immediate right to terminate the, 
contract. Accordingly, breach of a time stipulation must, according to this principle, produce 
the same result. That is, the buyer will be entitled to terminate the contract only when it is not 
practical to require the defaulting seller to perform his obligation. " This view has been 
strongly criticized by other jurists. "' The main objection to this approach is that breach of 
143 Section One, 2.1.2.2. 
144 See ibid., fn. 18. 
145 See ibid., (A). 
146 See e. g., Ansari, M., (1375 H. Q. ) at 283. 
147 See e. g., Tahidi, M. A., and Khilei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 547-548. 
"0 Some jurists have recently referred to such a nature of time stipulation. See for instance, Tabrizi, J., (1412 
H. Q. ) at 419. 
149 See, 3.2.3.4. 
1" This approach has been supported by the great Shiah jurist the late S9iib Javaher in: NaJafl, M. H., (1981) 
vOl. 23 at 99. 
"' See e. g., Ansiari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 303; Gharavi Isfahani, M. H., (1408 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 191; Khumayni, S. 
R. M., vol. 5 at 334; Midi, M. A., and Khuei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 548; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 
542. 
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has not committed any breach entitling the buyer to require the seller to perform. After the 
expiration of that time the defaulting seller can no longer perform his obligation under the time 
stipulation. "' 
However, the latter groups do not explain when the buyer will be entitled to terminate 
the contract for breach of time stipulation; is he entitled to terminate for any late delivery? It 
seems that the buyer's right to terminate the contract for the seller's late delivery should in 
principle be based on the serious consequences of delay. As explained before"', the main 
ground for giving a right to terminate the contract is the principle of Ri darar. Accordingly, it 
is difficult to say that any delay in performance of the contract will give rise to an immediate 
right of termination. He will have such a right only where late performance will cause him 
undue detriment. Nevertheless, in the context of commercial contracts it is fairly possible to 
infer from the circumstances of the case that the contracting parties have impliedly agreed that 
any delay by the seller will give rise to a right of termination even though it does not cause the 
buyer any loss. 
(C) No time specified in the contract 
Where no time provision is specified by the parties within the sale contract it is a well- 
accepted view in ShPah law that the contracting parties are required to perform their 
obligation ': faran" (promptly). " The term'promptly' is not defined in ShVah jurisprudence. It 
is generally said that it must be understood according to the custom of any particular case. 
Thus, the period of time for performance may differ from case to case. "' 
The question arises here whether or not the seller's failure to deliver promptly entitles 
the buyer to terminate the contract. There is no clear answer from the jurists in this 
connection. It seems that the question must be answered on the basis of the general principles 
explained above. One may argue that since the parties have left the question of time for 
performance open it may be inferred that the time for performance of the contract cannot be 
regarded as of the essence, since otherwise they would have expressly referred to it. 
Accordingly, termination should always be justified on the basis of the principle of 1A darar. 
However, the case may be different in the context of commercial contracts. In such contracts, 
performance within a reasonable time is of significance for the contracting parties. The parties 
may have relied on such a common understanding and have left the matter to the relevant 
152 See e. g., Qun-d, M. A. (Muhaqqeq Qumi), (1371 H. S. ) vol. 2 at 144 (question no 101) and 192 (question no. 
119). 
153 See, 3.2.2. 
154 See e. g., Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 303; Tf-Edi, M. A., and Khfiei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 547; 
Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 333; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 540. See also, Katozian, N., (1992) vol. I at 
173; hn&ni, S. H., (1363 H. S. ) vol, I at 237. 
155 TWddi, M. A., and Khdei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 547-548. See also, Katdzidn, N., (1992) vol. 1. at 173. 
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may have relied on such a common understanding and have left the matter to the relevant 
custom. " Accordingly, it may be said that delivery beyond a reasonable time will be breach of 
an implied undertaking that the seller will perform his delivery obligation within that time and 
if he fails to do so the buyer may be entitled to terminate the contract immediately. 
The point which deserves to be noted is whether one could adopt a Nachfilst type 
procedure (as provided in the Convention) or making the time of the essence of the contract 
(as recognized in English law) in this system. No jurist has addressed the question whether the 
buyer is able to give the seller a reasonable period of time requiring him to perform his 
obligations within that time so that if the seller refuses to perform the buyer is entitled to 
terminate the contract. It seems that Shiah law could follow neither. In ShVah law, as 
explained when dealing with the grounds for kheyardt". there are three well-accepted 
circumstances in which the buyer may be entitled to terminate the contract; a particular 
rewjyat which allows him to do so, shart-e-&mni (implied agreement) and the principle of Id 
darar. No particular authority can be found to allow the buyer to give the seller additional 
time and terminate the contract if he fails to perform within that time. Accordingly, the only 
way to justify termination for late delivery is either the doctrine of shart-e-&mni or the 
principle of Id darar as described when dealing with the grounds of the options. 
3.3. Mechanism of Termination 
3.3.1. No Automatic Termination 
As in the two other systems, in Shiah law termination is a matter of election. Tbus breach of 
contract does not automatically result in termination of the contract. This fact can easily be 
inferred from the definitions suggested by the jurists in respect of the concept of kheydr 
Although in terms of terminology ShPah jurists have defined the term in different ways, " all 
of them agreed that kheyar simply gives a party a right to terminate the contract if he wishes. 
Accordingly, termination of the contract is always at the option of the party who is given such 
a right. As long as he has not lost his right he cannot be required to elect to ternfinate or affirin 
the contract. 
1-56 The fact to which Diplock I (as he was then) referred in an English case of McDougall v. Aerommine of 
Emsworth Ltd. [1958] 1 W. L. R. 1126 at 1132. 157 See, 3.2.2. 
158 Definitions such as, " kheyar is the option to tenninate the contracV, or, "kheyar is the option to affum the 
contract or bring it to an end", or, "khcyar is the option to dissolve the contract or bring it to an en(r'. See in 
this respect, Ansdri, M., (1375 H. Q. ) at 214; Najafi, M., and, Ndeini, M. H., (1359 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 4; 
Khalkhali, S. M. K., & Rashti, M. H., (1407 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 5-6; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 4 at 5; Trihidi, NL 
A., and Khfiei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 6 at 5-6; Karimi, S. J., and, Amuli, M. H. (1380 H. Q. ) vol. 4 at 3 and 
seq. 
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3.3.2. Election of Termination 
A number of questions need to be considered here: When is a termination effective? Is the 
terminating buyer required to exercise his right in a particular form? Should termination be 
communicated to the seller? Is it necessary to obtain a court order for termination to be 
effective? 
3.3.2.1. Declaration 
The right to terminate is exercised by a simple declaration of intention to terminate the 
contract. A mere inner intention to terminate does not suffice. It must be clearly announced in 
a proper way. 159 Accordingly, there must be a positive act on the part of the buyer to declare 
his intention to terminate but the declaration is not required to take any special form. Any 
statement or conduct by the buyer will suffice to effect termination provided that it clearly 
indicates that he has intended to terminate. "' Accordingly, the contract will not be terminated 
merely because of the buyer's failure to declare it terminated. "' Thus the buyers rejection of 
defective goods or his request of the seller to return the money he has paid for the goods may 
be evidence of the intention to exercise the option to terminate the contract, provided that it 
was sufficiently unequivocal to show his intention. 
3.3.2.2. Communication 
It is commonly said that in ShPah law termination will be effective even though the party in 
breach has no awareness of it. "' This rule is based on the legal nature of termination. In 
ShPah law, termination is placed into the category of iqX, (unilateral juristic act), as opposed 
to aqd (bilateral juristic act). The expression refers to any legal institution which is created 
by a unilateral legal intention of a party. Under the theory of iqX a unilateral juristic act such 
as termination does not require the consent of any person to be effective but would be legally 
effective as soon as an intention to create such a legal concept has unequivocally been 
announced. Accordingly, what a buyer is required, under this construction, to do in exercising 
his right to terminate is simply to declare his intention to terminate by a proper means such as 
159 See e. g., Najafi, M., and, Naeini, M. H., (1358 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 59). Khumayni, S. R. U, vol. 5 at 279-280; 
TMddi, M. A., and Kh-dei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 451 and seq.; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 488. Among 
the Iranian lawyers see, Katozian, N., (1990) vol. 5 at 54. In contrast, see Ansih, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 294 and 
various references the late Ans, 1W cites there; Imami, S. H., (1363 H. S. ) vol. I at 184-185. 
160 See e. g., NaJafi, M., and, Naeini, M. H., (1358 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 37,163-164; KhurAsAni, U Y_, (1406 R Q. ) 
at 258; TWiidi, M. A., and Khilei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 445. See also, Arts. 449 and 451 of I. C. C. 
161 However, as will be seen below, where the buyer learns of the breach and his right to terminate the contract 
he has to exercise his right promptly, otherwise he will lose his right 
162 See e. g., Helli, A. M. (Fakhr al- Muhaqqeqin), vol. I at 484; Helh, M. M. (Allknah Helli), vol. I at 522; 
Hclli, M. M (Allamah Helli), and, Ameli, S. M. J. H., vol. 4 at 567,659 (in this reference Ameli, citing a 
considcrable number of sources on this view, observed that this view is a well-accepted view among Shiah 
juristsy, BahrAni, Y. vol. 19 at 117; Karaki, A. (Muhaqqeq Th&-d) vol. 2 at 269); Najafi, M. H., (1981) vol. 30 
at 344. 
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a notice. It may, therefore, be written or oral, and, may be transmitted by any means 
whatsoevcr. 
This view may result in an unreasonable effect. It may be the case when taking into 
account the fact that the jurists do not require the aggrieved buyer to notify the seller of the 
lack of conformity. In such a case, it is quite possible that the contract is terminated even 
before the seller learns of the buyer's alleged entitlement to terminate. Such a result may be 
harsh for him when he is faced with the return of defective goods without any readiness to take 
back them, since the costs and risks of re-disposal of the goods fall on the seller together with 
losses resulting from a decline in the market price, which under the contract would normally 
fall on the buyer. This is perhaps the reason why the late Imam Khumayni was forced to 
depart from this common view and tacitly accept that as long as termination is not properly 
communicated to the party in breach it will not be effective. 16' 
However, according to the suggestion made in this study, the buyer in practice will 
notify the seller of the lack of conformity. This is because his entitlement to terminate the 
contract should be assessed by taking into account the seller's ability and willingness to cure. 
Accordingly, the buyer will not be able to terminate the contract quickly to block the seller's 
right to cure. 
3.3.2.3. Application for the Court's Judgment 
Under ShPah law, the party who wishes to exercise his right to terminate the contract is not 
under any duty to apply for a court's decree. "" However, he may be forced to resort to the 
court in order to enforce the effects of termination. The party in breach may not accept the 
terminating party's entitlement to terminate and, in contrast, may regard him as guilty of 
unlawful termination. In such a case, the buyer is required to satisfy the court that he was 
entitled to do so and that he has properly exercised his right. In deciding the case, the court in 
fact declares the buyer's lawful termination. Consequently, his termination would be effective 
from the time the buyer's declaration. Where he fails to satisfy the court he will himself be 
guilty of breach of contract and obliged to perform his obligations under the contract. 
163 See Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 4 at 2 1. 
'" It seems that this is a well-settled view in Shiah jurisprudence. In this respect, the distinguished Shilah 
jurist, AllAmah Helli observes: "Termination to be effective does not depend on the court's decision. " (see 
Helli, A. M. (Fakhr al- Muhaqqiqin vol. I at 484). See also, Helli, M. M. (All&nah Helli), vol. I at 522; 
Helli, M. M. (AllAmah Helli), and, Ameli, S. M. J. H., vol. 4 at 567 and 659; Mamaqani, A., (1345 H. Q. ) at 
196. There is no clear provision in I. C. C. which requires a buyer who seeks to exercise his right to terminate 
to resort to the court. But in a case by the court in 1337 [1954] it is held that a buyer who NNishes to exercise 
his right to terminate the contract is not required to apply for a courts judgment (as cited in Y. Atozian, N., 
(1990) vol. 5 at 71, fh. 1). 
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3.3.3. Election of Affirmation 
As already pointed out, when a breach giving rise to the right to terminate is committed by the 
seller, the buyer does not have to terminate the contract but can waive his right to terminate 
and instead affirm the contract. He may expressly affirm the contract. Affirmation of contract 
by this way is called isq&-e-garih (express waiver). "' There are also circumstances in which 
he may be deemed as to have affirmed the contract. Affirmation in this way is called isqg-e- 
&mni (implied waiver). '" 
Where the buyer expressly affirms or is regarded as having affirmed the contract he will 
lose his right to terminate the contract. The reason is clear. The option to terminate is given to 
the buyer to protect himself against the seller's breach. Where it becomes clear that he has 
declared, whether by express words or conduct or by operation of the law, that he has 
accepted the continuance of the contract he must be bound to the consequence of his action. In 
the terminology of ShPah jurisprudence, loss of the right to terminate is justified on the 
principle of iqdkn (action against himself). Under this principle, any person who is given a 
right will lose his right where he himself, knowing of the right, acts to his detriment. The loss 
of the option can also be explained on the basis that the major ground of the options, as 
already explained"'. is the principle of Iff darar. This principle comes into operation in favour 
of the buyer where he has not consented to the detrimental contract. But if he himself declares 
his consent to the non-conforming delivery or the law presumes so the principle will not come 
into operation. "' 
3.3.3.1. Isqgt-e-krih 
Express waiver of the right to terminate the contract does not cause too much difficulty. The 
buyer may be regarded as having expressly abandoned his right where he expressly intimates 
to the seller that he will not reject the non-conforming goods. However, it should be 
emphasized that this does not mean that "express waiver" can only be made by words: it 
would be sufficient if he does some positive act by which he indicates that he intends to waive 
his right to terminate the contract. "' For example, where in the case of a documentary sale, the 
buyer, knowing the non-conformity of the seller's delivery with the contract, accepts and pays 
for the documents, it can be said that he shows his intention to abandon his rights to reject the 
165 See generally, AnsAri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 251,253; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 19-23. 
'" See generally, AnsAri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 251,254-5; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 23 and seq. 
167 See, 3.2.2. 
1" See e. g., Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 239 (with respect to the loss of the option of lesion). 
169Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 71; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 19,24-25. It is worth noting that 
where the relinquish is expressed by the words it is called "isqdt quIi", while if it is expressed by the conducts 
it is called "isqdtfeli". 
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non-conforming documents and non-conforming goods as far as defects apparent on the face 
of the documents are concerned. It may also be said that the buyer has expressly waived his 
right to terminate the contract for non-conformity of the goods delivered where he, actually 
knowing of the lack of conformity, takes the seller's delivery note and signs it. 
It is worth noting that express isqSt is not confined to cases where the buyer learns of 
the non-conformity and his right to terminate the contract. He may also do so before he learns 
of the fact. This is the position where after the seller's delivery he intimates to the seller that he 
will not reject the goods even though they do not conform with the contract. "' However, it is 
suggested that the buyer's intimation must be such that it clearly shows his intention to waive 
his prospective right to terminate. 
On the basis of this construction, where the buyer learns that the seller's delivery does 
not conform with the contract terms the buyer may expressly ignore his right to terminate and 
accept the non-conforming delivery. In this regard, he may totally waive all rights resulting 
from the non-conformity or he may simply ignore his right of termination. It is therefore the 
court's duty to decide in any case whether the buyer has waived the breach or merely his right 
to reject the non-conforming delivery and terminate the contract. 
3.3.3.2. IsqR-e-Amni 
In some cases, notwithstanding that the buyer has not expressly waived his right to terminate, 
he may be deemed to have ignored his right and affirmed the contract. The fact that in some 
cases the buyer may be deemed to have affirmed the contract is not controversial. The major 
problem arises in determining which circumstances in effect constitute an implied affinnation, 
in the sense that the buyer is regarded to have affinned the contract. 
In ShPah jurisprudence, the circumstances in which the buyer may have been treated as 
having impliedly affirmed the contract are discussed under the headings of tasarruf (literally, 
any act as to the goods delivered) and takhir (delay) in exercising the right to terminate. As 
far as the buyer's right to reject the non-confom-dng goods and terminate the contract is 
concerned, the jurists have exan-dned under the two headings various cases where a buyer may 
be deemed to have affirmed the contract. In some cases there is no doubt that the buyer will be 
regarded as having impliedly affirmed the contract, but others are controversial. However, no 
jurist has addressed the circumstances in which an international buyer may be taken to have 
170 Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 251 (the option of inspection) and 253 (the option of defect); TUhidi, M. A., and 
Khilei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 72,105. The buyer may also lose his right to terminate the contract for the 
seller's non-conforming delivery where he relinquishes from his right to reject non-conforming goods at the 
time of conclusion of the contract. See in this respect, Ans,, W, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 25 1; Yazdi, S. M. K-, (1379 
H. Q) vol. 2 at 60; Khalkhali, S. M. K., & Rashti, M. H., (1407 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 595; Midi, M. A., and Khilei, 
S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 74; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 4 at 435; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 266; and Art. 
448 of the 1. C. C. 
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lost his right to reject non-confom-dng documents and goods. In the following, examining some 
significant cases in which a buyer may be deemed to have accepted the contract, an attempt 
will be made to show how loss of the right to reject non-conforming documents could be 
analyzed in this system. 
(A) Tasarruf 
(1) Concept and Terminology 
The expression "tasarruf' refers to any act on the part of the buyer over the goods delivered 
by the seller. ShPah jurists suggest that the buyer may be taken to have consented to the non- 
conforming delivery by the method of tasarruf in three classes of case: use of the goods, 
dealing with them and altering them so that it is not possible to return them in the same 
condition they possessed at the time of delivery. "" 
The crucial question which arises here is whether any use of the goods delivered will be 
regarded as an implied affirmation of the contract or if the rule must be restricted to a 
particular use of them. Will any disposition of, or, dealing with the goods result in loss of the 
right to terminate the contract? Is there any difference between the case where the buyer 
knows of the non-conformity and his right to terminate, and the case in which he has no 
knowledge of the fact? And finally, is there any particular criterion to be relied on in 
ascertaining what acts should amount to an implied acceptance of the non-conforming 
delivery? 
(II) Istemal (Use) of Goods) 
The terin "istemal" is used to refer to any use which does not cause any change in the state of 
the delivered goods. Any ordinary use or that made in order to prepare them for the purposes 
for which they have been purchased will be placed into this category. It is commonly said that 
where the buyer has no knowledge of the non-conforn-tity giving rise to the right to reject and 
terminate the contract he will not lose his option of termination by mere use of the goods. " 
'Me reason is clear. Waiver of the right to terminate is a unilateral juristic act Oq! ). There 
will be an effective iqd' only where it is unequivocally declared by the party who has such an 
option. But it is hard to treat a party who does not know of his right to terminate the contract 
as having thus declared his intention to abandon his right to terminate"', since the buyer may 
171 See e. g., KhalkhAli, S. M. K., & Rashti, M. H., (1407 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 256; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 197. 
" In contrast, a number of jurists are of the view that in the case of the option of defect any use of the goods 
even before knowledge of the fact will amount to loss of the right to reject. See e. g., Muhaqqeq TehrAni, NL 
R., (1414 H. Q. ) vol. 23 at 268; Muqniyah, M. J., (1402 H. Q. ) vol. 3 at 226. 
173 Y. Mazian, N., (1990) vol. 5 at 13 1. The existence of the option after such acts can also be justified on the 
basis of the principle of Isteshab. That is, as long as it does not prove that the buyer has declared his intention 
to reaquish his right to terminate the pre-existent option is presumed as still standing (see Anski, U (1375 
H. Q. ) at 239). 
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have used the goods for different purposes. He may use them for his ordinary purposes or in 
order to ascertain whether or not the goods delivered conform with the contract or simply for 
the purpose of preserving them. " For this reason it is commonly said that the buyer's use of 
the goods delivered will be regarded as an implied waiver of the right to terminate if three 
requirements are met. "' First, he has used the goods as an owner of the goods does. Second, 
his conduct has not been for the purpose of examination of the goods so as to ascertain 
whether or not they are in conformity with the contract conditions. And third, when he uses the 
goods he has known of the lack of conformity giving rise to an option to terminate on that 
basis. On this view, as long as the buyer has not actually" discovered such a non-conformity 
he will not be deemed to have affirmed the contract by mere use of the goods. " 
However, in applying the rule some jurists have distinguished between the option of 
incorrect description and the option of defect. In respect of the first option, it has been 
suggested that the buyer will lose his right to terminate only where his acts customarily 
indicate his intention to affirm the contract, while with respect to the option of defect any use 
will result in loss of the right. 178 
It is suggested that in both cases the buyer should be deemed to have lost his right 
provided that his acts does clearly indicate his intention to affirm the contract, for, as will be 
seen below, not every act has this result. "' For instance, repairing or attempting to repair, or 
asking the seller to repair them may be regarded as a deemed affirmation, whereas, the same 
acts will not result in such a result if the buyer is not aware of the lack of conformity giving 
rise to the right to terminate the contract. It is therefore suggested that the buyer should not be 
174 See e. g., Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 226 ("It appears from the wordings of the most jurists that the right to 
terminate is not lost by the mere use because it is quiet possible that it was for examination or preservation for 
the sellcr. "). Accordingly, it cannot be said that the buyer has acted in his detriment. The principle of iqddm 
comes into operation where the buyer notwithstanding that he knows that his action would result in his 
detriment makes such an action (Ansari, M., ibid., at 239). 
175 See in this respect, Najafi, M., and, Nleini, M. H., (1358 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 164. 176 A buyer may be taken to have waived his right to reject the non-conforming delivery where he has discovered 
the non-conformity. The question arises here is whether it is necessary that defect to be latent on a reasonable 
person or the criterion is the buyer himself It is commonly said that the criterion is the buyer not a reasonable 
person. Accordingly, he will be entitled to terminate for the defect which can be discovered by a simple 
examination. Art. 424 of I. C. C. apparently accepts this criterion. This would be harsh for the seller if one 
takes into account that the jurists have not obliged the buyer to examine the goods. It is therefore suggested 
that the right of the buyer must be confined to cases where he has examined the goods but failed to discover 
the defect for where the buyer who knows that the goods may be defective, failed to examine them he cannot 
be protected by the principle of Id thrar, since he has acted against himself (qAedah-e-iqddm). 
177 Ansfrai, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 254-255; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) vol. 4 at 283-284. 178 Ansiti, M., (1375 H. Q. ) at 254, in which he cites from a great number ofjurists that any use amounts to the 
loss of the right. See also, Khalkhali, S. M. K, & Rashti, M. H., (1407 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 664 (in which the late 
Rashti says: "There is no doubt and nobody has disputed that use of the goods delivered after that the user has 
known of the defect in the goods would result in loss of the right to terminate. "); Midi, M. A., and KhIlei, S. 
A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 110-111 in which the late Ayatullah KhIlei quotes the view from a number of jurists 
such as Allamah Helli. 
179 Ansiri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 254-255; Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 60,71; Midi, M. A., and Khaei, 
S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 108; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 29; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 282-283. 
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taken as having affirmed the contract if a reasonable man in his position could not have 
discovered the lack of confonnity. 
aff) Muamelah (Dealing) with Goods 
In the context of commercial contracts, goods are often purchased for resale. It is quite 
possible that the buyer resells the goods delivered before he discovers the non-conformity. In 
particular, in an international sale of goods the buyer may sell the goods to a sub-buyer while 
they are in transit. He may also do so after he has learned of the non-confon-nity and his 
entitlement to reject the non-conforming goods. The crucial question is whether the mere resale 
of the purchased goods or any other disposition will be regarded as an act indicating his 
intention to consent to the contract? 
It is conunonly said that where the buyer is aware of the non-confom-dty his act in 
reselling the goods delivered, and other dispositions, do clearly indicate his intention to affirm 
the contract. "' The buyer, by his conduct, shows his interest in keeping the contract alive, 
otherwise he would not have resold or disposed of them to a third party. 
Nevertheless, the case becomes somewhat difficult where the buyer has sold or 
otherwise dealt with them before learning of the non-conformity. Although acts such as 
dealing with the goods normally indicate an intention to affirm the contract, it seems that a 
mere dealing with the goods cannot be regarded as a clear indication of the intention to affirm 
the contract. The buyer should be regarded as having affirmed the contract by such acts where 
he knew, or could have known, of the breach giving rise to the right. Otherwise, it is hard to 
say that the buyer has intended to affirm the contract by dealing with the goods, in particular 
where he resold them when they were in transit with no knowledge of the lack of conformity 
entitling him to terminate the contract, unless the circumstances of the case and the buyer's 
behavior show that he would have done so even if he had known of the fact. "' 
Assuming that the buyer's right to terminate the contract will be lost merely by selling 
them to a sub-buyer the question arises if, where the sub-buyer learns of the fact and rejects 
the non-conforming goods, the first buyer will be able to enforce his right to reject. Different 
answers have been suggested by the jurists. "' Some of them believe that after the sub-buyer's 
rejection the original buyer will be entitled to reject the non-conforming goods. " But others 
are of the view that after the buyer is deemed to have lost his right of termination by selling 
180 See ArL 450 of I. C. C. 
'81 See, Tfll-ddi, M. A., and Khilei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 73,107. The same argument has been supported 
by Ayatullah Khfiei in the case of option of lesion (see, TMddi, M. A., and Kh-dei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 6 at 
355). See also, Art. 450 of I. C. C. 
182 Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 29-30. 
183 See e. g., TfIsi, M. (Shaykh al- Taefah), vol. 2 at 13 1; Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 71-72. 
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the goods to a sub-buyer he will not be able to revive the right lost by his unilateral 
intention. "' 
It seems that one must distinguish between the case in which the loss of the right is 
justified on the implied affirmation of the contract and that in which the buyer is deprived of 
his right because of the impossibility of physical return of the goods. If it is accepted that by 
the resale the buyer has declared his intention to affirm the contract he himself has acted to his 
detriment (the principle of iqd,; Yn) and there is no room to return to the previous position. 
However, if the loss of the right is based on the impossibility of restoration it is quite possible 
for him to enforce his right to terminate. In fact his right has not been lost but its exercise was 
prevented by an external factor. As soon as the prevention is removed he will be entitled to 
exercise his right. "' 
(B) Tadhdhur-e-Radd-e-Mabi I (Impossibility of Physical Return of Subject of Sale) 
A further circumstances in which a buyer may lose his right to terminate the contract for the 
seller's non-conforming delivery is where the goods delivered cannot be returned to the seller 
in the same condition they were in at the time of delivery. The rule is applied whether the 
buyer knows of the right or not. "' However, this is an exception to the general principle 
established above and it is based on a particular rewgyat from Im. ýM Meq and only applies to 
the case where the seller of specific goods has delivered defective goods. In that case the 
Im&n, when he was asked about the situation in which the purchaser found some defect in the 
cloth or cattle after purchase, held that 
"If the cloth or cattle were in the same condition as they were in at the time of delivery 
he would have been entitled to reject them but if the cloth was cut or swung or painted 
he could have only claim price reduction for the defect. "187 
Where the right to terminate is based on other options the general principle already 
established would apply. Thus the buyer will lose his right to terminate in such a circumstance 
if it becomes clear that he has declared his intention to affirm the contract. As long as such an 
intention cannot be inferred from the buyer's conduct and other circumstances the buyer will 
preserve his right to terminate the contract. On this principle, even where the goods have 
perished or been destroyed by factors beyond the control of the buyer the right to terminate 
184 See Ansiri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 255; TabrizL J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 286. 195 See also, Katozian, N., (1990) vol. 5 at 299. See in contrast, ImAmi, S. H., (1363 H. S. ) vol. I at 506,507. '86 See e. g., Ansiri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 255; KhalkhAli, S. M. K., & Rashti, M. H., (1407 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 610; 
Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 29; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 294-285. See also Art. 429 of I. C. C. 187 See Ameli, H., vol. 12 Bab 16, p. 363, Hadith 3. The view is also supported by another M authentic 
(correct) hadith cited from Imam SAdeq (A. S. ) (ibid., at 362 hadith 2). 
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still remains. "' However, after termination the buyer will be entitled to request the seller to 
refund the difference between the price of non-conforming and conforming goods. "' 
(B) Takhir (Delay) in Exercise of the Right 
The other circumstance in which a buyer may lose his right to terminate the contract is delay 
in exercising his right after he has learned of the non-conformity giving rise to the right to 
terminate the contract. This is based on the view that the option to terminate should be 
exercised fi7ran (promptly). However, the question is controversial amongst the jurists and 
different views have been offered with respect to any option. 
As far as the options of incorrect description and defect are concerned, the jurists 
distinguish between these two opposite options. In the first case, most jurists suggest that the 
option must be exercised promptly. Any unjustified delay would result in loss of the right. "' It 
is worth mentioning that on this view, "prompt" is a customary concept. Accordingly, it will 
differ from case to case, depending on the circumstances of the case and the state of the buyer. 
In general, the buyer will lose his right to terminate if he fails to exercise his right within such 
period of time as he is able to do so according to the relevant custom. "' In contrast, in the 
second case, most of them believe that mere delay in exercising the right will not result in the 
loss of the right, unless the delay is such as to indicate his intention to affirm the contract. "' 
The different views are, it seems, based on the grounds on which the option to terminate 
is justified. According to the view which justifies the option to terminate on particular 
authorities, the option should not be lost by mere delay, for the authorities reflecting the option 
give an absolute right to the aggrieved party without restricting his right to a particular time or 
period of time. Accordingly, as long as the buyer's delay in exercising his right does not show 
his consent to the contract he will be entitled to enforce his right of termination. The same is 
true if they are based on the doctrine of shart-e-&mni. But if it is accepted that the options of 
inspection and defect are based on the principle of Ii darar the consequence will be different. 
188 In this respect, see Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 302. In contrast see, Midi, M. A., and Khaei, S. A. (1368 
H. S. ) vol. 7 at 73 (with respect to the option of inspection) 109 and 113 (in general). 
189 See e. g., Ansrui, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 255; Midi, NL A., and Khfiei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 108. 
190 See e. g., NarAqi, A., vol. 2 at 388; Bahrdni, Y., vol. 19 at 59; Fayz Kashlni, M., (1401 H. Q. ) vol. 3 at 72; 
Ans, dri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 250; KhalkWi, S. M. K., & Rashti, M. H., (1407 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 593; TUhidi, M. 
A., and Khilei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 72; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 4 at 433. See also Art. 415 of I. C. C. 
See in contrast, Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 263. 
191 Najafl, M. H., (1981) vol. 23 at 95; Midi, M. A., and Khaei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 72; Y. Atazi&n, N., 
(1990) vol. 5 at 73. 
192 See e. g., Ameli, Z. (Shahid Tldni), vol. I at 196; Helli, M. M. (Allamah Helli), and, Ameli, S. M. I H., vol. 
4 at 659 (and different sources cited there); Bahrani, Y., vol. 29 at 104,117. Shaykh Yasef Bahrtii and 
Abdullah MftAqani maintain that most of Shiah jurists have accepted this view (M&nAq&-d, A., (1345 H. Q. ) 
at 119). However, there are a considerable number of the jurists who are of the view that the option of defect 
is to be exercised promptly. See in this respect AnsAri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 254 and different references he 
cites there and p. 262.1. C. C. in Art. 435 follows the latter view. 
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Under this view, the principle comes into operation in favour of an aggrieved buyer to protect 
himself against losses imposed on him as a result of the seller's non-conforming delivery. 
According to this view, the principle gives the buyer a reasonable opportunity to decide and 
declare his intention. Any failure to do this while he is able to discharge himself from the 
detrimental contract will be at his risk. "' 
It seems that the buyer's right to terminate the contract for seller's non-conforming 
delivery should be exercised promptly, since, as already explained"'. the main reason for 
giving the buyer a right to terminate is the principle of /a darar. For this purpose, he should be 
given only an adequate opportunity which enables him to benefit from this legal protection 
within that period. In addition, where the buyer, knowing of his right and being able to 
exercise, does not exercise it he will be regarded as having acted to his detriment (the principle 
of iqda-m). Moreover, giving an indefinite right to the buyer would be harsh for the seller if 
one takes into account the fact that under ShPah law the buyer is not under any duty to inform 
the seller of the lack of conformity of the goods delivered. 
(C) Position of the Non- Conforming Documents 
One of the most important purposes of a commercial buyer is to have access to the goods for 
resale. An international buyer may wish to resell the purchased goods before they arrive at his 
destination. This is easily possible when the contract is made in the form of documentary sale. 
Under such a contract the buyer possesses documents representing the nature, quality, 
quantity and other specifications of the purchased goods. The documents enable the buyer who 
wishes to resell or obtain credit required for his fiiture commercial activities to deal with them 
without having to wait for actual delivery. The crucial question which arises here is whether 
merely dealing with the documents will result in the loss of the right to reject for undisclosed 
defects, whether they are related to the documents themselves or to the goods. The question 
has not been addressed by Shiah jurists at all. Accordingly, it should be answered on the 
basis of general principles. 
As already explained"', according to general principles of Shlah contract law, it would 
not seem any problem if one suggests that under a documentary sale contract the buyer may 
have two separate rights to reject: a right to reject non-conforming documents and a right to 
reject non-conforn-ting goods. Where the seller tenders documents which do not conforin with 
the contract the buyer is entitled to reject them and request conforming documents. However, 
193 See e. g., Ansr6, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 262; Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 60. 
194 See, 3.2.2. 
195 See, 2.2.4.3. 
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if the buyer, knowing of the non-conformity accepts them he should be regarded as having 
accepted them and will lose his right to reject them on the principle of iqda-m. 
The question which arises here is whether waiver of the right to reject non-confonning 
documents would result in the loss of the right to reject the goods where they prove non- 
conforming on arrival. It is suggested that if the non-conformity of the goods with the contract 
was apparent on the face of the documents he should be deemed to have lost his right to reject 
the goods. For, to accept documents representing non-conforming goods is a clear instance of 
conduct which indicates an intention to waive the right to reject. In contrast, if the defect was 
not apparent on the documents mere acceptance of them should not result in loss of the right to 
reject the goods. 
On the above interpretation, loss of the right to reject non-conforming documents does 
not necessarily result in loss of the right to reject the non-conforming goods. There may be 
cases in which the buyer loses, or is taken to have lost, his first right without losing his second 
right. The question is whether the buyer will lose his right to reject where he has dealt with the 
documents, by for instance, disposing the documents representing the goods to a third party. 
As stated before, it is a well-accepted rule of ShPah law that the buyer will lose his 
right only when he has expressly declared his intention to waive his right or when his conduct 
and other circumstances of the case clearly show that he has such an intention. On this general 
principle, it is suggested that a buyer who deals with the shipping documents should not be 
taken to have intended to waive his right to reject unless he was actually, or should have been, 
aware of the fact and his entitlement to reject. Accordingly, where the buyer learns later of the 
fact that the documents possessed a wrong date of shipment he should be allowed to reject 
them. The same is true afortiod as to the buyer's right to reject the goods where it proves that 
they do not conform with the contract conditions. 
3.4. Effects of Termination 
As in English law and the Convention, under ShVah law when election of tennination for 
breach of contract validly takes place, it affects both the contract and relations of the parties 
from that time. 
3.4.1. Effects on Contract 
The question of from when termination affects the contract has not caused major discussion 
between the jurists. With a few exceptions"', it is commonly said by the jurists that it is a 
196 Makki, M. (Shahid Awwal), vol. 2 at 79, (rule no. 173); Yazdi, S. M. K., (1988) vol. 2 at. 590 (question no. 
5). 
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general rule of ShPah contract law that termination of the contract by an innocent party for 
the other party's breach operates from the time of termination rather than the time of 
contract. "' However, it seems that it is not an entire picture of the law to say that termination 
has only prospective effects. Although some support can be found for the view that 
termination has prospective effect"', there can be found certain indications of retrospective 
effects of termination when, for instance, it is said that the purpose of termination is, like the 
mutual termination (i. e., iqalah), to place each party in the position in which he was at the 
time of making the contract, provided that it does not affect the rights of the third parties. '" Or 
the point that by termination both the subject-matter of transaction and the consideration for it 
are automatically restored to the party who was the owner before the contract was made. "' 
Such an effect seems to treat termination as retrospective rather than prospective. It can 
therefore be said that as far as such an effect is concerned, the contract is terminated ab initio. 
3.4.2. Effects on Rights and Obligations 
Generally, a valid termination of the contract releases not only the victim of breach but also 
the party in breach from their contractual obligations to perform in the future. 201 However, no 
jurist has examined the question what effects will termination have on the injured party's right 
to claim damages. This is a question which has to be examined in the third section of this 
chapter. For now it suffices to say that the defaulting seller is not totally discharged from any 
liability, but may be liable to pay damages according to general principles. This liability may 
relate both to breaches committed before termination and to losses suffered by the buyer as a 
result of the seller's refusal to perform his future obligations. The contract will survive 
termination and in awarding the buyer damages for the seller's breach, the court should assess 
the buyer's legitimate expectations by reference to the terms of the contract. 
197 For instance, Allamah Helli says: "Termination dissolves the contract from the time when the aggrieved 
party exercises his right to terminate not from the time of making the contract since when the contract is 
validly concluded it affects the relationship of the parties and its actual effects cannot be restored. The same is 
true as to termination. " (Helli, M. M. (Allamah Helli), vol. I at 531). 
198 Reference can be made to that when the contract is validly terminated RAure contractual obligations of the 
contracting parties are discharged. Although no jurist has expressly referred to this effect, this can be clearly 
inferred where the jurists say termination does simply dissolve the contract rather than annul it. For instance, 
the late Allameh Helli says: "Termination dissolves the contract! ', (Helli, M. M. (Allamah Helli), vol. I at 
531). 
199 See also, Y. Atozian, N., (1990) vol. 5 at 8 1. 
200 See e. g., Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 303'. Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 258,329; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 
539. See also, I. C. C., Arts. 287,288. 
201 It is to be noted that the jurists have not expressly referred to such a consequence for termination. However, 
it is easily inferable from the statements made in definition of termination. See e. g., Khuras&-d, M. K., (1406 
H. Q. ) at 266; Gharavi IsfahAni, M. H., (1408 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 45; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 258 and seq.; 
Karin-d, S. J., and, Amuli, M. H. (1380 H. Q. ) vol. 4 at 23.. 
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4.0. Summary and Conclusions 
In light of what has been discussed in this section, it has been made clear that under ShPah 
law a buyer who is aggrieved by the seller's non-confonning performance has a distinct right 
to withhold performance in the case of non-delivery. Although the question is not clearly 
analysed by the jurists, it was suggested that the right to reject non-conforming goods should 
be seen as an instance of the general right to withhold performance on account of the theory of 
"mutuality" of obligations which exists between the seller's duty to deliver goods in 
accordance with the contract terms and the buyer's duty to accept (not reject) them. It is only 
on this interpretation that the buyer's right to reject the non-conforn-iing goods can be justified. 
Similarly, despite the jurists' failure to address the question, it has been demonstrated 
that the buyer may be entitled to reject documents under a documentary sale contract. It was 
also suggested that under such a contract the buyer should be given two separate rights: to 
reject non-conforming documents and non-conforming goods and in some cases he may be 
entitled to benefit from one after he has lost the other. 
It has also been shown that the jurists have not expressly ascertained what degree of 
non-conformity will entitle the buyer to refuse to accept the seller's non-confom-dng delivery. 
It was, nevertheless, suggested that the buyer should be given such a right only when the lack 
of conformity attains a sufficient degree of seriousness. It was also suggested that the buyer's 
right to refuse to accept the seller's non-conforming delivery should be distinguished from his 
right to treat himself as discharged from the contract and terminate it. Termination is an 
exception to the principle of ufd bel uqW and should be justified on the principle of Id darar, 
whereas rejection is a form of withholding performance which is based on the principle of 
correlation of obligations. In any case where the lack of conformity is not customarily 
ignored the buyer would be entitled to refuse to accept the seller's performance. 
Likewise, it was seen that the buyer's right to reject the non-confom-dng and accept the 
conforming part where the seller has made a partially non-conforming delivery is not quite 
clear in ShPah jurisprudence. However, it was suggested that a distinction should be made 
between severable and non-severable contracts. In the first case, the buyer should be given a 
right to reject non-conforming and accept conforming part under certain circumstances, but in 
the second case he should be given a single right, either to reject all or to accept all. Similarly, 
it was seen that in the case of wrong'quantity delivery the buyer is in principle given a right to 
refuse to accept. 
It was also seen that Shiah jurists examine termination on the basis of a complex 
system of kheykg (options). It was shown that dealing with termination in this way causes a 
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number of important questions to be left unanswered. It was therefore suggested that the best 
way is first to analyze the grounds upon which the jurists have occasionally justified the grant 
of kheyjr (the right to terminate) and then to examine the options relevant to the issue in 
question on the basis of their proper rationale and finally to evaluate the relevant options in 
accordance with their proper grounds. In this way, it was first shown that the jurists are not 
unanimous on the rationale on which the option to terminate should be based. Some suggest 
that it should be based on the mutual intention of the parties, while others suggest that it 
would be better to base it on the principle of I! darar. However, it was suggested that the 
option to terminate is primarily to be based on the principle of Id diarar. Under this principle, 
not every non-conformity gives rise to the right to terminate. Non-conformity must attain a 
degree of seriousness which renders the contract harmful unless on a proper construction of 
the contract it is proved that the contracting parties have agreed that any non-confonnity will 
give rise to a right of termination. For this purpose, the court should take into account various 
factors, such as the nature of the breach, the actual and foreseeable diarars, the seller's ability 
and willingness to cure and the practicality of requiring the seller to perform his obligations. 
Likewise, the results should be sufficiently serious as to bring the case within the principle of 
11 darar, provided that they were actually, or could have been, foreseeable by the seller at the 
time of contract in the light of information available to him. On the basis of this construction, 
where the contract is treated as harmful for the buyer because of the seller's violation the 
principle of Id diarar comes into operation. By application of this principle the initial decree of 
luzCvn (non-terminable) of the contract is removed and it will be replaced by a secondary 
decree ofjaw5z (terminable). 
Similarly, it was shown that although the jurists have not expressly examined the 
seller's right to cure, it in principle accords with their arguments that the buyer has no right to 
terminate for mere non-conforming delivery. However, the position of the seller's right to cure 
where the contract is for sale of specific goods is not clear. It was suggested, however, that 
giving the seller a right to cure by way of repair under certain circumstances prescribed above 
is consistent with the rationale upon which the right to terminate is based. 
It was also seen that the jurists have not properly examined termination of severable 
contracts and a number of important questions are here left unanswered. However, it was 
suggested where the contract is construed as non-severable, the rules described above should 
be applied. But if the contract is construed as severable a distinction between partial 
termination and termination of the contract as a whole should be made. Partial termination 
should be allowed where the required conditions of termination, as described above, are met in 
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respect of a severable part. But the buyer should be allowed to terminate such contracts as a 
whole only where the seller's non-conforming delivery in respect of one or more instalments is 
such that the buyer can reasonably conclude that the contract would be harmful for him. 
It was also shown that the jurists have not made clear whether the buyer should be 
given a right of partial termination where the seller has only delivered part of the contract 
goods. Moreover, it is not clear what shortfall or excess will give rise to the right to terminate 
the contract in its entirety or in respect of the missing part. It was, however, suggested that the 
buyer's right should be subject to some restriction. Where he wishes to terminate the contract 
in its entirety the missing part should be such that its absence makes the contract harmful for 
the buyer. But where he wishes only to terminate the contract as to the missing part he can do 
so if the missing part is not so slight that it would be customarily unreasonable for him to do 
so. This should be assessed in light of the seller's ability and readiness to make a fresh tender 
or to deliver the contract quantity within the contract time. 
We also saw that the position of the buyer's right to terminate where the seller has 
delivered the contract goods beyond the contract time for performance is not quite clear in the 
current ShVah law. However, it was suggested that the buyer's right to terminate the contract 
for the seller's late delivery should in principle be based on the serious consequences of delay 
(the principle of R! darar), unless it is inferred from the circumstances of the case that the 
buyer's right to terminate for performance beyond a the fixed time was impliedly agreed upon 
at the time of the contract.. The same is true where the contract has not fixed a particular date 
or period of time for performance. 
The proceeding discussions also made clear that the option to terminate is in the hand of 
the victim of breach. Termination would be effective where it is properly announced. No 
particular form of declaration and communication is required. It may be oral, written or any 
other form. However, it should be such as unequivocally to show the buyer's intention to 
terminate the contract. The buyer does not need to apply to the court for termination. The 
buyer is also not required to terminate the contract. He may accept the non-conforming 
performance and claim for damages and demand that the seller cure the lack of conformity as 
described in the following sections. Under certain circumstances, he may also be deemed as 
have affirmed the contract. This may be the case where he has used, consumed, altered or 
dealt with, the purchased goods or delayed to exercise his right promptly, provided that he 
was, or ought to have been, aware of the lack of conformity giving rise to the right to reject 
and terminate. 
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Section Two. Specific performance 
1.0. Introduction 
The third remedy available for the buyer under this legal system is to require the defaulting 
seller to perform his obligations in accordance with the contract. Notwithstanding that it is 
commonly said that the primary remedy in this legal system is to require the defaulting party 
to perform the contraCt, 202 ShPah jurists have failed to discuss this remedy in detail. Much 
emphasis has been placed instead on the circumstances where the contract can be terminated 
by one of the parties. In the absence of a precise and detailed discussion in respect of this 
remedy a number of principal questions arise. (i) Is requiring performance a general remedy 
applicable in all cases of failure to perform contractual obligations? (ii) What rationale 
justifies requiring performance as a remedy? (iii) Is the aggrieved buyer entitled to require the 
seller to make substitute delivery or repair the defects in the case of defective delivery? (iv) In 
this connection, is there any difference between sales of specific and unascertained goods? (v) 
And finally, is there any restriction on the exercise of the remedy of requiring performance? 
What follows is an attempt to clarify the position of ShVah law in respect of the remedy of 
specific performance, in general, and to determine the circumstances in which the buyer may 
be entitled to demand that the seller cure his defective performance. 
2.0. Specific performance as a General Remedy 
It is a well-settled view amongst ShVah jurists that the defaulting seller can be required to 
perform his obligations in accordance with the contract . 
20' The only difference between the 
jurists is that some hold that the seller's mere refusal to perform gives the buyer an option 
either to keep the contract alive and require him to perform his contractual obligations or to 
terminate the contract, whereas others suggest that his primary remedy in such circumstances 
is to require the seller specifically to perform and that he will be entitled to terminate the 
202 See generally, NarAqi, A., (1408) at 44; NaJafi, M. H., (1981) vol. 23 at 145 and 210; Najafi, M. H., (1981) 
vol. 24 at 339; Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 284-285 and 312; Khalkhali, S. M. K, & Rashti, M. H., (1407 H. 
Q. ) vol. 2 at 542; Gharavi Isfahdni, M. H., (1409 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 158-159 and 199; Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 
RQ) vol. 2 at 125 and seq., in particular, 128; Najafi, M., and, Nleini, K H., (1358 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 131 and 
seq.; Irav5ni, A., (1379 H. Q) vol. 2 at 67; Bujn, 3rdi, M. H., (1389 H. Q) vol. 3 at 268, Midi, M. A., and 
Khffei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 366 and seq. and 592-593; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 220 and 372; 
Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 435 and seq. 
203 See the references mentioned above. See also, Sayari, J. M. (Faael Meqddd), (1343 H. S. ) vol. I at 71; 
Ardabili, A. (Muqaddas Ardabili), at 462; Bujnadi, M. H., (1389 H. Q) vol. 3 at 367 (in Anich he observes: 
"No jurist has denied the necessity of fulfilling "shart" in terms of religious duty. "). In Iranian Civil Code see: 
Arts. 237,376 and 395. 
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contract for the seller's refusal where he cannot receive what he bargained for by the remedy 
of requiring performance. "' 
Similarly, a close consideration of the jurists' arguments in favour of the remedy shows 
that it has a wide scope and may be invoked in a wide variety of circumstances. Generally, a 
buyer may be entitled to invoke the remedy where the seller fails to procure, produce or deliver 
the purchased goods or part of them (emtend' an al-taslim) or fails to perform an obligation to 
do a positive act such as delivery of goods at a particular port or on a date provided by the 
contract, or prepare and hand over the shipping documents, and, all other acts he may 
undertake to do or refrain to do under the contract (emtena' an al- wqja-'bj al- shart-e-fe'o. 
The fundamental reason for this general rule is the Quranic verse "ufij bel uqCd"-' 
which orders Muslims to fulfil their contracts and a number of rewdyat from the Prophet of 
Islam Hazrat Muhammad" and Imarn Ali and other Shjah Im5ms to the effect that 
contractual obligations must be respected unless performance amounts to violation of the 
Islamic code of conduct (i. e., it is a sin in Islam) or is otherwise against the law. "' 
Nevertheless, the question which remains unanswered is whether the Islamic court 
should be obliged to interfere in favour of an aggrieved buyer by ordering the defaulting seller 
to perform his own part of the contract? If so, to what extent should the court be required to 
accept the buyer's application for requiring performance? 
3.0. Reasons Justifying the Court's Intervention 
The question whether the court should be required to give effect to the buyer's application for 
specific performance and if so, upon what rationale such a rule can be justified, has not been 
clearly examined by the jurists. However, some statements can be found in jurisprudential text 
books which may help one to identify the reasons justifying the rule. Two opposing 
approaches can be identified. The first supports giving the court wide power to interfere in 
favour of the aggrieved party by requiring the defaulting party to perform his contractual 
204 In Us respect see, Section One, 3.2.3.4. 
205 The Holy Quran, Chapter 5 (Mae'dah), verse 1: "0 ye who believe, perform all covenan&'. 206 In a famous statement the Prophet of Islain said: "All Muslims are obliged to perform their contractual 
obligations". See Ameli, H., vol. 15, bab 20 at 30, hadith 4. The statement has been applied by Shilah ImAms 
in various cases, see for instance, Ameli, H., vol. 12, bab 6, at 353, ahadith I and 2; vol. 16, bAb 4, at 102, 
hadith 3 and at 103 hadith 5. 
207 Ile relevant rewAyAt are cited in: Ameli, H., vol. 12, bAb 6, at 353, hadith 5, Ameli, H., vol. 14, bab 32, at 
478, hadith 9; Ameli, H., vol. 15, bab 40, at 50, hadith 4. See generally, Anski, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 214-215; 
Khurisani, M. K., (1406 H. Q. ) at 144-145; Gharavi IsfahAni, M. H., (1408 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 4 and seq.; Yazdi, 
S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 34; Najafi, M., and, Ndeini, M. H., (1358 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 4 and seq.; Iravani, 
A., (1379 H. Q) vol. 2 at 2 and seq.; KhalkhAli, S. M. K., & Rashti, M. H., (1407 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 8 and seq.; 
TWddi, M. A., and Khilei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 6 at 15 and seq.; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 4 at 13 and seq.; 
Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) vol. 4 at 18 and seq. 
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obligations and the second favours an approach which minimises the court's power to 
intervene in contractual relationships of the contracting parties. 
(a) First Approach 
The first approach is justified on the basis of that as soon as a reciprocal contract is concluded 
the Islamic law-maker obliges the parties to fulfil their contractual obligations, if his 
conditions for validity of the contract are met. "'. No party to a contract is allowed to evade his 
contract, otherwise he will be acting contrary to the Islamic law (tak-lif sharei). Accordingly, 
they argue that the Muslim community should not allow violation of the sanctity of contract, 
and the Islamic judge must thus force the party in breach to perform. "' Although this 
argument has been raised in the case of breach of shart-e-fe'l, it is a general argument 
applicable to all cases in which a contracting party is under an obligation to do some act in 
favour of the other party under a binding contract. "' 
(b) Second Approach 
In spite of strong support for the first approach on the part of a considerable number of 
jurists, "' it has been criticised by some. "' According to them, private contracts are the source 
of personal rights. Breach of these contracts is a violation of personal rights of the party in 
whose favour the obligation is undertaken. "' It does not involve any of the duties owed by a 
man to God. Accordingly, there is no reason to justify the court's intervention. An aggrieved 
party, according to this approach, is left to the remedy of termination. However, the remedy of 
requiring performance is available in circumstances where breach of contract amounts to 
violation of not only the personal rights of the promisee but also the rights of the cornmunity, 
or obligations owed to God. "" If a breach of contractual obligations of such a nature is 
208 This group ofjurists, in justifying their view, invoke on the famous Quranic verse, i. e., "Ufi7 bel uqCtf' and 
various rewRyAt cited from the Prophet of Islam and the Imams of Shiah to which it has been referred in 
previous footnotes. See generally, Anski, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 283-294; 
209 Under this argument, the judge's intervention is, in fact, justified on the ground of his duty to protect the 
Islamic instructions (i. e., amre be al- marCf wa nahy an al- munkar). Although this argument is not 
expressly supported by the jurists, it has been raised by them as a possible argument in favour of this approach 
(see e. g., Yazdi, S. M. K., (1379 H. Q) vol. 2 at 126; Gharavi Isfahani, M. H., (1408 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 156,158; 
Iravani, A., (1379 H. Q) vol. 2 at 67). 
210 The general nature of the rule can be supported by the fact that the advocates of this view do not make any 
distinction between the breach of shart-e-fe7 and repudiation of the contract as a whole. See in this respect 
Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 283 and 285, Najafl, M., andý Ndeini, M. H., (1358 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 132. 
211 Ameli, Z. (Shahid ThAni), vol. I at, 191; Karaki, A. (Muhaqqeq Thkfi), vol. I at 262; Naraqi, A., (1408) at 
44; NaJafi, M. H., (1981) vol. 23 at 219; Anski, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 285; NaJafi, M., and, Ndeini, M. H., (1359 
H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 132. 
212 See e. g., Makki, M. (Shahid Awwal), and Ameli, Z. (Shahid Thani), t1309 H. Q. ) vol. I at 385-386; 
Tabatabaei, S. A., (1404 H. Q. ) vol. I at 536; Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 294 (citing from a number of eminent 
juristsý, NaJafi, M., and, Naeini, M. H., (1358 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 132). 
213 See e. g., the statement of AllAmeh Helli in: Helli, M. M. (AllAmah Helli), Mabhath al- ShunIt, at 180 in 
which he expressly says if the undertaking party fails to perform the judge cannot force him to perform. 
214 See the statement of al- Saymuri in: Ghlyat al- Maram, as cited in: Ans, 11ri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 284. It is 
worth noting that according to this approach the mcre refusal to perform a contractual obligation enables the 
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committed an Islan-dc judge would be obliged to prohibit any breach of such a contract 
because this type of breach is more than a simple violation of the rights of a contracting 
party. "' Although this approach has been taken by some jurists in the case of breach of shart- 
e-fe7, it is, as the late Meini, observe&", a general argument applicable to all contractual 
obligations under private contracts. 
(c) Suggested Approach 
It is hard to accept the argument that the authorities such as the Quranic verse uffi bel u'qw 
and the rewdyat such as al- Mumen Cm enda shuratehem are intended to impose on the parties 
to private contracts, in particular, to commercial contracts, a purely religious duty (taklif 
share'i mahe) to fulfil the contract, breach of which will amount to breach of a religious 
decree so that the party in breach will be regarded as guilty of violation of a duty owed by a 
man to God. Likewise, the second approach is unacceptable in its entirety, since termination is 
not always an adequate remedy. It is a not infrequent circumstance that the seller is a unique 
supplier, or is the only supplier able to procure and deliver the goods within the required time. 
The buyer sometimes requires the purchased goods for his business activities and is not able to 
procure them within the required time from another source. Accordingly, leaving the buyer to 
his remedy to terminate will sometimes cause him unreasonable harm. 
It seems that the language of authorities such as the Quranic verse and rewayat already 
referred to is nothing but to confirm that contractual expectations must be respected if the 
contract is concluded according to the Islamic law-maker's requirements. By this recognition, 
the Islan-dc law-maker does in fact accept a validly concluded contract as a source of personal 
rights which entitles each party to demand that the other give effect to what he has 
undertaken. "' It also follows that where one of the contracting parties has not received what he 
was entitled to obtain under the contract he should be compensated adequately. Accordingly, 
breach of contract will not always amount to violation of Islamic law in the strict sense that 
obliges the Islamic judge to interfere in order to protect the Islamic faith against violation. But 
since all contractual rights have been recognised by the Islamic law-maker, any breach of 
contract will result in violation of Islan-dc law in the sense of the necessity of respecting the 
contractual expectations. Hence, the court's interference is in order to protect a party who is 
aggrieved by the other party's violation. 
buyer either to terminate the contract or to keep the contract alive and claim arsh for non-performance of the 
contractual obligation (see the statement of al- Saymury in Ghayat al- Maram, as cited in: Ansari, M. (1375 
H. Q. ) at 285; Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 13 1). 
215 See in this respect, Amin, S. H., (1994) at 29. 
216 Najafi, M., and, Naeini, M. H., (1358 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 132. 
217 The late Iravani, confuming such a reading of these authorities, observes that the language of them is simply 
to recognise the contracting parties' contractual rights (see, IravAni, A., (1379 H. Q) vol. 2 at 66 and 67). 
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On this interpretation, requiring performance will be one of the ways to compensate the 
aggrieved party but not the only way. It is left to the aggrieved party to elect his proper 
remedy. However, the buyer's option to elect between remedies is subject to the principle of 11 
darar. Under this principle, as will be explained in detail in the next sectioný`, no detrimental 
religious rule is passed by the Islamic law-maker. Accordingly, if requiring performance will 
cause the party in breach loss greater than that inflicted on the victim of breach it will be a 
detrimental decree which is unenforceable under this principle. The Islamic order to respect 
contractual obligations does not mean that they must be performed under any circumstance 
but that contractual rights must be respected and a proper remedy should follow any breach. 
However, exercise of any particular remedy is subject to the restriction that it does not violate 
the cardinal principle of /a diarar. "' 
One of the natural consequence of the suggested approach is that the aggrieved buyer's 
right to demand specific performance is not an absolute right but is subject to the rights and 
interests of the seller in breach. Accordingly, if insisting on specific performance is 
unreasonable in the sense that it inflicts a greater loss on the seller in breach than the loss 
suffered by the buyer for non-performance, the cardinal principle of R! darar comes into 
operation in favour of the seller in breach and, consequently, the buyer is left to other 
remedies. Accordingly, it seems to the writer that the remedy of specific performance has, in 
general, no priority over the remedy of termination but it is one of the remedies available for 
an aggrieved party. It may be resorted to in any case in which it does not cause the breaching 
party an unreasonable loss or inconvenience. 
(d) Different Consequences of Three Approaches 
Although no jurist has addressed, adoption of any one of the above-mentioned approaches 
produces different consequences. According to the first approach, in any case in which the 
seller fails to fulfil one of his contractual obligations the court has to give effect to the buyer's 
application for specific performance. The court has no power to refuse to accept the buyer's 
application and request him to terminate the contract and accept damages in lieu. An order 
requiring the seller to supply and deliver the subject of sale will be granted, so long as the 
compulsion of the seller to perform is possible. No matter whether or not the costs exceed 
219 See: Section Three, 2.2.3. 
219 It is interesting to note that the same jurists who give priority to the remedy of requiring performance, relying 
on the principle of I& &rar, argue that as long as an aggrieved party is able to require the defaulting party to 
perform, he can be adequately compensated in this way. Consequently, there is no reason to justify his option 
to terminate the contract for non-performance (see e. g., Ansiri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 285; Khurdsani, M K., 
(1406 H. Q. ) at 246). The question is that if the principle of Id darar can come into operation in favour of the 
injured party it will also operate in favour of the defaulting party-, where requiring him to perform the contract 
would put him into a bad situation and impose on him unreasonable loss and inconvenience. 
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considerably the contract price, or the buyer is able easily to obtain the goods from another 
source. Under this view, the court, in fact, protects Islamic laws against the seller's violation 
and thus is not allowed to ignore the infringement of Islamic instructions merely because of 
the increase of expense of supply of the goods. 
In contrast, according to the second approach, the court is not given any power to 
interfere. The buyer is left to his remedy of termination. The only case in which he can apply 
for the court's aid is where the property in the purchased goods has passed to him. In such a 
situation, he can apply to the court for an order requiring the refusing seller to deliver the 
goods. However, the court's intervention is not justified on the basis of the buyer's right to 
require specific performance, but it is justified on account of ghasb; the seller is obliged to 
deliver the property to its real owner. 
According to the present writer's suggested view, the court is bound to interfere in 
favour of the personal rights of a buyer who is aggrieved by the seller's violation. However, 
its interference is subject to the principle of Id diarar. The court will give effect to the buyer's 
application for specific performance provided that it does not inflict on the seller loss greater 
than that the buyer may sustain for non-performance. 
4.0 Right to Demand Cure 
Although ShPah jurists have not discussed the question whether the buyer is entitled to 
demand that the seller cure his defective performance, close review of what they have stated in 
justi4ing the injured party's right to apply for an order requiring performance supports the 
idea that the buyer may be entitled to such a remedy, whether by way of repair or delivery of 
replacement goods, because both remedies are particular forms of specific performance. In all 
cases, the court indeed orders the party in breach to perform specifically what he has 
undertaken under the contract, that is, to deliver goods conforming with the contract terms. 
On this construction, the buyer's right to demand cure in the case of sale of 
unascertained goods is clear. Almost all jurists suggest that where the seller of unascertained 
goods fails to deliver conforming goods the buyer has an option to reject them and request the 
seller to deliver goods conforming with the contract conditions. "' If the seller refuses to deliver 
conforming goods the buyer may be entitled to apply to the court for an order requiring the 
seller to deliver substitute goods This is because where the buyer has lawfiilly rejected the 
non-conforming goods the case becomes one of non-performance in which the buyer may be 
entitled to require the seller to perform his contractual obligations. Alternatively, the buyer 
"See e. g., TWiidi, M. A., and Khaei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 60; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) vol. 4 at 419. 
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should be given the right to accept the non-conforming delivery and require the seller to repair 
the defects if he wishes. However, the right to demand cure is subject to the general principle 
of Id diarar; it must not cause the seller unreasonable expense or unreasonable inconvenience, 
otherwise the buyer will be left to his right to terminate the contract and/or claim damages. 
The buyer may also be entitled to request the seller to deliver substitute goods where the 
seller delivers the wrong quantity, or where some of the goods are not in accordance with the 
contract conditions. Accordingly, in a severable contract the buyer may be entitled to accept 
the confonning and reject the non-conforming part and request the seller to deliver instead of it 
conforming goods. 
However, the position of the buyer's right to demand cure where the seller of specific 
goods fails to deliver conforming goods does not seem so clear. It might be argued that the 
buyer has no right to demand that the seller do so. Any request by the buyer in such cases can 
be rejected by the seller. The view can be explained on the basis that the subject of the seller's 
obligation is to deliver the specific goods which were supposed to possess particular 
characteristics. After the seller has delivered them to the buyer his obligation to deliver has 
been performed. No other contractual obligation under the contract remains to be fulfilled by 
the seller. The duty to remove the defect by repair or to take back the non-conforming and 
deliver substitute goods is an extra duty which cannot be inferred from the contract unless the 
parties have agreed expressly on such a right for the buyer. However, wherever the non- 
conformity causes the imposition of an undue detriment on the buyer he is entitled to reject 
them and terminate the contract, as described in the previous section. 
This argument cannot be accepted in its entirety. It is true that in a contract for sale of 
specific goods the seller will not be under any duty to do a positive act in favour of the buyer 
when he has delivered the subject of sale to the buyer. However, in such a case, in particular, 
in the case where the seller has manufactured an item and sold it to the buyer according to his 
order, the seller gives a promise that he will produce and deliver goods conforming to the 
conditions on which they made their contract. "' If it is proved that the goods do not 
correspond with the requirements provided under the contract the seller has in fact failed to 
perform his obligation to produce an item conforming to the contract requirements. 
Accordingly, he is required to perform his obligation under the principle of ufa bel uq W if he 
is able to repair the defects or put the item into operation by changing some part of it. 
However, the buyer cannot demand that the seller take back the defective goods and deliver 
221 See also, Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 120. 
Chapter Four. Buyer's Remedies Under Shiah Law 266 
substitute goods, since the seller's duties were only concerned with the specific goods and he 
has not undertaken any obligation as to the delivery of replacement goods. 
5.0. Requirements of the Remedy 
If the first approach is adopted the buyer's entitlement to this remedy is subject to the 
practicality of requiring the defaulting seller to perform his obligations, whereas according to 
the suggested approach, the court will give effect to the buyer's application where it does not 
cause the seller an unreasonable expense or unreasonable inconvenience. Where the buyer, 
without any unreasonable expense or unreasonable inconvenience, could procure the goods 
from another source, repair them himself or have them repaired by others he should not be 
entitled to demand cure. It is to be stressed that under the suggested approach it is the seller in 
breach who has to satisfy the court that specific performance would place him in a difficult 
position and impose on him hardship not the buyer who is given a right to have in specie what 
the seller has promised under the contract. 
It is also suggested that the distinction made by the Convention (Art. 46 (2) (3)) 
between the right to demand replacement goods and cure by repair is an appropriate rule. 
Thus, in the first case, he should be given such a right, as in the case of the right to terminate, 
only where the lack of conformity results in sufficiently serious consequences, having regard 
to the circumstances of the particular case, including the seller's offer to repair. The buyer 
should not be given a right to demand replacement goods for minor defects. This suggestion, 
not only is in line with the principle of Id darar, but also would bring the remedy of 
demanding delivery of substitute goods close to that of termination. In practice, the former 
remedy would place the seller in more difficult situation in which termination will put him; the 
seller must take back the non-conforming goods and make a fresh tender. But in the second 
case, the buyer is entitled to demand repair of defects unless it is unreasonable having regard 
to all the circumstances. 
6.0. Summary and Conclusions 
This section showed that in spite of great emphasis by the jurists on the remedy of specific 
performance, the position of the remedy and its relation to other law remedies is not quite 
clear. Likewise, it is not clear whether, and in what circumstances, the buyer should be given 
the right to demand that the seller cure a non-conforming delivery by tendering conforming 
delivery or by way of repair. 
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However, it was shown that requiring the defaulting seller to perform his contractual 
obligations is a well-settled remedy amongst ShVah jurists. It was also shown that specific 
performance has a wide scope and may be invoked in a wide variety of circumstances. 
Likewise, it was seen that the buyer's right to demand cure where the contract is for sale of 
unascertained goods is consistent with general principles. The buyer in fact requires the seller 
to perform his contractual obligation. The buyer's right to demand cure where the contract is 
for sale of specific goods is not so clear. It was, however, suggested that the buyer should be 
given the right to demand that the seller cure the lack of conformity by way of repair. 
It was also seen that apart from a few jurists who disagreed with giving the buyer a 
right to apply for specific performance, most of them hold that in any case in which the seller 
fails to fulfil one of his contractual obligations the buyer has a ? Ight to apply for specific 
performance and the court has a mandatory duty to give effect to his application. According to 
this common view the court has no power to refuse to accept the buyer's application and 
request him to terminate the contract and accept damages in lieu. Under this view, an order 
requiring the seller to supply and deliver the subject of sale should be granted unless the 
compulsion of the seller to perform is impossible. No matter whether or not the costs exceed 
considerably the contract price, or, whether or not the buyer is able easily to obtain the goods 
from another source. According to this view, the court, in fact, protects Islamic laws against 
the seller's violation and thus is not allowed to ignore the infringement of Islamic instructions 
merely because of the increase of expense of supply of the goods. 
However, it was suggested that specific performance, contrary to few jurists who 
disagreed with it, should be regarded as a legal remedy in this legal system but not as an 
absolute remedy applicable in every circumstance, as most jurists seem to suggest. Requiring 
performance is provided in order to protect the injured party's contractual expectations 
against the other party's violation rather than to enforce purely religious duties. The Islamic 
order to respect contractual expectations does not mean that it must be met under any 
condition but that contractual rights must be respected and a proper remedy should follow any 
breach. However, exercise of any particular remedy is to be subject to the restriction that it 
does not violate the cardinal principle of la darar. On this basis, it was submitted that giving 
the buyer the right to obtain specific performance must be subject to the rights and interests of 
the seller in breach. Where insisting on specific performance is unreasonable in the sense that 
it inflicts a greater loss on the seller in breach than the loss suffered by the buyer for non- 
performance the court should have power to refuse to accept the buyer's application for 
specific performance and leave him to his remedy of terminating the contract and/or claiming 
for damages. Accordingly, where the buyer is readily able to purchase the goods from the 
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market the courts should not be required to accept the buyer's application for requiring 
performance if it will cause the seller unreasonable hardship and inconvenience. 
On this interpretation, specific performance has, in general, no priority over the remedy 
of termination, as most jurists seem to suggest, but is one of the remedies available for a buyer 
who is aggrieved by the seller's violation. Accordingly, the court in any case should look at all 
the circumstances, in particular any hardship which would be caused to any party by giving or 
refusing specific performance for the purpose of implementation ofjustice. For this purpose, it 
is the seller in breach who has to satisfy the court that specific performance would place him 
in a difficult position and impose on him hardship not the buyer who is given a right to have in 
specie what the seller has promised under the contract. 
On the same principle, it was suggested, the buyer's right to demand cure should be 
analysed, since a demand for cure is in fact a particular form of requiring the seller to perform 
specifically what he has undertaken under the contract. It should not be applied in a form 
which causes the seller unreasonable detriment, otherwise the buyer should be left to his right 
to terminate the contract and/or claim for damages. 
Similarly, it was suggested that a distinction should be made between the right to 
demand replacement goods and cure by repair. In the first case, he should be given such a 
right only where the lack of conforn-dty results in sufficiently serious consequences, having 
regard to the circumstances of any particular case including the seller's offer to cure by repair. 
But in the second case, it was suggested that the buyer should be entitled to demand repair of 
defects unless it is unreasonable having regard to all the circumstances. 
Section Three. Monetary Relief 
1.0. Sketch of Discussion 
When the seller has delivered goods which do not conform with the contract terms Shi dh 
jurists reefer to three types of liability: damin al- mu'dwa&h222, daman al- qimah" and 
daman al- arsh. 224 The first refers to the contracting parties' liability under a reciprocal 
222 It is also called diman al- musammA, as opposed to &m5n al- wlqei. See, e. g., Ansiri, M., (1375 H. Q. ) at 
271; KhalkhAli, S. M. K. and Rashti, M. H., (1395 R Q) vol. I at 125; Shirazi, N. M., (1413 H. Q. ) vol. I at 
167. 
223 It is also called &man al- waqe 7, that is, liability to pay the real value of the destroyed property (see in this 
respectý Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 102; Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. I at 93). 
n4 The late Shaykh AnsAd has made great attempts to distinguish between these three types of liabilities (see, 
Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 271) and concluded that liability to pay arsh is a particular liability which is to be 
distinguished from the two others. See also, Tahidi, M. A., and Khaei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 281-282; 
Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 126-127. 
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contract, while the second refers to the liability to pay ghardmat or khasdraP (literally, 
compensation or damages) for any loss inflicted to a person as a result of the other's unlawfid 
action. The third arises, as some jurists suggest, where the seller has delivered goods which do 
not correspond with the contract terms or, as most jurists suggest, which do not conform with 
the contract quality. The seller is then under a duty to pay the proportional difference between 
the value of the goods as actually delivered and the value they would have had had they been 
delivered in accordance with the contract. 
The first type of liability has no relevance to the question under consideration. This type 
of liability arises where the subject-matter of the contract, or a portion of it, is lost before risk 
passes to the buyer. In such a situation, it is a well-settled law that the contract comes 
automatically to an end, either as a whole or to the extent of the part lost, and the seller 
himself must bear the loss and restore the price to the buyer (if the buyer has already paid the 
price). "' The question which arises here is whether the seller should restore only the contract 
price or portion of it which is exchanged for the part lost (as the case may be) or whether his 
liability must be ascertained by reference to the real value of the subject-matter or part lost. "" 
The main concern of this section is, however, with the two latter types of liability, that 
is, liability to pay ghar, -vnat and liability to pay arsh. The question of liability to pay 
damages, as will be explained below, has not been properly discussed when the seller has 
committed breach of contract, but it is addressed here in order to ascertain the legal nature of 
arsh liability. In that case, as will be fiilly explained in the second part of this section, most 
jurists have described arsh as a sort of remedy provided to compensate the losses which the 
buyer has suffered as a result of the seller's non-conforming delivery. Nevertheless, they have 
not made clear whether beside the right to claim arsh, the buyer has a right to claim damages 
for loss he may suffer as a consequence of the seller's breach. 
In the absence of any sufficient discussion in this connection, some fundamental 
questions arises. Does an injured buyer have a general right to recover damages for darars 
(losses) he has sustained as a consequence of the seller's breach?. If so, for what sort of 
diarars can he recover damages? And finally, what formulae are to be used for the purpose of 
measuring the recoverable damages? Assuming that such a general right has been recognised 
225 It is worth noting that the term "khasAraf' in Islamic contract law terminology is used in two entirely 
converse meanings: "loss or damage" and "damages". The term in the first sense is used in Art. 221 and in the 
second sense is used in Art. 226 of I. C. C. See also, Imami, S. H., (1363 H. S. ) vol. I at 239. 
226 The rule comes into operation where certain requirements are met See in this respect, ., Najafi, M. H., (1981) vol. 23 at 85; Najafi, M. H., (1981) vol. 23 at 83 and seq.; Shirazi, N. M., (1410 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 353 
and seq. and different references cited there-, Kltdziý N., (1992) vol. I at 188 and seq. The Me is expressly 
adopted in Ad. 387 of the 1. C. C. 
227 In this case, it is commonly said that the seller is only liable to restore the contract price. See, TOhidi, M A., 
and Klidei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 281. See also the references cited above. 
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in this system, in what cases can the buyer claim arsh? And finally, how is this remedy related 
to the right to claim damages? The first part of this section is designed to answer the first three 
questions and the second part will examine the buyer's right to claim arsh and its relation to 
the right to claim ghar&nat. 
2.0. Part One. Claim for Ghar&nat 
2.1. Introduction 
It is hard to find any jurisprudential text book or other form of jurisprudential writings which 
have discussed the right to claim ghar&nat on account of breach of contract in ShPah law. "' 
The jurists have concentrated on the remedies of withholding performance, requiring 
performance, reduction of price and -with a large volume of discussion- on the right to 
terminate the contract on the basis of the options (khey5rat). The right to claim damages can 
only be traced where they are discussing general principles governing the liability for payment 
of khasdraP or where dealing with tort liability such as, conversion (ghasb) of the others' 
property, " dealing with cases in which one caused loss or damage to another's properties and 
personal injuries. " Even in those places, they have failed to address the injured party's right 
to claim damages for losses resulting from the other party's breach of contract. Such a failure 
228 One can, of course, occasionally identify some very short statements from some jurists who indicate that an 
injured party may be entitled to claim damages where the other party has failed to perform his contractual 
obligations (see e. g., Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 223). However, as appears from the context in which the 
issue is raised (i. e., breach of shan-e-fel), the victim of breach in such situation is given a right to sue the 
defaulting party for damages on account of the fact that the defaulting promisor is going to benefit from the 
other party's performance without fulfilling his own part of the contract not on the basis of principle of 
compensating an injured party. Moreover, they have not addressed awarding damages for breach of contract 
as a general rule and whether a party who has not received the contract performance is entitled to claim for 
loss of expectation created by the contract What the first part of this section intends is to establish a general 
rule allowing an injured buyer to recover damages for any loss he has suffered as a consequence of the seller's 
violation. The most clear indication may also be found in a jurisprudential book written in a very recent year. 
In that book the learned jurist has addressed the principle of compensation in a very brief statement. This is 
made where the seller has delivered the purchased goods beyond the contract time and as a result the value 
for them has fallen in the market. In that case, this jurist held the seller liable for the difference between the 
time of due delivery and that of actual delivery on account of the principle of Id &rar (see Shirazi, N. M., 
(1413 H. Q. ) vol. I at 200 and seq. ). However, he did not explain the principle of compensation as a general 
rule. 
229 See e. g., Nardqi, A., (1408) at 15 and seq., 108 and seq; Bujn&di, M. R, (1389 H. Q), vol. 2 at 4 and seq., 
17 and seq., 84 and seq.; Shirazi, N. M., (1410 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 193 and seq., 213 and seq., 231 and seq., 249 
and seq., 283 and seq. 
230 See e. g., Hclli, A. N. J. (Muhaqqcq Helli), (1377 H. Q. ) at 273 and seT, Isfahud, S. A., and Gulplygani, S. 
M. R. (1977) vol. 2 at 270 and seq.; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 2 at 152 and seq. 
231 See e. g., Helli, A. N. I (Muhaqqeq Helli), (1377 H. Q. ) at 381 and seq.; NaJafi, M. H., (1981) vol. 44 at I 
and seq.; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 2 at 498 and seq. The question of liability to pay damages has also been 
addressed by the jurists when dealing with the consequences of void contracts (uqild-e-fased) under which 
one of contracting parties has sustained loss (see e. g., Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) 105 and seq., 146 and seq. ), 
and dealing with the case of unauthorised sale (see e. g., Shahradi, S. A. and, Khaci, S. A., (1409 H. Q. ) vol. 2 
at 183 and seq., Shirazi, N. M., (1413 H. Q. ) vol. I at 180 and seq., 392 and seq. ). 
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raises the fundamental question whether or not an injured buyer has a right to recover 
damages on account of the seller's breach. " 
For this purpose, the best way, it is suggested, is to look at the origirW authorities 
governing the question of liability to pay damages. Accordingly, discussion of the question of 
the injured party's right to claim damages for losses he may suffer as a consequence of the 
other party's breach of contract, in general, and the buyer's entitlement to do so on account of 
the seller's breach, in particular, must be examined on the basis of general principles on which 
the liability to pay damages is based. Assuming that he has such a right, it would be 
appropriate to consider under what circumstances such a right can be exercised. After that it 
will be considered how the recoverable damages are to be measured in this system. 
2.2. General Principle 
Shi'ah jurists have fully examined the question of liability to pay damages when discussing 
the general principles governing liability to pay damages in general and have also applied them 
in detail in tort cases. A general look at those discussions shows clearly that in their view it is 
an established law that where anyone's act or omission causes another loss the victim is given 
233 a right to sue the injuring person for the loss he has sustained. This rule has not been 
disputed by any jurist. If any doubt has been cast on the question it is concerned with the 
different types of loss for which, or the circumstances under which, an injured person can 
claim damages rather than the rule itself 
This rule, as will be seen later, is based on the Quranic verses as well as rewayat. 
Pursuant to these authorities, no one is allowed to impose unlawful harm on the other, whether 
it be by a positive act or by refraining from an act which is to be done, otherwise the 
wrongdoer must bear the consequences of his action or inaction. On the basis of these 
authorities, Shiah jurists have developed certain principles upon which a person who is 
injured by another is given a right to sue the latter for losses he incurred as a consequence of 
the injurious act or omission in question. 
Generally, there are certain general principles upon which a person may be held liable 
to pay damages. However, not all of them are relevant to the issue under consideration. As far 
11 In contrast, the I. C. C., making a clear distinction, has allocated certain comprehensive provisions to the 
principle of compensation on account of breach of contract (see Arts. 221,222 and 226-230 under the heading 
of "on Losses Caused by Non-Pcrformance of Undertakinge'. Interestingly, after the victory of the Islamic 
Revolution, the Islamic Parliament of Iran, most of its member consisting of those educated in Shiah Islamic 
Schools, in revising the provisions of the Code only changed and revised a very few of its provisions, leaving 
the provisions regulating claim for damages on account of breach as they stood. Likewise, the Guardian 
Council of the Constitution six members of its twelve members are consist of Shý 'ah jurists have confirmed 
them and found them corresponding to ShVah law 
233 See the sources cited in fns. 216-218. 
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as the question of an injured buyer's right to claim damages is concerned, the following 
principles may seem relevant: the principle of itldf, the principle of tasbib and the principle of 
Id darar. 11' The following discussion will briefly exan-dne these principles in order to answer 
the question: 'low can these principles be utilised to justify the buyer's right to claim 
damages for loss he may suffer as a consequence of the seller's breach of contract? 
2.2.1. Principle of Ithy 
One of the most important principles justiýýg a claim for damages is the principle of Uldf 
(literally, wastage). "' According to this rule, "anyone who destroys another person's mal (i. e., 
property) (without his permission) will be held liable for the property lost". 'Me principle 
applies where property possessed by a person is damaged or destroyed by another. 23' 
The given principle is not found in the text of the Quran or sayings of the Prophet of 
Islam and Shiah Imdms, but rather is derived from several Quranic verses' as well as 
sayings of the Prophet and ShVah Imd=11 which reflect that concept. The principle comes 
into operation where a person's action is customarily regarded as a direct cause of destruction 
or damage to another's property. "' 
This principle has little relevance in the case of breach of contract. For example, where 
a seller has failed to deliver goods and the buyer is consequently forced to go into the market 
and procure equivalent goods at a price higher than the contract price it cannot be said that the 
seller has directly wasted the buyer's property. It is the buyer himself who has proceeded to 
234 The other principles are: qaedah-e-alalyad (the principle of unauthorised possession of the others' property), 
qdedah-e-ghurar (the principle of deception) and qaedah-e-taladdi wa tafrit (the principle of encroachment or 
abuse, and, negligence). See generally, Naraqi, A., (1408) at 108 and seT, Bujnardi, M. H., (1389 H. Q), vol. 2 
at 4 and seq., 84 and seq.; Shirazi, N. M., (1410 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 213 and seq., 231 and seq., 249 and seq., 283 
and seq.; KritdziAn, N., (1995) vol. I at 156 and seq. 235 The principle is explicitly recognised by 1. C. C., Art. 328. 
236 In Shilah law terminology, the principle is called "man atlaf mal al-ghayr (men ghayr edhneh) fahuwa lahu 
&men". See generally, Bujnardi, M. H., (1389 H. Q) vol. 2 at 17; Shirazi, N. M., (1410 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 193. 
237 See e. g., "Anyone who transgresses against you, transgress ye likewise against hirW' (chapter 2, verse 194). 
'Me language of the verse is very broad and covers various cases. However, in the context of liability to pay 
damages it is commonly interpreted into: "If someone transgresses on another the latter should be paid back in 
the same coin and the transgressor is liable to the extent of the transgression! '. See also, Silrah Nahl, verse, 
126; Silrah Shilra, verse 40. 
238 Ia this connection, there are a considerable number of cases in which a wrongdoer was held liable for the 
harmful consequences of his action. See e. g., Ameli, H., vol. 19, ketAb deyat, abwab mujebat al- &man, bab 
9, hadith 1, and bab 10, hadith 1, and bAb 11, hadith 1, and bab 13, ahadith 2,3, and bib 40, hadith 1; Ameli, 
H., vol. 18, ketAb al-hudild wa ta'zirat, abvAb nekah al-bahaem, bab 1, hadith 4, and ketAb al-shehAdAt, abWAb 
al-shehadat, bab 11, hadith 2, Ameli, H., vol. 16, abwab al-e'tq, bab 18, ahadith 5 and 9; Ameli, H., vol. 13, 
ketab al- ejareh, abwab ahkian al- ejareh, bab, 29, hadith 1, abwab ahkam al- ralm, bab, 7. hadith 2, abwab 
ahkam al- wasaya, bib, 37, hadith 1, abwab ahkAm al- A'reyah, bab 1, ahadith 2 and 9; Ameli, H., vol. 6, 
ketAb al- zakit, abwab al- mustahaqqin lei zakAt, bAb 39, hadith 2. See generally, Bujnardi, U H., (1389 
H. Q) vol. 2, at 17-19; Shirazi, N. M., (1410 H. Q. ) vol. 2, at 195- 202. None of these authorities state the 
principle in express term. But, from various occasions in which the Prophet or His Successors held liable a 
wrongdoer whose action caused damage to another the jurists have formulated this principle. 239 Ameli, Z. (Shahid Tli&-ý), vol. 2 at 250; Marighei, M. F., (1274 H. Q. ) at 291; NaJafl, M. H., (1981) vol. 42 
at 90 and seq.; Rashti, M. H., (1322 H. Q. ) at 29-30; Katozian, N., (1995) vol. I at 148 and seq. 
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buy from another source. Accordingly, loss of property (that is, the increased price) is due to 
the buyer's decision to obtain the substitute goods not a direct consequence of the seller's non- 
performance. The same is true where the non-conforming goods delivered by the seller have 
caused the buyer loss. However, it is accurate to say that the seller's failure to deliver in 
accordance with the contract was customarily regarded as the cause of the increased price or 
incurred loss. If he had delivered goods conforming to the contract the buyer would certainly 
have not been forced to purchase the equivalent goods at the high price. 
2.2.2. Principle of Tasbib 
Because of the inapplicability of the principle of ithyto the case of breach of contract, the 
principle of tasbib (literally, causation)" seems to play a significant role. "" The principle is, 
in fact, a particular form of the principle of U14' For this reason, it is often discussed by the 
jurists under the heading of itldfl and is justified by reference to the same authorities upon 
which the principle of itlaf is made. The significant difference between these two principles is 
in the degree of connection between the incurred loss and the wrongdoer's action. Under the 
principle of itlif, a person will be held liable if his action has directly destroyed, or damaged, 
another's property, " while the principle of tasbib comes into operation where his action is 
customarily regarded as the cause of the loss sustained, even though other factors may be 
involved in the occurrence of the loss in question. " 
The principle of tasbib is a general rule. It is provided to afford an aggrieved person a 
general right to claim compensation for losses he suffered as a consequence of the other's 
action. " Thus, where the seller, for instance, fails to perform his contractual obligations he 
may be held liable for any loss which is customarily attributable to him. On this principle, the 
240 The principle is expressly recognised by the I. C. C. in Art. 331. It is worth noting that although the 
expression "tasbib" is commonly translated into English term "causation! ' (see e. g., the English Translation of 
I. C. C., Art. 307), it differs from "causation7' in English law. Tasbib is a principle when its requirements are 
satisfied a victim will be entitled to claim damages, whereas "causatioe' in English law, as seen in the 
second chapter, is one of the provisions which restricts the recoverable damages. In comparison, one may 
liken this principle to the principle of compensation for foreseeable loss in English law. Accordingly, the 
principle of causation under Shilah law includes both the necessity of compensation of loss sustained and the 
rules of remoteness in English law. 
241 In some cases, the principle has been expressly relied on by some distinguished jurists in order to make one 
of the contracting party liable for losses caused by his failure to perform the contract See e. g., NaJafl, M. H., 
(1981) vol. 27 at 322 and seq. (in the case of breach of contract of lease); Rashti, M. H., al- Ijalreh, at 332. 
242 In Contrast, the I. C. C. has distinguished these two principles and allocated to each certain provisions. See, 
Arts. 328-330 under the heading of "itlaf' (direct injury) and Arts. 331-335 under the heading of "tasbib" 
(causation). 
243 See e. g., NaJafl, M. H., (1981) vol. 43 at 43,95; Rashti, M. H., (1322 H. Q. ) at 30, Shir5zi, N. M., (1410 
H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 205-207. 
244 See e. g., Helli, A. N. I (Muhaqqeq Helli), (1377 H. Q. ) at 273,385; Amcli, Z. (Shahid Thani), vol. 2 at 245; 
NaJafl, M. H., (1981) vol. 37 at 46,54, Rashti, M. H., (1322 R Q. ) at 30; Shinizi, N. M., (1410 H. Q. ) vol. 2, 
at 205-207; YMUWAn, N., (1995) vol. I at 150 and seq. The jurists normally call the first "itlaf bel 
mubasherah" (direct injury) and the second as "itl4f bel tasbib" (indirect injury). 
245 See in this regard, Gurgy, A., (1365 H. S. ) vol. I at 44. 
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buyer may be entitled to recover damages for any loss he has sustained as a consequence of 
the seller's action (i. e., breach), whether in the form of non-delivery, late delivery or defective 
delivery. The principle itself, it seems, is unquestionable. Where the buyer can satisfy the 
court that his loss is caused by the seller's breach he will certainly be entitled to recover 
damages for it. No jurist has questioned the principle in the above sense. The main 
controversy among them is about the term "maT'used in the subject of the principle which will 
be discussed later. 
2.2.3. Principle of LJDarar 
This is one of the most significant as well as a very broad principle which is relied on in 
various places of Shiah jurisprudence. 14 The principle is derived from a very leading 
statement attributed to the Prophet of Islam. " However, the jurists, in formulating the 
principle, have also relied on various Quranic verses" as well as the sayings of ShVah 
Imams. " The mandate is given, nevertheless, to the saying of the Prophet, that is, "Id darar 
wa la &rdrfi al- Islam" (literally, there is no loss and no harm in Islarn). " In fact, the other 
authorities narrated from Shiah Imdms have applied this rule in several cases. "' For this 
reason, the emphasis will be placed on the saying of the Prophet which constitutes the words 
of the principle. 
" This principle is similar to "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas". For a detail discussion of the history of 
development of this in Shilah jurisprudence see, Hakim, S. M., (1373 H. S. ) 
247 The statement is so: "la darar wa ld &rArfs al- Islam". It is cited in various occasions and in different 
languages. See e. g., Ameli, H., vol. 17, bAb 12, at 341, hadith 3. See also-, Ameli, H., vol. 12, bib 17, at 364 
ahAdith 3,4,5 (in this reference the phrase "upon Muslim" instead of "fi al- Islam7' is cited); Ameli, H., vol. 
17, bab 5, at 319 hadith 1, and bab 7, at 333 hadith 2 and bab 12, at 341 ahadith 3,4 (in this reference the 
phrase "upon Muslim7' is cited) and 5; and bab 1, at 376 hadith 10 (it is only in this reference the phrase "fi 
al- Islam7' is cited). 
249 Such as, "When ye divorce women and they fulfil the term of their (during the period of Iddah), either take 
them back on equitable terms or set them free on equitable terms, but do not take then to injure them ... " 
(chapter 2, verse 231); "Neither mother nor father is required to sustain harm. in preservation of their child! * 
(chapter 2 verse 234ý, "And let neither scribe nor witness suffer harm! ' (chapter 2, verse 284), "... after 
payment of legacies and debts (in the case of division of the assets of the deceasedý, so that no loss is caused! ' 
(chapter 4, verse 12); "Let the women live (during the period of Iddeh) in the same style as ye live; do not 
harm them (in terms of maintenance expenses and accommodation) to abandon from their rights. " (chapter 65, 
verse 2). See also, chapter 3, verse 12. See generally, Shirazi, N. M., (14 10 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 29-30. 
249 There are a considerable number of rewayat narrated from Shilah Imarns in which the principle is applied, 
such as the statement of ImAnt Sadeq who said. "Whoever injuries a Muslim he is liable for that lose' (Ameli, 
H., vol. 13, bab 6, at 339 hadith 4). See also, ibid. bib 9 at 179 hadith 2, and, bab 9 at 181 hadith 2. See 
generally, Nardqi, A., (1408) at 15-17. (in which he has mentioned II rewayat justi4ring the principleX 
Bujnilrdi, M. H., (1389 H. Q) vol. I at 176-177; Shirazi, N. M., (1410 H. Q. ) vol. I at 3145; Sistani, S. A., 
(1414 H. Q. ) at II and seq. 
250 What is to be noted is that there is only one authority in which the phrase "in Islarre' is added to the 
statement "I! ciarar wa la&ra? '. The other authorities contains either the phrase "upon Muslim! ' or without 
any additional words. However, it is common between the jurists that the statement is what cited in the text. 
251 See for instance, Ameli, H., vol. 13, bab 22 at 49 hadith 1; Ameli, H., vol. 15 at 299,331,385,402,509, 
515 and 516. 
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Because of the great importance of the statement, the case in which the Prophet made 
this pronouncement is briefly cited. The case was concerned with a Muslim who was the 
owner of a date tree in the dwelling house of another Muslim. The owner of the house took 
action against the owner of the date tree who was frequently exercising his right of passage in 
unsocial hours to go to his date garden through the dwelling house without prior 
announcement, which caused the owner of the house inconvenience. After the owner of the 
date tree had refused to accept all suggested solutions, the Prophet, ordering that the tree to be 
pulled down and given to its owner, held that the owner of the date tree was a person whose 
action caused loss to the other and that in Islam no loss is permitted to be sustained. "' 
Because of the importance of the judgement, the jurists have written numerous 
pamphlets and books in order to elucidate the terms used in the Prophet's judgement and the 
extent to which it could be applied. This is not, of course, a proper place to review all of them. 
What is discussed in the following is to show how the principle can be relied on to make the 
seller in breach liable for losses resulting from his breach. For this purpose, two issues are of 
significance. First, what is intended by the statement? Second, what is the meaning of darar 
used in the judgment? 
(A) Concept of the Principle 
As the language of the Prophet's statement shows, the principle is provided to declare that 
"there is no loss and no harm in Islam". Since there is no doubt that there is loss in fact 
between Muslims and in Islam, 253 ShVah jurists have made great attempts to identify the real 
intention of the Prophet in his statement. In this respect, various interpretations have been 
offered as to the concept of the principle so that some of the jurists have identified nine 
views. " Among those interpretations, four of them are particularly significant. The first holds 
that the principle is designed only to rule that "no one is allowed to cause the other loss". "' 
The second observes that the principle is prescribed to say that " there is no uncompensated 
252 See the references cited in fa. 234. Although this statement was declared for settlement of a tortious dispute 
between two Muslims in respect of exercising the right of ownership of one whose act was causing loss to the 
other, the jurists, relying on application of this judgment in various cases by the Shiah Iniffnis, have regarded 
it as a general principle applicable to any situation whether public, private, contractual, tortious, or otherwise. 
For this reason, the principle of 1A &rar in its broad form is incorporated in the Iranian Constitution of 1979 
in terms of Principle 40 which provides: "No one is entitled to exercise his rights in a way which causes others 
loss, or is an encroachment of public interests. " See also Principle 43 which provides: "Ile economy of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran shall be based on the following criteria: (1) ... (5) the prohibition of 
infliction of harm 
and loss upon others ...... 253 Qumi M. A. (Muhaqqeq Qumi), vol. 2 at 48. 
254 See MullA Aq1i Darbandi in: Khazlen, (cited in: Bahraini, H., (1366 H. S. ) at 293) 255 See e. g., Shari'ah al- IsfahAni, F. (Shaykh al- Shari'ah) at 25. The view was firstly raised by Al- Badakhshi, 
as it is cited in: Naraqi, A., (1408) at 18. 
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loss in Islam". "The third view holds that the principle is simply provided to declare that "no 
harmful mandate (hukm-e-dhra? I) is prescribed in Islam". 211 Finally, the fourth view believes 
"no decree is prescribed for an injurious subject (mudW-e-dTaraH)". I` 
Among these views there are two fundamental views which constitute, in fact, the basis 
of other subordinate views. "' Because different results derive from adoption of each of these 
views, both of them are briefly examined in the following. Full discussion of them would 
require more space than is available here. What follows is a general review of these views as 
far as the present purpose is concerned without getting involved in detail in their various 
arguments presented in support of their views. 
(1) LA Darar as a Rule Denying Harmfu I Decree 
The view which is supported by a considerable number of leading jurists" is that the only 
thing inferable from this principle is that Islamic law-maker does not prescribe any rules from 
which loss results. But the fact that the loss sustained must be compensated and in what form 
should the said compensation itself be, requires other reasoning which should be discussed in 
other place. "' 
Interpreting the principle as being only for the purpose of negation of harmful decrees, 
raises the question: does the principle mean that no loss is recognised in Islamic law, whether 
it results from a prescribed rule or from the lack of a proper law, or is it only prescribed to 
negate positive decrees? 71he question arises where there is no specific authority holding the 
injuring person liable. "' The issue is disputed between the jurists. Most of them argue that the 
principle is only for the purpose of negating a prescribed rule if its performance results in 
2-56Bashravi, A. (Fidel Toni), (1309 H. Q. ) at 194; Marighei, M. F., (1274 H. Q. ) at 94; Rashti, M. H., (1322 H. 
Q. ) at 4. 
257 (ýumi M. A. (Muhaqqeq Qunii), vol. 2 at 48; Narlqi, A., (1408) at 18; Ansdri, M. in: Ans5h, M., (l 375 H. Q. ) 
at 372; Khalkhali, S. M. and Rashti, M. H., (1395 R Q., ) vol. I at 156; Yazdi, S. U Y-, (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 
37 and 180; Ndeini, M. H. in: NaJafi, M., and, Naeini, M. R, (1358 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 200; Bujnilrdi, M. H., 
(1389 H. Q) vol. I at 182; Tohidi, M. A., and Kliflei, S. A. (1369 H. S. ) vol. 3 at 204; Shahrddi, S. A. and, 
KhIlei, S. A., (1409 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 153. 
258 Khurlsk-d, M. K., (1364 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 267 and seq. 
25' For instance the first two views are the same in effect If the principle is provided to prohibit to cause 
another loss it must be compensated where the loss occurs, since prohibition of causing loss does not confine 
to the stage of inflicting loss, but it covers leaving the loss uncompensated. The inherent result of such an 
extension is that the loss should be compensated. The fourth view also resembles the third. Both of them hold 
that the principle is simply provided to declare that no harmful decree is prescribed in IslanL However, the 
fourth view differs from the third in that according to the fourth view it is the harmful subject which is 
negated by the principle. That is, by negation of a harmful subject the relevant decree is negated. Whereas, on 
the third view, it is the hannfid decree which is negated. However, some slight difference may appear between 
the third and fourth views. See in this respect, Maraglici, M. F., (1274 H. Q. ) at 99; Bujnilrdi, M. H., (1389 
H. Q) vol. I at 181-182; KAtflziln, N., (1995) vol. I at 146. 
260 See the references cited in fii. 244. 
261 For instance, in the case of lesion in a transaction, by virtue of the principle the contract will not be binding 
on the aggrieved party, but the fact that he has the "option of lesiore' cannot be inferred from it. See Naraqi, 
A-, (1408) at 19; Khurisani, M. K., (1406 H. Q. ) at 99,100. 
262 There are also other instances in which the reference is made to the principle for negating the loss resulted 
from the lack of positive rule. See generally, Sistani, S. A., (1414 H. Q. ) at 291 and seq. 
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harm. "' In contrast, others hold that it is a broad principle covering both cases. '" On the latter 
interpretation, the principle would be a significant principle holding the wrongdoer liable for 
any loss resulting from his action or inaction where there is no particular authority holding 
him liable for the loss sustained. 
(H) La darar as a Rule Requiring to Compensate the Incurred Loss 
The foregoing interpretation has not, however, been accepted by some eminent jurists. 
According to them, the sentence narrated from the Prophet, that is, 11 darar wa ld &rArfi al- 
Islam, was, in fact, intended to rule that "there is no uncompensated loss in Islam". An 
inherent result of such an interpretation is that where any loss occurs it must be compensated. 
In justif 
. ýing 
the express language of the statement which negates the existence of darar in 
fact, this view observes that when it is said that the loss sustained must be compensated it is 
accurate to say that there is no loss in the view of the Islamic law-maker. "' 
(111) Preferred Interpretation 
Having seen briefly the various interpretations suggested in respect of the principle, it is 
essential to decide which is to be preferred. As a rule, it can be said that the principle is 
provided to declare that "no loss is recognised by Share' (the Islamic law-maker) in his 
legislative environment". The principle, it seems, should not be restricted to a particular area. 
It can play a significant role either in respect of the performance of religious instructions in 
relation of man to God where his prescribed rule results in harnP and in respect of the 
relationships between individuals where the conduct of one of thern causes another loss. "'. 
The view can be supported by the language of the general statement prescribed in the 
Prophet's judgment and by the special circumstances in which the judgement was issued. As 
the case is recorded in the original sources, it was held that there is no harm in Islam. Such a 
statement is consistent with the view that the Islan-dc law-maker does not recognise any harm 
within his legislative environment, whether the given harm results from performance of his 
prescribed rules or from another person's actions. It does not mean that there is no loss in fact, 
213 Naraqi, A., (1408) at 20; Naeini, M. H. in: Najafi, M., and, Naeini, M- H., (1358 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 220 and 
seq.; BujmIrdi, M. H., (1389 H. Q) vol. at 200; Shahradi, S. A. and, Khaei, S. A., (1409 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 153. 
264 The given broad interpretation has been supported by Marighei, M. F., (1274 H. Q. ) at 95; Ansiri, M in: 
Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 373; Shirazi, N. M., (1410 H. Q. ) vol. I at 85 and seq.; Shir5zi, N. U, (1413 H. Q. ) 
vol. I at 169,219 and 394; SistAni, S. A., (1414 H. Q. ) at 291 and seq. See also, BahrAmi, H., (1366 H. S. ) at 
341 and seq. 
265 See e. g., Marighei, M. F., (1274 H. Q. ) at 94. 
266 AS the late Naraqi, Ansari, and Naeini observed. See the references cited when explaining their view. 267 As it is suggested by Ayatullah Nisser MakArem ShirAzi in: Shirazi, N. M, (1410 H. Q. ) vol. I at 67 and seq. 
The broad interpretation has been addressed by the great Shiah jurist, Muhaqqeq QumL in- Qumi M. A. 
(Muhaqqeq Qumi), vol. 2 at 48, but he did not reach the conclusion that the principle orders that the loss must 
be compensated. 
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for the facts are due to their causes; they are not in the hand of the law-maker. What is to be 
done by the law maker is to pass or reverse the law, not to negate the external facts. 
The inherent result of non-recognition of loss by the Islamic law-maker is that if some 
harm occurs, whether in the stage of performance of a particular rule prescribed by the 
Islamic law-maker or in relation of the individuals to each other, it must be removed by an 
appropriate means. Where the exercise of a religious instruction causes a person loss in the 
stage of performance of his religious duties he is to be given a power to disregard them from 
the very begint-dng. '" Whereas, if a person causes another loss by his conduct the inherent 
result of the non-recognition of loss in Islam is that it must be compensated"', since leaving 
the loss sustained outstanding between the injuring person and the victim without allowing the 
latter to claim damages would mean that the Islamic law-maker consents to the existence of 
loss. 
Based on the above construction, it is fair to say that the principle is designed both to 
negate the binding force of the Islamic rules where they cause Muslims loss in the stage of 
performance and to oblige the injuring person to compensate the victim of injury who suffered 
loss from the former's harmful conduct (breach). Accordingly, this principle, as the principle 
of tasbib, becomes a general rule holding the party in breach liable to pay damages. If any 
dispute arises it is in fact concerned with the concept of darar rather than the principle of 
compensation of darar under this principle. 
2.2.4. Scope of The Principles of Tasbib and Ld. Darar 
No jurist has questioned the necessity of compensating actual incurred damage. What has 
been questioned by most of them is recovery of loss of profit. In describing the concept of loss 
of profit, most of ShVah jurists hold that it does not fall into the scope of the subject of the 
268 On such understanding, apparently, the Prophet, in declaring the principle, applied the principle in the case 
where one of the Muslims was exercising his right of passage in bad faith. In that case, the Prophet judged 
that, although the defendant was in principle entitled to exercise his right of passage to see his date tree, his 
right was subject to his not causing loss (in that case, inconvenience) to the other Muslirn. For this reason, 
when it was proved for the Prophet (after the defendant had rejected all the proposed ways of solutions 
rendered by the Prophet) that the defendant was exercising his right in a harmful way, he held that his right of 
26 
passage is unrespectable and as a result ordered the plaintiff to pull down the date tree. 
' The cardinal divergence of this interpretation with the common view is that the latter restricis the principle 
to negation of positive decrees. That is, it does not say that the injuring person should compensate the injured 
party. Whereas, under the suggested view, the principle is general. It is provided for the purpose of 
compensation of damages and comes into operation either where the performance of a decree causes a person 
loss and where he is harmed for the lack of a rule holding the injuring person liable to pay damages. The 
advocates of the opposite view observe that inferring such a broad reading from the principle results in 
emergence of a new jurisprudence and in any case the loss must be compensated by the Islamic State (see 
e. g., Ndeini, M. H. in: Najafl, M., and, Nrteini, M. R, (1358 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 221. However, as the suggested 
view shows, the loss must be compensated by the person whose conduct caused the loss not the government. 
In addition, if the true language of an authority suggests such a broad interpretation one should not fear the 
emergence of a new jurisprudence. The history of development of Shiah jurisprudence has witnessed such 
surprising reading. What is important is to read the authorities as they purport. See also in this respect, 
Katazian, N., (1995) vol. I at 147. 
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principles of tasbib (i. e., mA4 and that of Id diarar (i. e., darar) so as to be recoverable on 
these two principles. "' The key point in relying on these two principles is, therefore, to 
determine the precise meaning of the terms "mar' and "darar" used in their subject. 271 
Concept of MIV and Darar. In spite of lack of use of the term 'mdl' within the authorities 
justifying the principle of tasbib, the jurists have incorporated it into the subject of the 
principle. It has placed them in great difficulty in ascertaining what the term means. A strict 
view supported by most jurists holds that mV is any valuable res which physically exists but 
not what comes into the existence in future. Thus, a prospective profit is not regarded as mW 
but is simply a chance to gain, and consequently loss of it will not be loss of mal. The same 
view has been taken as to the term "d7ra? '. In their view, alarar in the authorities declaring 
the principle of 11 darar was used to describe any loss or damage to the existing property or 
personal injuries. As a result, a person whose conduct causes loss of prospective profit cannot 
be held liable on the basis of the principles of tasbib"I or I! dararl". 
According to this narrow interpretation, the buyer will be entitled to recover damages 
for any expense he has incurred in reliance of the seller's perforniance or as a consequence of 
the seller's breach provided that the requisite requirements which will be examined later are 
satisfied, since in such cases he has lost the property he actually possessed or has sustained 
270 See e. g., Qumi, M. A., Ame'al- Shetdt (stone edition at 140) as cited in: K&WziAn, N., (1995) vol. I at 220) 
in which he says according to most Shiah jurists loss of profit is not recoverable. See also, Rashti, M. H., 
(1322 H. Q. ) at 2 1. 
271 Confronted by the restrictive interpretation of the principle of 1A darar, as well as the strict interpretation of 
mal and &rar by most jurists, some jurists have recently tried to justify the principle of compensation in 
respect of prospective loss on the basis of the principle of tafflt-e-manfat (literally, causing the prospective 
profit lost). That is, anything which common usage would regard as a profit whose loss requires compensation, 
has to be regarded in view of the Islan-dc law-maker as &rar for which the victim can recover damages. This 
view has been put forward by some eminent jurists when the writer was discussing the issue with them (i. e., 
AyatullAh Sayyd Mussd Shubayri Zanjani and Ayatullah Sayyd Ali Muhaqqeq Damad) at the Holy City of 
Q= two years ago. It seems that this view adds nothing to the issue in question. It is principally based on the 
common-usage criterion. 'Mat is, the question whether loss of a particular head of prospective profit is &rar 
must be referred to the relevant usage. This is the question which can be covered by the principles of tasbib 
and 1A Jarar, since, as already pointed out in the text, no jurist disputed the principles. What is questioned is 
the concept of mal and darar. By referring the case to custom, they conclude that loss of prospective profits is 
not customarily loss of mal or darar. However, if it is proved that the cornmon usage does regard loss of a 
particular prospective profit as loss of mAl or darar it will certainly be recoverable in accordance with the 
principles of tasbib and 1A &rar. However, the view might be seen as a new trend to justify the principle of 
compensation in this legal system if it is accepted that the principle of compensation of &rar should be based 
on the bana al- Wqall which is fully explained in the first chapter when dealing with the sources of Shiah 
law. In that event, an Islamic legal rule can be justified without needing to refer the case to any particular 
authority from Quran and Sunnah, but whatever the learned (uqa1a) have regarded as a binding rule between 
themselves the Islamic law-maker would ratify it as an Islamic rule as long as it does not contradict the 
general principles. 
272 See e. g., Helli, A. N. J. (Muhaqqeq Hclli), (1377 H. Q. ) at 274; Isfahard, S. A., and Gulpaygdni, S. M. R., 
(1977) vol. 2 at 274,278; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 2 at 158,159 (questions 5,6); Gurgy, A., (1984). 273 See e. g., Naraqi, A., (1408) at 17-18; Rashti, M. H., (1322 H. Q. ) at 21, Shahrodi, S. A. and, Kliffei, S. A., 
(1409 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 204; Gurgy, A., (1984). 
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I darar. In contrast, loss of any profit which is expected to be received following the 
performance of the contract by using the purchased goods in the course of business or other 
financial activities is irrecoverable because it does not fall into the subject of these two 
principles. According to this group of jurists, even in the case where a person has unlawfully 
prevented an owner of a property from selling in a situation in which its market price is high 
he will not be liable if the market has dropped down later. "" 
Preferred Interpretation. The given views, as described above, turn on the concept of 
darar and mV. Although this view is supported by most jurists, it is, however, notable that 
these jurists, as they indicate themselves in appropriate places, "' do not render it as a matter 
of law, rather, they simply observe as a matter of fact. There is no doubt if it is proved that 
the common usage would regard deprivation of some particular head of prospective profit as 
darar or loss of mV they will certainly judge that it is recoverable under the principle of 1A 
darar and tasbib. 
A close consideration of what these jurists observe reveals the fact that their concern is 
with a person who is held liable for speculative profits whose non-materialisation can be due 
to different factors and unknown contingencies, the happening of any of which may render any 
estimate of them incorrect, and hence result in injustice. Whereas, these principles are 
designed to protect a person who has sustained loss by the reason of other party's actions. In 
other words, the main reason for this view is the uncertainty of future profits rather than the 
fact that prospective profits are of no economic value. " 
Such a strict view is understandable in the case of non-commercial goods, where it is 
quite possible to say that the probability of using the purchased goods in a way which results 
in receiving profits is frequently a mere chance, but in the context of commercial goods, the 
case is entirely converse. In these cases, it is quite likely that the purchaser uses the goods in a 
way which will certainly result in obtaining some legitimate profits. Basically, businessmen 
" See e. g., Helli, A. N. I (Muhaqeq Helli), (1377 H. Q. ) at 274; Nanlqi, A., (1408) at 18; Najafi, M. H., 
(1981) vol. 37 at 14; Isfahani, S. A., and GulpaygAni, S. M. R., (1977) vol. 2 at 278; KhUmayni, S. R. M., vol. 
2 at 158,159. Even the late SAheb JawAhcr goes further and asserts that "there is no doubt that the preventing 
person has no duty to pay damages for the reduction of market price of the property whose owner is prevented 
to sell, for he has not caused him loss of any mW so as to be liable under the principles of itl4f or tasbib 
(NaJafi, M. H., (1981) vol. 37 at 15). 
273 See e. g., NarAqi, A., (1408) at 17; Marighei, M. F., (1274 H. Q. ) at 197 in which they expressly refer their 
definitions to the Wrf(custom). 
276 The point is clearly inferable from the wordings of the late Mir Fattah when he says loss of those profits 
which exist potentially (i. e., those will be derived habitually) should be regarded as &rar, but deprivation of 
the profits which are susceptible to derive is not darar but it is simply deprivation of benefiting. Nevertheless, 
in the latter case he did not deny liability of the preventing person, but he says "it is another subjecV (see, 
Maraghei, M. F., (1274 H. Q. ) at 95 and 96). Such a distinction shows that the difference is concerned with 
the degree of probability of occurrence of loss not with differentiation between mal and manfalat (profit), for 
what potentially exists is not an existent thing, but it is what would habitually matcrialise in Ague. 
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bear the risk of business in order to obtain such profits. Common usage and traditional 
wisdom attaches considerable economic value to them and the credibility of a trader is 
frequently assessed by the degree of probability of receiving such profits. Accordingly, if any 
doubt arises it should be as to the recoverability of entirely speculative profits which may be 
subject to different contingencies rather than as to whether deprivation of future profits is to 
be regarded as loss of property. It is perhaps on such an understanding, that some 
distinguished jurists have taken the view that loss of prospective profit may be reckoned as 
loss of property by common usage where certain circumstances are met. "" This is the position 
where, according to them, the causes and pre-requisites of profit have been acquired. Under 
these jurists' view, if it is quite probable that the plaintiff would have received the prospective 
profit in the ordinary course of events he would certainly be one has sustained darar and loss 
of mal as a consequence of the defendant's action. " 
On this basis, it is quite fair to say that deprivation of prospective profits under certain 
circumstances would commercially be loss ofproperly and d7rar which entitles the injured 
buyer to recover damages. " Such damages will be assessed, as will be seen below in detail, 
not by reference to the whole gain which the plaintiff buyer hoped to make or the whole loss 
which he hoped to avoid, but by reference to the degree of probability of the chance's turning 
out in his favour. Such lost gain will be recoverable when the plaintiff can show that the gain 
210 would most likely have been made. 
2.3. Principles Restricting Recoverable Losses 
Although the principles governing liability to pay damages have been examined in general and 
applied to tortious cases, jurists have failed to clarify the rules restricting the amount of 
recoverable losses. It is thus not quite clear under what circumstances an injured buyer may be 
277 See e. g., Maraghei, M. F., (1274 H. Q. ) at 197-198; Naeini, M. H. in: Najafl, M., and, Naeini, M. H., (1358 
H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 199; Shirazi, N. M., (1413 H. Q. ) vol. I at 187-189. There are also other eminent jurists who 
considered loss of prospective profit as loss in particular circumstances. See e. g., Tabatabaei, S. A., (1404 
H. Q. ); Shahid Awwal in al- Qawaed wal- Fawaed (as cited in: Bahrkni, H., (1366 H. S. ) at 240-241). 
Although the I. C. C. does not specifically refer to recoverability of loss of profit, the Civil Procedure Code 
does expressly refer to it (Art. 728). The fact that the provision has not been altered by the Iranian Islamic 
Parliament and the Guardian Council after the Islamic Revolution shows that according to the governing 
jurists, loss of prospective profits is darar and must be compensated. 
278 See e. g., Khalkhali, S. M. K. and Rashti, M. H., (1395 H. Q. ) vol. I at 162 in which he expressly accepts the 
view that where the pre-requisites of profit is available that prospective profit will be regarded "mAr'. 
279 This is a fact to which some legal systems have expressly referred. See e. g., Art. 728 of the Iranian Civil 
Procedure Code and Art. 352 of the German Civil Code. See also Art. 1149 of the French Civil Code; Art. 74 
of the Convention examined in this study. 
280 See e. g., ImAnii, S. H., (1363 H. S. ) vol. I at 244-245,407411 (in which he distinguishes between the profits 
which are expected to be certainly derived had the seller performed properly the contract (manAfe'muhaqqeq 
al husugf) and those are hoped to be derived (mangfe'muhtamal bl- husal). See also, K&tdziAn, N., (1995) vol. 
I at 220. 
Chapter Four. Buyer's Remedies Under Shiah Law 282 
entitled to recover damages. "' Is he entitled to recover damages for any loss subsequent to the 
seller's breach? Can he claim damages for loss the seller did not foresee or could not have 
foreseen? Does an injured buyer have a right to claim damages for losses he could have 
avoided? 
Because of the lack of clear jurisprudential statements, it seems necessary to look at the 
general principles upon which the principle of compensation is justified. As explained above, 
according to the two principles of tasbib and Id darar, an injured buyer must be given a right 
to claim damages for any loss resulting from the breach so that he is placed in the same 
position as if the breach had not occurred. However, social events are fully interconnected so 
that it is hard to decide all the close and remote losses caused by non-performance of the 
contract. The main issue is thus to identify what sort of loss can be attributed to the seller in 
breach. Relying on the above principles the following rules may help to identify some general 
criteria which can play a restrictive role in this system. 
2.3.1. Causal Connection 
One of the rules which can play a significant restrictive role is that the buyer may only be 
entitled to claim damages for those losses which have a causal connection to the seller's 
breach. The mere fact that the loss sustained has some connection is not sufficient. Loss, as an 
actual event, may be connected to a number of factors. A defaulting seller will only be 
required to bear loss incurred where there exists such causal connection between the loss 
sustained and the breach of contract that it is customarily attributed to the seller in breach. 
This requirement can clearly be found in the statements of the jurists which are mentioned 
under the following heading. "' 
291 The I. C. C. also does not specifically prescribe the requirements under which damages can be claimed. Art. 
226 does simply provide: "In case of non-performance of undertakings by one of contracting parties, the other 
party cannot claim damages for losses sustained unless a specified period was provided for the performance of 
the undertaking and that period has expired. And if no period was fixed for the performance of the 
undertaking, the other party may claim damages only when he was authoriscd to fix the time of performance 
of the undertaking and can prove that he has demanded the performance of the undertaking. " However, Art. 
728 of the Iranian Civil Procedure Code does more clearly state the relevant requirements as follows: ...... the 
court will pass a judgment for recovery of damages only in cases where the plaintiff proves that loss has been 
inflicted upon him and this loss has arisen directly out of non-performance or delay in performance of 
obligations or failure to submit the judgment debt . ..... The provision, as 
indicated by Professor Yutdzidn, is 
derived from Art. 1151 of the French Civil Code (Katdzidn, N., (1990) vol. 4 at 247). However, the 
enactments passed after the revolution, the Islamic MaJIis (parliament) of Iran, instead of relying on the 
"direct loss critcrion7, has placed the emphasis on the test of "foreseeable' (see e. g., Arts. 347-349,352-353 
of the Iranian Islamic Penal Law, 1370 H. S. / 1991 (as amended 1375/1996) section Deyat (Blood Money). It 
is worth noting that these two criteria are different, for, firstly, the first is objective and depends on the facts, 
while the second is subjective depends on the persons. Moreover, using these two criteria may result in 
different consequences, since not every foreseeable loss is direct. It is quite possible that an indirect loss is 
foreseeable by the party in breach when the contract is made. 
282 See e. g., the statement of the late Shahid Thkii in: Ameli, Z. (Shahid ThAni), vol. 2 at 245; Helli, M. M. 
(Allamah Helli) and Ameli S. M. J. H., vol. 6 at 206; Bujnardi, M. H., (1389 H. Q) vol. 2, at 28,29. 
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2.3.2. Foreseeability Test 
In considering the principles governing the recoverable losses, ShPah jurists have not 
expressly recognised a rule similar to the "foreseeablity" limit on damages. The question is 
therefore whether an injured buyer is entitled to recover damages for any loss resulting as a 
consequence of the seller's breach or can only recover damages for those losses which were 
foreseeable for the seller in breach. Assuming that the buyer can claim damages only for 
foreseeable loss, the following questions are also unanswered: To what extent must it be 
foreseeable? When must the loss be foreseeable?, and, by whom should it be foreseeable? 
2.3.2.1. Foreseeable Losses 
Although the jurists have not specifically referred to the test of foreseeability of recoverable 
losses, some statements can be found which indicate what is called in common law system as 
"foreseeable" loss. The jurists have addressed the point when defining the concept of "tasbib", 
the criterion upon which a person may be held liable. For instance, the late Shahid Thani says: 
"A person will be held liable provided that two requir=ents are satisfied; first, the 
loss- (in his word, wastage)- can be attributable to him, that is, if it had not been for 
his default the loss would not have occurred. Second, the sustained loss was that which 
is habitually (in his word, adatan) is expected to reSUlts, 283 
The word "habitually" used in the statement of this jurist shows that in his view, the 
wrongdoer is liable for those losses which are frequently expected to result. 
The writer of Meft5h al- Ker5mah, that is, the late Sayyed Muhammad Jawad 
Ameli, 
has gathered a number of statements which expressly show that the mere causal connection 
between the loss suffered and the unlawful action does not suffice. A wrongdoer will be held 
294 liable for losses which arefrequently expected to result. 
The point is also explicitly addressed by the late Sa-heb Jawdher. In his leading text 
book, this jurist observes that the wrongdoer would be liable for those losses of which he did 
personally know or could have known that they would result from his aCtion. 211 The criterion 
of foresecability has been also addressed in more general form by the late Mimi Habibullah 
Rashti, in definition of the principle of tasbib. In defining causation, he maintains: 
213 AMeli, Z. (Shahid Thani), vol. 2 at 245. See also, Bujnardi, M. H., (1389 H. Q) vol. 2, at 29,29. 
284 See Hclli, K M. (Allamah Helli) and Amcli S. MIR, vol. 6 at 206. For instance, he cites from the 
distinguish jurist, A119mah Helli, in his leading text book, Ghawaed al Ahkrun, that he said: "... The defaulting 
person would be liable where it is expected that his action causes such loss ... " (ibid. ). Such a statement 
is 
also cited from Muhaqqeq Karaki in Ame' al- Maqased (ibid. ). 
285 See Najafi, M. H., (198 1) vol. 37 at 59 (the phrase is so: La a7ema wala tanna al- talddi). The distinction 
between the actual and presumed knowledge is also expressly made in page 61 when he explains Muhaqqeq 
Helli and AllAmah Helli's views. In this regard, he says: "The word 'conjecture (iann)' in their statements is 
purported to refer to what occurs habitually, ... although the wrongdoer has not actually realised at the time of default. " 
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"The cause of loss is whatever is regarded as a cause of loss in view of custom ... so long as it is not treated as a rare caUSe.,, 286 
That is, a defaulting person would be held liable for any loss resulted from his unlawfid action 
provided that it is not regarded as a remote consequence of his action. A remote consequence, 
in view of this jurist, is that which is customarily attributed to other causes rather the 
defaulting person's act. 
Bearing in mind the foregoing statements declared by a number of distinguished jurists, 
it can be said with certainty that the mere causal link between the loss sustained and the 
unlawfid act does not suffice. The wrongdoer should be held liable only for those losses which 
were foreseeable. "" 
However, the above statements were all declared in the context of tortious liability. 
Thus, the question is whether such a limitation is applicable to the contractual liability. It 
seems that the answer is positive. There is no satisfactory reason to confine the given 
restrictions to the particular case of tort liability. The jurists have not distinguished between 
liability based on tort and that based on breach of contract. Consequently, what they have said 
in justifying liability for tort should in principle be applied to the liability for breach of 
contract. 
One can go even further and say that the restriction should a fortiori be applied to 
contractual liability, since in contract cases the injured party has an opportunity to make 
known unusual risks to the party in breach. Thus, it is reasonable to say that the seller in 
breach should only be held liable for those losses he foresaw or could have foreseen. If the 
buyer, wishes to protect himself against a risk which to the seller would appear unusual, he 
can direct his attention to it before the contract or at least the breach is made. 
Further arguments can also be made in favour of this view on the cardinal principle of 
Qubh-e-e'qdb-e-be1A bay-in (No punishment except in accordance with the law, similar to 
"nulla poena sine lege"). "' Contract is the law of the parties to the contract. Where one of 
them is required to pay damages for loss which he neither foresaw nor could have foreseen he 
will in fact be punished contrary to the contractual law. The contractual law commands that 
the party in breach should be held liable for those losses he was aware or at least could have 
been aware of. 
286 See Rashti, M. H., (1322 H. Q. ) at 30. 'Me same criterion is expressly accepted by Isfahani, S. A., and 
Gulpaygani, S. M. R., (1977) vol. 2 at 288 (question no. 6 1). 
287 It is probably on this reason that the grand Ayatullah Nasser Makarem Shirazi has suggested that where a 
person has prevented an owner to sell his property when the market price is high he would be liable if the 
market does fall down later provided that he knows or could have reasonably known that the owner has the 
intention to sell his property (see Shirazi, N. M., (1413 H. Q. ) vol. 1, at 200). 
299 See also, Katazian, N., (1990) vol. 4 at 252. 'Me principle is commonly called in the jurists' terminology, 
asgat al- baraeh. However, it is to be mentioned that despite the language of this rule, damages in Shilah 
law, as shown in the text according to the principles of tasbib and la darar are compensatory. 
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In this respect, there must, of course, be a distinction between losses which result 
naturally from the breach of contract in the ordinary course of events and those which result 
from special circumstances. "' In the first case, the seller in breach should be held liable for 
those losses directly and naturally resulting from the breach. Such losses are generally 
foreseeable for any reasonable person who is in the same position. Thus, the seller in breach is 
not allowed to claim that he was not aware of the events. However, in the latter situation the 
case becomes different. The seller should not be held liable for losses resulting from unusual 
circumstances he has no knowledge of unless the buyer could show that the seller was able to 
foresee such results in light of the facts and matters available to him at the time of making the 
contract or committing breach. Accordingly, the seller should not be regarded as liable for loss 
of a particular resale contract, new project in using the purchased materials or stoppage in the 
buyer's factory for a few days delay in delivery, where the buyer did not specify his special 
circumstances and particular purposes for the purchase of goods. 
2.3.2.2. Degree of Foreseeability 
The question now arises to what extent must the loss be foreseeable? In the case of tort cases, 
the jurists have suggested different criteria. For instance, some jurists held a wrongdoer liable 
for that loss which is habitually expected to result from his wrongdoing. 290 With a slight 
divergence, the criterion has been supported by the late Muhaqqeq Karald in Ame, al- 
Maqdsed. '9' In contrast, according to the late Mirza Habibull5h Rashti, loss will be 
recoverable if it is customarily regarded as a possible consequence of the default . 
21 The same 
view has been supported by the late All5mah Helli in Qaw5ed al- Ahkdm. In that book, he 
suggested that, for making a wrongdoer liable, it is sufficient if the loss in question is such it is 
expected to result from the default. 293 
It seems that the defendant should only be held liable when in the light of information 
actually given to him or which he could reasonably have obtained from the facts and 
circumstances which exist at the time of the contract he did actually foresee or could 
reasonably have foreseen it as a most likely result of his breach of contract. The reason is 
clear. The general principles, as described above, would only come into operation when the 
loss sustained is customarily attributed to the seller's non-performance. This is the reason why 
289 17he distinction has clearly been made by the late Najafi in his leading book, Jawaher al- Kaldm (see, Najafi, 
K H., (1981) vol. 37 at 61. See also, fh. 269. 
290 AMeli, Z. (Shahid Thani), vol. 2 at 245. 
291 As cited in: Helli, M. M. (Allknah Helli), and, Ameli, S. M. J. H., vol. 6 at 206. See also, Bujnfirdi, M. H., 
(1389 H. Q) vol. 2 at 28,29. 
292 Rashti, M. H., (1322 H. Q. ) at 30. 
293 See, Helli, M. M. (Allknah Helli), and, Ameli, S. M. J. H., vol. 6 at 206. 
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most jurists, as already quoted from some of them, restricted the liability of the injuring party 
to the case where it was expected that the loss wasfrequently result from the cause (sabab). 
It is to be noted that there is no mention of the question whether the exact amount of the 
loss should be foreseeable or if it is sufficient if the occurrence of the type of loss is most 
likely to result. It is hard to accept the latter requirement in accordance with the general 
principles prescribed above. It is of course natural that the court should resort to estimation of 
loss sustained so as to determine the amount of foreseeable loss. 
2.3.2.3. Time of Foreseeability 
It is also not clear at what time loss must be foreseeable. The statements cited above show that 
the time point must be when the wrongdoing is committed. The question which arises here is 
whether the same time-criterion should be applied to the case of breach of contract. As pointed 
out earlier, the above statements were originally made in respect of tort liability in which the 
victim has no opportunity to make the wrongdoer aware of his circumstances, while in 
contract cases, the injured party has such an opportunity. Thus, it is suggested that the proper 
time for foreseeability of loss in contract cases should be the time when the contract was 
made. This is the reasonable time at which the buyer must make any particular unusual risk 
known to the seller, for in that time the went of the duties and rights of contracting parties 
are determined. Requiring one of the contracting parties to bear the risk of any particular 
circumstance which was unknown for him at the time of the contract would break the cardinal 
principle of transactional Astice (ada-lat-e-mu ývad). Accordingly, a contracting party, say 
buyer, will not be entitled to claim damages for unusual loss unless he has directed the 
attention of the seller to that particular loss by making him know of his special circumstances 
when the contract was made. 
2.3.2.3. Whose Foreseeability 
As the above-cited statements show, the party whose foreseeability is crucial is the party in 
breach. For instance, the passage quoted from the late SIheb JawAher shows clearly that the 
criterion is that the loss must be foreseen or could have been foreseen by the wrongdoer. "' No 
great significance should be attached to the injured party's foreseeability. The knowledge of 
the injured buyer will be of legal value when he has made it known to the seller in breach at 
the time of making the contract. 
294 See NaJafi, M. H., (1981) vol. 37 at 59. See also p. 61 in which he expressly gives the significance to the 
wrongdoer's knowledge. 
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2.3.3. Mitigation Principle 
Although Shiah jurists do not talk of the principle of "mitigation", taking into account the 
principles which constitute the grounds of liability to pay damages draws a significant 
guideline for this purpose. Under ShPah law, as seen above, a defaulting party will be 
responsible for those damages caused by his actions provided that they were foreseeable by 
him when the contract was made. Accordingly, in any case where damage is customarily 
attributable to the plaintiff rather than the party in breach it is the plaintiff who must bear the 
consequences of his conduct. For example, suppose seller A fails to deliver raw materials for 
use in buyer B's factory and B fails to purchase substitute materials that are available on the 
market with the result that B's production is interrupted. The shut-down was in fact a 
"consequence" of B's conduct rather than A's breach. 
The rule can also be justified on the principle of iqd&n (fault against himself)'". That 
is, a buyer who could have avoided loss but fails to take some reasonable measures to avoid it 
has in fact acted to his own detriment. In such cases, the principle of Ii darar does not come 
into operation, for the principle is provided for the favour of a party who is aggrieved by the 
unlawful actions of the other, while it is presumed that such losses are caused by the buyer's 
own action rather than the seller's breach. 
2.3.4. Relevance of Fault 
To hold a person liable for the harmful consequences of his conduct, ShPah jurists have not 
attached much significance to the doctrine of taqsir (literally, fault). ` If the doctrine is 
occasionally talked of, it is in order to decide whether the loss sustained is attributable to the 
defendant. For instance, in relation to the question whether a trustee (amin) is liable for the 
loss of, or damage to, the subject of the contract of trust (aqd -e-wadilah), it is said that he 
will be held liable on the principle of taddi (abuse)"' and taf? It (negligence)"', that is, when 
he has acted other than a reasonable man would have done in his position. "' The fact that, the 
trustee is not held liable for the sustained loss when he has acted reasonably does not mean 
... The principle can be defined in English as follows: "No liability arises in favour of an owner %%to has acted 
in detriment to his own property" See generally, Shahabi, Mahmiad, (1326 H. S. ) at 103. 296 See Najafi, M. H., (1981) vol. 27 at 128-129. 
297 The term is defined in I. C. C., Art. 951 as "TaIddi is transgression of what is permitted or is customary in 
relation to another person's property or right. " 
298 The term is defined in I. C. C., Art. 952 as "Tafrit means omission of an act that, by virtue of a contract or by 
custom, is necessary for the preservation of the property of another person. " 299 See e. g., Helli, A. N. I (Muhaqqeq Helli), (1377 H. Q. ) at 120,141 and 151; MakId, NL (Shahid Awwal), 
and Ameh, Z. (Shahid ThAni), (1309 H. Q. ) vol. I at 414,441 and 446; Najafi, M. H., (1981) vol. 27 at 128, 
183 and 428. See also, Yazdi, S. M. K., (1988) vol. 2 at 146; Isfahani, S. A., and Gulpaygani, S. M. R., 
(1977) vol. I at492,503, and vol. 2 at 112; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. I at 594,602 
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that the commission of taqsir is an essential element of liability, but is for the purpose of 
determining whether or not the trustee has performed his duties. 
The issue has its origin in the nature of the duties imposed on the promisor. To explain, 
contractual duties are divided into two general categories: the obligation of result (tahhud be 
natijah) and the obligation of means (tahhud be wasilah). ' In both cases, what a plaintiff is 
required to do is to prove that the defendant has not performed his contractual duty. However, 
in the case of obligation of result it is achieved by showing that the seller, for instance, has not 
delivered goods in accordance with the contract, while in the case of obligation of means, he 
must prove that the defendant has not acted as a reasonable person would have done. 101 
Bearing in mind the above point, the seller must actually deliver the purchased goods in 
accordance with the contract. Any form of non-performance will entitle the buyer to sue him 
for damages if he can show that the seller has not performed the contract and that the loss 
sustained was caused by that non-performance. The seller can only excuse himself from 
liability where he proves that non-performance was caused by factors which were beyond his 
control or by the conduct of the injured buyer himself. Thus, he will not be discharged from 
liability merely because he has done his best and has not committed any form of talddi or 
tafrit. 
2.4. Assessment of Damages 
So far we have been concerned with the question whether or not ShVah law has recognised a 
general right to claim damages for breach of contract, and, assuming that there is such a rule 
in this legal system, for what losses can an injured buyer recover damages? Further questions 
are: according to what criteria should the court assess the damages recoverable? At what time 
and place are damages to be measured? How are damages to be quantified where there is no 
market price for the purchased goods and the buyer has not made a substitute transaction? 
And finally, is priority to be given to the market price or substitute-transaction price, where 
the buyer has made an actual substitute contract? No clear answer can be found in ShVah 
jurisprudence. The best way, it is suggested, is to look at what the jurists have relied on in the 
case of tortious liability where the question of quantification of recoverable loss, the criteria 
upon which damages are to be assessed, time and place on which the amount of damages are 
to be determined have been extensively examined. The following discussion will try first to 
300 See e. g., Makki, M. (Shahid Awwal), and Ameli, Z. (Shahid 11ani), f1309 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 352; Najafi, M. 
H., (1981) vol. 42 at 106; Ale K&shef al- QetA, M. IL (1359 H. Q. ) vol. 3 at 148 and 149. See also, KAtQziAn, 
N., (1990) vol. 4 at 175; MaziAn, N., (1995) vol. I at 85. 
301 In comparison, the distinction here appears to be very similar to the one drawn in English law between an 
absolute obligation to do something - such as the seller's obligation under a sale of goods contract - and an 
obligation to use "best endeavours" to do something, or to take reasonable skill and care. 
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identify those rules developed in the context of tortious liability and then to show how they can 
be applied to contract cases. 
2.4.1. Formulae for Assessment in Tort Cases 
In several places, the jurists have discussed the question of quantification of damages which 
can provide some useful guidelines for the present purpose. For instance, in the case of the 
buyer's liability for the purchased goods when it proves that the transaction was in fact void, 
it is commonly said that the receiver (buyer) is obliged to return the property to its owner 
(seller) in the same condition as at the time of delivery. Where the return of it in its initial 
conditions is impractical he is required to pay the owner its equivalent if it is of methli 
(fungible) or to pay its value if it is of qimi (non-fungible). ` The jurists have examined in 
detail various questions such as, the meaning of methli and qimi, time and place at which the 
value of goods must be determined. The same discussions can be found when dealing with the 
liability of a gh5seb (usurper) to pay damages in the case of ghasb (usurpation). "' 
2.4.1.1. Methfi Property 
Where a transaction is treated as void but the return of the goods, becomes, for any reason, 
impractical the buyer is required to pay the seller its equivalent. For this purpose, the buyer is 
required to give a replacement to the seller where the property in question was methh. Neither 
is the seller entitled to require the value of the item nor does the buyer have an option to pay 
the value instead of the replacement. ' The reason for giving priority to replacement over 
paying the value was said to be that the former can better place the injured party into the 
position in which he was before the wrongdoing was committed without forcing him to go to 
the market and purchase the equivalent item. "' 
302 See generally, Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) 105 and seq., Najafi, M., and, Naeini, M. H., (1373 H. Q. ) vol. I at 
116 and seq.; Shabradi, S. A. and, Khoei, S. A., (1409 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 183 and seq., Shirazi, N. M., (1413 
H. Q. ) vol. I at 180 and seq. Ile same rule is applied when discussing the liability of a person who has 
destroyed or damaged another person's property (see e. g., Shirazi, N. M., (1413 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 242 and seq. ). 
The rule is expressly accepted by I. C. C. in Art. 311. See also, Arts. 328 (in itlq) and 331 (in tasbib). 303 See e. g., Isfahkd, S. A., and Gulpaygani, S. M. R., (1977) vol. 2 at 277 and seq.; Khumayni, S. R. M., Vol. 2 
at 159 and seq.; ImAmi, S. H., (1363 H. S. ) vol. I at 368 and seq. 304 See e. g., Najafi, M. H., (1981) vol. 37 at 85; Qumi, M. A., (1371 H. S. ) vol. 2 at 301; Ansdri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) 
at 105 and seq.; NaJafi, M., and, Ndeini, M. H., (1373 H. Q. ) vol. I at 135 and seq., particularly, at 146; 
ShAhradi, S. A. and, Khaei, S. A., (1409 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 184; Shirazi, N. M., (1413 H. Q. ) vol. I at 190 and 
seq.; ImAmi, S. H., (1363 H. S. ) vol. I at 368 and seq. The same rule is expressly applied to the case 
usurpation (see e. g., Isfahani, S. A., and GulpAygAni, S. M. R., (1977) vol. 2 at 277; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 
2 at 159). 
305 See Ameli, Z. (Shahid ThAni), vol. 2 at 247; Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 106; Najafi, M., and, Naeini, M. R, 
(1373 H. Q. ) vol. I at 135; Kritazian, N., (1995) vol. I at 532-533 and the references cited there. 
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Concept of Methli. The term "methh" has been defined in various forms by the jurists. "' A 
close look at those definitions would lead one to conclude that "a property will be regarded as 
methli when there are various similar instances so that it can be readily accessible in the 
market. Existence of some equivalent which is hard to be accessed will not cause the case to 
become of the methh. "I" However, almost all of the jurists have acknowledged" that whether 
a particular item is to be regarded of methli or qimi is to be referred to the relevant custom. 
Thus, in the event of dispute in any particular case the court should refer the case to the 
relevant established custom so as to decide whether the item in question is of methli or qimi. 
Where it proves that the item is of the first type, the defendant is obliged to provide the 
replacement for the plaintiff. 
2.4.1.2. Qimi Property 
In contrast, where the property in question is qimi the party at whose risk the property is 
destroyed, damaged or becomes altered is required to pay its real value. The same rule, it is 
suggested, should be applied to the case where the purchased item under an invalid contract is 
provided on the buyer's instructions and has no equivalent in the market. The same is also true 
where the purchased goods become unavailable, for whatever reason. In all of these cases, the 
wrongdoer's liability is to be measured by reference to the real value of the purchased goods. 
That is, the court must, in accordance with relevant factors such as, the agreed price, or price 
offered by a purchaser, determine the value of it as payable damages to the injured person. 
2.4.2. Applicability of the Tort Formulae to Contract Cases 
The jurists have not considered applying the above-explained criteria when losses are caused 
by breach of contract. ' However, a close consideration of the jurists' arguments in respect of 
assessment of damages in tort cases shows a general formula: the wrongdoer's liability should 
be ascertained according to whether lost property is methli (i. e., there is an available market 
for it) or qimi (no market is available for it). In the first case, the wrongdoer's liability should 
be determined by reference to the market price. For this reason, it is said that he has to pay the 
306 See e. g., Helli, A. N. J. (Muhaqqeq Helli), (1377 H. Q. ) at 274; Ameli, Z. (Shahid ThAni), vol. 2 at 247; 
Najafi, M. H., (1981) vol. 37 at 89,93; Qumi, M. A., (1371 H. S. ) vol. 2 at 298-300; Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) 
at 105; Khalkhali, S. M. K. and Rashti, M. H., (1395 H. Q. ) vol. I at 166; Khurisani, M Y-, (1406 H. Q. ) at 
35; Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. I at 96; Najafi, M., and, NReini, M. H., (1373 H. Q. ) vol. 1 at 140; 
Amuli, K T., and, Naeird, M. R, (1413 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 336-337; ShAhMdi, S. k and, Khaei, S. A., (1409 
H. Q. ) vol. 2, at 186; Shirazi, N. M., (1413 H. Q. ) vol. I at 193. 307 AMUli' M. T., and, Ndeini, M. H., (1413 H. Q. ) vol. 2 vol. 2 at 338; Shirazi, N. M., (1413 H. Q. ) vol. I at. 
194-195). The same definition is adopted by I. C. C. Art. 950. 
308 Qumi, M. A. (Muhaqqeq Qumi), (1371 H. S. ) vol. 2 at 300; Najafl, M. H., (1981) vol. 37 at 93; KhalkhAli, 
S. M K. and Rashti, M. H., (1395 H. Q. ) vol. I at 165; Yazdi, S. M. Y-, (1378 H. Q) vol. I at 96; Amuli, U 
T., and, Ndeini, M. H., (1413 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 337; Shirazi, N. U, (1413 H. Q. ) vol. I at. 194; Katezift, N., 
(1995) vol. 2 at 66. See also, Art. 950 of I. C. C. 
309 It is worth noting that the I. C. C. is also silent as to this issue. 
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equivalent. Neither is the victim entitled to require the value of the item nor does the 
wrongdoer have an option to pay the value instead of the replacement. In the second case, his 
liability is to be ascertained by reference to the value of the property lost. The logic behind 
this formula is, it seems, to place the victim in the same position as if the wrongdoer had not 
destroyed his property. It seems that there is no justification preventing the application of the 
given formulae to contract cases. Accordingly, it is suggested that assessment of damages for 
breach of contract under this system are to be made in accordance with the following 
formulae. 
General Formula. The general formula should be the 'difference in value' rule. As far as 
contract cases are concerned, some trace of reliance on such a rule can be identified in ShPah 
jurisprudence. As will be seen when dealing with arsh, 111 almost all jurists have suggested that 
arsh should be assessed by reference to the difference between the value of sound and 
defective goods. Although this rule is originally applied to arsh liability, since most of the 
jurists have described arsh as a sort of ghar5nat (damages) it indicates the basic rule in 
measurement of compensation in their view. Moreover, this is in line with the principles of Id 
darar and tasbib. According to these principles, the cardinal principle which must be 
constantly kept in focus is that the total damages awarded should not exceed the actual loss 
the buyer has suffered by reason of the seller's non-performance. According to this formula, 
the buyer's damages are to be measured by reference to the general principle, that is, an 
estimate of the sum which will place him in the same position as if the seller had performed 
the contract rightly. In those cases, the court has to decide the case in accordance with relevant 
factors such as the contract price, the price which a second purchaser paid or was prepared to 
pay for it. 
Special Formulae. where the contract goods have an available market it is not clear whether 
the prevailing rule should be the market price rule (as English law suggests) or if the sub- 
contract price should primarily be taken into account in measurement of damages for non- 
delivery (as the Convention suggests). Both methods may be supported in this system. "' 
However, it is suggested that the English rule is more compatible with general principles. 
Accordingly, wherever there is an available market for the purchased goods so that the buyer 
is readily able to purchase a substitute his damages are to be measured by reference to the 
market price. Sub-contracts should in principle be disregarded. The same rule, it is suggested, 
310 See, this section, 3.4. 
311 One may argue that the Convention approach is more acceptable in this system. This is because it is in line 
with the philosophy upon which awarding damages is justified to put the aggrieved party into the same, but 
not a better, financial position as if the other party had performed the contract Where this purpose can be 
achieved by the substitute contract price formula, no reason to justify reference to the current price formula. 
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should be applied to the buyer's sub-sales. The suggestion can be justified on the basis of the 
same policy the jurists have offered in tort cases where.. it is commonly said that the 
wrongdoer is first obliged to give back the owner his property. Where the return of it in its 
initial condition is impractical his primary duty is shifted into a secondary obligation to pay 
damages. The liability to pay damages are to be ascertained by reference to the market price if 
the property lost is methli (i. e., it has an available market), otherwise he has to pay the real 
value of the item lost. On the basis of this rule, it is suggested that what the seller has 
undertaken to deliver is a certain quantity of goods conforming to the contract terms. As long 
as the seller has not performed his obligation he remains obliged in favour of the buyer to 
deliver the purchased goods: the buyer is entitled to demand performance of that obligation 
and the seller is required to perform it. Where due to the seller's breach delivery of the agreed 
goods to the buyer is impractical, his duty to deliver goods corresponding with the agreed 
conditions is shifted into a secondary obligation to pay damages. In this way, where the 
contract goods have an available market the seller's liability should be ascertained on that 
ground. Neither should the buyer be entitled to claim the actual price (if he has for example 
purchased the replacement goods or resold the purchased goods in a price higher than the 
market price) nor should the seller in breach have an option to rely on it (if the buyer, for 
instance, purchased or resold in a price less than the market price). In addition, it can also be 
argued that if the buyer has actually paid more than the market price the increase was due to 
the buyer's failure to go to the market and purchase at a reasonable price and that where the 
buyer has paid less than the market price the saving was due to the buyer's act rather than the 
seller's breach. Thus, it is the buyer, not the seller, who has to bear the increased price in the 
first case and benefit from the lower price in the second case. 
Relying on the above formula, it is suggested that where the case becomes one of non- 
delivery the buyer's normal damages are to be assessed by reference to the difference between 
the contract price and the price available in the relevant market for goods resembling the 
contract goods. Similarly, in the case of late delivery the buyer's damages are to be measured 
by reference to the difference between the value of the purchased goods at the time they should 
have been delivered and at the time of actual delivery. Equally, in the case of non-conforming 
delivery the buyer's damages are to be determined by reference to the difference between the 
value of the goods actually delivered and that of the goods which should have been tendered. 
In all of the above cases the buyer should also be given a right to claim further damages 
provided that the requirements already explained are satisfied. 
312 See, this Section, 2.4.1. 
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2.4.3. Time of Assessment 
Where the contract goods are qimi it seems that the court will not have much difficulty. The 
problem arises where they are classified as methli and the price for the goods varies between 
the time of the contract and the time of performance. According to the price at what time 
should the court assess the buyer's damages? 
Again, the problem has only been addressed by the jurists in the tortious cases. A great 
variety of solutions have been presented; ` ranging from assessment on the basis of the time of 
default to assessment on the basis of the time of enforcernent of the court's order to pay 
damages. "" All of these solutions have been suggested in situations where a person has 
illegally possessed another person's property and subsequently caused its destruction, damage 
or alteration. As far as the contract for sale of goods cases are concerned, it seems that most 
of these solutions are inapplicable. 
Some Iranian lawyers have suggested that the general time is to be the time when the 
court decides the case, since it is only this time that the loss caused by the non-performance of 
the contract would be adequately compensated. Relying on any other time would, they argue, 
leave some undue loss uncompensated. "' This suggestion seems unacceptable, for it would 
allow the buyer to recover damages for losses he could have avoided if he has acted as a 
reasonable man. Allowing the buyer to sit aside and await for the court's judgement would 
mean that he could recover damages for losses which are not caused by the seller's non- 
performance. It is, therefore, submitted that the general rule applicable to the case of breach of 
sale contract should be the time of breach, that is, the time when the seller fails to perform his 
duty to deliver goods conforming to the contract requirements, for this is the time when the 
seller's duty to perform his primary obligation is changes into a secondary duty to pay 
damages. On this rule, where the seller refuses to deliver the contract goods the buyer's 
damages are to be measured by reference to the difference between the market price of the 
purchased goods at the time when the buyer knows or ought to have known of the lack of 
313 These suggestions arc cited in: Qumi, M. A. (Muhaqqcq Qumi), (1371 H. S. ) vol. 2 at 294 and seq.; NarAqi, 
A., at 368; Maraghei, M. F., (1274 H. Q. ) at 314 and seq.; Rashti, M. H., (1322 H. Q. ) at 64; Yazdi, S. M. K, 
(1378H. Q)vol. I at 99-100; Najafi., M., and, Nleini, M. H., (1373H. Q. )vol. I at 147 and seq.; Amuli, M. T., 
and, Nacini, M. H., (1413 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 357 and seq.; Shabradi, S. A. andý Khfti, S. A., (1409 H. Q. ) vol. 2, 
at 196 and seq.; Shirazi, N. M., (1413 H. Q. ) vol. 1, at 202 For criticism on these solutions see, Y. AtQziý N., 
(1995) vol. 2 at 69-74. 
314 These solutions are: date of wrongdoing, date of destruction of mal, date of claim for damages; date of the 
court's Judgment, the most high price from the date of possession till the date of destruction, the most high 
price from the date of possession till the date of claim, the most high price from the date of possession till the 
date of payment. See in this respect, Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. I at 99-100 in which he has identified 
about fifteen suggestions. 
315 Katazi, % N., (1990) vol. 4 at 240-241. See also, ShirAzi, N. M., (1413 H. Q. ) vol. 1, at 202. The late 
Muhaqqeq Qumi has suggested that in the first case methli the victim's damages are to be measured by 
reference to the time of payment (yum at- ada ) and in the case of qimi damages are to be assessed by 
reference to the time of destruction (Qumi, M. A. (Muhaqqeq Qumi), (1371 H. S. ) vol. 2 at 34). 
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conformity. However, "the time of breach criterion" should be construed as a flexible one. It 
must be intended as a period of time within which the buyer could reasonably decide to go into 
a proper market. Likewise, where a defect in the goods appears some time after delivery it is 
suggested that the damages are to be ascertained by reference to the difference between the 
contract price and the value of the goods at the time when the buyer discovered or ought to 
have discovered the defect. 
The same criterion is, it is suggested, to be applied where the seller has failed to deliver 
within the contract time. If the value of the purchased goods has fallen between the time of due 
delivery and the time of actual delivery the buyer's damages are to be measured by reference 
to the difference between the value of the goods when actually delivered and at the contractual 
delivery date. 
2.4.4. Place of Assessment 
The jurists have not examined in detail the question at what place it has to be decided that the 
destroyed, damaged or altered item is methli or qimi. It is therefore not clear according to the 
price at what place the wrongdoer is to pay the injured owner's damages. Various solutions 
have been offered. "' According to one, the case should be decided by reference to the place of 
the unlawful action (ghasb), while another holds that it must be referred to the place of 
destruction (taldfi. A further view observes that the case must be decided by reference to the 
place of payment of damages. "" 
These suggested solutions have not been properly applied to contract cases. The 
question therefore arises whether they can be applied to the case in which different places may 
be relevant. For instance, in the case of a contract for an international sale of goods various 
places may seem relevant; the seller's country, the buyer's country, the place of goods and the 
place at which they are to be tendered. It is suggested that the question is to be answered by 
reference to the place at which the seller should have performed his delivery obligation. This is 
because this is the place in which the seller's duty to deliver goods is discharged. "' The first 
step is, therefore, to ascertain whether the contract has provided a particular place for 
delivery. If there is such a provision it would prevail. In the absence of such a provision in the 
contract, the place of delivery should be where the contract was made, unless established 
custom provides otherwise. "' Accordingly, in any case the court has first to ascertain the place 
316 See generally, Shirazi, N. M., (1413 H. Q. ) vol. 1, at 215 -216. 317 Shghradi, S. A. and, Khflei, S. A., (1409 H. Q. ) vol. 2, at 206; Kataziki, N., (1995) vol. 2 at 74-75. See also, 
Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. I at 100 in which he refers to the place at which the victim sues the party in 
default for damages, place of wastage of the property and the option is to be in the hand of the victim. 318 Qumi, M. A. (Muhaqqcq Qumi), (1371 H. S. ) vol. 2 at 237 (question 15 1). 319 Ibid., at 236 (question 15 1). 
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at which the seller could have been discharged had he performed his delivery obligations and 
then proceed to determine whether there is an available market at that place or not. The 
buyer's damages are to be measured by reference to the price of that market if it proves that 
the place of delivery has such a market. Hence, the amount of his liability must be assessed by 
reference to that place. However, where the place of delivery lacks an available market for the 
purchased goods it seems that the Convention solution can be a useful one, that is, "the price 
at such other place as serves a reasonable substitute" (Art. 76 (2)). "' In applying the 
substitute market due allowance for differences in the cost of transporting the goods to the 
buyer's place should be, however, taken into account when measuring the recoverable 
damages. 
3.0. Part Two. Claim for Arsh 
3.1. Introduction 
As indicated in the introductory remarks of this section, in ShVah law under certain 
circumstances the buyer is given a right to claim another form of monetary relief. In the 
language of ShVah jurisprudence, this is called arsh. Although the right to claim damages for 
breach of contract has not been properly examined, the right to claim arsh is extensively 
examined by ShVah jurists, when dealing with the case where it proves that the article 
purchased was defective. In that case, they have examined its nature, scope, and the different 
formulae by reference to which it is to be assessed. The following discussion will try first to 
define the concept and nature of the term, and then to determine in what circumstances the 
buyer will be entitled to this remedy, and finally to ascertain how it is to be measured. At the 
end it will make an attempt to exan-tine the relationship between this right and the right to 
claim darnages as described in the previous part. 
3.2. Concept and Nature 
In ShPah jurisprudence, the term "arsh" is used in a general sense to refer to any valuable res 
which is to be paid to the victim of breach or personal injury. For instance, Shaykh Murtad! 
Ansdri describes the word as follows: 
"Arsh" is used between the jurists to refer to any valuable res which must be paid 
against any vice in an article sold, or, for any bodily injury as a result of an unlawful 
320 The late Meini has expressly referred to the solution when discussing liability of a contracting party as to 
the wastage of the subject-matter of the contract when it proves that the contract was originally invalid (i. e., 
maqbu dbe a'qdfased ) (see Naj afl, M., and, Ndeini, M. H., (1373 H. Q. ) vol 1 at 140). See also, Shirazi, N. 
M., (1413 H. Q. ) vol. 1 at 204. 
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act, provided that there has not been ascertained a specific blood money (de)wh) for 
that injury in the latter case. 321 
On this definition, the word is used to describe the valuable res either in case of breach of 
322 
contract and tort. However, in the context of sale of goods, the terrn is used to refer to "the 
proportional difference between sound and defective goods which is to be paid by the seller to 
the buyer where it proves that the purchased goods were defective". 313 
Generally, almost all jurists have adopted arsh as a remedy for the buyer where in the 
case of sale of specific goods it proves that the purchased goods were defective. However, 
they have questioned other aspects of this remedy, in particular, its legal nature, whether it can 
be claimed for any non-confonning delivery or only in the case of delivery of defective goods 
and, whether it is a separate remedy or an alternative to the right to terminate the contract. 
3.2.1. Nature of the Remedy 
Shi'ah jurists are of two different views as to the legal nature of arsh: according to the first, it 
is in fact a portion of the contract price which is specifically allocated to the wasf-a-saldmat 
of the object sold""; according to the second, it is a type of ghar5inat the seller has to pay the 
buyer for the defective goods. "5 
It seems that the jurists' dispute as to the nature of this remedy is partly because of the 
rationale justifying the remedy and partly because of the different languages used in the 
rewayat prescribing the remedy. To explain, as indicated in respect of the first two remedies 
previously discussed, a number of jurists tend to justify them on the basis of the mutual 
intention of the contracting parties. In respect of this remedy some jurists also tend to justify it 
on the basis of the will of the contracting parties. In contrast, others try to base them on the 
cardinal principle of la darar; a party who is injured by the other's violation should be 
321 Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 271. See also: Shahidi, M. F., (1375 H. Q) at 544; Muqniyah, M. J., (1402 R Q-) 
vol. 3, at 217. 
322 Arsh in the latter case is discussed under the heading of "dqUpL deyah" (blood money) and it is sometimes 
called "hukronah). See in this respect, Khumayni, S. P, M., vol. 2 at 498. It is worth noting that deyah is one 
of the financial penalties prescribed in Shiah criminal law. Arsh in the sense of financial penalty is prescribed 
in cases where determination of the financial penalty is left to the court. In contrast, deyah is a pre-ascertained 
financial penalty the court has no power in ascertaining its amount. 
323 MUqniyah, M. J., (1402 H. Q. ) vol. 3 at 217; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 126; Tahidi, M. A., and Khilei, 
S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 269. 
324 See generally, Helli, M. M. (AllAmah Helli), and, Ameli, S. M. J. H., vol. 4 at 631-632. See also, Ans5ri, M 
(1375 H. Q. ) at 271, and, Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 85 (where he quotes this view from some 
jurists); Muqniyah, M. J., (1402 H. Q. ) vol. 3 at 218; Muhaqqeq TehrAni, M. R., (1414 H. Q. ) vol. 24 at 4. See 
also, Art. 427 of I. C. C. 
325 See generally, Helli, M. M. (Alldmah Hclli), and, Ameli, S. M. J. H., vol. 4 at 632; Khurasani, M. K, (1406 
H. Q. ) at 231; Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 67,85-, Khalkhali, S. M. K., & Rashti, M. H., (1407 H. 
Q. ) vol. 2 at 674; Najafi, M., and, Naeini, M. H., (1358 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 137; IravAni, A., (1379 H. Q) vol. 2 at 
52; Tahidi, M. A., and Khilei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 270; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 8-9; Tabrizi, J., 
(1412 H. Q. ) vol. 4 at 280. In Iranian Law see, hr&ni, S. H., (1363 H. S. ) vol. I at 501-502; KitaziAn, N., 
(1990) vol. 5 at 307-308. 
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redressed by a proper means. This is the reason, it seems to the present writer, why the jurists 
have disputed the nature of the present remedy. The advocates of the first theory tries to 
justify arsh on the grounds that the parties to the contract have agreed that where it proves 
that the article sold lacks the agreed characteristic a portion of the consideration should be 
returned to the party who has not received the conforming article. "" In contrast, those jurists 
who support the latter theory try to justify the remedy on the grounds that where it proves that 
the article sold does not conform with the contract quality keeping the defective goods will be 
harmful and consequently the principle of la olarar entitles him to claim arsh for the lack of 
conformity. 327 
A further cause for this dispute may be the use of different language in the rewdydt 
entitling the buyer to claim arsh. A considerable number of rewayat are available in this 
respect . 
321 However, they are not cited in a consistent language. In some of them it was held 
that the buyer was entitled to claim a portion of the contract price3", in others to claim the real 
value of the defect (which resembles the right to claim damageS)330, while others held simply 
that he was entitled to claim arsh without specifýing its nature. 331 
It seems that none of the above-described interpretations is acceptable in its entirety; 
arsh is neither the exact portion of the contract price nor the real value of the defect. It is, as 
will be explained in more detail, a proportional difference between the value of defective and 
sound goods. The policy behind the rewayit concerned is to protect the buyer against the seller 
who has benefited from the contract without having completely performed his own part of the 
contract, rather than the principle of I! darar. 111 The rule is, in fact, based on the principle of 
akI -e- mV bel Mtel (i. e., unjust enrichment). ' Accordingly, although one cannot agree with 
326 This view was criticised by a substantial number of eminent jurists. See e. g., Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H-Q) 
vol. 2 vol. 2, at 67,85, in which he observes that although the appearance of the rewayat is consistent with 
this view, for several reasons it must be rejected. 327 As will be seen below, the late Sayyed Yazdi, relying on this principle, suggests that in any non-conforming- 
delivery case an aggrieved buyer should be given an option to claim for arsh. He also goes further and 
suggests that the buyer may claim arsh where he is entitled to terminate the contract on the option of lesion 
(kheiyar-a-ghabn) (Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 130-131). In contrast, see: Midi, M. A., and 
Khiftei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 104, in which he argues that the principle of 1A darar cannot be relied on in 
the case of non-conforming delivery at all so as to give the buyer a right to claim arsh. 328 See for this respect, Ameli, H., vol. 18, at 29-32,101-109. It is worth noting that almost all of these rewAydt 
are concerned with the sale of slaves. 329 See e. g., ibid., ahadith nos.: 23068, at 30; 23240, at 102; 23244, at 103. 330 See e. g., ibid.. ahAdith nos.: 23242, at 103; 23245 and 23247, at 104; 23257, at 108. 331 See e. g., ibid., ahadith nos.: 23069, at 30; 23241, at 102; 23243, at 103; 23246, at 104. 332 -Me fact to which the distinguished Shiah jurist the late Ayatulldh ImAm Khumayni has expressly pointed 
out in his authoritative text book " Kitab al- Bay 'a, (see, Khumayni, S. R. U, vol. 5 at 127,128 and 130). 
The reason is clear. If the principle justifying arsh is the principle of IFL darar the buyer should be entitled to 
claim the whole difference between the sound and defective goods under arsh not a proportional difference. 333 Ile doctrine of "unjust enrichmenr' or the doctrine under which a person shall not be allowed to profit or 
enrich himself inequitably at another's expense (akl-e-mal bel batel), is based on the Quranic verse which 
says: "And do not eat up your property among yourselves for vanities ... " (Chapter 2, verse 188). 
Chapter Four. Buyer's Remedies Under Shiah Law 298 
those jurists who describe arsh as a portion of the contract price which is to be refunded to the 
buyer, it cannot be said that arsh is the same as damages. It seems that those jurists who have 
attempted to describe it as ghardpnat, have done so only for the purpose of avoiding treating it 
as a portion of the contract price. For this reason they have described it as a type ofgharamat 
not ghardmat itself. Arsh, as will be seen below, differs from damages in terms of its grounds 
and purposes. It is a particular form of protection provided for a buyer against a seller who is 
going to profit or enrich himself at the buyer's expense. 
3.2.2. Scope of the Remedy 
The second controversial aspect of this remedy in ShPah jurisprudence is to determine the 
circumstances in which it can be resorted to. While a substantial number of the jurists have 
treated the remedy as exceptional, few jurists have made great attempts to justify it as a 
general rule applicable to breach of any contractual term. 
According to the first approach, the rule is that in a contract for sale of specific goods 
any lack of conformity gives an injured buyer a single option: either to reject the non- 
conforming goods and terminate the contract or to accept the non-conforraing goods. 
However, because of a particular rew! yIt and ijMW (consensus), they argue, the case of 
breach of shart-e-saldmat is excluded from the general rule. According to these authorities, 
the only case in which the buyer is given a right to claim arsh is where the seller of specific 
goods has delivered a defective article. On this approach, the remedy cannot be relied on 
where the contract is for sale of unascertained goods and where the seller of specific goods has 
delivered goods which do not conform with the contract quantity, description or which are 
subject to third-party rights or claims. It also does not apply to other types of breach such as 
delay, delivery at the wrong place, defects in documents and the like. ' 
In contrast, some jurists have suggested that there is no reason to restrict the right to 
claim arsh to breach of shart-e-salamat. The remedy, according to this approach, can be 
relied on for breach of any contractual term, whether it be of the type of shart-e-saldmat, 
shart-e-sefat or shart-e-fe 7.331 
334 Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 271,285; (the late Ansari expressly describes the remedy as an exceptional one 
provided for by virtue of rewayat and consensus (see, ibid., at 271); Khurisani, M. Y-, (1406 H. Q. ) at 231; 
Gharavi IsfahAni, M. H., (1408 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 159-160; Najafi, M., and, Naeini, M. H., (1358 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 
137-138,143; Iravani, A., (1379 H. Q) vol. 2 at 67; Shahidi, M. F., (1375 H. Q) at 546; TWddi, M. A., and 
Khxlei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 157,269-271 and 375-376; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 357,443-444. It 
appears that the Iranian Civil Code restricts the right to claim arsh for breach of shart-a-salamat (see Arts. 
422437). See in this respect, Y. Atazian, N., (1990) vol. 5 at 307. 335 See e. g., Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 69,130-131 and other sources cited there, Khumayni, S. R. 
M., vol. 5 at 226-227 (in respect of the breach of shart-e-fe'l, where the buyer has lost his right to terminate 
the contract). 
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It seems that arsh is a general remedy which can be claimed in any case of non- 
conforming delivery where the seller benefits from his breach of a contractual term describing 
the contract goods at the expense of the buyer. There is no clear reason to restrict the remedy 
to the particular case of defective goods. The only arguments in favour of such a restriction 
are that there is an ijma' on the view, or, that no rewdýw exists under which the remedy has 
been extended to a case where the seller has delivered goods which do not conform with other 
contractual tenns. 
It seems that none of the above arguments can justify such a restrictive approach. First, 
the alleged ijm! ' has been broken throughout the history of development of Shiah 
jurisprudence by dissenting views on the part of some distinguished jurists. ' Secondly, it is 
quite possible that the advocates of the first approach have relied on the above interpretation 
h, thin of the rewayat. There is no doubt that such an ijMW as no legal value . 
337 The only g 
which may remain is that most jurists throughout history have supported the restrictive 
approach. But, as explained in the first chapter, it is a well-accepted rule that the mere fact 
that a view is popular between a number of scholars, does not make the view an authority. It 
is their own understanding, which has no authoritative force for others. 
In addition, it is quite possible to go further and claim that the suggested approach 
seems consistent with the rewayit authorising the injured buyer to terminate the contract or to 
claim arsh for defective delivery. It is hard to accept that these rewayat are intended to give a 
particular religious decree for a special case. If the case is so, this question cannot be 
answered: why have the jurists extended them to other cases? For instance, almost all of these 
rew5y, 5t are concerned with the sale of slaves, while the jurists have extended them to the sale 
of any commodity. In addition, these rewiyat are specifically related to the contract for sale, 
while the jurists have extended them to other reciprocal contracts, such as leases. "' Moreover, 
notwithstanding that these rewayat are concerned with the buyer who has received defective 
goods, the jurists have applied them to the case in which the seller has received a defective 
article as a consideration. " More importantly, notwithstanding that a considerable number of 
jurists have acknowledged that the rewiyat have subjected the right to claim arsh to the case 
of loss of the right to terminate, almost all the jurists have disregarded the appearance of these 
rewayat and have judged that the buyer can claim arsh even where he is able to reject the 
336 See e. g., the sources cited in: Ansiri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 285. 
337 Since, as explained in the first chapter, ijmA' can be relied on as a source of legal view where there is no 
primary source (i. e., Quran and Sunnah) on the point. 
338 See, Chapter One, 2.1.2.1. 
33' See e. g.,, Yazdi, S. U Y-, (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 71. 
340 See e. g., Helli, M. M. (Allamah Helli), and, Ameli, S. M. I H., vol. 4 at 624; Ansdri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 
253; Yazdi, S. M. Y-, (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 70; TOddi, U A., and Khaei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 104; 
Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 13-14; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. I at 529. 
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defective goods and terminate the contract. These instances show clearly that the rcwayit are 
not intended to provide a special decree, but that they are in fact applied to the common cases 
with which the contracting parties were mostly concerned at that time of the rewayft. 
Moreover, the policy behind the rule is of general application. It is applicable to any case in 
which a seller enriches himself at the expense of the buyer. The rewiyat are in fact in line with 
the given policy. There is nothing in the concept of a ýb (defect) which restricts the rewayat to 
the particular case of defective goods. Accordingly, as far as the rewayit are concerned, they 
should not be regarded as preventing extension of this remedy to cases other than delivery of 
defective goods. On the above construction, it seems that in any case of non-conforming 
delivery the buyer should be given a right to claim arsh if the seller has benefited from his 
non-conforming delivery. 
3.3. Arsh as an Alternative or Separate Remedy 
The other controversial aspects of the remedy in question is the relation between this remedy 
and that of termination. The jurists have discussed arsh when discussing the buyer's right to 
terminate the contract on the basis of kheyir-e-a ýb. In that case, they have regarded the right 
to claim arsh as a part of kheyk-e-a ýb. 17hat is to say, where it proves that the object sold 
was defective the buyer has khey5r-e- a ývb in the sense that he is entitled to reject the defective 
article and terminate the contract or to accept it and claim arsh. In that conteA they have 
considered the question whether the buyer can claim arsh even where he is entitled to 
terminate the contract or can resort to it only where he has lost his right to terminate. In this 
connection, as pointed out above, the language of rewdyat authorising the buyer to claim arsh 
shows that this remedy is available only when the buyer has lost his right to terminate the 
contract. Relying on the face of these rewdyft, some jurists have regarded arsh as a substitute 
for the right to terminate the contract so that, as long as the buyer is able to protect himself by 
rejecting the defective goods and recovering his money back, he cannot claim arsh. He will be 
allowed to claim arsh for defects in the purchased goods only when he has lost, for any 
reason, his right to terminate the contract. This view was supported by Shaykh Tiisi in the 
early centuries of codification of ShVah jurisprudence. "' However, at the present time most 
jurists support the view that in the case of defective delivery the buyer has an option either to 
reject the goods and terminate the contract or to keep the defective goods and claim arsh. ' 
341 Tiftsi, M. H. (Shaykh Tilsi), vol. 2 at 13 1. 
342 See generally, Bahrani, Y., vol. 19 at 63-64; Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 253; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 8 
and 226; Tahidi, M. A., and KhIlei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 102. For instance, the great Shiah jurist the 
late Shaykh Ansari observes that there cannot be found any authority within rewriyat authorising the buyer to 
claim arsh where he is able to reject the defective goods and terminate the contract. But what the relevant 
rewayat say is that the buyer can claim arsh where he has lost his right to terminate the contract because of the 
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As it appears from the jurists' statements, they have not made a distinction between 
these two remedies; they justify both the remedy of termination and that of arsh on a single 
ground. That is, a buyer who has received non-conforming goods would in principle be 
entitled either to terminate the contract or to keep the contract alive and claim arsh. However, 
they have not addressed the question whether this remedy only arises where the contract can 
be terminated on the basis of the seller's defective delivery or it is a separate remedy which 
may arise even where a buyer may not be entitled to terminate the contract. 
In the absence of a clear jurisprudential statement, it is suggested that the right to claim 
arsh should be distinguished from that of termination. In the context of commercial contracts, 
termination is a drastic remedy and should be restricted to the case where the buyer cannot be 
adequately compensated by the other means. The remedy of arsh is an effective remedy which 
can protect an injured buyer without jeopardising the existence of the contract. It is in line 
with the cardinal principle of asWat al- luzrBn of the contract, while termination is an 
exception to this principle justified on the principle of Ii darar. Accordingly, it would be 
unreasonable to treat the two remedies alike or subject them to the same restrictions. Common 
wisdom commands that these two remedies must be distinguished. An injured buyer should be 
given a right to terminate the contract only when the seller's failure has resulted in sufficiently 
serious consequences, and arsh, in contrast, should be given to the buyer where the seller is 
going to benefit from his violation at the expense of the buyer. This suggestion, if accepted, 
would bring this legal system into line with commercial reality and business practice. Buyers 
do often prefer, particularly in a rising market, some form of monetary relief rather than 
getting involved in a time wasting and expensive process of termination of contract. Moreover, 
the fact that a buyer may lose his right to terminate the contract rather than the right to cl i 
arsh under certain circumstances is, in fact, a step towards recognising the distinction between 
these two remedies and that termination for its drastic effects must be restricted as far as 
possible. But the right to claim arsh must be kept as long as the buyer has not expressly or 
impliedly waived his right. " Similarly, it can be said that even the rewayat restricting the 
remedy to the case where the buyer has lost his right to terminate are in fact in line with the 
policy of distinguishing these two remedies. 
use of the delivered goods (see Ansliri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 253. The same statement has been made before him 
by the late SAhcb HadAeq in: Bahrani, Y., vol. 19 at 63-64. See also: Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 67; 
Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 8-11; Tahidi, M. A., and Kh1ftei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 100 and 102; 
Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 278). See in contrast, See also, Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 279.1. C. C. has 
followed the former group of the jurists (Art. 422). 
343 See in this respect below, 3.5., and the references cited in fa. 342. 
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3.4. Assessment of Arsh 
One of the significant aspects of this remedy in Shilah jurisprudence is to determine the extent 
of the seller's liability to pay arsh for his defective delivery. The rewdyat prescribing this 
remedy have used different language when introducing the criterion on which it should be 
quantified. They can be classified into three general categories. According to some, the buyer 
is given a right to claim the difference between the value of the goods in sound and defective 
condition when he realises that the item delivered is defective. 3" In contrast, others give him a 
right simply to claim arsh for defects which exist in the article delivered, without making clear 
how the arsh should be assessed. " Finally, others entitle him to claim the value of defect, but 
require it to be quantified by reference to the contract price. ' 
It seems that all the three categories of rew5. y,! t are in fact in the same line. All of them 
are intended to provide that a buyer who has received defective goods must be protected by 
giving him a right to claim arsh. "' This protection is to be made by, in effect, reducing the 
contract price in the same proportion as the defect reduces the actual value of the goods as 
delivered. In order to refer to this point, in some of these rewAyat it was said that the buyer is 
entitled to claim a portion of the contract price. Whereas, if arsh is the real value of defect it 
may sometimes exceed the agreed price. Thus, the absolute nature (that is, ftlaq) of the first 
category of rewayat should be disregarded in favour of the express language of the third 
category which describes arsh as a portion of the contract price. ' 
3.4.1. Time of Assessment 
Shi'ah jurists have not made much discussion about the time point at which the value of the 
goods actually delivered and that of the goods as they should have been delivered under the 
contract must be assessed. However, there can be found some references in which they have 
suggested different criteria. " The time of making the contract, the time of delivery and the 
344 Ameli, H., vol. 18, bab 4, ahAdith nos. 23242 and 23243 , at 103. 345 Ibid., bib 6, hadith no 23241, at 102, bib 4, hadith no. 23246 at 103. 
346 Ameli, H., vol. 18, bab 16, hadith no. 23068, at 30, bab 4, ahadith nos. 23240, at 102 and 23244 at 103, and 
bab 5, hadith no. 23249 at 105, and bab 6, hadith no. 23257 at 108. For instance, the late Shaykh Ansdri cites 
from some jurists of the early centuries that they were apparently of the view that arsh is the difference 
between the defective and perfect goods (AnsAri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 271). 
347 See also, Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 130. 
348 See generally, Helli, M. M. (Allknah Helli), and, Ameli, S. M. I H., vol. 4, at 632; Bahrani, Y., vol. 19 at 
64; Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 271,272; Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 101; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 
5 at 126-129 and 136; Tahidi, M. A., and Khfiei, S. A. (1368 RS. ) vol. 7 at 272-275,285; Tabrizi, J., (1412 
R Q. ) at 362-363. See also, Katazian, N., (1990) vol. 5. at 321. The saxne criterion is provided by I. C. C. Art. 
427. 
349 Some of jurists have gathered about six possibilities in this regard (MranAqAni, A. (1345 H. Q. ) at 136. For 
the lack of a well-settled criterion between Shiah jurists, I. C. C. is silent on the question. See in this respect 
Y. Atazirm, N., (1990) vol. 5 at 313-316. 
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time of the buyer deciding to claim arsh are some of possibilities supported by some 
distinguished jurists. 
The time of making the contract has been supported by a considerable number of 
eminent jurists, '-, on the grounds that this is the time at which the value of the defective and 
perfect goods is assessed by the contracting parties. It is true, they argue, that the buyer will 
be entitled to claim arsh when he learns of the lack of conformity, but his right is based on the 
defect which was in the article sold at the time of the contract. According to this view, a 
change in the market price should not affect the liability of the seller to pay arsh. What he has 
to pay is the proportional difference between the value of the goods actually delivered and that 
of the conforming goods at the time when the contract was made. "' This argument may be 
defensible in respect of sale of specific goods where the defect was hidden at the time of the 
contract. However, it cannot be applied to the case of unascertained goods or to that where the 
article sold was perfect at the time of contract but was damaged during the period of time 
when the risk of loss was on the seller. "' For this reason, some jurists who supported arsh as 
a general remedy have tried to rectify the criterion so as to cover such situations. According to 
them, the value should be assessed on the basis of the time when the defect arises, provided 
that the goods are at the risk of the seller. "' 
It seems that the different views as to time for assessment of arsh are based on the 
jurists' different views on the legal nature of arsh. If it is in fact a portion of the price which 
has to be refunded to the buyer, it is quite reasonable to say that it should be assessed at the 
time of the making-contract criterion, for at that time the seller has received a portion of the 
price against nothing. But according to the view that it is a monetary relief which is to be paid 
to compensate the buyer for the losses he has suffered as a consequence of non-conforn-dty, it 
has to be determined at the time at which the buyer elects arsh, for before the buyer's election 
the seller's duty is not quite clear; he is simply under the duty to do some positive act in the 
buyer's favour. It may be in the form of refimding the whole price if the buyer prefers 
termination, or, to pay arsh if he prefers to keep the non-conforming goods. " 
350 See e. g., Ameli, Z. (Shahid Thani), vol. I at 196; Helli, M. M. (AllAmah Helli), and, Ameli, S. M. I H., vol. 
4 at 632 (and different sources cited there); Najafi, K H., (1981) vol. 23 at 289; Yazdi, S. M K., (1378 H-Q) 
vol. 2 at 103; Muhaqqeq Tehrani, M. R. (1414 H. Q. ) vol. 24 at 3-8. In the latter source it is said that there is 
no difference between the time of contract criterion and that of other criteria. However, as pointed out when 
discussing the remedy under the Convention, it is accurate where the value of non-conforming goods rises or 
falls proportionately to that of conforming goods from the time of formation of contract, otherwise the time 
35 
point will be of significance. 
Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 103. 
352 K[Ltdzian, N., (1990) vol. 5 at 314. 
353 Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 103. See also, NaJafi, M. H., (1981) vol. 23 at 290. 354 Najafi, M. H., (1981) vol. 23 at 290. In hwfian law, see, Kritaziý N., (1990) vol. 5 at 315. 
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Under the suggested construction, however, arsh is a proportional reduction of price 
which should be assessed by reference to the value of perfect and defective goods at the time 
of delivery. Under this view, both views are satisfied; the ratio of difference between the 
perfect and defective goods is determined and to that extent the buyer's entitlement to reduce 
the contract price is ascertained. 
3.4.2. Place of Assessment 
No jurist has addressed the question at what place the value of the conforming and non- 
confortning goods must be determined. Accordingly, it is not clear whether it must be assessed 
by reference to the market value at the seller's place of business or the buyer's destination, or 
even, where the seller knows at the time of contract that the buyer will dispatch the 
consignment directly to a second purchaser, on the basis of the market value at the second 
buyer's destination. In the absence of any jurisprudential statement, it is suggested to leave the 
case to the court to decide according to the circumstances of each case, although one may 
argue that the place at which the seller is discharged from his delivery obligation would be the 
place most consistent with the concept and purpose of this remedy. 
3.5. Restrictions on the Remedy 
Owing to lack of a clear distinction between the right to terminate the contract and the right to 
claim arsh in ShPah jurisprudence, this remedy seems to be subject to the same requirements 
as the right to terminate the contract for defective delivery. ShPah jurists, as seen above, 
analyse both remedies within a single concept, i. e., kheydr-e-a ýb (option of defect). On this 
construction, the buyer's right to claim arsh will be confined to the same circumstances as 
those in which he will be entitled to terminate the contract on the basis of the 'option of 
defect'. Accordingly, arsh may be available for the buyer only where the contract is for sale of 
specific goods and the seller has delivered goods which do not conform to the contract quality. 
Likewise, it may be resorted to for the same defect for which the contract can be terminated. 
Similarly, arsh may be lost in principle in the same circumstances in which the right to 
terminate the contract may be lost, although the jurists have tried to identify some cases in 
which the buyer may lose one rather than the other. "' Among the various circumstances in 
355 See generally, Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 253,259; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 19 and seq., 63; TDMdi, M. 
A., and KhRei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 105 and seq., 156. It is to be noted that the circumstances in which 
the buyer may lose only his right to terminate the contract on the option of defect were examined when 
dealing with loss of the right to terminate the contract, that is, express waiver and tasarrg. But the 
circumstances in which the buyer may only lose his right to claim arsh have no relevance to the commercial 
contracts. 
Chapter Four. Buyer's Remedies Under Shiah Law 305 
which the buyer may lose his option of defect including the right to claim arsh the following 
are the most relevant. " 
3.5.1. Delay in Claiming Arsh 
One of the circumstances in which the buyer may lose his right to claim arsh is delay to 
exercise his right promptly. The question is, however, controversial. "' The controversy is, as 
explained in the case of termination, " due to the question whether the 'option of defect' 
should be exercised immediately after it proves that the goods delivered are defective, or will 
survive even after the buyer has deliberately failed to exercise it. Accordingly, as in the case of 
termination, if it is accepted that the option of defect is to be exercised promptly, any delay in 
claiming arsh will result in loss of the right. In contrast, if it is an indefinite option, the buyer 
will be entitled to resort to this remedy even after that time has expired. 
3.5.2. Seller's Offer to Cure the Non-Conformity 
No jurist has addressed the question in this form. What the jurists have raised here is whether 
the buyer will lose his right to claim arsh where the defect has been cured by itself. " In that 
case, some jurists suggested that where at the time of claim arsh the defect concerned was 
removed the buyer will lose his right to claim arsh. The view has been justified on the grounds 
that the buyer is given a right to claim arsh for the loss resulted from the defect. Thus, where 
the defect is actually removed there is no reason to jus* claim for arsh. ' 
At the present time almost all jurists analyse the remedy of price reduction (arsh) in this 
way. In this event, arsh cannot provide an efficient remedy for a buyer under commercial 
contracts. However, as was suggested before", the right to claim arsh should not be confined 
to the case where the buyer is given the right to terminate the contract. It is a general right 
based on the principle of unjust enrichment. In any case where a buyer has been delivered 
non-conforming goods he should be given a right to claim arsh if he wishes to keep the non- 
conforming goods, whether the contract is for sale of specific or unascertained goods. " The 
356 See generally, Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 260-262; Khalkhali, S. M. K., & Rashti, M. H., (1407 H. Q. ) vol. 2 
at 651 and seq.; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 66 and seq.; Tahidi, M. A., and Khiftei, S. Aý (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 
at 160 and seq.; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 306 and seq. 
357 TMddi, M. A., and Khaei, S. A. (1369 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 186; Tabrizi, J., (1412 IL Q. ) at 317. 
358 See, Section One, 3.3.3.2., (B). 
359 This can be the case where the subject of sale is animal which was ill at the time of the contract but before 
the buyer has known of the fact or exercised his right the animal becomes sound. 
360 See e. g., Ansdri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 261 in which he cites different sources in this respect. See also, 
Ydialkhali, S. M. Y-, & Rashti, M. H., (1407 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 664; Tilhidi, U A., and Kh(Lei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) 
vol. 7 at 171-175. In contrast, see: Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 76-79; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 312. 361 See above, 3.3. 
362 The late Sayyed Yazdi, basing the view on the principle of 1A &rar, has accepted the view where the buyer 
of unascertained goods has lost, for whatever reason, his right to reject the defective goods (see Yazdi, S. M. 
K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 70). The suggested view can be supported by the argument presented by some jurists 
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fact that the jurists have recognised certain circumstances in which a buyer may lose his right 
to terminate without being barred from his right to claim arsh demonstrates that it is an 
independent remedy which is subject to its own requirements, though some requirements may 
be applied to both. Accordingly, it should not be surprising if it is said that failure to exercise 
the right to terminate the contract promptly results in loss of the right to terminate but not of 
the right to arsh. 1 However, the jurists who support the view which holds that the buyer does 
not have to exercise his right promptly do not suggest any time limit under which the buyer 
will lose his right. It is suggested that there must be some time limit after the buyer should not 
be entitled to claim arsh. It seems that the buyer should be required to use his right within a 
reasonable time. Allowing the buyer to claim arsh for an indefinite time would place the seller 
in a great uncertainty which is contrary to the principle of IA d1brar. 
Likewise, the buyer should not be entitled to claim arsh where the seller has actually 
cured his defective performance. It seems that there is no difference between the case of self- 
cure where the jurists have suggested that the right is automatically lost and the case in which 
the seller has cured at his expense. What is important is to protect the buyer against the seller 
who has benefited without perfectly performing his obligations under the contract. Where the 
seller has cured the lack of conformity at his own expense, transactional justice is re- 
stabilised. Thus, there is no reason to justify the right. It is suggested that the same rule should 
be applied where the seller has made a reasonable offer to cure. Accordingly, as long as the 
seller is ready and able to cure without causing the buyer unreasonable detriment the buyer 
should not be given the right to claim arsh. 
3.6. Arsh and Ghahftat 
As seen in the first part of this section, ShVah jurists have not examined the right to claim 
damages for breach of contract. It is, therefore, hard to explain the relation between the right 
to claim arsh and the right to claim damages in view of Shiah jurists. Failure to make a clear 
distinction between these two remedies caused some jurists, as already seený", to confuse arsh 
in order to apply the option of defect to the case of delivery of defective items under a sale of unascertained 
goods. According to them, where the seller of unascertained goods has delivered goods which do not conform 
with the contract quality the buyer has an option to accept them and claim arsh or to reject them and terminate 
the contract immediately, or, according to some others, to claim arsh where he has lost his right to reject the 
non-conforming goods. This is because, they argue, where the seller appropriates a particular consignment to 
the contract and the buyer consents to it, it becomes as the case of sale of specific goods breach of which gives 
rise to the option of defect (see the different sources cited in: Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2, at 70; 
Gharavi IsfahAni, M. H., (1408 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 97. See also Khumayni, S. R. K, vol. 5 at 17; ImAmi, S. H., 
(1363 H. S. ) vol. I at 504). However, they do not explain why this argument is not to be applied where the 
seller has tendered goods which do not correspond with the contract description. 
363 See also, Muhaqqeq Tehrani, M. R., (1414 H. Q. ) vol. 24 at 8. 
364 See above, 3.2.1. 
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with the right to claim damages. As fully explained above, most jurists have rejected the idea 
that arsh is a portion of the contract price which is to be paid by the seller to the buyer for the 
defect in the article sold. In their view, it is a particular type of gharainat which an injured 
buyer can claim for loss he has suffered as a consequence of the seller's defective delivery. On 
this interpretation, great efforts have been made to distinguish this remedy from other financial 
liabilities. "' 
Nevertheless, in spite of most jurists who have described arsh as a remedy provided to 
compensate the losses which an injured buyer has suffered as a result of the seller's non- 
conforming delivery, it is suggested that the right to claim damages and the right to claim arsh 
are to be distinguished. Some significant differences can be identified which justify treating 
them as two separate remedies. 
(a) A main divergence between these two remedies is the legal basis upon which they are 
justified; damages are awarded in order to compensate a party who has suffered undue loss as 
a consequence of the other party's non-performance of the contract; while arsh is awarded in 
order to prevent the enrichment of the seller at the expense of the buyer. 
(b) The right to claim arsh is available for mere non-conforming delivery, whereas, the right 
to claim damages, as seen earlier, arises only where the requirement of causation and that of 
foreseeability are satisfied. 
(c) The seller who has been sued by the buyer for damages may be exempted from liability if 
he can prove that the lack of conformity was out of his control, while arsh is not subject to 
any restriction of this type. 
(d) Arsh is determined by the buyer's unilateral declaration, though the seller may later 
dispute the buyer's entitlement or its amount, ' while damages are to be quantified by the 
court. "' 
(e) Damages are calculated by reference to the difference between the value of conforming and 
non-conforming goods, whereas, arsh is a proportional difference between the value of the 
goods as actually delivered and the value of the goods as they were required to be under the 
contract. 
(f) Arsh can only be claimed in the case of defective delivery under a sale of specific goods, as 
most jurists suggest, or for any form of lack of conformity, as the present writer, consistent 
365 See e. g., Ansdri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 271; Midi, M. A., and Khaei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 281-282; 
Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 126-127. 
366 Where the parties dispute on the amount of arsh the court will refer the case to the experts to ascertain what 
the seller must pay the buyer as arsh. See in this respect Ansari, M., (1375 H. Q. ) at 272-273; Tahidi, M. A., 
and Khtlei, S. A. (1369 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 285 and seq.; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 136 and seq. Tabrizi, J., 
(1412 H. Q. ) vol. 4 at 363 and seq. 
367 However, as pointed out in the third chapter, this difference will be questioned when the buyer has pre-paid, 
particularly, the price is paid by documentary credit 
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with some distinguished jurists, suggests, whereas damages may be claimed in any case in 
which a contracting party fails to perform the contract. Accordingly, damages have a wide 
application. It can also be resorted to for consequential losses. 
4.0. Summary and Conclusions 
In light of the above section it was seen that great uncertainty exist in the present ShPah law 
in respect of the buyer's right to claim damages. It is not clear whether the buyer has a right to 
claim damages for losses he has suffered as a consequence of the seller's breach. If so, for 
what losses can he recover damages and how are the recoverable damages to be measured? 
However, by examining the principles primarily developed in tort cases, i. e., the principles of 
tasbib and la darar, it was shown that these principles are general and applicable to both 
contract and tort cases. A close consideration of these principles also showed that in ShPah 
law the general rule is that any undue darar (loss) must be compensated. Accordingly, an 
injured buyer has a general right to claim damages for any loss he has suffered as a 
consequence of the seller's action (breach of contract). The necessity of compensation for loss 
sustained is an obvious fact to which the wisdom (a'ql) commands. Religious mandate is only 
for the purpose of confirmation of such a decree. 368 On this rule, no difference seems to exist 
between the case of "out of pockee' losses and the case where the plaintiff claims for loss of 
future gains. Thus, compensation involves not only assessment of gains prevented by the 
breach but also of losses ensuing which would not have occurred had the contract been 
performed. It was also suggested that no distinction should be made between the various forms 
which the violation may take. The buyer may be entitled to claim damages for non-delivery, 
late delivery or non-conforming delivery provided that the requisite requirements as prescribed 
above are satisfied. 
Damages justified on these general principles should be regarded as compensatory and 
awarded to protect certain recognised interests of the plaintiff in order to place him, so far as 
money can do, in the same situation as if the injurious action has not occurred, whether the 
given act is a breach of contract or something else. Thus there must be some injury to the 
plaintiffs contractual interests before damages are awarded. This principle restricts the extent 
of recoverable damages in various ways. In the first place, unlike the remedy of arsh which is 
based on the unjust enrichment doctrine, an award of damages must be justified on the 
grounds of loss to the plaintiff and not of gains and benefits to the defendant. Gains which 
368 See in this respect, Shirazi, N. M., (1410 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 28-, ImAmi, S. H., (1363 H. S. ) vol. I at 394; 
Mazian, N., (1995) vol. I at 147. For this reason, it should not be confined to particular cases; it can be 
extended to any case in which an undue darar is imposed to the individuals or society (KAtazian, N., ibid. ). 
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have accrued to the party in breach may be recoverable on the principle of akl-e-mg bel bNel 
(unjust enrichment), for example where the defaulting seller has made use of the aggrieved 
buyer's property and thus saved expense. Thus, profits to the party in breach are not 
recoverable merely because they have accrued as a result of the breach of contract. The 
second consequence of these principles is that an award of damages should be a sum equal to 
the loss the plaintiff has sustained: he cannot recover more than his loss. If a seller of goods 
defaults, the buyer may as a result save storage charges; any such savings must be brought 
into account on the buyer's claim for damages. The third consequence of these principles is 
that 'punitive' (or 'exemplary') damages will not be awarded for breach of contract . 
36' The 
fourth consequence is that a mere breach on the part of a contracting party does not entitle the 
other to claim damages; they will be awarded only when the victim of breach has suffered loss 
as a result of that breach. 
It also becomes clear that under ShPah law, what an injured buyer is required to do so 
as to satisfy the court for an award of damages is simply to show first that he has suffered loss 
as a result of the seller's failure to perform his obligations in accordance with the contract. He 
is not required to show any kind of taddi or tafrit on the part of the seller because according 
to the principles of R! darar and tasbib any loss which can customarily be attributed to him he 
is liable for it. Accordingly, a buyer seeking damages for losses he sustained must show that 
the seller has failed to perform his contract and that the seller's failure was the close cause of 
the loss so that it was actually foreseeable by the seller or that a reasonable man in his 
circumstances could have foreseen it as a most likely result of the default when the contract 
was made. In the case of different causes, the seller in breach is liable for a loss if his default 
appreciably increased the objective possibility of loss of a kind that in fact occurred. He will 
not be liable if the default would ordinarily have been a matter of indifference with regard to 
what actually occurred and only became a condition of the occurrence of the loss as a result of 
unusual or intervening events. Accordingly, the buyer will not be entitled to recover damages 
for losses he could have avoided them by taking reasonable measures. 
Whether a breach is a sufficient cause for the incurred loss is, it is suggested, to be 
determined by applying the objective standard on the basis of information available to the 
seller in breach at the time of contract. For this purpose, the court would attribute knowledge 
of all the circumstances which a reasonable person at the position of seller could have known, 
as well as any additional circumstances which he himself actually knew. Thus, under the 
369 It is worth noting that the Shilah jurists have not made a clear distinction between "punitivd" or "exemplary" 
and "compensatory" damages. Both cases are sometimes exan-dned in one place and under a single heading, 
like the discussions made under the heading of deyat and usurpation (ghasb). 
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"sufficient causation" test there is both an objective and a subjective element, which does not 
limit, but rather, expands damage. 
Once the liability of the seller is established it is the court's task to evaluate and 
quantify the damages in terms of money. It was shown that ShPah jurists have not addressed 
the question how the injured party's damages are to be measured. However, according to the 
rules developed by the jurists in tort cases, it was suggested that normal damages are basically 
to be assessed by reference to the "difference in value" rule. In the absence of available market 
no particular rule exists here to be relied on. For this purpose, the court may take into account 
various factors such as the contract price, actual price, the price offered by a second buyer 
and other circumstances surrounding the case. The cardinal principle which must constantly 
be kept in focus is that the total damages awarded should not exceed the actual loss the buyer 
has suffered by reason of the seller's non-performance. However, where there is an available 
market for the purchased goods in the sense described above the buyer's damages are in 
principle to be measured by reference to the market price unless the seller has known of the 
buyer's intention to resell the same goods he purchased as specific goods. In such case, since 
the buyer is not able to deliver the second buyer by procuring substitute goods, it was 
suggested that his damages are to be measured by reference to the resale price. In the case of 
different current price, the price at the time of breach of contract is crucial provided that the 
buyer has known of it. The place for ascertaining the current price is the place of delivery. 
Similarly, the second part of the third section has shown that unlike damages remedy, 
arsh has been extensively examined by the jurists. It was seen that except for a few jurists, 
almost all jurists have considered it as an exceptional remedy applicable to the case where the 
seller of specific goods has delivered goods which do not conform with the contract quality. 
Likewise, it was shown that this remedy has been seen as an alternative to the right to 
terminate. However, it was suggested that arsh should be regarded as a general remedy which 
can be claimed in any case where the seller benefits from his breach of a contractual term 
characterising the goods at the expense of the buyer. It was also suggested that the right to 
claim arsh should be distinguished from that of termination. An injured buyer should be given 
a right to terminate the contract only when the seller's failure has resulted in sufficiently 
serious consequences by taking into account the relevant factors; and arsh, in contrast, should 
be given to the buyer where the seller is going to benefit from his violation at the expense of 
the buyer. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
COMTARATIVE ASSESSMENT 
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Introduction 
The primary purpose of this study, as indicated in the introduction of this work, is to present a 
general picture of the buyer's remedies for seller's non-conforming delivery under ShVah law 
which has no developed legal system. It was suggested that this could be achieved by 
examining the issue under developed legal systems. This would help the writer to identify gaps 
in the undeveloped system and also have the rules provided in developed systems as guidelines 
for dealing with the issue under the undeveloped system. For this purpose, the issue has been 
dealt with first under English law and the Convention and then under ShPah law in 
accordance with the methodology suggested in the first chapter. In the chapter on ShPah law, 
it was first attempted to identify the existing law. When no clear answer was found great 
attempts were made to answer the relevant questions by interpretation of the jurists' 
judgements (fatdwd) made in similar cases and the original authorities on which they relied. In 
the absence of jurisprudential statements, an attempt was made to show how far the rules 
suggested in English law and/or the Convention could be adapted to the well-accepted 
principles of this system. 
In the following, an attempt will be made to review the English and the Convention 
approaches first to highlight gaps in the current ShPah jurisprudence and then to compare 
both with the ShPah law approach to assess this system as described in the fourth chapter. 
This would help to show how far the rules relating to buyer's remedies under the two systems 
examined here could be utilised to fill the gaps in the current ShPah law as well as points of 
sin-tilarity and difference between English law and the Convention on the one hand and ShPah 
law on the other hand. To facilitate the treatment, it will address the question by considering 
the remedies previously examined. 
1.0. Withholding Performance and Termination 
1.1. Withholding Performance as a Separate Remedy 
Withholding performance can play a significant role in providing transactional justice. Under 
this remedy, a party who has not received what he bargained for can lawfully suspend 
performance of his own part of the contract without being sued by the other party who has 
failed to perform his reciprocal obligations in accordance with the contract. This is an 
effective remedy for an aggrieved party where he has not already performed his obligations. 
He can withhold performance without the court's assistance and thereby induce the defaulting 
party to perform his obligations as the contract provided. As shown in the second and third 
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chapters, both English law and the Convention have addressed the right to withhold 
performance and provided their own answers. ShPah law seems to be similar to its two 
counterparts on some occasions and to depart from them on others. In some areas its position 
seems clear but in others, due to the jurists' failure to examine the question, unclear. 
1.1.1. Delivery of Non-Conforming Goods 
As far as the seller's failure to deliver goods is concerned, as English law (s. 28 of the Sale of 
Goods Act) and the Convention (Art. 58) , Shilah law, by accepting the 
doctrine of haq-e- 
habs, has recognised that the buyer has an option to withhold performance of his payment 
obligation as long as the seller fails to deliver the subject-matter of the contract. As shown, no 
substantial theoretical divergence exists between Shiah law and the two other systems. Both 
English law and the Convention base the right on the theory of interdependence of the delivery 
and payment obligations (s. 28 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 and Arts. 58 and 71 of the 
Convention) and Shiah law bases the remedy on the theory of shart-e-&mni, as some jurists 
suggest, or Wqiid mua ývwad, as the others suggest, which is similar to the English and the 
Convention analysis. Accordingly, it can be said that under all three systems, the remedy is 
justified on the basis of the theory of dependency, whether it is by operation of law or will of 
the contracting parties, as the first approach in Shiah law suggests. 
The difference appears where the seller has perforined his delivery obligation in a way 
which does not conform with the contract terms. In English law although the Sale of Goods 
Act 1979 has referred to the buyer's right to reject the goods where the seller's non- 
conforming delivery has resulted in breach of a term classified as "condition" (s. 11 (4)), as 
explained earlier in detail, ' it is not entirely clear whether this is a separate right or a 
component of a single right, i. e., the right to treat the contract as repudiated. Nevertheless, a 
substantial number of English authors suggest that rejection is distinct from the right to treat 
the contract as repudiated and that it is a particular form of the right to withhold 
performance. ' In contrast, it was showt? that although the Convention does not mention the 
buyer's right to withhold performance within the remedial provisions provided for the buyer 
(Arts. 45-52), close analysis of the Convention provisions demonstrates that the buyer has a 
separate right simply to withhold performance of his obligations. The two systems, however, 
differ in that in the Convention, unlike English sale of goods law which precisely provides that 
any breach of condition entitles the buyer to reject, it is not precisely determined what non- 
1 See Chapter Two, Section One, 2.1.1. 
2 See, ibid., 2.1.2. 
3 See, Chapter Three, Section One, 2.2. 
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conformity will give rise to the right to refuse to accept and take delivery of the goods. 
However, it was shown' that the buyer is certainly not required to show that the lack of 
conformity has amounted to a 'fundamental breach' defined in Art. 25. Fundamentality of 
breach is only required for the purpose of termination and requiring delivery of substitute 
goods (Arts. 49 (1) (a), 51,72,73 and 46 (2)). Similarly, it was argued that the Convention 
does not certainly allow the buyer to refuse to accept the goods for any lack of conformity. 
Close consideration of Arts. 46 (2), (3) and 71 (1) suggests that the buyer is not entitled to 
reject the goods for minor lack of conformity. This result deduced from the relevant provisions 
of the Convention accords with the system of remedies provided by the Convention, the 
principles of good faith (Art. 7 (1)) and mitigation (Art. 77). It appears that the Convention 
has left the case to the arbitrators to decide in accordance with the particular circumstances of 
each case. 
Despite this apparent sharp difference, it seems that as far as the buyer's right to reject 
is concerned, the difference between the two systems will not be substantial in some cases. 
This would be the case where the buyer has alleged that the seller's non-conforming delivery 
has resulted in breach of a term implied by ss. 13-15 of the English Sale of Goods Act. In that 
event, s. 15 A (1) of the Act, by recognising the rule that where breach of a term implied by 
ss. 13-15 is so slight that it would be unreasonable for the buyer to reject the goods the buyer 
who does not deal as a consumer will not be entitled to reject, gives in fact the court a 
discretionary power to decide whether rejection was or not was reasonable. Moreover, as 
already shown, ' English courts will usually be disinclined to treat a term placed outside the 
area of legally classified terms as a condition if the result of such a construction would be 
unreasonable. 
In ShVah law, as already shown% the jurists, by recognising haq-e-radd (right to reject) 
have in principle accepted that the buyer has an option to withhold performance where the 
seller has delivered non-confom-dng goods. However, no proper guidelines are provided in this 
system to answer the question: under what circumstances should a buyer be given the right to 
reject a non-conforraing delivery? Is he entitled to reject the goods for any lack of conformity 
(as English sale of goods law suggest where a "condition" is broken) or must there be some 
restriction on the right (as the Convention and s. 15A (1) of the English Sale of Goods Act 
suggest)? Each of the given approaches may be supported in this system. This is because, as 
4 See, Chapter Tbree, Section One, 2.4. 
5 See, Chapter Two, Section One, 1.2. 
6 See, Chapter Four, Section One, 2.2.2. 
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explained in the fourth chaptee, ShVah jurists have based the right to withhold performance 
for non-delivery on two different criteria. By applying them to the case of non-conforming 
delivery, one may argue that if it is accepted that the right to reject should be based on shart- 
e-&mni (implied agreement) it was the mutual intention of the contracting parties that any 
lack of conformity should give rise to the right to reject. In contrast, if it is accepted that the 
right must, as suggested in this study', be justified on the basis of nature of a aqd -e- 
muaývwad (the theory of mutuality) it is difficult to say that the nature of the reciprocal 
contract requires that any party should have the right to refuse to accept the other's 
performance for any lack of confonnity. On this basis, it was suggested that the right to reject 
must be restricted to cases where the lack of conformity is not trivial. ' 
If one describes ShPah law according to the first doctrine, it would be more similar to 
English law than the Convention. In any case, rejection should be justified on the mutual 
intention of the contracting parties. The court should look at the terms of the contract and the 
other circumstances surrounding the case to decide whether a perfect tender was, or is 
assumed to have been, the pre-condition of the buyer's acceptance. Nevertheless, it will depart 
from English law in two aspects. The first is cases covered by s. 15A of the English Sale of 
Goods Act. The second is that, unlike English law, the jurists are reluctant to pre-classify a 
contract term as a condition. In contrast, if it is explained on the basis of the second doctrine 
Shi'ah law would seem very similar to the Convention approach; in both systems the court 
should look at the effects of the breach on the buyer's position to decide whether or not the 
buyer was entitled to refuse to accept the seller's delivery. However, it will be close to the 
English approach in cases covered by s. 15A of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, since in ShVah 
law, as in English law in respect of cases covered by s. 15A, the court should look at the 
effects of the breach and see whether or not in the circumstances of the case at hand rejection 
is or is not customarily unreasonable for the buyer. 
1.1.2. Tender of Non-Conforming Documents 
Particular problems may arise where the seller fails to perform his duty to procure and tender 
documents representing the goods in accordance with the requirements provided by the 
documentary sale contracts. Should the buyer be given the right to reject non-conforming 
documents? Assuming that the buyer has the right to reject non-conforming documents, should 
7 See, Chapter Four, Section One, 2.2.1. 
8 Ibid. 
9 See how this suggestion is justified, ibid., 2.2.2.3. 
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he be granted a fiather right to reject the defective goods? Assuming that he has both the right 
to reject documents and goods, how are these two rights exercised? 
The Convention while referring to the seller's duty to deliver goods and documents in 
accordance with the contract terms (Arts. 30 and 34), has not properly answered these 
questions. Although one may, relying on Arts. 30,34 and 58 (1) which provides that the seller 
must tender documents which are in conformity with the contract, argue that the buyer has an 
option to refuse to accept non-conforming documentslo, the other questions are left 
unanswered. This is perhaps because the subject is already adequately covered in such well 
known and widely accepted terms as the International Chamber of Commerce's Incoterms and 
its Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits. In contrast, English common law 
has addressed the issue in detail. Under a typical documentary sale contract, i. e., c. i. f. terms, 
English courts have regarded the seller's duty to tender conforming documents as distinct from 
the duty to deliver conforming goods and thereby they have held that breach of any of these 
duties would allow some remedy. " By classifying the seller's duty to tender conforming 
documents under documentary sale contracts in accordance with the contract terms as a 
'condition', English courts have granted the buyer a right to reject them for any lack of 
conformity. By recognising a right to reject non-conforming documents distinct from the right 
to reject non-conforming goods, English law gives the buyer the right to reject the former even 
though the goods themselves are perfectly in accordance with the contract". English law has 
also taken a further step and provided that the right to reject non-conforming goods is not 
necessarily impaired by acceptance of the documents". Tbus the buyer could still reject the 
goods after accepting the documents if the goods suffered from a defect which did not appear 
on the face of the documents. However, if the defect giving rise to both rights of rejection is a 
single breach, for example, the goods are shipped late and this fact appears from the 
documents, the buyer's acceptance of the documents has been treated as having waived his 
right to reject the documents as well as the goods constituting their subject and thus he is 
bound to accept the goods on arrival 14 , although he has been given an opportunity to reject the 
goods on arrival if a different defect, or non-conformity, not appeared by the documents, 
becomes apparent. 
10 See in this regard, Chapter Three, Section One, 2.5. 
11 See, e. g., Kwei Tek Chao v. British Traders & Shippers Ltd ([1954] 2 Q. B. 459 and Gill & Duffus SA. v. 
Berger& Co. Inc ([1984] 1 A. C. 382). 
12 See, e. g., Re General Trading Co. Ltd., and Van Stolk's Commissiehandel ([1910] 16 CorrL Cas. 95); Tarnvaco 
v. Lucas (no. 1) [1859] 1 E. &E 581. 
13 See, e. g., Kwei TekChao v. British Traders &ShippersDd [1954] 2 Q. 13.459. 
14 See, e. g., Panchaud Freres S. A. v. Etablissments General Grain Co ([197011 Lloyds Rep. 53). For further 
cases see, Atiyah, P. S., & Adams, J., (1995) at 468, fh. 79. 
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ShPah law, in contrast, seems very poor in this connection. It has not developed proper 
rules to regulate the seller's duties to tender conforming documents and the buyer's remedies 
where the seller fails to perform his duty to tender documents conforming to the contract 
requirements. The buyer's right to reject non-conforming documents is entirely unknown in 
ShPah jurisprudence. It is however, suggested that the English law rules might work in this 
system. As indicated before", the seller's duty to prepare and tender documents representing 
the purchased goods should be analysed on the basis of the theory of shart-e-fe 7. Where the 
seller fails to tender documents in accordance with the contract terms the buyer should be 
given a right to refuse to accept them. The suggestion can be justified on the basis that in a 
documentary sale transaction the seller is under a general obligation to prepare particular 
documents and hand them over to the buyer in accordance with the contract terms. The buyer 
is obliged to accept and pay in exchange for such a performance. As long as the seller does not 
tender such a performance the buyer is not under any duty to accept and pay for them. It is 
also submitted that under such contracts the theory which justifies withholding performance 
on the basis of shart-e-&mni (implied stipulation) is applicable to the issue in question. It is a 
well-settled customary law that the seller should tender documents precisely conforming with 
the contract requirements. Any non-conformity gives the buyer (or his bank when the payment 
made by letter of credits) the right to reject and pay for them. 16 Thus, unless a contrary 
intention appears it is quite possible to infer that the parties to such contracts impliedly agreed 
that the seller should tender conforming documents and any lack of conformity will entitle the 
buyer to reject them. It is also suggested that the buyer under a documentary sale contract 
should be given the right to reject documents for defects on their face, whether it relates to the 
goods or documents themselves or both. It should be regarded as a separate right based on 
breach of the duty to perform shart-e-fe 7, while the right to reject the goods is founded on the 
basis of breach of the duty to deliver conforming goods. However, it is not clear whether the 
buyer should be given the right to reject the goods on arrival for defects in the goods if he has 
already accepted documents representing them. It may be suggested that where the defect is 
one which was not apparent on the face of documents he should be entitled to reject, since as 
will be seen in respect of the right to terminate the contract, the buyer will lose his right when 
he was, or ought to have been, aware of the lack of conformity giving rise to the right. But if 
the defect was apparent on the face of documents or could be disclosed by a simple 
15 See, Chapter Four, Section One, 2.2.4. 
'6 See, e. g., Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits (1993 Version), Article 13; Incoterms 1990 
(International Commercial Terms) published by ICC. 
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examination he should be taken to have also accepted the non-conforming goods on the 
doctrines of isq& (waiver) and iqd&n (action against himself). 
1.1.3. Partial Non-Conforming Delivery and Delivery of Wrong Quantity 
Both English law and the Convention have set forth particular provisions for the cases where 
the seller has either delivered the wrong quantity, or has delivered the right quantity but not all 
of the goods delivered conform to the contract. 
In English law, where the seller has made a partial non-conforming delivery the buyer 
will be entitled to reject all if the requisite requirements are satisfied (s. 35A of the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979). Similarly, the same Act gives the buyer the right to reject some or all of the 
defective goods and keep those which conforni to the contract provided that the goods 
unaffected by the breach were included in those goods he has accepted (s. 35A (1)). In 
contrast, although the Convention has allocated a particular provision to the case of partial 
non-conforming delivery (Art. 51), it does not expressly address the question whether the 
buyer would be entitled to reject all the goods for partial non-conformity, or keep the 
conforming and reject the non-conforming part. Nevertheless, relying on Art. 51 (1) which 
expressly enables the buyer to exercise his remedies under Arts. 46-50 in respect of the non- 
conforming part, one may suggest that the same principles applicable to case where the whole 
goods are affected by the seller's default can be applied to case where a particular part is 
affected. 17 However, it seems that the rules under s. 35A of the English Sale of Goods Act and 
that set forth by Art. 51 (1) of the Convention differ in two aspects. First is that as the 
language of s. 11 (4) shows, s. 35A (1) is concerned with non-severable contracts, while the 
position of Art. 51 (1) of the Convention is not so clear. Some commentators suggest that it is 
designed to regulate severable contracts but others say that it is general. " Second is that the 
first applies to the case where the buyer could reject all the goods but wishes to keep some and 
reject the other part, while under the latter the buyer may reJect the non-conforming part even 
though he is not entitled to reject all. It might be argued that these two differences are not 
substantial. This is because first, the provision under s. 35A (1) is subject to the qualification 
that goods accepted by the buyer should not constitute a part of single commercial unit (s. 
35A (7)). Accordingly, in English law the mere fact that something is physically separate does 
not follow that it would necessarily appropriate to reject it separately. " Second, as some 
17 See, Chapter Three, Section One, 2.3. 
's See, ibid., 3.2.3.1. 
19 See in this respect, Guest, A. G., et al, (1997), Para. 12-062. 
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commentators suggesfo, Art. 51 (1) of the Convention is only concerned with severable 
contracts to which s. 31 (2) of the English Sale of Goods Act refers. 
Partial rejection is also addressed by both systems where the contract is for delivery of 
goods by instalments. In both systems the buyer is impliedly empowered to reject a defective 
instalment even though he has accepted previous instalments . 
2' However, it is not clear what 
lack of conformity gives the buyer the right to refuse to accept the non-conforming instalment 
(S). 22 One difference appears between English Sale of Goods Act and the Convention in this 
respect; the former extends partial rejection right to the instalments (s. 35A (2)), while the 
Convention provides no such provision. 
In Shiah law, as shown before, " no jurist has disputed the buyer's right to reject goods 
delivered by the seller where some of them do not conform with the contract. However, no 
jurist has directly addressed partial rejection as a remedy. What they have discussed is the 
right to terminate the contract partially on the ground of the option of defect where the seller 
of specific goods has delivered goods some of which are not in conformity with the contract 
quality. However, as seen before? ', although some jurists have refused to accept the right of 
partial tennination, a number of jurists have accepted to grant the buyer a right to terminate 
the contract (including the right to refuse to perform his obligations if he has not already done 
so) in respect of the non-conforming part. It was showný' that the different views are due to 
the lack of a clear distinction between severable and non-severable contracts. If the contract is 
treated as non-severable no jurist disputes that breach of shart-e-sefat or sharte-e-sehhat in 
respect of some portion of the purchased item should be treated as a breach of the whole 
contract giving rise to a right to reject it. As already shown, " those jurists who disagreed with 
giving a right of partial rejection refer to such a case. In contrast, where the seller under a 
severable contract has delivered goods some of which do not correspond to the contract the 
buyer will be entitled to keep the conforming and reject the non-conforming part. It seems that 
those jurists who support the view that the buyer has partial-rejection right" refer to such a 
case. Accordingly, it is quite possible to say that in Shiah law, as in English law and the 
20 Chapter Mee, Section One, 3.2.3.1, fri. 10 1. 
21 As to English law see, Chapter Two, Section One, 2.3.1. (D) and the Convention see, Chapter Mee, Section 
One, 2.3. 
22 See, Chapter Two, Section One, 2.3.1. (D), where it has been suggested that the general principles applicable 
23 
to non-severable contract would be applicable to each instalment. 
See, Chapter Four, Section One, 2.2.3.1. 
24 See, ibid. 
25 See, ibid. 
26 See, ibid. 
27 See, e. g., Gharavi Isfahkii, M. H., (1408 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 108; TDhidi, M. A., and Khfiei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) 
vol. 7 at 146 and seq.; Tabrizi, J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 299-300. 
Chapter Five: Comparative Assessment 319 
Convention, the question whether the buyer should be given partial-rejection right depends on 
whether the contract is severable or non-severable. Where the contract is construed as 
severable each severable part will constitute the subject of a separate subsidiary contract 
within the main contract and the buyer will have the same right with respect to the severable 
part as he has in respect of the whole goods under a non-severable contract. It is suggested 
that this rule is applicable whether the contract is for sale of specific or unascertained goods. 
However, the jurists have not made clear what lack of conformity will give rise to the partial- 
re ection right. It seems that, as some academic authors suggested in English law", any j 
severable part should be regarded as the subject of a subsidiary contract within the main 
contract and the general principles applicable to non-severable contract are applied to the 
severable part under such contracts. 
Delivery of wrong quantity. Both English law and the Convention have provided 
particular provisions for the case where the seller has delivered the wrong quantity goods. 
Under English law where the seller delivers to the buyer a quantity of goods less than he 
contracted to sell, the buyer may reject them (s. 30 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979). The 
same right is given to the buyer where the seller delivers to the buyer a quantity of goods 
larger than he contracted to sell. In the latter case, the buyer may accept the goods included in 
the contract and reject the rest, or he may reject the whole. However, the right to reject the 
whole of the goods delivered is subject to s. 30 (2A) under which the buyer who does not deal 
as a consumer will not be entitled to reject the goods where the shortfall or, as the case may 
be, excess is so slight that it would be unreasonable for him to reject. In contrast, although the 
Convention has expressly empowered the buyer to refuse to take delivery of the excess 
quantity where the seller delivers a quantity of goods greater than that provided for in the 
contract (Art. 52 (2)), it does not make clear whether the buyer is entitled to refuse to take 
delivery of the goods delivered by the seller where they are less or greater than the contract 
quantity. And if so, what shortfall or excess can give rise to the right to reject. However, one 
may argue that since the buyer is, under certain circumstances, entitled to terminate the 
contract in its entirety (Art. 51 (2)) which includes the right to refuse to perform his 
obligations insofar as this has not taken place, the same logic justifies the buyer's right to 
refuse to perform until complete delivery in conformity with the contract is offered. But this 
provision does not make clear when the buyer can benefit from this right. A further defect of 
the Convention rule is that it does not make clear whether the buyer can refuse to perform his 
obligations in respect of the missing part. This is also the position of s. 30 of the English Sale 
28 See, Chapter Two, Section One, 2.3.1. (D). 
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of Goods Act. As far as the Convention is concerned, one may argue that since the buyer is 
given the right to terminate the contract with respect to the missing part if the requirements of 
fundamental breach or Nachfrist notice procedure are satisfied (Art. 51 (1)) by express 
reference to Arts. 46-50 including Art. 49), it can be said, by analogy, that he is entitled to 
withhold a corresponding portion of his own performance. The view can also be supported by 
Art. 58 (1) which provides that the buyer is bound to pay only when the seller places the 
goods at the buyer's disposal. 
In Shiah law, in contrast, the question has only been addressed by the jurists where the 
seller of specific goods has failed to deliver the contract quantity. In that case almost all of 
them have suggested that the buyer is entitled to refuse to accept the wrong delivery-29 
However, the position of the case where the seller of a particular quantity of unascertained 
goods delivers to the buyer a quantity of goods larger or less than he contracted to sell is 
unclear: is he entitled to reject the goods delivered by the seller? If so, what shortfall or excess 
would give rise to this right? Finally, in the case of short delivery, is he entitled to accept the 
goods delivered and withhold a corresponding portion of his own performance? It seems that s. 
30 of the English Sale of Goods Act 1979 would work properly in this system. This is 
because, as the jurists' discussions show, the seller's duty to deliver the contract quantity is 
placed in the category of shart-e-sefat. 'O Accordingly, the buyer's duty to accept is qualified 
by the seller's complete performance. As long as he has not delivered the right quantity the 
buyer's duty does not arise. It is also suggested that the same rule, by analogy, is applicable to 
the case where the buyer wishes to keep the goods delivered and demand that the seller deliver 
the missing part. However, the position of the latter question is not clear: Is the buyer entitled 
to reject for any shortfall or excess? There seems no rule such as the English de minimis rule 
or the test of "unreasonableness" provided by s. 30 (2A) of the English Sale of Goods Act. 
Accordingly, it might be thought that in ShPah law the buyer may reject for a minor non- 
conformity with the quantity stipulation. However, it seems that the rule under s. 30 (2A) 
would be compatible with this system, since, as suggested with respect to other fonns of non- 
conformity, by virtue of the principle of ufd bel uqiki the buyer is required to accept the 
seller's performance. He will be discharged of this duty only where the lack of conformity 
results in such a degree of seriousness that rejection is not customarily regarded as 
29 See, generally, Ansari, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 286-7; Najafl, M., and, NAeini, M. H., (1358 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 142-3; 
Gharavi Isfahani, M. H., (1408 H. Q. ) vol. 2 at 162; Yazdi, S. M. Y-, (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 129, and 133-135; 
Tahidi, M. A., and Khaei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 383-9. See also I. C. C., Art. 384. 30 See the references cited above. 
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unreasonable for the buyer. In such circumstance, the principle of Iff darar comes into 
operation and allows the buyer to treat himself as discharged from the duty to accept. 
1.2. Relationship 
Termination 
Between Withholding Performance and 
A further question is whether a buyer who is given a right to reject the non-confonning goods 
should also be given an immediate right to terminate the contract. English law and the 
Convention have responded but in different ways. 
English law has based tennination on two different theories -the theory of breach of 
'condition' and that of HongKong Fir. Where the seller's non-conforming delivery results in 
breach of a term properly classified as a condition the relationship between the buyer's right to 
reject the non-conforming goods and his right to terminate the contract is not quite clear. " For 
this reason two different interpretations are suggested by the English commentators. A 
considerable number of academic writers have interpreted the language of the Act (s. 11) as 
providing that any non-compliance with a condition by the seller will immediately place him in 
breach of condition and give the buyer an immediate right to reject the non-conforming goods 
and treat the contract as repudiate d32, while some others suggest that the mere delivery of 
goods which do not comply with a condition will not place the seller in breach of condition. 
On their view, the buyer's immediate remedy for the seller's non-conforming delivery is 
simply to refuse to accept it. Termination will be justified only where the seller's defective 
delivery amounts to a repudiation of the contract or the time for performance of contract has 
expired. ". The Convention, in contrast, makes a clear distinction between the right to withhold 
performance and that of termination. While refusal to perform will be justified where the 
seller's non-conforming delivery allains a certain degree of seriousness, termination is based 
primarily on the doctrine of 'fundamental breach' (Arts. 49 (1) (a), 51 (1), 72 (1) and 73). 
If the first construction is preferred the English approach would substantially differ 
from the Convention approach. The difference would appear more significant taking into 
account the fact that the English Sale of Goods Act 1979 has adopted an a priori system of 
classification of certain contract terms into "conditions" (ss. 13-15). Accordingly, under this 
construction the buyer will be entitled to reject the goods and terminate the contract (subject to 
s. 15A (1) of the Sale of Goods Act), even though the actual breach is minor in character, 
31 See in this respect, Chapter Two, Section One, 2.1.2. 
32 See the references cited in ibid., fh. 40. 
33 See the references cited in ibid., fh. 43. 
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while under the Convention the buyer only will be entitled to terminate the contract on account 
of the seller's non-conforming delivery where the breach has resulted in a "fundamental 
breach". 
However, the traditional method of justifying termination under English law has been 
somewhat modified by the HongKong Fir doctrine. " Under this doctrine, all contract terms 
under a contract for sale are not necessarily divided into "conditions" or "warranties". There 
are some contractual undertakings which cannot be categorised as "conditions" or 
"warranties". Where such a contractual term is broken by the seller the buyer will not be 
entitled to reject the goods and terminate the contract immediately. Termination under this 
doctrine should be justified by reference to the severity of the breach and not turn on the a 
priori classification of the terms breached. In this way English law becomes close to the 
Convention approach. Despite this similarity between the two systems, some difference still 
remains. In English law, no authority can be found to make a clear distinction between the 
buyer's right to reject and that of termination and there is no decided case in which a buyer 
has been given a right to reject on the basis of this doctrine without being entitled to terminate 
the contract. 
Under both systems, termination on the doctrine of severity of breach will be justified 
where it has resulted in serious consequences. English courts have used various expressions to 
describe this doctrine 15 and the Convention uses the term "fundamental breach" to refer to the 
test. In English law, three factors have been considered by the courts for the purpose of 
determining whether or not breach is sufficiently serious": the nature of the breach, and its 
actual and foreseeable consequences. Similarly, according to Art. 25 of the Convention, 
breach of contract will be regarded as 'fundamental' "if it results in such detriment to the 
other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect under the contract". 
However, Art. 25 of the Convention does not make clear whether the fundamentality of breach 
is to be assessed by reference to the actual consequences of the default, or as in English law, 
by reference to its actual and/or foreseeable results, although one may argue that the phrase 
'... to expect under the contract' seems to suggest the latter. But neither system has made clear 
what degree of foreseeability is enough to justify the buyer's claim. " 
34 [1962] 2 Q. B. 26 applied in the sale of goods cases by the Court of Appeal in Cehave NY v. Bremer 
HandelsgeselIschaft mbH (The Hansa Nord) [ 1976] Q. B. 44. 
35 See in this respect, Chapter Two, Section One, 2.2.1. 
36 See, e. g., HongKong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [1962] 2 Q. B. 26, perUpjohnLJ at 
64, and per Diplock LJ at 66,70 and 72; Bunge Corp v. Tradar Export S. A. [1981] 1 W. L. R. 711, per Lord 
Scannan at 717. 
37 In English law see, Chapter Two, Section One, 2.2.2., (A). 
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Although the doctrine of serious breach has been explained by different wordings in 
English cases, as explained before" these are in fact different ways of saying the same thing. 
In comparison, the "fundamental breach" test, as defined in Art. 25 of the Convention can be 
likened to the words Diplock LJ used to describe the doctrine of serious breach in HongKong 
Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd " and subsequently applied to the sale 
of goods cases. 'O Accordingly, despite the difference in wording it seems that both the English 
and the Convention approaches say the same thing: the seller's breach must result in such 
event (detriment) that it substantially deprives the buyer of what he was entitled to expect 
under the contract. " Under both systems determination of the degree of a given detriment (or 
event, as expressed in the statement of Diplock L. J. ) and drawing the line between substantial 
and insubstantial deprivation is not left to the judge's sole and sovereign appreciation but 
requires him to decide in the context of the contract and the circumstances which existed at the 
time it was made. By qualifying the injured party's expectation (benefits) by the phrase "he is 
entitled to expect under the contract" both system seem to introduce an important qualification 
and ensure that it is not solely the buyer's expectations which are relevant. It depends as much 
on the seller's expectations as on the buyer's. Thus, as long as the seller has not been informed 
of the buyer's opportunity to obtain a particular benefit it cannot be said that the buyer was 
"entitled" to expect that benefit under the contract. However, the two tests n-dght differ in that 
according to the English test, as the wording of Diplock LJ in describing the doctrine suggests, 
the court should only assess the degree of deprivation by reference to loss of those benefits he 
should have obtained from the contract. " Whereas, such a restriction may not be inferred 
from Art. 25 of the Convention, the language of which provides "... he is entitled to expect 
under the contract... " 
Neither approach, however, introduces any concrete factors to guide the judges to 
decide whether the consequences of the breach have reached the threshold of substantial 
deprivation. It seems that under both systems the question is left to the court to decide on the 
basis of the circumstances of each particular case. The courts will classify a failure in 
performance with an eye to the nature of the breach and its consequences, considering all the 
38 See ibid., 2.2.1. 
39 [1962] 2 Q. 13.26 at 70. 
40 Cehave N. V. v. Bremer Handelsgesellschaft mbH (The Hansa Nord) [ 1976] 1 QR 44. 
41 In contrast, see, Ziegel, J., (1982) at 43 who argues that the Convention test is a demanding one and goes 
beyond the scope of Hong Kong Fir doctrine and may be likened to the test of fundamental breach applied by 
English and Canadian courts in determining the validity of exception clauses (the latter test has been 
examined in detail in the charterparty case: Suisse AtIantique Societe dAr7nement Maritime S. A. v. N. V 
Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [19671 A. C. 361). Cf. with Nicholas, B., (1989) at 218 who likened the 
Convention test to the HongKongfir test. 
See HongKong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [196212 Q. 13.26 at 66,70 and 72. 
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circumstances surrounding the contract, the subject-matter, the position of the party in breach 
and other relevant factors. 
Nevertheless, one may argue that the Convention approach departs from the English 
approach in a number of aspects. First, as will be seen, the Convention has granted the seller a 
general right to cure (Arts. 34,37 and 48). On this basis, the question whether or not the 
breach committed by the seller before the contract date has expired was fundamental must be 
assessed in the light of the seller's offer to cure. Where the seller has offered to cure his 
default in accordance with Art. 37 it would convert an otherwise fundamental breach into a 
non-fundamental one. Whereas, English law, as most English commentators suggest, does not 
recognise such a right. Thus, under the English approach a breach satisfying the requirement 
of seriousness may be regarded as fundamental even though the seller has offered to cure it. 
Second, where the seller proves that the alleged consequences of his breach was not actually 
foreseen by him or could not have been foreseen by a reasonable person of the same kind in 
the same circumstances the breach will not be regarded as a fundamental breach under the 
Convention, while the test of serious breach, as described in the HongKong Fir case, does not 
refer to such a limitation, Thus, it might be said that under English law where the buyer could 
show the court that the seller's breach has resulted in such consequences which deprived (or 
will deprive) him of substantially the whole benefit he was entitled to obtain under the contract 
the breach would be regarded sufficiently serious as to justify his termination. And the seller 
will not be able to excuse himself on the grounds that he' did not foresee, or a reasonable 
person in his circumstances could not have foreseen, such consequences. However, one may 
argue that since the buyer is not entitled to recover damages for non-foreseeable losses, he 
should not be entitled to rely on such consequences for the purpose of terminating the 
contract. " 
Assuming that under both systems the buyer can only rely on foreseeable results, a 
number of questions are left unanswered. First, although the Convention places the burden on 
the party in breach to show that serious consequences were not reasonably foreseeable, the 
position of English law is not clear. Second, in both systems it is not clear to what degree the 
loss resulting from the breach must be foreseeable by the seller, although one may suggest that 
the criterion prescribed in the context of damages can be applicable to the present case. 
Likewise, it is not clear at what time is the foresight of the party in breach to be judged? Is the 
relevant time when the contract was concluded or when the breach was committed, or does it 
depend on the circumstances of each case? " Nevertheless, it is possible to argue in support of 
43See also, Chapter Two, Section One, 2.2.2., (A). " To know the history of the question under the Convention, see Chapter Three, Section One, 3.2.1.2. (C). 
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the first approach in both systems. As indicated in respect of the concept of the injured 
buyer's contractual expectations, whether or not the buyer was entitled to expect to have a 
particular benefit should be ascertained within the contract terms and other circumstances 
which came into the attention of the seller in breach at the time of making the contract. The 
same analysis seems to be applied to the measurement of foreseeability of the consequences of 
the breach. As far as the Convention test is concerned, one can even go further and argue that 
the language of Article 25 is in line with this approach, since it defines the consequences 
relevant to the determination of fundamental breach in terms of what a party "is entitled to 
expect under the contract" and the second sentence of the article refers to the foreseeability of 
44 such result" by the party in breach. Accordingly, as contractual expectations are formed at 
the time of contracting, foreseeability of substantial deprivation of those expectations by 
reason of a breach should also be measured at that time. 
ShPah jurists, in contrast, have justified termination on the basis of a complex system 
of kheydrdt (options to terminate). The jurists, instead of closely analysing the ground(s) upon 
which kheydrdt should be justified, have placed much emphasis on examination of kheydrdt 
themselves. " Looking at their detailed discussions under these headings shows that they seem 
to accept a mixed approach. Where the seller of unascertained goods has tendered non- 
conforming goods rejection is sharply distinguished from termination: the buyer is only given a 
right to reject the goods. Termination will be available for the buyer where he cannot coerce 
the seller to deliver conforming goods through the judicial authorities. In contrast, where the 
seller of specific goods has made a non-conforming delivery almost all the jurists suggest that 
in any case where the buyer is entitled to reject the goods he would be able to terminate the 
contract immediately. " 
Dealing with termination in this way causes some significant questions to be left 
unanswered. (a) why should the buyer have an absolute right to terminate a contract for sale 
of specific goods? (b) when can the buyer terminate the contract for sale of unascertained 
goods? To deal properly with the right to terminate the contract and its relationship with the 
right to reject non-conforn-iing goods under this system, a suggestion was made" to analyze 
the grounds upon which the jurists have occasionally justified the grant of kheyk (the right to 
terminate). Likewise, it was shown" that basing the option to terminate on one ground rather 
than other would have significant effects in granting a buyer the right to terminate the contract 
45 See, Chapter Four, Section One, 3.1. 
46 See, ibid., 3.2.3. 
47 See, ibid., 3.2.2. 
48 See, ibid., (A). 
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and would help to justify why the buyer should have the right to terminate the contract, and to 
decide what lack of confonnity should entitle him to tenninate the contract. 
As discussed in detail", a thorough consideration of the jurists' arguments in justi4ing 
the grant of the option of termination reveals three general principles: rewayat, shart-e-&mni 
and 19 darar. When a party is given the right to terminate the contract because a particular 
rewdyat says so the scope of the right should be ascertained in accordance with the express 
language of that authority. It cannot be extended to analogous cases. However, as already 
shownýo, very few options are solely based on the rewayat. The primary principles justifýing 
the right to terminate are, therefore, the doctrine of shart-e-&mni and the principle of Lff 
darar. 
Doctrine of shart-e-&mni. Where a particular kheyar (option to terminate) is to be based 
on the parties' mutual intention two requirements must be satisfied. First, it has to be proved 
that it was the implied mutual intention of the parties that the seller should have delivered 
goods perfectly corresponding with the contract descriptions (shart-e-sefat) and quality 
(shart-e-sehhat). Second, it is to be proved that the contracting parties have agreed that any 
breach of those terms would give the buyer an immediate right to terminate the contract. On 
the basis of this doctrine, as long as the buyer could show that the seller has broken his 
obligations under one of these terms the buyer will be entitled to terminate the contract, no 
matter what actual detriment will result from the lack of conformity. If this construction is 
accepted termination under Shiah law would be similar to English law when it is justified on 
the basis of the doctrine of "condition". However, the two systems differ in that in English law 
some particular contract terms have been a priori classified as conditions by law, while in 
ShPah law the jurists are inclined to remit the case to the court to decide in light of particular 
circumstances of each case whether a particular contractual obligation is so important that 
any breach of which would give rise to an immediate right to terminate the contract. 
The jurists seems to have applied this approach to the case of specific goods and where 
a shart-e-fe 7 is broken. By analogy, it is suggested that the buyer should be given such a right 
in the case of unascertained goods. For this reason, in the case of late delivery, as will be seen, 
it is commonly saiO that the buyer has an immediate right to terminate the contract, whether it 
is for sale of specific goods or unascertained ones. 
49 See, Chapter Four, Section One, 3.2.2. 
50 See, ibid. 
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Doctrine of Iff olarar. If the right to terminate is to be based on the principle of 19 darar 
termination should be justified on the basis of the consequences of breach. On this principle, 
the buyer will only be entitled to terminate the contract when the seller's breach results in a 
detriment such that it makes performance of the contract harmful for the buyer, since it is only 
in such a case that the principle of 15 &rar comes into operation and ceases the decree of 
1uz0m-e-a'qd, which orders the buyer to perform the contract, to operate. If this approach is 
accepted ShPah law would be more similar to the Convention than English law. 
However, the jurists are not unanimous on a single view. Some are in favour of the 
former" and others the latter52 . Nevertheless, as explained in detail, 
" the primary ground 
justifying giving a right to terminate the contract is the principle of Iff darar. Although it is 
quite possible for the court to identify certain cases in which the contracting parties have 
agreed on an implied undertaking that any breach of shart-e-sefat, shart-e-sehhat or shart-e- 
fe7 gives a contracting party an absolute right to terminate the contract, it does not mean that 
all the options provided under ShPah law are to be justified on a single ground. It is perhaps 
for this reason that some jurists have justified termination on the first doctrine in some 
circumstances and on the second principle in some other occasions. 54 
If the suggested interpretation is accepted, Shilah law would resemble English law more 
than the Convention. This is because under the Convention to decide whether the buyer is 
entitled to terminate the court should only look at the effects of the breach, while under both 
English and ShPah law the court's basic duty is to look at the terms of the contract and the 
surrounding circumstances to ascertain whether it was a condition of the contract that the 
seller had undertaken to make a perfect delivery and that the buyer should have an immediate 
right to reject and terminate the contract if the seller failed to make perfect delivery. If such a 
condition is not proved the court then should look at the breach itself and examine whether it 
is sufficiently serious to justify termination of the contract on the principle of serious 
detriment. 
When termination is to be justified on the basis of the first principle the aggrieved buyer 
has no great difficulty; he should only satisfy the court that the broken term was of the above 
described character. But if termination is to be based on the second principle this crucial 
question arises: what degree of detriment will be sufficient for the principle to come into 
51 See, Chapter Four, Section One, 3.2.2., fri. 74. 
52 See, ibid., fns. 75,76. 
53 Ibid., (B). 
54 See, e. g., Ansiri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 253 has based the option of defect on the first doctrine, while at 235,244 
and 249 has justified the options of lesion, delay in payment and inspection, respectively, on the second 
principle. See also, Yazdi, S. M. K., (1378 H. Q) vol. 2 at 128, and 208. 
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operation? Notwithstanding that a considerable number of ShPah jurists have occasionally 
justified the option to terminate on the basis of this principle, they have not exan-dned this 
question. Can one suggest that the English and the Convention test of "substantial 
deprivation" would work here? If so, how can it be justified in this system? 
In the fourth chapter, by relying on what the jurists have stated in the context of the 
option of lesion (kheydr-e-ghabn)", it was suggested that the principle of IS diarar should 
come into operation to justify termination when the detriment (alarar) caused by the seller's 
non-conforming delivery is of such a degree a reasonable man would not overlook it. 
However, whether or not the contract becomes harmful for a reasonable person in the buyer's 
position must be assessed by reference to the degree of his deprivation from those legitimate 
benefits he should obtain from the contract. Although no jurist has addressed such a 
restriction, it seems that it is clearly inferable from the context. It is obvious that whether or 
not a particular contract becomes harmful for the buyer by reason of the seller's breach 
should be measured in accordance with the degree of the buyer's deprivation of those benefits 
he was entitled to obtain through proper performance of the contract by the seller. 
But, is this the same as the test provided under English law and the Convention? It is 
most likely that a reasonable person would not ignore the results caused by the breach, even 
though they are not such to deprive the buyer substantially of his contractual benefits. 
Accordingly, one may argue that under the ShPah law test the buyer will be entitled to 
terminate the contract for breach where he could not do so under the two other systems. 
However, it should be borne in mind that under ShVah law, as will be seen later, the seller has 
a general right to cure. Accordingly, it is suggested that the question whether the seller's 
breach is sufficiently serious to make the contract harmful is to be assessed in light of the 
seller's right to cure; where the seller has offered to cure, as will be described later, the 
contract will not reasonably be harmful to justify the operation of the principle of 19 &rar. In 
this way the difference between the two tests is considerably reduced. 
However, two further questions remain unanswered. First, can the buyer rely not only 
on consequences of the breach which have actually occurred but also on those which are 
foreseeable as likely future consequences of it? Second, how foreseeable must the actual, and 
probable, consequences of the breach be? Can he rely on any detriment caused by the breach, 
or only on those which were foreseeable by the seller? As to the first question, it was 
suggested that the principle of IJ darar is broad. It covers both actual and foreseeable 
53 See in this connection, Chapter Four, Section One, 3.2.2., (C). 
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consequences. However, they are to be those that are most likely to happen. Likewise, as to 
the second question, as already pointed out", no jurisprudential statement exists in this 
connection. Nevertheless, it seems that the limitation provided under the Convention would be 
compatible with the general principles under Shiah law. Accordingly, the court should only 
consider those results which were or ought to have been foreseeable by the seller according to 
the information available to him at the time of making the contract. If there is a particular 
circumstance which is significant for the buyer he should bring it to the attention of the seller 
when the contract is made. The suggestion can be supported on the grounds that the principle 
of Id darar would only negate those detriments caused by the party in breach. Any detriment 
caused by the party who failed to bring the special circumstances to the attention of the other 
party would be at his risk (the principle of iqd,; P-n). However, it is suggested that it is the 
seller's duty, as in the Convention, to show that the detriments caused were not reasonably 
foreseeable. This is because where the seller's non-conforming delivery has resulted in 
sufficiently serious breach it will bring the principle of 19 darar into operation. The seller will 
only be able to escape from the drastic effects of termination where he can show that it was in 
fact the buyer's action or omission. I 
Relying on what has been said above, it can be concluded that where the seller of 
unascertained goods fails to deliver goods corresponding with the contract requirements the 
buyer should be given the right to terminate the contract only where the seller is not able and 
willing to make a fresh tender within the contract time. The suggestion can be justified on the 
basis that the mere non-conforming delivery by the seller does not render the contract harnifal 
for the buyer, since the buyer has an opportunity to reject the non-conforming delivery and 
require the seller to deliver conforming goods. Where the seller is ready and able to deliver 
replacement goods which confonn to the contract within the contract time without causing the 
buyer unreasonable expense or inconvenience there will be no reason to justify the buyer's 
termination. The same is true where the seller has failed to perform his obligations under 
shart-e-fe 7 such as the duty to prepare the relevant shipping documents in accordance with 
the contract requirements. Tbus where the seller is ready and able to tender conforming 
documents the buyer should not be entitled to terminate the contract provided that the seller's 
re-tender does not cause the buyer undue detriment. In contrast, where the seller of specific 
goods has failed to deliver conforming goods, no matter whether it is for breach of contract 
description (shart-e-sefat) or contract quality (shart-e-sehhat), the buyer should be given an 
immediate right to terminate the contract (as almost all jurists suggest). But it must be borne 
56 See, ibid. 
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in mind that in such cases termination is not always the only means to protect the injured 
buyer. He can be protected by requiring the seller to cure by way of repair. If the seller is 
ready and able to cure the non-conformity by way of repair within the contract time without 
causing the buyer unreasonable expense or inconvenience he will be adequately compensated. 
Under such circumstances there is no reason to justify application of the principle of ld diarar 
allowing the buyer to terminate the contract. The buyer's termination in such cases would be 
justifiable only when the actual and/or foreseeable losses resulting from the breach makes the 
contract harn-Lful for the buyer, unless it is proved that the parties' mutual intention was that 
any non-conformity would give rise to the right to terminate (as may be the case in consumer 
transactions). 
(1) Termination of Severable Contracts 
Both English law and the Convention have provided particular restrictions for termination of 
severable contract. Under both systems, the mere fact that the seller has made a defective 
delivery in respect of one or more severable parts will not entitle the buyer to terminate the 
contract as a whole, even though the requisite requirements in respect of the defective parts 
are satisfied (s. 31 (2) and Arts, 51,73). In such situations the buyer can only reject the 
defective parts as described above. Termination of the contract as a whole will be allowed 
only when the seller's defective delivery in respect of one or more instalments has resulted in a 
serious breach. However, the language used to describe the ground justifying termination is 
different. On the one hand, s. 31 (2) of the English Sale of Goods Act provides that it is a 
question in each case depending on the terms of the contract and the circumstances of the case 
whether a breach of contract in respect of one instalment is a repudiation of the whole 
contract, or whether it is a severable breach giving rise to a claim of compensation but not to a 
right to treat the whole contract as repudiated. On the other hand, Art. 73 (2) of the 
Convention requires the buyer to prove that the seller's failure to perform one of his 
obligations in respect of any instalment gave the buyer good grounds to conclude that a 
fundamental breach of contract would occur with respect to further instalments. Despite the 
difference in the language of the two pieces of laws, English case law seems to suggest that 
the practical results will be much the same as they are likely to be under Art. 73 (2) of the 
Convention. As shown in detail, under English case law the seller will be treated as 
repudiating the contract as a whole by delivery of defective instalments if his default goes to 
the root of the contract by considering "first, the ratio quantitatively which the breach bears to 
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the contract as a whole, and secondly, the degree of probability and improbability that such a 
breach will be repeated 07 
However, the two systems appear to depart from each other in a number of aspects. 
First, while in English law it is not clear whether the buyer is entitled to reject prior 
instalments, " by virtue of Art. 73 (3) of the Convention the buyer is given an opportunity, at 
the same time, to declare the contract terminated "in respect of deliveries already made or of 
future deliveries if, by reason of their interdependence, those deliveries could not be used for 
the purpose contemplated by the parties at the time of the conclusion of the contract". 
However, this difference may be more apparent than real since the rights conferred under Art. 
73 (3) only arise where the deliveries are interdependent" in which some English authors have 
suggests the same right. " Second, although the English Sale of Goods Act 1979 gives the 
buyer a right of partial rejection (s. 35A), it does not clearly answer the question: is there any 
case where the buyer is able to terminate the contract as to the rejected part and keep it on foot 
with respect to the remainder where the seller has made a partially non-conforming delivery? 
Whereas, the Convention has expressly empowered the buyer to terminate the contract 
partially (Arts. 51 (1) and 73 (1) and (2), although one may argue that the English Sale of 
Goods Act has also impliedly accepted partial termination since it does not allow the buyer to 
reject those instalments already accepted, as some English commentators SUggeSt. 61 
In ShVah law the position of the issue in question is somewhat complicated. The jurists 
have not separately examined termination of severable contracts. However, as already 
shown, " some indications of the issue can be found when dealing with the question whether 
the buyer of specific goods has an option to terminate the contract in respect of the defective 
part and keep it on foot with respect to the sound part where the seller has delivered goods 
part of which is in conformity with the contract quality. In that case, no jurist has disputed the 
buyer's right to reject all of the goods and terminate the contract as a whole, but they have 
differed in regard to the buyer's right to terminate the contract partially. However, a number of 
important questions are here left unanswered: under what circumstances should the buyer be 
given the right to terminate the contract partially or as a whole? Is there any difference to be 
57 Lord Hewart in Maple Flock Co. Ltd. v. Universal Furniture Products (Wembley) Ltd[1934] I K. B. 148 at 
157. For a detail discussion see, Chapter two, Section One, 2.3.1. (B). 
58 For academic suggestions see, Chapter two, Section One, 2.3.1., (C). 
59 This suggests that "delivery of goods by instalments" in Art. 73 has a broader meaning that it has under the 
English Sale of Goods Act 1979 and may encompass some types of contract that are indivisible or at least 
indivisible in part. See in this respect, Ziegel, I& Samson, C., (1981) Art. 73. 
60 See in this respect, Chapter two, Section One, 2.3.1., (C). 
61 See, ibid. See also, Guest, A. G., et al., (1997) Para. 12-061 in which the editors of Benjamin's Sale of Goods 
favour partial termination. 
62 See, Chapter Four, Section One, 2.2.3.1., and, 3.2.5.1. 
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between termination of the contract as a whole and termination in respect of the part affected 
by the breach? Is he entitled to partial termination where the seller of unascertained goods has 
tendered goods some of which do not conform with the contract? 
As was shown, 63 the jurists' different views in respect of specific goods are due to the 
lack of a clear distinction between the cases of severable and non-severable contracts. For this 
reason, it was suggested to distinguish between severable and non-severable contracts. Where 
the contract is construed as non-severable, the rules described above should be applied. But if 
the contract is construed as severable, as described before, it was suggested 65 to distinguish 
between partial termination and termination of the contract as a whole. Termination of such 
contracts as a whole is to be permitted only where the seller's defective delivery in respect of 
one or more instalments is such that the buyer can reasonably conclude that the contract 
would be harmful for him. If this construction is accepted, ShPah law would be close to 
English law and the Convention, although, as indicated in respect of non-severable contracts, 
the two tests differ in the degree of seriousness they require. 
On this suggestion, no difference should be made between specific and unascertained 
goods. Where the required conditions of termination, as described above, are met in respect of 
a severable part the buyer should be given the right to terminate the contract with respect to 
that part, although the contract is for sale of unascertained goods. 
Termination for delivery of wrong quantity. Unlike the Convention which entitles the 
buyer to terminate the contract as a whole or in respect of the missing Part where the seller has 
delivered only a part of the contract goods (Art. 50), the position of English law is not quite 
clear. Although s. 30 of the English Sale of Goods Act enables the buyer to reject the goods 
where the seller delivers to him a quantity of goods less or larger than he contracted to sell, it 
does not make clear whether the buyer is entitled to terminate the contract in its entirety or in 
respect of the missing part. Even sub-section (2A) which restricts the non-consumer buyer's 
right to reject to the case where it is unreasonable for him does not say whether he has a 
separate right to terminate the contract. Accordingly, it is not clear whether the buyer's right 
to terminate should be based on the doctrine of condition or serious breach. 66 
In ShVah law the jurists have only addressed the question in respect of the contract for 
sale of specific goods. In that case, it is commonly said that where a quantity term is broken 
the general rule explained as to breach of shart-e-sefat applies here, i. e.,. breach of which will 
63 See, ibid. 
64 See, ibid., 2.2.3.1. 
65 See, ibid., 3.2.5.1. 
66 For academic suggestions see, Chapter two, Section One, 2.3.3. 
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entitle the buyer to reject the wrong quantity and terminate the contract on the basis of the 
option of incorrect description (kheydr-e-takhalluf an al- wasj). But the question whether the 
buyer should be given the right to keep the contract alive as to the part delivered and terminate 
in respect of the missing part is controversial. '7 Similarly, they have not made clear whether 
the buyer should be given such a right where the seller of unascertained goods has only 
delivered part of the contract goods. Moreover, it is not clear what shortfall or excess will give 
rise to the right to terminate the contract in its entirety or in respect of the missing part. 
It was, however, suggested' that the buyer should be given the right to terminate the 
contract on account of delivery of wrong quantity, whether the contract is for sale of specific 
or unascertained goods. But his right should be subject to some restriction. If he wishes to 
terminate the contract in its entirety the missing part should be such that its absence makes the 
contract harmful for the buyer. However, he should be given the right to terminate the contract 
as to the missing part where it is not so slight that it would be customarily unreasonable for 
him to do so. If this construction is adopted ShPah law would differ from English law in that, 
while under the suggested interpretation the buyer's right to terminate is to be subject to the 
seriousness of the lack of conformity, which is to be assessed in light of the seller's offer to 
cure, under English law, assuming the academic suggestion, the seller's duty to deliver the 
right quantity is a condition breach of which gives the buyer, subject to s. 30 (2A), an 
immediate right to treat the contract as repudiated. It also differs from the Convention in the 
degree of seriousness required, since under the Convention the missing part must be such as to 
result in a fundamental breach of the contract, whereas, the requirement of seriousness under 
Shi'ah law does not necessarily amount to a fundamental breach as defined under the 
Convention. The same is true where the buyer wishes to terminate the contract in respect of 
the missing part; it should be such as to render the contract harmful in respect of that part. 
Termination for Breach of Time Stipulation. With respect to stipulations as to time, 
English law and the Convention have adopted different approaches. While the Convention 
provides that termination of the contract for delay in performance should in principle be based 
on the doctrine of "fundamental breach" - whether delivery is made beyond a specific date or 
period of time fixed by the contract or if delivery is made outside a reasonable time where no 
specific time provided by the contract (Art. 33), English law seems to base it on the theory of 
"the nature of contract terms". Although s. 10 (2) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 provides that 
whether any stipulation as to time of performance other than time of payment is or is not of 
67 See in this respect, Chapter Four, Section One, 3.2.5.2. 
" Ibid.. 
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the essence of the contract depends on the terms of the contract, it was for a long time 
assumed by case law that the seller's duty to deliver on time under commercial contracts 
would have to be classified a priori as a condition regardless of the severity of the breach. " 
Accordingly, under English law the buyer is prima facie entitled to terminate the contract for 
any delay in delivery, no matter how trivial, or whether or not it causes any loss. However, as 
explained befodo, this is a rule based on considerations of commercial convenience and 
certainty applicable in a particular context, rather than on any general principle or 
presumption as to time being, or not being, of the essence . 
71 Accordingly, where it is proved 
that the time for performance is not of the essence, termination should be justified on the basis 
of the doctrine of serious breach7'. or on the ground of the seller's failure to deliver within the 
reasonable time fixed by the buyer according to the common law rule, i. e., notice-giving 
procedure. 73 The same rule is applied where the contract is silent as to the time for 
performance unless special circumstances of the case indicate that a failure to perform within 
a reasonable time is to be regarded as a breach of condition entitling the buyer to terminate-74 
In this way the English law approach comes close to the Convention approach. This is 
because first, the Convention has accepted the rule that where the contract (Art. 6) or a usage 
and the parties' established practices provide otherwise (Art. 9) the fundamental breach test is 
not necessary for termination on account of delay. Second, it does not leave the buyer in a sea 
of uncertainty. The Convention, by recognising the Nachfrist-notice procedure, allows the 
buyer to treat a delay in performance as a ground to terminate the contract if it is not cured 
within a reasonable time fixed in the notice in accordance with Art. 47 (Art. 49 (1) (b)). This 
rule comes close to the English rule of making performance of basic contractual obligations 
within the period fixed in the notice "of the essence" of the contract. It makes non-performance 
within the time so fixed the equivalent of a fundamental breach of contract and thus allows a 
party awaiting performance to terminate the contract regardless of whether the breach is 
fundamental or not. 
In ShPah law, in contrast, the position of the buyer's right to tem-dnate where the seller 
has delivered the contract goods beyond the contract time for perforniance is not quite clear. 
The jurists have only addressed the case where the seller has broken an express stipulation as 
69 See in this respect, Chapter Two, Section One, 2.3.2., (B), (I). 
70 See, ibid. 
71 See, e. g., Bunge Corp v. TradaxErport S. A. [19811 I W. L. R. 711 per Lord Roskill at 725; per Lord Lowry at 
719. 
72 See in this respect, Chapter Two, Section One, 2.3.2., (B), (H). 
73 See in this respect, ibid., fh. 137. 
74 See, ibid., 2.3.2., (B), (M). 
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to the time of performance. They have not examined the case where the contract has not 
expressly provided a time provision. In the first case, two opposing views have been 
suggested. Some jurists suggest that any delay would entitle the buyer to terminate the 
contract on the basis of the option of unfulfilled condition (kheyar al- takhlluf an al- shart)75, 
while others disagreed with giving the buyer an immediate right to terminate for delay. 76 
As already explaineV, the difference is due to the different grounds upon which the 
option to terminate should be justified. However, as in other cases, it is suggested that the 
buyer's right to terminate the contract for the seller's late delivery should in principle be based 
on the serious consequences of delay (the principle of I! diarar). The same is true where the 
contract has not fixed a particular date or period of time for performance. Accordingly, 
termination for delivery beyond a reasonable time should be justified on the basis of the 
principle of Ii darar, unless it is inferred from the circumstances of the case that the buyer's 
right to terminate for performance beyond a reasonable time was impliedly agreed upon at the 
time of the contract. On this interpretation, a close similarity appears between English and 
ShPah law. In both systems, where it is proved that performance within a given time was an 
implied condition the buyer has an immediate right to terminate, no matter what actual loss 
results from delay. In contrast, where such an implied condition is not inferable termination 
should be justified on the basis of the consequences of delay. However, the difference appears 
in a number of aspects. First is the case where timely performance is not treated as of the 
essence of the contract. Under English law termination will be justified where the delay in 
performance was so grave as to frustrate the commercial purpose of the contract, while in 
Shi'ah law it will be justified where the delay is such that performance of the contract 
becomes customarily harmful for the buyer. Second is with respect to the making the time of 
performance of the essence of the contract. Although no jurist has addressed the question, it 
seems that it would be hard to reconcile this rule with the general principles already described. 
As indicated above, in ShPah law there are three general principles upon which termination 
may be justified; a particular rewAyat, shart-e-&mni and the principle of Ii darar. No 
particular authority, whether specifically or in general, can be found to allow the buyer to give 
the seller additional time and terminate the contract where he fails to, or announces that he will 
not, perform within that time. The third difference between the two systems appears in that in 
English law a stipulation as to the time for delivery of goods under a commercial contract is 
75 See, e. g., Midi, M. A., and KhOei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 549; Khumayni, S. R. M., vol. 5 at 334; Tabrizi, 
J., (1412 H. Q. ) at 542. 
76 See, e. g., Najafi, M. H., (198 1) vol. 23 at 99. 
77 See, Chapter Four, Section One, 3.2.5.3., (B). 
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primafacie treated as of the essence of the contract, while under Shiah law in any case the 
buyer should satisfy the court that the term has such a character. 
1.3. Seller's Right to Cure 
A ftirther question which is to be answered by any legal system is whether the buyer's right to 
terminate is to be subject to the seller's right to make amend by resubn-dtting a conforming 
delivery and/or repairing the defects in the goods delivered to the buyer, or he can terminate 
the contract immediately. Both English law and the Convention have responded to this 
question but in a different way. As already shown in detail78 , English law has not expressly 
recognised a general right to cure for a seller who has made non-conforming delivery. 
Although a number of English academic writers" have tried to prove that such a right is in 
principle compatible with the existing English law of sale and is supported by a number of 
judicial dictP, some others, rejecting their arguments", argue that the present English law 
does not support such a general right for the seller. He may be entitled, they suggest, to cure 
his defective delivery only where the buyer consents to it. In contrast, the Convention gives the 
seller a general right to cure the lack of conformity. The right is broadly applicable to the case 
where the seller has delivered non-conforming documents (Art. 34) and goods (Art. 37). The 
right can be exercised by the seller before and after the time for performance has expired (Art. 
48). 
In comparison, English law would be similar to the Convention if the former system is 
seen in view of the first group of English authors; under both systems the seller would have a 
general right to cure his non-conforming performance before the time for delivery has expir4 
and the buyer has no right to reject the seller's offer, otherwise he himself will be guilty of 
breach of contract. Similarly, under both systems the right will be available for the seller even 
if the lack of confortnity is serious. As far as the seller is ready and able to cure, non- 
compliance with the contract terms will not be treated as one giving rise to the right to 
terminate the contract. Despite these similarities, the two systems will differ in some aspects. 
First, under English law, as described by the first approach, the seller will not be entitled to 
cure where his conduct is such that constitutes a repudiation of the contract. One may say that 
it may be the case where the lack of conformity is so serious that the buyer has lost his 
confidence in the seller's ability and willingness to make a conforming tender. Whereas, under 
78 See, Chapter Two, Section One, 2.1.3. 
79 Ibid., fn. 45. 
go Ibid., fn. 46. 
81 Ibid., fn. 50. 
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the convention, as explained before", the seller's rightful offer to cure under Art. 37 would 
convert the character of an actual fundamental breach into a non-fundamental breach. Thus, 
as far as the seller is able and willing to cure under Art. 37 the buyer has no right to reject it 
and tenninate the contract. Second, under English law cure by the seller beyond the contract 
time depends on the fact whether or not time was of the essence of the contract, while the 
seller's right to cure beyond the contract date for performance, as prescribed by Art. 48 of the 
Convention, is not subject to such a restriction. 
Similarly, despite a clear difference between the Convention and English law, as 
interpreted by the second approach, one may argue that the two systems have some 
similarities. The first appears in respect of non-conforming documents. Under the Convention, 
the seller is expressly given the right to cure any lack of conformity in documents before the 
contract time for handing them over is expired (Art. 34). There is the argument that the seller 
will also be entitled to cure under English law to that eXtent. 83 As explained befor e84, in 
English law there are certain judicial authorities which clearly state that following the buyer's 
lawful rejection the seller under certain circumstances has a right to make a sound tender 
provided that he can do so within the contract time. However, one may argue that this is only 
the case where the seller has not made already an unconditional appropriation. The second 
similarity is the case where the seller has intended by his tender to appropriate a particular 
cargo to the contract rather than to perform his delivery obligation. In that case, as long as his 
offer has not been unconditionally accepted by the buyer English law gives the seller an 
opportunity to withdraw his non-conforniing tender and make a fresh tender. 85 
The position of ShVah law, as already shownS6, is unclear. No jurist has exan-dned the 
question whether the seller should be given a general right to cure his defective performance 
and if so, in what circumstances it should be granted. In the absence of clear jurisprudential 
authorities on this issue, it is suggested that the Convention provisions regulating the issue 
could be compatible with this system. To adapt this rule with this system, it is suggested to 
analyse the issue on the basis of two general criteria upon which termination of contract is 
justified in this system, that is, shart-e-&mni and Id darar. Where it is accepted that 
termination is to be based on the first approach the buyer will have an immediate right to 
82 See, Chapter Three, Section One, 3.3. 
83 Moreover, it is the practice in relation to documentary credits that documents rejected as not conforming to the 
credit are generally allowed to be represented. See also Uniform Customs and Practice for Doumcntary Credits 
(1993 Version), Art. 14 (d)). 
84 Chapter Two, Section One, 2.1.3. 
85 As explained before, a number of English authors are inclined to explain the decided cases in this way. In this 
respect, see ibid. 
86 See, Chapter Four, Section One, 3.2.4. 
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terminate the contract if the seller's non-conforming delivery results in breach of shart-e-sefat 
or shart-e-sehhat. On this view, there is no opportunity for the seller to cure the lack of 
conformity. The seller's right to cure may arise where the option to terminate is to be based on 
the principle of /a darar. On this approach, one may argue that giving the seller a general 
right to cure his non-conforming delivery is a sensible rule. This is because as long as the 
seller is able and ready to cure the defects in the goods delivered, as described below, it is 
quite possible to say that breach is not sufficiently serious to make the contract harmful for 
operation of the principle of Id darar. 
It is suggested, however, that it is necessary to distinguish between sales of specific and 
of unascertained goods. In the first case, giving the seller a right to replace non-conforming 
87 
goods seems difficult to reconcile with general principles. But, the position of the seller's 
right to cure by repair is not clear. There is an argument against recognising such a right for 
the seller in this system. " Nevertheless, it was suggested that no clear reason exists to justify 
not giving the seller such a right. 89 In contrast, where the contract is for sale of unascertained 
goods giving the seller a general right to cure seems more consistent with general principles. 
As already pointed out, almost all jurists have said that in such cases where the seller's tender 
does not conform to the contract terms the buyer has only a right to reject the non-conforming 
delivery. 90 On this approach, it is quite reasonable to suggest that the seller should be given a 
general right to cure his non-confom-dng delivery under certain circumstances. The same 
suggestion seems to be applicable where the seller has tendered non-conforming documents. 
The right to cure, however, should be subject to the requirements that it could be done without 
causing the buyer unreasonable expense or unreasonable inconvenience. 
On this construction, Shiah law comes close to the Convention. Under both systems the 
seller has a general right to cure his defective performance. As long as the seller is ready and 
able to cure as described above the buyer has no right to terminate the contract. If the buyer 
rejects the seller's offer to cure he will be guilty of breach of contract. However, ShPah law 
seems to depart from the Convention in that while the latter allows the seller to cure after the 
time for performance has expired, under the former, as indicated before, " the time for 
performance may be treated as of the essence of the contract. In that event, the buyer may be 
entitled to terminate the contract and as a result no opportunity is left for the seller to cure. 
97 See in this respect, Chapter Four, Section One, 3.2.4.1. 
88 See, ibid. 
89 See, ibid. 
90 See the references cited in ibid., 3.2.3.2. (B), fn. 109 and 3.2.3.3. (B), fn. 116. 
91 See, ibid., 3.2.5.3. (B). 
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However, this difference will not be substantial, since first, as already explained in detail", 
under Art. 48 of the Convention the buyer's right to avoid the contract has priority over the 
seller's right to cure. " Second, under ShPah law, unlike English law, timely performance is 
not pre-classified as a "condition". Whether it is or is not of the essence of the contract 
depends on the true construction of the contract and the circumstances of each case. 
Accordingly, where it is not proved that the time stipulation is of that character the seller 
would be able to cure. The only difference between the two systems would be the case where 
the lack of conformity is not sufficiently serious to justify termination. In that case, the seller 
will be entitled to cure the lack of conformity in accordance with Art. 48, while under Shilah 
law he will be able to do so where the time provision is not construed as of the essence of the 
contract. However, this difference seems insubstantial, since the buyer will in practice prefer 
cure by repair to a claim for damages or/and price reduction (arsh). 
1.4. Mechanism of Exercising the Right to Terminate 
As already shown", generally, all three systems here under examination have accepted that 
where a breach giving rise to the right to reject the non-conforming delivery and terminate the 
contract is committed by the seller the buyer has an option either to terminate the contract or 
to continue performance if he wishes; he is not required to elect to terminate the contract or to 
affirm it when he wants the contrary. Likewise, in terminating the contract he is not required 
to apply for a court's judgment even though he may sometimes need the court's decision to the 
effect that he was entitled to terminate the contract. When he prefers to reject the seller's non- 
conforming delivery and terminate the contract he must declare his intention by unequivocal 
words or conduct. The question whether the notice of termination must be communicated to 
the seller in breach is controversial in English law. 95 But the position of the Convention and 
ShVah law seems clear, the buyer exercising his right to terminate the contract should declare 
his intention to terminate by any means appropriate in circumstances. Delay or error in the 
transmission of the communication or its failure to arrive will not deprive him of the right to 
96 rely on the conummication (Aft. 27). 
92 Chapter Tliree, Section One, 3.3. 
93 However, if Professor Honnold's view (see, Honnoldý (1991) at 375-376, particularly, footnote no. 6 at 376, see 
also, p. 259) is accepted, the Convention will differ from Shiah law in this respect, since on his view the buyer 
will be entitled to tenninate the contract only when the seller is not willing and able to curc after the expiration 
of the time for delivery. 
94 See, Chapter Two, Section One, 3.1., 3.2.; Chapter Tbrce, Section One, 3.4.1., 3.4.2., and Chapter Four, 
Section One, 3.3.1., 3.3.2. 
95 See the discussion in Chapter Two, Section One, 3.2.1.2. 
96 In Shiah law see, Chapter Four, Section One, 3.3.2.2. 
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The buyer may wish to continue the performance of the contract and resort, to other 
remedies. Affirmation of the contract must also be announced by unequivocal words or 
conduct. Since where the contract is affirmed by the buyer he will be precluded from 
subsequent rejection and termination, a crucial issue is at what point will the buyer be deemed 
to have affirmed the contract and as a result have lost his right to reject the non-conforming 
delivery and to terminate the contract? Both English law and the Convention have set out 
certain circumstances in which the buyer may be deemed to have affirmed the contract. In 
English law the buyer may lose his right under the following circumstances: (a) intimating to 
the seller that he has accepted'the goods, (b) after the seller's delivery doing an act 
inconsistent with the seller's ownership and (c) retaining the goods beyond a reasonable time 
without giving the seller a notice of rejection (s. 35 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979). " 
Similarly, the Convention provides that the buyer may lose his right by failure to notify the 
seller of the lack of conformity in accordance with Art. 39; by lapse of a reasonable time 
without giving notice to the seller of his avoidance (Art. 49 (2) or where by the reason of the 
buyer's acts or omission restitution of the goods in substantially the condition in which he 
received them becomes impossible (Art. 82). " 
Despite the difference in the language of the provisions, the two systems seem similar in 
a number of aspects. Under the Convention, as in English law, it is a general rule that it would 
be sufficient to result in loss of the right if the buyer was placed into a position in which he 
could discover the lack of conformity giving rise to the right to terminate the contract. Loss of 
the right does not require that the buyer has actual knowledge of breach giving rise to the 
right. Similarly, under both systems, the buyer may lose his right to reject when he fails to 
exercise his right within a reasonable time. Again, loss of the right to reject under s. 35 (1) (b) 
of the English Sale of Goods Act (subject to sub-section (6)) will substantially be in the same 
circumstances in which it may be lost under Art. 82 (1) of the Convention. 
However, it is possible to say that the Convention seems more generous than English 
Sale of Goods Act. Although the English Sale of Goods Act provides that the buyer will not 
lose his right to reject merely because he has delivered the goods to another under a sub-sale 
or other disposition (s. 35 (6) (b)), acts such as consumption of the goods by the buyer or 
using them in a way which makes the physical return of the goods impossible could result in 
loss of the right to reject under the heading of "acts inconsistent with the seller's ownership" 
(s. 35 (1) (b). Whereas, under the Convention as long as these acts are done in the normal 
97 For a detail discussion see, Chapter Two, Section One, 3.2.2.2. 
98 For a detail discussion see, Chapter Three, Section One, 3.4.3. 
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course of use they will not result in loss of the right (Art. 82 (2) (c). This is perhaps for the 
reason that unlike English law (s. 35 (2)), the buyer may lose his right under Art. 82 of the 
Convention even where he has not had a reasonable time to exan-dne the goods. Similarly, in 
comparing Art. 39 of the Convention with the English Sale of Goods Act 1979, one may argue 
that on the one hand Art. 39 (2) is more generous to the buyer in regard to the time allowed to 
him - this may be the case where the defect was a latent one and could not reasonably have 
been discovered by the buyer within a reasonable time - but on the other hand, while the 
Convention deprives him of all remedies (subject to Arts. 40 and 44) if he fails to notify in 
accordance with Art. 39, under English law his right to claim damages will survive even 
though he has lost his right to reject the goods and treat the contract as repudiated. "' 
As already shown in detail, 100 Shiah law, as its two counterparts, provides certain 
circumstances in which the buyer may lose his right to reject and terminate the contract. 
ShPah jurist have gathered certain circumstances in which the buyer may be treated as having 
impliedly affirmed the contract. These circumstances are comprised under the heading of isqg 
t-eiafih (express intimation to the seller that he will accept the goods) and isq&-e-&mnf 
containing (a) tasarruf (any act as to the goods delivered)'Ol, and (b) takhir (delay) in 
exercising the right to terminate. Apart from the general similarities between this system and 
its two counterparts, ShPah law differs from English law and the Convention in some aspects. 
First, unlike both English law and the Convention, which provide that the buyer's presumed 
knowledge of the lack of conformity giving rise to the right to terminate will be sufficient in 
loss of the right, according to most jurists there will be an effective deemed affirmation of the 
contract only where the buyer has actually discovered such a non-conformity. 102 However, it is 
suggested that the buyer should be taken as having affirmed the contract if a reasonable man in his 
position could have discovered the lack of conformity. He should not be entitled to reject the goods 
and terminate the contract for a defect which could have been discovered by a simple 
99 It is to be noted that in English law "an action founded on simple contract shall not be brought after the 
expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued" (s. 5 of the Limitation Act 1980J. 
Accordingly, an injured party will be entitled to take an action for damages before the court within a period of 
six years. The Convention, however, does not ascertain for how long the buyer could take an action for 
damages. The is perhaps because the issue is covered by another UN Convention, i. e., The 1974 Convention 
on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of Goods (New York), as amended in 1980. Under Art. 8 of 
the latter Convention the limitation period shaU be for four years. But the position of Shiah law is not clear, 
no clear rule exists in this respect 
1974) 
100 See, Chapter Four, Section One, 3.3.3. 
101 As explained before (Chapter Four, Section One, 3.3.3.2., (A), Shiah jurists suggest that the buyer may be 
taken to have consented to the non-conforming goods by the method of tasarrufin three classes of case: use of 
the goods, dealing with them and altering them so that it is not possible to return them in the same condition 
they possessed at the time of delivery 
102 See, e. g., Ansirtri, M. (1375 H. Q. ) at 254,261; Midi, M. A., and Khaei, S. A. (1368 H. S. ) vol. 7 at 108, 
175. 
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examination. The reason is clear: where the buyer who knows or could have known that the 
goods may be defective, failed to examine them he cannot be protected by the principle of la 
olarar. In such a case, he has in fact acted against himself (qaedah-e4qda-m) and should bear 
the risk of his action. 
Second, unlike English law and the Convention under which the buyer will lose his right 
if he fails to exercise it within a reasonable time, the position of ShPah law is not clear. 
According to some jurists the buyer will lose his right to reject and to terminate the contract if 
he has not exercised his rightfi7ran (promptly), while others suggest that he may keep his right 
even after that time. " However, it is suggested that the buyer's right to reject the non- 
conforming goods and terminate the contract must be exercised within a reasonable time. 
Where the buyer who knows or ought to know of the lack of conformity giving rise to the right 
does not exercise his right, he should be deemed to have impliedly waived it. This is because 
the main reason for giving the buyer a right to terminate is, as already shown, the principle of 
A darar. For this purpose, he should be given only an adequate opportunity under which a 
reasonable person can benefit from this legal protection. In addition, where the buyer, knowing 
of his right and being able to exercise it, does not exercise it he will be regarded as having 
acted to his detriment (the principle of iqdaim). 
Position of Non-Conforming Documents. Shiah jurists have not addressed the question 
whether a mere dealing with documents will result in loss of the right to reject for undisclosed 
defects. In the absence of a clear jurisprudential authority, it is suggested that the general 
principle applied to the case of non-conforming goods has to be applied to the case in 
question. Thus, a buyer who deals with documents representing the purchased goods should 
not be taken to have intended to waive his right to reject unless he was actually, or should 
have been, aware of the non-conformity giving rise to the right to reject. Accordingly, where 
the buyer learns later of the fact that the documents possessed a wrong date of shipment, for 
instance, he should be allowed to reject them. The same is true afortiofi as to the buyer's right 
to reject the goods where it proves that they do not conform with the contract conditions. 
Effects of Termination. As explained before", in all three systems, when termination for 
breach of contract validly takes place, it affects both the contract and relations of the parties 
from that time. It brings the contract to an end in respect of the unfulfilled obligations and 
releases both parties from their unperformed primary obligations either wholly or in part as 
the case may be. However, while under English law and the Convention it is expressly 
103 See the references cited in Chapter Four, Section One, 3.3.3.2. (B). 
104 See, Chapter Two, Section One, 4.0; Chapter Three, Section One, 3.5, and Chapter Four, Section One, 3.4. 
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provided that the contract survives termination for the purpose of settling any dispute between 
the parties including the question of damages, Shilah jurist have not addressed the question. 
This is perhaps due to the jurists' failure to examine the principle of compensation on the 
basis of breach of contract. It is, however, suggested that in this system the contract is not 
totally ended. Although the jurists seem to base the buyer's damages for the seller's breach on 
the principles applicable to tort cases, it is suggested, as will be explained later, that these two 
cases are to be distinguished. For the purpose of awarding the buyer damages on account of 
the seller's breach of contract the buyer's legitimate expectations are to be assessed by 
reference to the contract. 
2.0. Specific Performance 
The contract is made to be performed. However, it is not infrequent that the seller seeks to 
evade performance of his own part in order to escape from a bad bargain. In such cases the 
buyer who is aggrieved by the seller's failure to perform the contract may wish to have in 
specie what he bargained for. 105 For this purpose, he may need the assistance of the judicial 
authorities to issue a decree ordering the seller to carry out his contractual obligations. 
Both English law and the Convention have responded to this demand, though in totally 
different ways. As shown before", English law favours damages over specific performance. 
In this system, little significance is given to the idea of compensating an injured buyer by 
coercing the defaulting seller to carry out what he promised. The Sale of Goods Act, placing 
specific performance under the heading of "Buyer's remedies", seems to recognise it as a right 
for the buyer who is aggrieved by the seller's breach. However, the express language of s. 52 
of the Sale of Goods Act and the history of specific performance in English law shows that it 
is not treated as a matter of right for the aggrieved buyer seeking remedy, but is an equitable 
remedy whose exercise is left to the court's discretion. As already seen", specific 
performance of a sale contract may be granted, provided that the court thinks fit, where the 
contract is for sale of specific goods or, in the case of contract for sale of unascertained goods, 
they are already ascertained. Even in those cases, English courts do not generally order 
specific performance of a contract where damages can afford adequate remedy to an injured 
party. "' in any case where the buyer is seeldng the remedy of specific performance he has to 
"5 Long before an English author had identified a number of reasons why a buyer might want to seek specific 
, 
jerformance of the contract (Treitcl, G. H., (1966) 211. See also Secretariat Commentary, (1979) at 38. 
See, Chapter Two, Section Two, 1.0. 
107 See, ibid., 2.0. 
log see, ibid., 3.0. 
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satisfy the court that damages are an inadequate remedy. " Leaving the remedy to the 
discretion of the court may cause some uncertainty; the buyer cannot predict under what 
circumstances the court would be satisfied to accept this remedy. For instance, in Societe Des 
Industries Metallurgiques SA. v. The Bronx Engineering Co. Ltd. " 0, notwithstanding that 
the evidence showed that it would have taken the plaintiffs between nine to twelve months to 
obtain similar goods from an alternative source, the Court of Appeal was not satisfied that the 
case was a proper one for grant of specific performance, for the Court was of the view that the 
goods were of a type obtainable on the market in the ordinary course of business"' and the 
additional loss suffered by the plaintiffs as the result of the delay would have been covered by 
an increased award of damages. In view of the fact that an order for specific performance 
under this system is only likely to be available in exceptional circumstances, it is even less 
likely that an order will be granted where the buyer has demanded that the seller cure his non- 
conforming performance by replacement or repair. 
As far as the remedy of specific performance is concerned, the Convention substantially 
differs from English law. First, unlike English law, the Convention gives the buyer a general 
right to require the seller to perform what he has undertaken under the contract (Art. 46). 
Second, in contrast to English law, specific performance under the Convention has been 
treated as a fight (Art. 45 (1). Accordingly, where the buyer applies for it the court is bound 
to give a judgment ordering the seller to perform his obligation where the requisite 
requirements are satisfied (although Art. 28 of the Convention gives the national courts a 
discretion to depart from the Convention rules if under their national law they do not grant 
specific performance in similar contracts of sale not governed by the Convention). Third, as 
12 shown in the light of the legislative history' , the buyer, unlike in English 
law, is not required 
to show the court that damages are an inadequate remedy; he need not demonstrate inability to 
procure the contract goods elsewhere prior to obtaining specific performance. Likewise, unlike 
in English law, in the case of sale of unascertained goods, identification of the goods to the 
contract is not treated as a pre-requisite to a claim for the remedy of requiring performance 
under the Convention. 
The remedy of specific performance under the Convention has a broad scope. The 
buyer may be entitled, subject to the restrictions provided by the Convention"', to this remedy 
when the seller fails to procure or produce the goods or to deliver them, hand over any 
109 See, e. g., CNMafine Inc. v. Stena Line (The Stena Nautica (No. 2)) [1982] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 336 at 348. 
110 [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 465. 
111 [1975] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 465, Lord Edmund Davies at 468,469. 
112 See, Chapter Tbree, Section Two, 4.6. 
113 See in this respect, ibid., 4.0. 
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documents relating to them at the right place or date fixed in the contract (Arts. 31,33 and 
34). He may also apply to the court for this remedy where the seller refuses to deliver goods, 
hand over any documents relating to them (Art. 30), or where part of the purchased goods are 
missing or does not conform to the contract (Art. 5 1) and do all other acts necessary to fulfil 
the contract as originally agreed. Similarly, the Convention gives the buyer the right to apply 
to the court to enter a judgment ordering the seller to deliver substitute goods or repair the lack 
of conformity in accordance with Art. 46 (2) and (3). When applying for replacement goods, 
what he is required to prove is that the seller's non-conforming delivery is serious enough to 
constitute a 'fundamental breach' (Art. 46 (2). In contrast, when he applies for an order 
requiring the seller to repair the lack of conformity he should only show that his request is not 
unreasonable "having regard to all the circumstances" (Art. 46 (3)). Although according to the 
wide language of this provision the buyer will have a general right to require the seller to cure 
any fonn of lack of conformity by way of repair, the buyer who contemplates resorting to 
these remedies obviously takes the risk that, if the matter comes to litigation, the court may 
hold that to require repair is unreasonable or that the lack of conformity is not sufficiently 
serious to constitute a fundamental breach. Accordingly, although specific performance under 
the Convention may be regarded as the logically prior remedy, in practice the buyer would 
likely prefer the certainty and simplicity of damages, unless repair or replacement is very 
difficult for the buyer to obtain otherwise. 
In comparing ShVah law with the two other systems, it seems that this system has close 
similarities to the Convention. As already seen, ' 14 requiring the defaulting seller to perform his 
contractual obligations is a well-settled remedy amongst Shiah jurists. Because of the jurists' 
failure to address damages as a remedy for breach of contract, one might conclude that they 
appear to regard specific performance as the only primary remedy available in this system for 
an aggrieved party. 
As in the Convention, in ShPah law almost all jurists have recognised specific 
performance as a legal remedy. As shown before' 15, apart from a few jurists who disagreed 
16 
with giving the buyer a broad right to apply for specific performance' , most of them 
hold 
that in any case in which the seller fails to fiilfil one of his contractual obligations the buyer 
has a right to apply to the court for specific performance and the court is bound to give effect 
to his application. Under this interpretation, the court has no power to refuse to accept the 
buyer's application for specific performance and request him to terminate the contract and/or 
114 See, Chapter Four, Section Two, 2.0. 
... See, ibid. 
116 See the references cited in- 3.0., (B) fa. 212. 
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accept damages in lieu. Under this view, an order requiring the seller to supply and deliver the 
subject of sale will be granted unless requiring the seller to perform is impossible. No matter 
whether or not the costs considerably exceed the contract price, or whether or not the buyer is 
able easily to obtain the goods from another source. Likewise, although the jurists have not 
expressly addressed the issue, it seems that their interpretation does not distinguish between 
minor and substantial breaches where the buyer rejects the non-conforming goods and 
demands that the seller deliver conforming replacement. The buyer may be entitled, under this 
view, to demand that the seller deliver replacement goods even if the seller's non-conforming 
delivery does not amount to a substantial breach. According to this view, the court, in fact, 
protects religious rules against the seller's violation and thus is not allowed to ignore the 
infringement of Islamic instructions merely because supply of the goods would considerably 
exceed the contract price. 
On this interpretation, specific performance is a broad remedy and may cover cases 
where the buyer is not entitled to obtain it under the Convention. Under this approach, as long 
as the seller can be compelled to perform, the court has to give effect to the buyer's 
application. Since these jurists have not ascertained the degree of impossibility of 
performance, one may conclude that the court, according to them, should give effect to the 
buyer's application unless the performance of the contract becomes impossible. Moreover, 
this view seems to suggest that the buyer may be entitled to apply for specific performance for 
any lack of conformity. Whereas, under the Convention, in giving effect to the buyer's 
application for specific performance, the court should look at the circumstances of each case 
to ascertain whether or not the buyer's request is reasonable. "' Likewise, under the 
Convention the buyer will not be entitled to demand substitute goods where the lack of 
conformity does not result in a fundamental breach of contract. 
However, by introducing a new reading of the main authorities relied on for this 
purpose"', it was suggested that the above interpretation cannot be accepted in its entirety. 
Under this suggestion, specific performance, contrary to the few jurists who disagreed with it, 
should be regarded as a legal remedy in this legal system but not as an absolute remedy 
applicable in every circumstance, as most jurists seem to suggest. Likewise, the remedy of 
specific performance is not provided in this system only to preserve the pure religious decrees. 
It is set forth to protect the aggrieved party's legitimate expectations under the contract. 
117 The Convention only refers to this qualification in respect of the buyer's demand to cure by repair (Art. 46 
(3), but it is also applicable to demand to cure by delivery of replacement goods. See in this respect, Chapter 
Three, Section Two, 3.2. 
118 See in this respect, Chapter Four, Section Two, 3.0. (c). 
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Accordingly, it is submitted that giving the buyer the right to obtain specific performance 
should be assessed according to the degree of losses and hardship caused to any party by 
giving or refusing specific performance. Under this suggestion, where insisting on specific 
performance is unreasonable in the sense that it inflicts a greater loss on the seller in breach 
than the loss suffered by the buyer for non-performance the court should have power to refuse 
to accept the buyer's application for performance and leave him to his remedy of terminating 
the contract and/or claiming for damages. The suggestion can be supported by the principle of 
1i darar. The Islamic order to respect contractual obligations does not mean that they must be 
performed specifically under any conditions. It is subject to the restriction that it does not 
violate the cardinal principle of Id darar. On this interpretation, specific performance has, in 
general, no priority over the remedy of termination, as most jurists seem to suggest"9, but is 
one of the remedies available for a buyer who is aggrieved by the seller's breach. Accordingly, 
the court in any case should look at all the circumstances, in particular any hardship which 
would be caused to both parties by giving or refusing specific performance, for the purpose of 
implementation of justice. For this purpose, it is the seller in breach who has to satisfy the 
court that specific performance would place him in a difficult position and impose on him 
hardship not the buyer who is given a right to have in specie what the seller has promised 
under the contract. 
Having accepted that the buyer has a right to require the seller to perform what he has 
undertaken under the contract, it is suggested that the Convention provisions giving the buyer 
a right to require the seller to cure his non-conforming delivery by delivery of substitute goods 
and/or repair is consistent with general principles and the authorities authorising the buyer to 
obtain specific performance. However, it is suggested"O that the buyer's right to demand cure 
should be analysed on the principle described above. Thus, the buyer's demand to cure by the 
seller should not be accepted where it causes the seller unreasonable expense or unreasonable 
inconvenience. In such cases, the buyer is to be left to his right to terminate the contract and/or 
claim for damages. Similarly, the buyer should not be given a right to demand delivery of 
replacement goods where the contract was for sale of specific goods, although he may be 
entitled to demand cure by repair. Demanding delivery of substitute goods should be available 
only where the contract is for the sale of unascertained goods. Likewise, it was suggested that 
in giving the buyer a right to demand cure, a distinction should be made between the right to 
demand replacement goods and to demand cure by repair. The right to demand substitute 
119 See, Chapter Four, Section One, 3.2.3.4. 
120 See also, Chapter Four, Section Two, 5.0. 
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goods should be given only where the lack of confonnity results in sufficiently serious 
consequences. But the right to demand cure by repair is to be available unless it is 
unreasonable having regard to all the circumstances. "' 
Although on the suggested interpretation the circumstances in which a buyer may be 
entitled to apply for specific performance are considerably reduced, there are still important 
differences between ShPah and English law. Under this suggestion, the buyer is not required, 
as he is under English law, to satisfy the court that damages are an inadequate remedy for him 
or that the subject of sale is unique which cannot be obtained from another source. What he 
has to show is that the seller has failed to perform his obligations under the contract. It is the 
seller's duty to show that the contract goods are such that alternatives can be obtained from 
another source, and that requiring him to procure and deliver them under the contract would 
place him in a position worse than the buyer would be placed if specific performance is not 
granted. Likewise, unlike in English law, in ShPah law where the criterion, as described 
above, is met the court has no discretion; it has to enter a judgment for specific performance. 
Similarly, although this suggestion, as described above, shows a close similarity to the 
Convention in a number of aspects, it seems that they differ in that, while under the 
Convention delivery of substitute goods will be available for the buyer only where the lack of 
conformity constitutes a fimdamental breach of contract, under ShVah law the buyer may be 
given a right to demand replacement goods where the lack of conformity is, as in the case of 
termination, such that it is not customarily unreasonable for him having regard to all the 
circumstances including the possibility of repair by the seller. 
3.0. Right to Claim for Damages 
As was shown in detail, both English law and the Convention have recognised damages as a 
primary remedy which can be obtained with any of the other remedies previously discussed. 
Under both systems, a breach of contract, no matter what form it takes, always entitles the 
buyer to sue the seller for any loss he has sustained. 122 Likewise, under both systems the 
plaintiff must show that he has suffered loss, caused by the seller's breach of contract, which 
is not too remote. Similarly, both systems have adopted the rule that the injured party is under 
a duty to mitigate his loss and that failure to do so will result in reduction of damages 
recoverable from the party in breach. " English law and the Convention are also similar in 
recognition of a subjective as well as an objective test of foreseeability. A party who seeks to 
121 To justify this distinction, see ibid. 122 Chapter Two, Section Three, 2.1 and 2.2.; Chapter Three, Section Three, 2.1. and 2.2. 123See, Chapter Two, Section Three, 2.3.; Chapter Three, Section Three, 2.3. 
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recover normal damages will not face much difficulty under English law and the Convention. 
Both systems regard the party in breach as having foreseen the loss causing such damages 
according to the standard of a reasonable man. Accordingly, the injured party is not required 
to prove that the loss in question was actually foreseeable by the party in breach at the time of 
contract. ' 24 
The other similarity appears as to the time of determining whether or not a particular 
loss was foreseeable by the party in breach. In this respect, both systems require that the time 
for determining what is foreseeable is the time of making the contract (Art. 74). " In addition 
to the foregoing similarities, under both systems an injured party can recover damages for the 
loss incurred without being required to prove any fonn of fault, negligence or intentional 
breach. Under both systems, the party in breach will be regarded as liable even he can prove 
that he did not conunit the breach intentionally or he was not at fault or negligence. ' 26 
Despite the similarities in general principles, the two systems depart from each other in 
their detailed provisions. The first difference appears in the degree of foreseeability of 
consequential losses. As explained before, "' under English law, as the House of Lords made 
clear (though by using different terminology) in The Heron 11"", the Convention criterion is 
applicable to tort cases rather than contract ones. According to the rule under The Heron II, in 
contract cases, the losses will not be recoverable unless there is a "serious possibility" of their 
occurrence and not merely 'foreseeable'. Thus, the Convention criterion that provides that 
losses only need to be 'foreseeable' certainly ought to narrow the limitations of Hadley v. 
Baxendale and widen the scope of recovery. For this reason, the House of Lords explicitly 
rejected the use of the term "foreseeability" in the context of contract-damages claims and 
suggested that the term should be confined to tort cases. Accordingly, the language of the 
English standard makes it less likely that the seller will be held liable for consequential 
damages than does the Convention test. However, one may argue that the English approach 
seems more favourable for the buyer than the Convention one, since in English law, provided 
that the type of loss could reasonably be contemplated as a serious possibility, the seller would 
be liable for all losses of that type, even though they may be far greater in extent than what 
was expected. 129. Whereas, under the Convention the test of recoverable loss is, as the 
language of Art. 74 suggests, that the seller did, or could have foreseen the precise amount of 
124 Chapter Two, Section Three, 2.3.2.2.; Chapter Three, Section Three, 2.3.2. 
125 As to English law see, Chapter Two, Section Three, 2.3.2.3., particularly, fiL 316. 
126 Chapter Two, Section Three, 2.3.4.; Chapter Three, Section Mee, 2.3.4. 
127 Chapter Two, Section Three, 2.3.2.3. 
128 [1969] 1 AC 350. 
129 See, Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v Uttley Ingham & Co Led [1978] QB 791. 
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it at the time of the Contract. 13' But, as already pointed out"', the rule under Parsons 
(Livestock) Ltd. v Uttley Ingham & Co Dd132 in English law has been criticised by academic 
writers and it is possible to say that the rule has not resolved the problem which arises in cases 
such as Victoria Laundry (Windsor) v. Newman Industries Dd133. In that case, 
notwithstanding that the type of loss (loss of profits) was foreseeable, the Court of Appeal 
held that some lost profits were not recoverable. 
The second possible difference between the Convention and English approaches appears 
in the presumed state of knowledge of the seller in breach. In English law, as in the 
Convention, knowledge of the ordinary course of events is imputed to the party in breach. But 
in the case of consequential losses he must, as the judgment of Asquith LJ shows, have actual 
knowledge "of special circumstances outside the 'ordinary course of things' of such a kind 
that a breach in those special circumstances would be liable to cause more IOSS. 9434 Under the 
Convention, however, it appears to be sufficient if a man in the position of the seller in breach 
exercising reasonable care would have known of those special circumstances, even though the 
seller in breach in fact did not know of them. If a reasonable man would have learnt of those 
circumstances, the seller in breach would be held liable for any loss which, had he known of 
these circumstances, he ought as a reasonable man to have foreseen that loss as a possible 
consequence of his breach. 135 
A ftirther difference between these two systems appears in the context of computation 
of normal damages. As already seen in detail, "' under English sale of goods law, the buyer's 
normal damages are to be measured by reference to the market price where the goods of the 
contract description are available for the buyer (s. 51 (3) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979). 
Under this rule no great significance is in principle given to the resale or substitute purchase 
price. In contrast, under the Convention the buyer's normal damages are first to be measured 
by reference to the actual price he has paid for purchase of substitute goods (Art. 75). Under 
this rule, the market price should not be relied on even where the substitute transaction price is 
higher or lower than the market price. "' The market price will be relied on where the buyer 
has not made an actual substitute transaction according to the requirements of Art. 75. 
"0 See in this respect, Chapter Three, Section Three, 2.3.2.2. 
131 Chapter Two, Section Three, 2.3.2.3. 
132 f 1978] QB 79 1. 
133 [1949] 2 KB 528 at 539. 
134 Asquith L. J. in Victoria Laundry (Windsor) v. Newman Industries Ltd [1949] 2 KB 528 at 539. 135 See also, Sutton, K. C., (1977) at 102. 
136 See, Chapter Two, Section Three, 2.4.1.1. 
137 This would be in favour of the seller in breach and will give him a chance to benefit from a good bargain 
made by the injured buyer. However, the buyer will be entitled to recover damages for further loss he may 
sustained as a consequence of the seller's breach (Art. 75). 
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Despite this difference, it seems that in practice the difference between English and the 
Convention tests is not likely to be considerable, since it would be the case under the 
Convention only where the buyer has made the substitute transaction in a reasonable manner, 
and within a reasonable time after avoidance of the contract as described before. "" If the 
buyer has made a substitute transaction at a price substantially different from the market 
price, he will have difficulty in showing that he acted reasonably. 139Likewise, the Convention 
only applies the substitute-transaction fonnula where the buyer has bought the replacement 
goods. It does not make clear whether his damages are to be measured by reference to this 
formula or the market price rule where he has re-sold the contract goods. Since Art. 75 of the 
Convention makes express reference to the case of buyer's purchase, one may argue that the 
other case is excluded. Accordingly, as in English law, under the Convention rule the seller 
will not be entitled to rely on the buyer's actual sub-sale to reduce his liability to pay 
damages, as the buyer will not be entitled to rely on the sub-sale price to increase the seller's 
liability if he resold them in a price lower than the market price. In this way, it can be said that 
the buyer under the Convention, as in English law"01. may be entitled to recover the market 
price where he resold the contract goods at a price less or higher than the relevant market 
price. 
However, some differences between the two tests would remain. First, under the 
Convention, the injured party who has made substitute transaction is deemed as have acted in 
reasonable manner (according to market price) unless the party in breach shows that the sub- 
contract price is unreasonably higher than the available market price, while in English law it is 
the injured party who has to satisfy the court that he has acted according to the market which 
was available for him. Second, the distinction is likely to be significant where there is a market 
and the substitute contract actually made by the aggrieved buyer is more favourable to him 
dm one which he could have made in the market. 
Another difference between the two systems may appear in respect of the time at which 
the market price is to be determined. In the Convention, it is in general the time at which the 
139 See, Chapter Three, Section Three, 2.4.2.1. 
139 See also, Nicholas, B., (1989) at 23 1; Treitel, G. H., (1988), Para. 102. 
140 In English law, as already seen (see Chapter Two, Section Three, 2.4.1.2. ), the market price rule is a prima 
facie rule and will not apply if there is no available market for the contract goods or its application is seen as 
inappropriate. For this reason it has been accepted that where the buyer has bought to sell to his sub-buyer the 
very same goods he purchased from the seller as specific goods (see R&H. Hall Ltd. v. W. H. Pim (Junior) & 
Co. Ltd. [1928] 33, Com. Cas. 324; see also Williams Bros v. Ed. T. Agius Ltd. [19141 A. C. 510 at 523; The 
Arpad [1934] 40 Com. Cas. 16 at 24), or he has fixed the same delivery date in the contract of resale as in the 
original contract (Kwei Tek Chao v. British Tmders and Shippers, [1954] 2 Q. B. 459 at 489490), his damages 
are to be measured by reference to sub-transaction price if such special circumstances were reasonably 
contemplated by the seller at the time of original contract. 
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contract has been declared avoided by the buyer (Art. 76 (1), whereas the moment under the 
Sale of Goods Act is broadly the time at which the seller's duty to deliver becomes due (s. 51 
(3)). "" It seems that the divergence between the two criteria would not in fact be substantial in 
the ordinary case. This is because first, an injured buyer who delays in avoiding the contract 
at a time when the market is changing may under the Convention be held to have failed to 
perform his duty to mitigate the loss. Second, the buyer will lose his right to avoid the contract 
if he does not do so within a reasonable time after he knew or ought to have known of the lack 
of conformity (Art. 49 (2)). Moreover, the Convention, by providing that where the buyer 
claiming damages has avoided the contract after taking over the goods the current price is to 
be determined by reference to the time of such taking over rather than the time of avoidance 
(Art. 76 (1) sent. 2), has in fact prevented the buyer from speculating at the expense of the 
seller by holding non-conforming goods until a fall in the market makes avoidance 
advantageous. In one case, however, the practical divergence between the two formulae may 
seem substantial, that is, in that of anticipatory repudiation. The Sale of Goods Act rule, as 
seen previously'4, has given rise to difficulties in this case and it was suggested by the decided 
cases that the time-default formula should not be extended to the case of anticipatory 
repudiation. Whereas, the Convention time of avoidance-formula, as some commentators 
suggeSt143, seems applicable to the case of anticipatory breach. 
A further divergence may appear between the two formulae in respect of the time for 
determining the market price where documentary sales are involved. Although the English Sale 
of Goods Act does not expressly address the point, English case law provides that damages 
are to be measured at the time of tender of documents'44, whereas under the Convention the 
general rule is the time when the buyer declares the contract avoided. However, with a broad 
interpretation of the phrase "taking over" in Art. 76 (2), one may argue that in such a case 
damages are to be measured from the time of taking over the documents, since the term does 
not refer only to the physical possession of the goods but also includes control over them. 
Another possible divergence between the two formulae appears in respect of the time 
for determining the value of conforming and non-conforming goods. While the English Sale of 
Goods Act 1979 provides that it has to be determined by reference to the difference between 
the value of the sound and defective goods at the time of delivery to the buyer (s. 53 (3)), 145 
141 See also, DIT's Consultative Documentý (1989) at 46. 
142 See, Chapter Two, Section Three, 2.4.5., fii. 415. 
143 See e. g., Nicholas, B., (1989) at 231-2; DTI's Consultative Document, (1989) at 46. 
144 See, Chapter Two, Section Three, 2.4.5. 
145 The rule, as prescribed in the English Sale of Goods Actý has been criticised as being too strict and give rise 
to possible injustice in a number of ways. See in this respect, Greig, D. W., (1974) at 272. One may argue that 
the language of s. 53 (3) which suggests that in the case of non-conforming delivery the moment of 
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the Convention seems to leave the issue to the arbitrators to decide what they see an 
appropriate in any particular case. 146 However, as explained before, 147 the rule that the buyer's 
damages should be assessed by reference to the market price at the time of delivery is only a 
'prima facie' rule from which the English courts have departed in a number of cases as an 
inappropriate time. 
The Convection also differs from English law in relation to the place for determining 
the market price. While the Convention expressly recognises the place of delivery as a place 
for determining the current price (Art. 76 (2), the English Sale of Goods Act does not make 
any reference to the place at which the market price is to be measured. Despite the silence of 
the Act, it has been suggested that damages are generally to be measured by reference to the 
market price of the place at which the goods were to be delivered under the contract. "' 
However, this test may be too rigid if the place of receipt of the goods and the place of 
delivery are different, as they often are. In English law, it has been suggested that if it was to 
the knowledge of both buyer and seller that goods are bought c. i. f. and f. o. b. for shipment to a 
particular market, the relevant values to be taken into consideration are the values of the goods 
upon that market on arrival there. "' In the case of the Convention it can be said that 
presumably there is some flexibility in Art. 76 (2) and a court may be able to substitute the 
price obtaining at the place of arrival of the goods where that is more reasonable market for a 
hypothetical covering purchase. "' Where there is no market at the place of delivery the 
Convention provides that damages are to be measured by reference to the market of an 
alternative place which serves as a reasonable substitute. A similar suggestion has been made 
in English law. "' 
As seen above, both English law and the Convention have given great significance to 
damages. But due to the failure of ShPah jurists to address 'damages' as a remedy for breach 
of contract, the position of this remedy in Shiah contract law is so unclear that it makes a 
comparative treatment impossible. However, in the ShPah law chapter it was shown that there 
are general principles which could be applied to the case. "' In light of what was discussed 
assessment is the time when the seller has made actual non-conforming delivery may include delivery before 
the time for delivery of contract goods. Accordingly, it may be slight difference between non-delivery and 
non-conforming delivery cases. 
146 See in this respect, the suggestion of the UNMRAL Secretariat cited in: Chapter Three, Section Three, 
2.4.1., fa. 246. 
147 See, Chapter Two, Section Three, 2.4.5. 
148 See the refrences cited in: Chapter Two, Section Three, 2.4.6., fh. 429. 
149 See e. g., Diplock L. J. inAryeh v. Lawrence Kostoris & Son Ltd. [196711 Lloyd's rep. 63 at 71 and 734. 
150 See also, Ziegel, I& Samson, C., (1981) Art. 76. 
151 See, Anorney-General Rep of Ghana v. Texaco Overseas Tank Ships Ltd. (The Texaco Melbourne) [199311 
Lloyd's Rep, 471; Bridge, M., (1994 ) at 157. 
152 See Chapter Four, Section Three, 2.2. 
Chapter Five: CDmparative Assessment 354 
there, it can be said that, as in English law and the Convention, in ShPah law an injured buyer 
has a general right to claim damages for any loss he has suffered as a consequence of the 
seller's action (breach of contract) and this right can be exercised with any of the remedies 
previously discussed. "' Similarly, as in its two counterparts, in ShPah law the buyer seeking 
damages must show that he has suffered loss, caused by the seller's breacW", which must 
have been foreseeable by the seller in breach when the contract was made. "' He is also not 
required to show any kind of taddi or tafrit. "6 
Despite the similarities between ShVah law and its two counterparts in general aspects, 
this system, as described in the fourth chapter, seems to depart from English law and the 
Convention in its detailed provisions. First, as was showný 57 . according to ShPah law, the 
seller should only be held liable when in light of information actually given to him or which he 
could reasonably have obtained from the facts and circumstances which exist at the time of the 
contract he did actually foresee or could reasonably have foreseen it as a most likely result of 
his breach of contract. This criterion would surely be stricter than the Convention test and 
much closer to the English test. However, ShVah law will differ from English law in that while 
in English law making the seller in breach liable will be sufficient if the occurrence of the type 
of loss is seriously possible to result, in ShPah law, as under the Convention, the whole 
amount of the loss must be foreseeable as most likely. "' 
One may argue that ShPah law also differs from both English law and the Convention 
in respect of the duty to mitigate loss. This possibility can initially be supported on the ground 
that no ShPah jurist has addressed 'duty to mitigate' as a requirement for recoverability of 
loss caused by breach, even where dealing with tort cases (the typical place for discussing the 
law of damages). Accordingly, the buyer may be entitled to claim damages even for losses he 
could have avoided if he had acted reasonably. However, although in this system it is difficult 
to say that an injured party is under a 'duty to mitigate' his loss, "" it is suggested that the 
seller should not be held liable for losses the buyer could have avoided if he had acted 
reasonably. 'Me suggestion, as discussed before", can be supported on the ground that a 
153 See, Chapter Four, Section Three, 2.2. 
154 See, ibid., 2.3.1. 
155 See, ibid., 2.3.2. 
156 See, ibid., 2.3.4. 
157 See, ibid., 2.3.2.2. 
158 See, ibid. 
"' On this basis, it can be said that the buyer will not be able to recover damages for losses he sustained when 
taking reasonable measures to minimise his loss. In any case, the general criterion for recovery of damages is 
that the loss sustained is customarily attributable to the seller, which was foreseeable to him at the time of the 
contract. 
160 For further arguments in favour of this restriction in this system see, Chapter Four, Section Three, 2.3.3. 
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defaulting seller, as indicated above, will be responsible for those damages caused by his 
actions provided that they were foreseeable by him when the contract was made. Where 
damage is customarily attributable to the buyer rather than the seller in breach it is the buyer 
who must bear the consequences of his conduct. On this basis, the "causation" principle might 
be found to operate in the same way that the mitigation principle does in English law and the 
Convention. Accordingly, the explicit mitigation principle under English law and the 
Convention strengthens results that one could reach by the principle of causation under Shiah 
law. 
Further differences may appear between ShVah law on the one hand and English law 
and the Convention on the other hand in the detailed provisions on quantification of damages. 
As was already pointed out161 , relying on the rules the jurists have developed in the context of 
tort claims"", it was suggested that the English rules are more compatible with this system. 
Accordingly, damages for breach of contract are basically to be assessed by reference to the 
'difference in value' rule and that this basic rule should be implemented by the 'market price' 
rule where the contract goods have an available market. On this suggestion, ShPah law would 
be more similar to English law than the Convention. As in English law, the buyer's damages 
are in principle to be measured by reference to the market price if the contract goods have an 
available market. Accordingly, neither should the buyer be entitled to rely on the substitute 
transaction price (if he has for example purchased the replacement goods or resold the 
purchased goods in a price higher than the market price) nor should the seller in breach have 
an option to rely on the actual price (if the buyer, for instance, purchased or resold in a price 
less than the market price). However, the rule may cease to work in certain cases. This is the 
case where the purchased goods have no sufficient equivalent in the market (i. e., qimi) or 
application of the rule becomes inappropriate. In such cases, the buyer's damages are to be 
measured by reference to the general principle, that is, an estimate of the sum which will place 
the aggrieved buyer into the same position as if the seller had performed the contract rightly. 
In those cases, the court has to decide the case in accordance with relevant factors such as the 
contract price or the price which a second purchaser paid or was prepared to pay for it. On 
this rule, if the buyer's sub-sale was foreseeable by the seller when the contract was made the 
actual price offered by the sub-buyer should be used for the measurement of the buyer's 
damages. 
161 See, Chapter Four, Section Tlircc, 2.4.2. 
162 See, ibid., 2.4.1. 
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As explained before, the point of time for determining the market price is not clear in 
Shi'ah law. However, relying on the different time points the jurists have suggested in tort 
cases"", it was suggested that the proper rule applicable to breach of sale contracts should in 
principle be the time of breach, that is, the time when the seller fa ils to perform his duty to 
deliver goods conforming to the contract requirements. However, since the "time of breach 
criterion" may give rise to injustice in some cases, it was suggested"' that, as in English law, 
it should be regarded as a 'primafacie' rule from which the court could depart in appropriate 
circumstances. 
A further gap in ShPah law is at what place the value of the contract goods should be 
165 ascertained. Relying on the various solutions suggested by the jurists in tort cases. , it was 
suggested that the question is to be answered by reference to the place at which the seller 
should have performed his delivery obligation. However, the case will be unclear where the 
place of delivery lacks an available market for the purchased goods. No jurisprudential 
statement can be found in this respect. It is, however, suggested that the Convention solution 
can be a useful one, that is, "the price at such other place as serves as a reasonable substitute" 
(Art. 76 (2). Likewise, as in English law, it is suggested that where it was to the knowledge of 
the parties to the contract when it was made that the purchased goods will be shipped to a 
particular place the buyer's damages should be measured by reference to the market of that 
place. 
4.0. Right to Reduce the Contract Price 
In some jurisdictions, an injured buyer is given a further monetary relief Under this remedy he 
is given a right to reduce the contract price unilaterally where the seller has delivered non- 
conforming goods. The buyer may be entitled to reduce the price without being required to 
prove that he has suffered loss as a consequence of the seller's breach; price reduction is not 
compensatory, but primarily restitutionary in nature and is designed to prevent the seller from 
unjust enrichment. 
In this respect, ShPah law departs from English law and becomes closer to the 
Convention. English law, as seen before, "' has not recognised such a remedy. The closest 
English law counterpart may be the 'set-off rule provided in s. 53 (1) (a) of the Sale of Goods 
Act 1979. But price reduction, as prescribed under the Convention and ShPah law, is 
"3 See, Chapter Four, Section Tliree, 2.4.3. 
164 See, ibid. 
"5 See, ibid., 2.4.4. 
166 See, Chapter Two, Section Ilree, 1.0,2.4.2.3. 
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substantially different from the English law rule. Under the Convention and ShVah law, the, 
remedy of reduction in price is available even where the buyer has already paid the price, 
while the English rule applies only where the buyer has not paid the price in advance. Another 
important difference between this remedy and s. 53 of the English Sale of Goods Act is that 
price reduction under the Convention and Shiah law covers cases in which he may be unable 
to claim damages but nevertheless wish to keep goods that do not conform to the contract. For 
this reason, the buyer can reduce the price without having to be concerned with Art. 74 
defences such as foreseeability of damages, force majeure (i. e., Art. 79 exemptions) or failure 
to mitigate losses under Art. 77. Whereas, the set-off rule can be relied on only where the 
buyer is entitled to claim damages. This is perhaps the reason why s. 53 of the English Sale of 
Goods Act has not placed the set-off rule under a separate section, as it did in respect of the 
other remedies. This shows that the set-off rule is not a separate remedy but it is, in fact, a 
particular means of exercising the right to damages. Under this rule, the buyer is given an 
option either to claim damages as described above or to withhold a part or all of the contract 
price as a self-help where the seller sues him for the price. 
In contrast, as was shown in detail 167 . both the Convention and ShVah law have 
recognised reduction in price as a separate remedy. Under both systems, price reduction can 
be effectuated by the buyer's unilateral declaration. Thus, no court action or even seller's 
agreement is required, unless the seller disagrees with the buyer as to the existence of a non- 
conformity or to the monetary consequences of that non-confom-dty. Similarly, both systems 
provide that reduction of price is to be measured by reference to the proportional reduction of 
the price of goods according to the ratio of the value of conforming goods to that of the goods 
actually delivered. "" 
However, despite the similarity of ShPah law with the Convention in some general 
aspects, considerable differences can be found between the Convention and Shiah law, as 
described in the present Shiah jurisprudence, in their detailed provisions. Under the 
Convention, as already discussed in detail, "" according to the general language of Art. 50, 
price reduction may be made either where the seller has delivered but "the goods do not 
conform with the contract" in quantity, quality and description or are not contained or 
packaged in the manner required by the contract (Art. 35 (1)), while most jurists in ShPah law 
suggest that the buyer can only claim arsh (price reduction) where the seller has delivered 
167 Scc, Chaptcr Tlirec, Scction Thrcc, 3.2., 3.3. and 3.5.; Chaptcr Four, Scction Thrcc, 3.1. 
168 Ibid., 3A, rcspectively. 
169 Chaptcr Tlircc, Scetion Tbrcc, 3.3. 
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defective goods. "' Second, under the Convention the right of price reduction does not preclude 
the buyer from clain-dng damages for any consequential losses he has sustained (Art. 45 (2), 
while under ShPah law the position is unclear. No jurist has addressed the relationship of arsh 
and damages. Third, as was explained"', Art. 50 of the Convention seems also to cover cases 
where the seller has rendered a partially non-conforming delivery, while the position of ShPah 
law is unclear. Fourth, price reduction under the Convention may be claimed whether the 
contract is for sale of specific or unascertained goods, while almost all ShPah jurists suggest 
that it can be claimed only where the seller of specific goods has delivered defective goods. "' 
A further difference between the two systems appears in respect of the time for determining 
the value of conforming and non-conforming goods. While the Convention expressly provides 
that the decisive time for calculation of the price difference between conforming and non- 
conforming goods is the time of delivery of the goods, in Shilah law there is no settled view 
amongst the jurists. Various criteria have been suggested. "' However, both systems are silent 
in respect of the place at which the value of the non-conforming goods must be determined. It 
seems that in both systems the case is left to the court to decide the appropriate place 
according to the special circumstances of any particular case. "4 A further significant 
difference between the two systems appears in that under the Convention price reduction is 
distinguished from the right to terminate the contract. For this reason, it is not subject to the 
various limitations applicable to termination of the contract, such as exercising it within a 
reasonable time, and fundamentality of breach, whereas in ShPah law, as it now stands, the 
jurists, treating price reduction as a part of the 'option of defect', extend almost all the 
requirements applicable to the right to terminate the contract to the right to claim arsh. For 
this reason, the buyer will be entitled to claim arsh only in cases where he is given the right to 
terminate the contract and he will lose the first under the same circumstances in which he will 
lose the second. 
However, in light of the analysis of the rewayat authorising the buyer to claim arsh and 
general principles, it was suggested that arsh should be regarded as a general remedy"' and 
distinct from the right to claim damages"' and that of termination. " It should be given to the 
buyer in any case where the seller benefits from his non-conforming delivery at the expense of 
'70 Chapter Four, Section Three, 3.2.2. 
171 Chapter Three, Section Three, 3.3. 
172 Chapter Four, Section Three, 3.2.2. 
173 See, ibid., 3.4.1. 
174 See, Chapter Three, Section Three, 3.4.2. and, Chapter Four, Section Three, 3.4.2. 
175 Chapter Four, Section Three, 3.2.2. 
176 See, ibid., 3.6. 
177 See, ibid., 3.3. 
Chapter Five: Comparative Assessment 359 
the buyer. This suggestion would bring ShPah law close to the Convention. In this event, as in 
the Convention, the buyer will be able to claim arsh where the seller has delivered goods 
which do not conform with the contract in quantity, quality and description required by the 
contract. It would also be available for the buyer even in the case of sale of unascertained 
goods. Similarly, arsh in this system will, as in the Convention, be subject to the requirements 
appropriate to itself. On this basis, unlike the right to terminate, the right to claim arsh will 
not be lost if the buyer has not exercised it promptly. There must, however, be some time limit 
after that the buyer should not be entitled to claim arsh. This can be a point of difference 
between ShPah law and the Convention. Although the Convention provides that where the 
buyer fails to notify the seller of any lack of conformity within a reasonable time after he 
discovered or ought to have discovered it he will not be entitled to rely on the lack of 
conformity (including reducing the contract price), it fails to provide a time limitation for 
exercising the right to claim price reduction. Whereas, in ShPah law it seems that the buyer 
should be required to use his right within a reasonable time. "" On the basis of the suggestion 
made in this study, the right to claim arsh should also, as in the Convention, be subject to the 
seller's right to cure the lack of conformity of the goods delivered to the buyer within a 
reasonable time (Art. 50 of the Convention). "' 
178 To justify the suggestion, see Chapter Four, Section Three, 3.5.2. 
179 See, ibid. 
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In the introduction of this thesis it was said that the primary purpose of this study is to answer the 
question: could ShPah law be used as a system to govern modem sale transactions? At the outset, 
it was claimed that because of a number of areas of uncertainty and substantial gaps, current 
ShPah law is not capable of being an appropriate system in this regard. This actually proved to be 
true in the course of an extensive study of this system in one of the areas in which the jurists have 
done a great deal of work. This study shows that present ShVah law suffers from two substantial 
deficiencies. 
(1) Gaps and Areas of Uncertainty in the Law 
For instance, although a close interpretation of the jurists' statements in respect of the buyer's 
right to reject non-conforming goods reveals that the current ShPah law recognises the right as a 
remedy distinct from the right to terminate the contract, ' it does not address the question: what 
lack of conformity will give rise to the right to reJeCt? 2 It is also not clear whether the buyer has a 
3 partial rejection right and if so, under what circumstances he can exercise this right. More 
importantly, present ShPah law does not deal with the question whether under a documentary sale 
contract the buyer is entitled to reject documents where the seller has failed to hand them over in 
accordance with the contract and if so, what relation is there between this right and the right to 
reject non-confonydng goods. 4 
Further substantial gaps and uncertainty exist in respect of the buyer's right to terminate 
the contract. Although the jurists have made a sharp distinction between the right to reject and that 
of termination in the case of a contract for sale of unascertained goods, no ShPah jurist has 
addressed whether the seller has a right to cure, and if so, how this right could work in this 
system? More importantly, no jurist has made clear when the buyer can terminate a contract for 
sale of unascertained goods? Moreover, it is not clear why the buyer should have an absolute right 
to terminate a contract for sale of specific goods. Substantial gaps also exist in respect of 
5 remedies for breach of severable contracts and late performance. 
1 See, Chapter Four, Section One, 2.2.2.1., 2.2.2.2. 
2 See, ibid., 2.2.2.3. 
3 See, ibid., 2.2.3. 
4 See, ibid., 2.2.4. 
5 See, ibid., 3.1. 
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There is further uncertainty and gaps in relation to the remedy of specific performance. 
Despite the fact that the jurists give priority to the remedy of specific performance, 6 it is not clear 
to what extent the court should give effect to the buyer's application for specific performance. 
Similarly, no jurist has examined the question whether the aggrieved buyer is entitled to require 
the seller to make a substitute delivery or to repair defects in the case of defective delivery? If so, 
is there any difference between these two forms of requiring performanCef 
A further substantial gap exists in relation to damages and price reduction (arsh). Although 
current ShPah law recognises price reduction as a separate remedy, surprisingly, no jurist has 
even addressed damages as a remedy. Under present Shilah jurisprudence, it is difficult to say that 
an injured buyer has a right to claim damages. Assuming that he has such a right, it is not clear 
under what circumstances can he exercise his right? What losses are recoverable? How are the 
recoverable damages to be measured? Moreover, the position of the right to claim arsh is not 
clear. While a few jurists suggest that the remedy is to be recognised for any form of lack of 
conformity, a substantial number suggest that it is an exceptional remedy which can be available 
where the seller of specific goods has delivered defective goods. 9 In addition, no jurist has 
examined properly the relationship between this remedy and the right to terminate the contract. 10 
Likewise, at the present situation it is not clear how this remedy could be related to the right to 
claim damages. 
(2) Inadequacy of the Way This System Currently Deals with the System of Remedies 
In addition to uncertainty and substantive gaps, this study reveals that current ShPah law also 
suffers from a significant weaknesses in relation to the way this system deals with the remedies 
available to the injured buyer. At the present time, almost all jurists suggest that an immediate 
right to terminate the contract is available only where the seller of specific goods has delivered 
non-conforming goods. The right to reduce the contract price is also confined to the sale of 
defective specific goods. But in the case of sale of unascertained goods (which is often the case in 
the context of commercial contracts) the dominant opinion amongst Shiah jurists is that where the 
seller has made a non-conforming delivery the buyer has only a right to reject and demand 
delivery of conforming goods. Neither he is entitled to accept non-conforming goods and reduce 
the contract price nor is he entitled to terminate the contract. Termination will be allowed only 
6 See, Chapter Four, Section Two, 2.0. 
7 See, ibid., 1.0. 
8 See, ibid., Section Tbree, 2.1. 
9 See, ibid., 3.2.2. 
" See, ibid., 3.3. 
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when compelling the defaulting seller to perform is impossible. Since the concept and degree of 
impossibility of compulsion on which termination will be justified has not been clearly determined, 
it may give an uncontrolled discretionary power to the court in deciding whether or not the seller 
can be compelled. Such a broad discretionary rule would in turn lead to great uncertainty. 
Moreover, the jurists' unwillingness to address damages as a remedy for breach of contract may 
signify that they do not attach significance to this remedy. 
It is submitted that insisting on the remedy of specific performance and failure to provide 
an adequate law of damages is inconsistent with the realities of the commercial world. Damages 
are a commercially vital remedy. Although specific perfonnance may be a useful remedy in some 
cases, in the context of commercial contracts the buyer needs goods at the agreed time. If the 
seller does not render a correct performance at the agreed time later performance, or cure, will 
often cause the buyer substantial loss. The buyer must then be compensated. If this system could 
not provide an adequate law of damages it will not be capable of being a proper system in this 
regard. 
It seems to the writer that the origins of the current situation of ShVah law lie in two main 
factors. The first is due to the method of inferring legal rules from the relevant sources. 
11istorically, this system was primarily developed by Shlah jurists in the context of theoretical 
discussions rather than by judges in resolving the factual problems referred to them. The jurists 
over centuries have constantly dealt with hypothetical cases, or those cases reflected in the texts of 
rewayat and jurisprudential statements of the eminent jurists in the early centuries of development 
of ShPah law. This method has constantly been repeated by the jurists. Even at the present time it 
is difficult to find a jurist who is inclined to deal with the legal issues actually involved in society. 
They still prefer to proceed in this way to infer detailed provisions. " 
The second, by far the most important factor, is due to a particular understanding of the 
sources upon which a legal view is to be based. 'Me common practice of the jurists, although it is 
not expressly referred to, is that both the legal issues and the solution are to be inferred from the 
sources offeqh. By definition, the main sources would in actual fact be the Quranic rules and 
those contained in rewiyat, a mass of dispersed texts containing various general and specific 
12 rules. 
11 This is the reason why the jurists over centuries have been dealing with the similar issues to infer detailed 
12 
provisions and little development can be seen in Shiah jurisprudence during the two later centuries. 
See in this respect Chapter One, 2.2. 
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The author believes that if the existing jurisprudential method is used to deal with the legal 
issues ShVah law will never be able to meet the modem situations. Legal issues are due to the 
legal life of individuals and human community. They are to be identified through scientific 
methods and human experiences. The sources offeqh such as Quran and Sunnah (tradition) 13 Will 
never explain to a jurist what the legal issue is. The author also believes that this per se will not 
be adequate. Tradition and Quranic rules will certainly not suffice a jurist to infer the needed 
detailed provisions. 14 
It is therefore suggested to reconsider both the way of dealing with the legal issues and the 
reliability of the secondary sources of law. It seems to the writer, the best, and most practical, way 
to deal with new situations is to rely on banX& al- uqalj (traditions of the learned). The author 
believes that legal solutions suggested in developed legal systems could be regarded as clear 
instances of banX& al- uqalA since developed legal systems reflect the attitudes of judges, 
lawyers and the results of scientific researches. Accordingly, if no contrary rule, whether 
expressly or impliedly, can be found those rules could be accepted in the jurisprudence (feqh) as 
legitimate rules. 15 On this basis, in any legal context, whether sale of goods or other areas of law, 
it is suggested to exan-dne first the issue in question under developed systems of law to identify the 
questions and the way they are dealt with and then to deal with how those questions could be 
answered under ShVah law. 
The author believes that if the suggested method is used Shiah law could properly be 
developed and answer the new questions which arise in any particular area of law. This actually 
demonstrated to be true in the field of the law of remedies. In light of this method, the author dealt 
with first the law governing the buyer's remedies under English sale of goods law and the 
Convention in order to identify the relevant questions and the way they are dealt with and then 
under ShPah law. On this basis, the author could systernatise the law governing the buyer's 
remedies for the seller's non-conforming delivery, fill in the substantive gaps and cure 
substantially the areas of uncertainty which exist in current ShPah law in the following. 
(1) Gaps Filling 
A close analysis of the jurists' jurisprudential statements and general principles demonstrates that 
in ShPah law an aggrieved buyer should be given a separate right to reject the seller's non- 
13 For a detail discussion of these two sources of Shiah law see, ibid., 2.1.1.1., and, 2.1.1.2. 
14 For more detail see, ibid., 3.0. 
15 For more detail see, ibid., 4.0. 
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conforming delivery only when it is not customarily unreasonable for the buyer unless it is proved 
that it was the mutual intention of the contracting parties that any lack of conformity should give 
rise to the right to reject. '6 
Similarly, despite the jurists' failure to examine the buyer's right to reject non-confonning 
documents, it seems to the writer that the English law rules" could work in this system, since this 
right is consistent with the settled customary law" as well as with general principles already 
examined. '9 Under such a contract the buyer should be given two separate rights: to reject non- 
conforming documents and non-conforming goods and in some cases he may be entitled to benefit 
from one after he has lost the other. 20 
Likewise, it is suggested that in Shilah law termination should primarily be based on the 
serious breach (Ij darar); the buyer should be given the right to terminate the contract when the 
actual or/and foreseeable detriment (diarar) caused by the seller's non-conforming delivery is of 
such a degree that a reasonable man would not overlook it. However, where the court is satisfied 
that it was a condition of the contract that the seller had undertaken to make a perfect delivery the 
buyer will have an immediate right to reject and terminate the contract even though the breach is 
21 not actually substantial. The same rule is also applicable where the seller has rendered a late 
delivery. 22 This would, however, be the case where the contract is non-severable. Where the 
contract is construed as severable, termination of the contract as a whole is to be permitted only 
where the seller's defective delivery in respect of one or more instalments is such that the buyer 
can reasonably conclude that the contract would be harmful for him, otherwise he can only 
terminate the contract in respect of the severable part provided that the required conditions of 
23 termination are met in respect of a severable part. The same rule applies to cases where the seller 
has only delivered part of the contract goods; termination of the contract in its entirety is to be 
16 For a detailed discussion see, Chapter Four, Section One, 2.2.2.2., 2.2.2.3. For a detailed discussion about the 
application of the same criterion to breach of severable contracts and delivery of wrong quantity see, ibid., 
2.2.3.1., and, 2.2.3.2., respectively. For the application of s. 30 of the English Sale of Goods Act 1979 to the case 
of delivery of wrong quantity in Shiah law see, Chapter Five, 1.1.3. (Delivery of wrong quantity). 
17 For a detailed discussion of these rules see, Chapter Two, Section One, 2.3.4. 
18 See e. g., Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits (1993 Version), Article 13; Incoterms 1990 
(International Commercial Terms) published by ICC. 
19 See in this respect, Chapter Four, Section One, 2.2.4. 
20 For a detailed discussion see, ibid., 2.2.4.2., 2.2.4.3., and, Chapter Five, 1.1.2. 
21 See, Chapter Four, Section One, 3.2.2. (C), 3.2.3.2., 3.2.3.3., and, 3.2.3.4. 
22 See, ibid., 3.2.5.3. 
23 See, ibid., 3.2.5.1. 
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allowed only where the missing part is such that its absence makes performance of the contract 
harmful for the buyer. 24 
Furthermore, although the jurists have not expressly examined the seller's right to cure, it 
seems to the author that the Convention provisions23 regulating the issue are in principle consistent 
with this system; it accords with general principles and the jurists' arguments that the buyer has 
no right to terminate for mere non-conforming delivery. Accordingly, where termination is 
justified on the theory of serious breach the seller should be given a general right to cure his non- 
conforming delivery. However, a distinction should be made between sales of specific and of 
unascertained goods. In the first case, he should only be allowed to cure his non-conforming 
performance by repair. In contrast, where the contract is for sale of unascertained goods he has a 
right to cure either by delivery of replacement goods or/and by repair. Ile seller should also be 
given the right to re-tender where he has tendered non-conforming documents. The right to cure, 
however, should be subject to the requirements that it could be done without causing the buyer 
unreasonable expense or unreasonable inconvenience. However, cure by the seller beyond the 
contract time depends on the nature of time provision. 26 
As regards the remedy of specific performance, it is subn-dtted that a close examination of 
the main authorities authorising an aggrieved buyer a right to require the seller to perform his 
obligations suggests that specific performance should be regarded as a legal remedy in this legal 
system but not as an absolute remedy applicable in every circumstance, as current ShVah law 
suggeStS27. Giving the buyer the right to obtain specific performance should be assessed according 
to the degree of losses and hardship caused to any party by giving or refusing specific 
performance. Accordingly, where insisting on specific performance is unreasonable in the sense 
that it inflicts a greater loss on the seller in breach than the loss suffered by the buyer for non- 
performance the court should have power to refuse to accept the buyer's application for 
performance and leave him to his remedy of terminating the contract and/or claiming for damages. 
Specific performance has, therefore, no priority over the remedy of termination, as current ShPah 
law suggeStS2', but is one of the remedies available for a buyer who is aggrieved by the seller's 
breach. 29 
24 See, Chapter Four, Section One, 3.2.5.2. 
25 See, Chapter Three, Section One, 3.3. 
26 See, Chapter Four, Section One, 3.2.4., and Chapter Five, 1.3. 
27 Ibid., Section Two, 3.0., (a), (d). 
28 See, ibid., Section One, 3.2.3.4. 
29 See, ibid., Section Two, 3.0., particularly, (d). 
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Having accepted that the buyer has a right to require the seller to perform the contract, it is 
submitted that the Convention provisionS30 entitling the buyer to demand that the seller cure his 
non-conforming delivery by delivery of substitute goods and/or repair are consistent with general 
principles and the authorities authorising the buyer to obtain specific performance. However, it is 
suggested that the right to demand substitute goods should be given only where the lack of 
conformity results in sufficiently serious consequences. But the right to demand cure by repair 
should be available unless it is unreasonable having regard to all the circumstances. 31 
Similarly, despite the jurists' failure to examine 'damages' as a remedy for breach of 
contract, it seems to the writer that an injured party should be given a general right to claim 
damages. This is because awarding damages as a remedy is consistent with general principles the 
jurists have primarily developed in tort cases. 32 Second, it is a commercially vital remedy. Third, 
almost all modem legal systems have adopted damages as a significant remedy, which signifies 
that the rule is an obvious instance of banXt al-uqalff. Accordingly, an injured buyer should be 
given a general right to claim damages for any IOSS33 the seller did actually foresee or could 
reasonably have foreseen as a most likely result of his breach of contract34 and this right can be 
exercised with any of the remedies previously mentioned. According to the language of the general 
principles allowing the buyer to claim damageS, 35 they are to be awarded to compensate the 
injured buyer. This is the main point which distinguishes this remedy from the remedy of price 
reduction. For this reason, unlike the remedy of arsh which is based on the unjust enrichment 
doctrine, an award of damages must be justified on the grounds of loss to the plaintiff and not of 
gains and benefits to the defendant. 36 
As regards the assessment of the recoverable damages under ShPah law, it seems to the 
writer that the English ruleS37 are more compatible with the rules the jurists have developed in tort 
cases. 38 Under this finding, it is suggested that they are basically to be assessed by reference to the 
'difference in value' rule and that this basic rule should be implemented by the 'market price' rule 
where the contract goods have an available market. In the absence of an available market for the 
contract goods, the buyer's damages should be measured by reference to the general principle, 
30 Chapter Three, Section Two, 3.0. 
31 See, Chapter Four, Section Two, 4.0., 5.0., and, Chapter Five, 2.0. 
32 See, ibid., Section Three, 2.2. 
33 See, ibid. 
34 For a detailed discussion of these requirements see, ibid., 2.3.2. 
35 See, ibid., 2.2.2., 2.2.3., and, 2.2.4. 
36 See also, ibid., 3.2.1., and, 3.6. 
37 Chapter Two, Section Three, 2.4. 
38 See, Chapter Four, Section Three, 2.4.1. 
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that is, an estimate of the sum which will place the aggrieved buyer into the same position as if the 
seller had performed the contract rightly. " 
Similarly, although current ShPah law suggests arsh in a very restricted range of 
circumstances, in light of the analysis of the rewdyit authorising the buyer to claim arsh and 
general principles, it seems that arsh should be regarded as a general remedyýo and distinct from 
the right to claim damages4l and that of terminationý2. It should be given to the buyer in any case 
where the seller benefits from his non-conforming delivery at the expense of the buyer. However, 
the right to claim arsh is to be exercised within a reasonable time and should be subject to the 
seller's right to cure the lack of conformity of the goods delivered as described before. 43 
(2) General Balance of the Remedies 
In addition to filling the substantive gaps, this study has also demonstrated that in the general 
balance of the remedies, in ShPah law significance should be given both to damages and specific 
performance. However, damages are to be awarded more easily than specific performance. While 
damages should be awarded for any loss resulting from the seller's breach, specific performance 
is not to be awarded where insisting on it is unreasonable in the sense that it inflicts a greater loss 
on the seller in breach than the loss suffered by the buyer for non-performance. Nevertheless, the 
buyer is not required to show that damages are an inadequate remedy for him or that the subject of 
sale is a unique item which cannot be obtained from another source. It is the seller's duty to show 
that the contract goods are such that alternatives can be obtained from another source, and that 
requiring him to procure and deliver them under the contract would place him in a position worse 
than the buyer would be placed if specific performance is not granted. Likewise, the buyer should 
be given a right to reduce the contract price where the seller has delivered non-conforming goods. 
This remedy is not compensatory, but primarily restitutionary in nature and is designed to prevent 
the seller from unjust enrichment. On this basis, it does not depend on that the seller's breach has 
caused the buyer loss. It will be an efficient remedy particularly where the buyer is not entitled to 
claim damages. In addition to that, although an aggrieved buyer should be given a general right to 
refuse to accept non-conforming delivery, termination of the contract should in principle be 
permitted only where the lack of conformity has resulted in serious breach. 
39 See, Chapter Four, Section Three, 2.4.2. 
40 See, ibid., 3.2.2. 
41 See, ibid., 3.6. 
42 See, ibid., 3.3. 
43 See, ibid., 3.5. 
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At the level of comparison, it seems that Shlah law departs from English law and becomes 
closer to the Convention. In English law primacy is given to damages as a remedy and specific 
performance is rarely awarded as a remedy. In contrast, both ShPah law and the Convention give 
significance both to damages and specific performance. Similarly, while price reduction, as a 
separate remedy, is unknown in English law, both Shilah law and the Convention give the buyer a 
right to reduce the contract price. However, although English law has restricted the right to 
terminate the contract for breach, by developing the "theory of serious breach" and the 1994 Sale 
of Goods Act reforms, it still seems to permit termination more easily than the Convention. 
Nevertheless, ShPah law seems to permit termination more easily than the Convention but less 
easily than English law. Despite this general similarity and difference, an extensive comparison of 
the detailed provisions shows that ShPah law departs from the Convention in some parts and 
becomes closer to English law and vice versa. This shows that neither English law nor the 
Convention could be used as a sole model for ShPah law. In order to make a comprehensive study 
of bang't al-uqalA it is therefore necessary to examine Us undeveloped system in light of 
different well-developed systems of law. 
The most appropriate conclusion to this work must be, very broadly, to underline the fact 
that this comparative study of the buyer's remedies for the seller's non-conforming delivery has 
revealed that although English sale of goods law and the Convention suffer in turn from a 
substantial amount of uncertainty, gaps and uncertainty in the current ShVah law are so 
fundamental that they render this system inappropriate to govem modem sale transactions. The 
only way to adapt this system to the changing circumstances is to reform the method of inferring 
the needed laws. This study is first step to show how this system could work in the modem world 
and how it could be developed. It reveals that if the suggested method is applied it could be 
developed and fill in the gaps and remedy the areas of uncertainty in the law. It is suggested that 
this method could be used in other parts of this system to develop the relevant law. 
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